Dosia Tremain Stewart v. State of Florida

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________

Case No. 5D2025-0614
LT Case No. 2024-101182-CFDB
_____________________________

DOSIA TREMAINE STEWART,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.
_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Karen A. Foxman, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Darnelle Paige Lawshe,
Assisitant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Dosia Tremaine Stewart, Lake City, pro se.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alyssa M.
Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

June 12, 2026

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.
JAY, C.J., and KILBANE, J., concur.
LAMBERT, J., concurs, with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

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Case No. 5D2025-0614
LT Case No. 2024-101182-CFDB

LAMBERT, J., concurring.

Dosia Stewart was convicted, as charged, at trial of
aggravated battery, in violation of section 784.045(1)(a)1., Florida
Statutes (2023), which is a second-degree felony. The jury
separately found that Stewart actually possessed and discharged
a firearm that resulted in great bodily harm. Under these
circumstances, section 775.087(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2023),
permits the reclassification of this second-degree felony to a felony
of the first degree. See Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla.
1991).

Stewart was also prosecuted under what is known as
Florida’s 10-20-Life statute, codified at section 775.087(2), Florida
Statutes. Under section 775.087(2)(a)3., any person convicted of
one of the enumerated felonies listed in the statute, regardless of
whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during
the course of the commission of such felony, such person
discharged a firearm resulting in death or great bodily harm
inflicted upon any person “shall be sentenced to a minimum term
of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term
of imprisonment of life in prison.”

Stewart’s conviction here for aggravated battery is one of the
enumerated felonies under this statute. See § 775.087(2)(a)1.f.,
Fla. Stat. The jury’s specific findings that Stewart actually
possessed and discharged a firearm that resulted in great bodily
harm thus required that he be sentenced to a minimum mandatory
term of imprisonment of twenty-five years up to life.

The trial court orally announced that it was sentencing
Stewart “under 10-20-Life” to serve life in prison. The written
judgment and sentence imposed thereafter shows Stewart’s
sentence on this count to be life in prison, but later includes
Stewart as serving a minimum mandatory term of twenty-five
years under this statute.

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The written judgment is inconsistent with the court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence, which is what controls. See Santiago
v. State, 227 So. 3d 692, 693 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“[W]hen there is
a discrepancy between the written sentence and ‘the oral
pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails.’” (quoting State
v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261, 269 (Fla. 2011))). The trial court never
announced a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence;
rather, it announced a life sentence. And based on the jury’s
express factual findings, a mandatory minimum sentence of life in
prison under the 10-20-Life statute for this first-degree felony is
permitted and is lawful, even though it exceeds the statutory cap
of thirty years for the offense. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat.;
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 742 (Fla. 2010) (holding that
the trial court has the discretion under the 10-20-Life statute to
impose a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life,
even if the mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum
provided for in section 775.082).

In other words, Stewart’s mandatory minimum sentence of
life in prison is lawful. However, a sentence of life in prison with
a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term for this first-degree
felony, as the written judgment here arguably shows, is not. Cf.
Hatten v. State, 203 So. 3d 142, 145 (Fla. 2016) (noting that while
the trial court could have imposed its total forty-year sentence as
a mandatory minimum sentence under the 10-20-Life statute
despite it exceeding the thirty-year maximum for a first-degree
felony under the general sentencing statute, the defendant’s forty-
year sentence with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory
provision is not permitted absent some additional statutory
authority). However, the error in Stewart’s written judgment and
sentence has not been preserved for review.

A second problem exists with the written judgment and
sentence on this count. Stewart stipulated that he qualified for
sentencing as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (“PRR”), and the court
also orally sentenced him as such. Under section 775.082(9), the
portion of Stewart’s sentence being served as a PRR cannot exceed
the statutory cap of thirty years’ imprisonment. Stewart’s written
judgment contains the PRR designation as announced, but it does
not reflect the first thirty years of the sentence as being served as
a PRR. Instead, it shows Stewart serving a life sentence as a PRR

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as well, which is not authorized. Stewart’s counsel noted this error
in passing, but pragmatically observed that any correction in the
written judgment will have no substantive effect on his sentence.

Which, in light of the mandatory minimum life
imprisonment sentence on this count under the 10-20-Life statute,
is true. Moreover, Stewart separately tendered an open, nolo
contendere plea to a count of possession of a firearm by a Violent
Career Criminal, in violation of section 790.235, Florida Statutes,
which is a first-degree felony. Stewart also stipulated that he
qualified under section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes, for
sentencing as a Habitual Felony Offender (“HFO”). The trial court
accepted Stewart’s plea; adjudicated him guilty; and sentenced
Stewart as a HFO to serve life in prison on this count, to be served
concurrently with his mandatory minimum life sentence on count
one for aggravated battery. Stewart’s HFO life imprisonment
sentence is lawful, see § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat.; and no error has
been demonstrated that the trial court’s acceptance of Stewart’s
plea on this count and its resulting sentence were erroneous.

Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s affirmance of
Stewart’s convictions and sentences on both counts but write to
encourage trial courts and counsel to remain vigilant in the
preparation and review of the written judgments and sentences
issued.

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