Florida Public Service Commission native order document 01294-2024

Order No. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EIFlapubserv

Gesamter Gesetzestext

FILED 3/25/2024
DOCUMENT NO. 01294-2024
FPSC - COMMISSION CLERK
BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida
Power & Light Company.
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
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ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
ISSUED: March 25 , 2024
The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter:
APPEARANCES:
MIKE LA ROSA, Chairman
ARTGRAHAM
GARY F. CLARK
ANDREW GILES FAY
GABRIELLA P ASSIDOMO
R. 	WADE 	LITCHFIELD, 	Vice 	President 	and 	General 	Counsel; JOHN 	T.
BURNETT, 	Vice 	President 	and 	Deputy 	General 	Counsel; 	MARIA 	J.
MONCADA, 	Senior 	Attorney, 	and 	CHRISTOPHER 	WRIGHT, 	ESQUIRE,
Florida Power & Light Company, 7 00 Universe Boulevard, Juno Beach, FL
33408
On behalf of Florida Power & Light Company (FPL).
RICHARD 	GENTRY, 	Public 	Counsel; 	PATRICIA 	A. 	CHRISTENSEN,
Associate Public Counsel; ANASTACIA PIRRELLO, Associate Public Counsel;
and CHARLES REHWINKEL, Deputy Public Counsel; Office of Public Counsel,
c/o The Florida Legislature, 111 West Madison Street, Room 8 12 , Talla ha ssee,
Florida 32399-1400
On behalf of Office of the Public Counsel (OPC).
WILLIAM C. GARNER, ESQUIRE, Law Office of William C. Gamer, PLLC,
3425 Bannerman Road, Unit 105 , #414, Tallahassee, FL 32312
On behalf of the CLEO Institute Inc. (CLEO).
ROBERT 	SCHEFFEL 	WRIGHT 	and 	JOHN 	T. 	LAVIA, 	III, 	ESQUIRES,
Gardner, 	Bist, Bowden, Dee, 	LaVia, Wright, Perry 	& 	Harper, 	P.A. , 	1300
Thomaswood Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32308
On behalf of Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. (FAIR).
SCOTT L. KIRK, MAJ, USAF , AF/JAOE-ULFSC, ESQUIRE, 139 Barnes
Drive, Suite 1, Tyndall Air Force Base, FL 32403
On behalf of the Federal Executive Agencies (FEA).
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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PAGE 2
JON C. MOYLE, JR. and KAREN PUTNAL, ESQUIRES, Moyle 	Law 	Firm,
P.A., 118 North Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, FL 32312
On behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG).
FLOYD R. SELF, ESQUIRE, Berger Singerman, LLP, 313 North Monroe Street,
Suite 301, Tallahassee, FL 32301 and T. SCOTT THOMPSON, ESQUIRE,
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., 555 12th Street NW, Suite
1100, Washington, DC 20004
On behalf of Florida Internet & Television Association, Inc. (FIT).
JAMES W. BREW and LAURA WYNN BAKER, ESQUIRES, Stone Mattheis
Xenopoulos & Brew, PC, 1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Eighth Floor, West
Tower, Washington, D.C. 20007
On behalf of Florida Retail Federation (FRF).
BRADLEY 	MARSHALL 	and 	JORDAN 	LUEBKEMANN, 	ESQUIRES,
Earthjustice, 111 S. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., Tallahassee, Florida 32301 and
CHRISTINA I. REICHERT, ESQUIRE, Earthjustice, 4500 Biscayne Blvd., Ste.
201, Miami, Florida 33137
On behalf of Florida Rising, Inc., League of United Latin American Citizens of
Florida, and Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Inc. (Fla. Rising,
LULAC, ECOSWF).
NATHAN A. SKOP, ESQUIRE, 420 NW 50th Boulevard, Gainesville, FL 32607
On behalf of Daniel and Alexandria Larson (Larsons).
GEORGE CAVROS, ESQUIRE, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, 120 E.
Oakland Park Blvd., Suite 105, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33334
On behalf of Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE).
KATIE CHILES OTTENWELLER, ESQUIRE, Southeast Director, Vote Solar,
838 Barton Woods Road, Atlanta, GA 30307
On behalf of Vote Solar.
STEPHANIE U. EATON, ESQUIRE, Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, 110
Oakwood Drive, Suite 500, Winston-Salem, NC 27103
On behalf of Walmart Inc. (Walmart).
SUZANNE S. BROWNLESS, SHAW P. STILLER, and BIANCA LHERISSON,
ESQUIRES, Florida Public Service Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850
On behalf of the Florida Public Service Commission (Staff).
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 3
MARY ANNE HELTON, ESQUIRE, Deputy General Counsel, Florida Public
Service Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-
0850
Advisor to the Florida Public Service Commission.
KEITH C. HETRICK, ESQUIRE, General Counsel, Florida Public Service
Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850
Florida Public Service Commission General Counsel.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINAL ORDER
BY THE COMMISSION:
BACKGROUND
This proceeding is before us on remand from the Florida Supreme Court.1 Before
addressing the substance of this remand, we provide the following brief synopsis of the
procedural history of this matter.
This docket was opened January 11, 2021, when the Florida Power & Light Company
(FPL or Company) filed a letter notifying us that it would file a request for a base rate increase.
On March 12, 2021, FPL filed its petition, minimum filing requirements, and testimony for a
base rate increase effective January 2022. Numerous parties intervened in this docket and
undertook substantial discovery.
One week prior to the scheduled commencement of the final hearing, FPL and several
intervening parties in this docket (Signatories)2 filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement
Agreement, with a copy of the subject Stipulation and Settlement (2021 Settlement). Intervenors
Floridians Against Increased Rates (FAIR), the Environmental Confederation of Southwest
Florida (ECOSWF), Florida Rising, Inc., and League of United Latin American Citizens of
Florida (LULAC) (collectively “Intervenors”) did not join the Agreement and opposed the Joint
Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement.
On September 20, 2021, we conducted a final hearing on FPL’s base rate petition as well
as the Joint Motion for Approval of the 2021 Settlement. On December 2, 2021, we entered a
Final Order Approving 2021 Stipulation and Settlement Agreement.3 On December 9, 2021, we
entered an Ordering Amending that Final Order to correct several non-substantive scrivener’s
1 Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark, 371 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 2023) (referred to hereafter as FAIR).
2 The Office of Public Counsel, Florida Industrial Power Users Group, Florida Retail Federation, and Southern
Alliance for Clean Energy joined the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. On August 24, 2021, FPL filed notice
that additional parties Vote Solar and the CLEO Institute, Inc. had joined in the Agreement. On August 27, 2021,
FPL filed notice that the Federal Executive Agencies had also joined the Agreement.
3 Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI, issued December 2, 2021, in Docket No. 20210015-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Florida Power & Light Company.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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errors relating to dates and references.4 This Order and Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI will be
referred to collectively as “the 2021 Final Order” in this Order. Copies of these Orders are
appended hereto as Attachments A (PSC-2021-0446-S-EI) and B (PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI).
On December 28, 2021, FAIR timely filed an appeal of the 2021 Final Order. On January
3, Florida Rising, ECOSWF and LULAC (collectively “Florida Rising”) timely filed their appeal
of the 2021 Final Order. The Florida Supreme Court consolidated these appeals and, on
September 28, 2023, remanded this matter for further proceedings.
We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Court’s remand and the provisions
of Chapter 120 and Sections 366.04, 366.05, and 366.06, Florida Statutes (F.S.).
SCOPE OF REMAND
The 2021 Final Order that was appealed and remanded addressed the numerous issues
raised by the parties in three groups, described as follows:
[1] standing – whether FAIR’s request to intervene should be granted; [2]
jurisdictional - whether we have the statutory authority to approve proposed rate
recovery mechanisms as part of the 2021 Settlement; and [3] whether the 2021
Settlement should be approved.
As to the first issue group, no party appealed or cross-appealed the issue of FAIR’s standing and,
accordingly, it was not the subject of the Supreme Court’s remand. We are not entering
supplemental findings or conclusions regarding FAIR’s standing, and that section of the 2021
Final Order remains unchanged.
Turning to the second issue group, the Court did not question our statutory authority to
consider the various tools and accounting approaches set forth in the 2021 Settlement.
Appellants raise other arguments in opposition to the Commission's approval of
the 	settlement 	agreement. 	These 	arguments 	include 	challenges 	to 	the
Commission's statutory authority to approve various pieces of the settlement
agreement: 	the 	Storm 	Cost 	Recovery 	Mechanism; 	the 	Reserve 	Surplus
Amortization Mechanism; the Asset Optimization Incentive, which includes the
monetization of renewable energy credits; a corporate tax adjustment; the Solar
Base Rate Adjustment mechanism (SoBRA); a construction incentive for solar
generation sites constructed pursuant to SoBRA; and cost recovery related to the
Green Hydrogen Pilot Program and a consummation payment FPL made to
Jacksonville Electric Authority concerning the retirement of a coal-fired power
generation unit. To the extent any of these challenges to the Commission's
4 Order No. PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI, issued December 2, 2021, in Docket No. 20210015-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Florida Power & Light Company. We will refer to this Order and Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI
collectively as the 2021 Final Order.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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statutory authority is preserved, none gives us a reason to set aside the order under
review.5
Because the Court found our stated bases for jurisdiction to be sufficient, we are not entering
supplemental findings or conclusions regarding our jurisdiction to consider the 2021 Settlement,
and that section of the 2021 Final Order remains unchanged.
The only issue the Court remanded to us is whether the 2021 Settlement should be
approved as being in the public interest.6 The Court neither affirmed nor reversed our prior
conclusion that the 2021 Settlement is in the public interest. The Court did not vacate the 2021
Final Order. Instead, the Court remanded for a further explanation of our approval, directing that
we specifically address certain matters:
That includes considering [A] the competing arguments made by the parties
below in light of [B] the factors relevant to the Commission’s decision, and
supplying, given these arguments and factors, an explanation of how the evidence
presented led to its decision.7
A. Competing Arguments made by the Parties
The Court identified the arguments forwarded by FAIR, LULAC, and ECOSWF as
follows:
1. 	Need for the rate increases in the settlement agreement
2. 	ROE range.
3. 	Equity-to-debt ratio.
4. 	RSAM.
5. 	Rate base investments (SoBRA).
6. 	Pilot programs (electric vehicle chargers, Green Hydrogen, Solar Power
Facilities.
7. 	SolarTogether.
8. 	Minimum bill.
9. 	Extension of time for recovery of retirement costs of certain assets.8
We have thoroughly reviewed Intervenors’ Prehearing Statements and Post Hearing Briefs to
determine if there are any additional disagreements between, or arguments raised by, the parties
that were not specifically identified by the Court. We found six arguments raised before us that
were 	not 	expressly 	mentioned 	in 	the 	above-quoted 	paragraph. 	On 	November 	9, 	2023,
Commission staff conducted an informal meeting with the parties to this docket who were also
5 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 907.
6 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 905 (“[W]e remand this case to the Commission for an explanation of its decision consistent
with the governing law as set forth in our case law and reiterated here.”).
7 FAIR, 371 So. 3d 912.
8 FAIR, 371 So. 3d 908-09.
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parties to the Supreme Court appeal – Intervenors and FPL – and presented the above list of
arguments. These parties agreed to that list with the following additional issues:
10. 	Revenue allocation between classes.
11. 	FPL system overbuilt.
12. 	Storm cost recovery mechanism.
13. 	Federal tax adjustments.
14. 	Incentive mechanism for asset optimization.
15. 	Solar cap cost incentive.
B. Factors Relevant to the Commission’s Decision
The Court identified certain factors that we must consider in this remand when we
address these competing arguments:
The Legislature has provided that the Commission, in “fixing fair, just, and
reasonable rates for each customer class, ... shall, to the extent practicable,
consider the cost of providing service to the class, as well as the rate history,
value of service, and experience of the public utility; the consumption and load
characteristics of the various classes of customers; and public acceptance of rate
structures.” § 366.06(1). The Commission “shall also consider 	the performance
of each utility pursuant to [the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act]
when establishing rates for those utilities over which the commission has
ratesetting authority.” § 366.82(10), Fla. Stat. (2021). A reasonably explained
decision 	from 	the 	Commission 	must 	reflect 	that 	those 	factors 	have 	been
considered to the extent practicable.9
The Court also noted additional factors that we may consider in appropriate circumstances at our
discretion:
[T]he Commission can consider “the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the
facilities provided and the services rendered; the cost of providing such service
and the value of such service to the public; the ability of the utility to improve
such service and facilities; and energy conservation and the efficient use of
alternative energy resources.” § 366.041(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). And the Legislature
has made clear that “it is in the public interest to promote the development of
renewable energy resources in this state.” § 366.91(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). Evidence
that these factors have been considered—where they are germane to determining
whether the settlement agreement is in the public interest and results in rates that
are 	fair, 	just, 	and 	reasonable—permits 	meaningful 	judicial 	review 	of 	the
Commission’s conclusions.
The Commission can also consider non-statutory factors if it explains why they
9 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
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are relevant and how they relate to the Commission’s “historical and statutory
role.” Sierra Club, 243 So. 3d at 911. For example, in the order under review, the
Commission supported its decision by stating that “FPL’s residential 1,000 kWh
bill [is] projected to remain 21% below the current national average” under the
settlement agreement. Assuming that it can explain the relevance of this metric in
light of “the purpose of the Commission,” id., the Commission can permissibly
consider it in making its decision.10
C. 	Procedure and the Record
Citing the Court’s direction that we “shall also consider the performance of each utility
pursuant to [the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act] when establishing rates for
those utilities over which the commission has ratesetting authority”11 and the discretion afforded
us in conducting this remand, FAIR filed a Motion to Reopen the Evidentiary Record on
February 6, 2024. In the Motion, FAIR requests that we reopen the evidentiary record for the
limited and sole purpose of admitting the Annual Report of Activities Pursuant to the Florida
Energy and Conservation Act for 2021 (FEECA Report). FAIR asserts that we must have the
FEECA Report to comply with the Supreme Court’s remand.
FPL filed its response in opposition, arguing first that the existing record on FEECA is
sufficient. FPL submitted prefiled testimony on a number of areas relevant to FEECA. FPL states
that all Intervenors had the opportunity to respond to this testimony, and that several did present
FEECA-related testimony. FPL also notes that virtually all of the documents sought to be
submitted were not in existence when we made our original decision.
The FEECA Report was prepared by us pursuant to Section 366.82(10), F.S., which
provides, in pertinent part, that “[]the commission shall require periodic reports from each utility
and shall provide the Legislature and the Governor with an annual report by March 1 of the goals
it has adopted and its progress toward meeting those goals.”12 The FEECA Report bears an
issuance date of November 2021. The final evidentiary hearing in the base rate case concluded
September 20, 2021. We voted to approve the stipulation and settlement on October 26, 2021.
The FEECA Report was not in existence on either of these dates.
Because we prepared the FEECA Report pursuant to a statutory duty, it may be
admissible in a proceeding in which it is relevant.13 However, the FEECA Report did not exist in
this form until the record in this proceeding was closed and the decision made. We find that it
10 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
12 Pursuant to Section 366.82(6), F.S., we must review the conservation goals of each utility subject to FEECA at
least every five years. We last established conservation goals for FPL in 2019. Order No. PSC-2018-0509-FOF-EG,
issued November 26, 2019, in Docket No. 20190015-EG, In re: Commission review of numeric conservation goals
(Florida Power & Light Company).
13 See Lee v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 698 So. 2d 1194, 1200 (Fla. 1997).
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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would not be appropriate to place documents created post-hearing, post-decision in the record for
purposes of making additional findings.14
Additionally, FAIR’s request would necessitate opening the proceeding to provide FPL
due process,15 leading to a potential procedural morass.
If one side were permitted to produce additional evidence, as suggested . . . , then
the other side would necessarily have to be given the same privilege, and each
side would of necessity have to be given the right of confrontation and cross-
examination of the additional witnesses, and possibly rebuttal. We do not envision
the Administrative Procedures Act as permitting such a never-ending process.16
Because we could not have relied on this evidence when making the original decision, it
would be improper to do so now and admit the FEECA Report. Moreover, granting the Motion
would create numerous fundamental procedural issues. We have in this Supplemental Order
complied with the Florida Supreme Court’s direction that we consider FEECA performance “to
the extent practical.” For all of these reasons, FAIR’s Motion to Reopen the Record is denied.
Citing the same provisions in the FAIR opinion discussed immediately above, Florida
Rising filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on February 7, 2024. While similar to FAIR’s
Motion, Florida Rising seeks broader relief. Florida Rising first requests that we schedule an
evidentiary hearing solely on FPL’s FEECA performance. Alternatively, Florida Rising seeks
to submit the FEECA Reports covering the years 2020, 2021, and 2023. By comparison, FAIR
only sought to submit the 2021 FEECA Report. Florida Rising also seeks to submit the
Demand Side Management (DSM) Reports from FPL for this same, three-year time period.
Finally, 	Florida 	Rising 	seeks 	to 	submit 	data 	compiled 	by 	the 	United 	States 	Energy
Information Agency (EIA) for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022. Florida Rising contends that
we must have this information in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s remand and the
consideration of FPL’s FEECA performance. 	FPL filed its response in opposition, arguing
first that the existing record on FEECA is sufficient. FPL submitted prefiled testimony on a
number of areas relevant to FEECA. FPL states that all Intervenors had the opportunity to
respond to this testimony, and that several did present FEECA-related testimony. FPL also notes
that virtually all of the documents sought to be submitted were not in existence when we made
our original decision.
As to the materials that were not in existence when we made our prior decision and the
request for an evidentiary hearing on those materials, the same analysis applies as set forth
14 Cf. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d 421, 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
(“Official recognition is not a device for agencies to circumvent the hearing officer's findings of fact by building a
new record on which to make new findings.”).
15 See Citizens of State of Fla. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 383 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 1980) (official recognition
“guarantees parties the basic rudiments of procedural due process notice and an opportunity to be heard before
permitting agency action which may affect their vital interests”).
16 Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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immediately above. The request by Florida Rising’s that we reopen the record to consider this
data suffers the same flaws as FAIR’s Motion and is denied for the same reasons.
The EIA information in existence prior to October 2021 and the 2020 FEECA and DSM
Reports were in existence when we made our prior decision. Accordingly, Florida Rising could
have sought to submit them in 2021 when this docket was litigated. No good cause for this
failure is set forth in the Motion.
Allowing 	Florida 	Rising 	to 	submit 	this 	material 	would 	necessitate 	some 	sort 	of
evidentiary hearing to comport with due process. Again, Florida Rising has demonstrated no
cause for us to take the extraordinary step of reopening a rate case to allow the presentation of
evidence that could have been, but was not, introduced at the rate hearing.
The request that we conduct a limited hearing specifically on FEECA is beyond the scope
of this remand. As to the request to submit additional documentary evidence, virtually all of the
evidence Florida Rising seeks to submit for consideration was not in existence at the time we
made the original decision. Because we could not have relied on this evidence when that decision
was made, it would be improper to now admit the various reports cited by Florida Rising (or
have an evidentiary hearing on them). Moreover, granting the Motion would create numerous
fundamental procedural issues. These same procedural concerns apply with equal weight to the
materials proffered by Florida Rising that were in existence when we made our prior decision.
Reopening the record for purposes of admitting these materials would result in, essentially, a
new hearing, when these materials could have been but were not admitted in the original rate
case. For these reasons, we deny Florida Rising’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.
D. 	Conclusion
Consistent with the Court’s direction, we provide below our explanation of how the
evidence presented on the parties’ competing arguments, in light of the identified factors, leads
to our conclusion that approving the 2021 Settlement is in the public interest. We do so based on
the existing record. All aspects of Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI and Order No. PSC-2021-
0446A-S-EI remain unchanged.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
In reviewing a settlement agreement, we first “make[] factual findings based on the
evidence presented by the parties.”17 As the finder of fact, we must “consider all the evidence
presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the
evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based on competent substantial evidence.”18 Each
of those ultimate findings of fact must be based on a preponderance of the record evidence.19 The
Florida Supreme Court defines “preponderance of the evidence” as follows:
17 FAIR¸371 So. 3d at 910.
18 Martuccio v. Dep't of Pro. Regul., Bd. of Optometry, 622 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (citation omitted).
19 Fla. Stat. § 120.57(1)(j).
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The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater
number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most
convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free
the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and
impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.20
Our findings of fact regarding the competing arguments presented by the parties are set forth
below.
Issue 1: The need for the rate increases in the Settlement Agreement.
In the original filing, FPL requested a comprehensive base revenue increase in 2022 of
$1.108 billion, a subsequent year adjustment in 2023 of $607 million, and adjustments in 2024
and 2025 solely for solar generation (discussed below in Issue 5, Solar Base Rate Adjustment).
Capital initiatives account for most of the requested increases in 2022 and 2023, with inflation,
customer growth, and changes in the weighted average cost of capital also affecting to the total.
The capital initiatives include improvements to reliability, upgrades and additions to the
generation fleet, and hardening infrastructure. Id.
The 	2021 	Settlement 	lowers 	the 	rate 	increases 	originally 	proposed 	by 	FPL. 	The
Agreement authorizes FPL to increase its base rates and service charges effective January 1,
2022, to generate an additional $692 million of annual revenue. 	The 2021 Settlement further
authorizes FPL to increase its base rates and service charges effective January 1, 2023, to
generate an additional $560 million of annual revenue.
FAIR asserts that the increase proposed in the 2021 Settlement – the largest (by dollar
amount) in history for an investor-owned Florida utility – imposes rates that are unfair, unjust,
and unreasonable because they exceed the level that FPL needs to fulfill its duty of providing
safe and reliable service at the lowest possible cost. FAIR Witness Herndon testified that FPL
can provide services at its current (2021) rates, and that only modest rate increases during the
term of the 2021 Settlement (Settlement Term) are justified. Florida Rising argues that FPL’s
rate base has quadrupled in sixteen years (2010-2025) and that the current increase in base rates
reflects this continuing overspending pattern.
In support of the need for the requested rate increases, FPL presented testimony that its
2022 test year jurisdictional adjusted ROE is projected to be 8.40 percent. This ROE is below the
bottom of the currently-authorized ROE range. Id. FPL’s projected 2023 jurisdictional ROE is
projected to be 7.03 percent, also below the bottom of FPL’s currently-authorized ranged.
Accordingly, continues FPL, the rate increases are necessary to ensure a fair return within the
authorized range.
FPL notes that the base rate increases in the 2021 Settlement represent a $383 million
reduction from FPL’s original request for 2022 base rates, and a $45 million reduction from the
20 S. Fla. Water Mgmt. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So. 3d 869, 872 n.1 (Fla. 2014).
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request for 2023.21 FPL argues that even with the rate increases set forth in the 2021 Settlement,
its typical residential customer bills remain twenty percent below the national average, and will
remain stable and predictable over the Settlement Term.
The common theme among Intervenors’ arguments is that FPL can provide reliable
service to its customers at a far lower cost than requested in the 2021 Settlement. FPL’s response
is that the entire financial and capital structure it has proposed – including the base rate increases
– is necessary for it to continue providing current levels of service and value at a reasonable cost.
Virtually all of the operative provisions of the 2021 Settlement and the projects that are
being placed into rate base are not new.22 With the exception of the Pilot Programs discussed
below under Issue 7 and the minimum bill, every mechanism in the 2021 Settlement is a
continuation, expansion, or modification of a prior approval. The requested debt to equity ratio is
unchanged. Because FPL is continuing an existing path, we first examine existing rates and
utility operations. While we must pass on each proposal on its merits on the record before us, an
examination of utility performance under prior approvals can educate our decision-making.
In making this observation, we are guided by Section 366.06(1), F.S.:
In fixing fair, just, and reasonable rates for each customer class, the commission
shall, to the extent practicable, consider the cost of providing service to the class,
as well as the rate history, value of service, and experience of the public utility;
the consumption and load characteristics of the various classes of customers; and
public acceptance of rate structures.
In this same statute, the Legislature has directed us to “consider the cost of providing service to
the class, as well as . . . the value of service.”23 Because Chapter 366, Florida Statutes, does not
define “cost” or “value,” we look to dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain and ordinary
meaning of “cost” and “value.” 24 “Cost” is defined as “the amount or equivalent paid or charged
for something.” 25 “Value” is defined as “relative worth, utility, or importance.”26
21 The solar adjustments in 2024 and 2025 were not changed by the 2021 Settlement.
22 We need not discuss the prudence of every project being placed into rate base in determining whether a settlement
agreement is in the public interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable. See Sierra Club v. Brown,
243 So. 3d 903, 911-12 (Fla. 2018).
23 Fla. Stat. § 366.06(1) (emphasis added).
24 Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 891–92 (Fla. 2022).
25 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cost, last checked 01/31/24.
26 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/value, last checked 01/19/24. Some common definitions of “value”
are virtually the same as “cost.” However, assigning both terms the same definition and treating them as the same
would not be consistent with the legislative directive that we consider cost as well as value. Moreover, courts have
cautioned against ascribing the same meaning to two different terms when the legislature uses them in the statute.
“The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different
meanings were intended.” Department of Business Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1984).
The placement of “value” in this statute between two retrospective terms – “rate history” and “experience of the
public utility” – directs us to make an examination of the relative value of past service a part of our inquiry.
Additionally, the Legislature’s use of the phrase “the value of such service to the public” in a different statute also
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The evidence in this record demonstrates that FPL has delivered value to its customers at
a relatively low cost. Residential rates remain well below the national average27 and below those
charged by other Florida investor-owned-utilities. The capabilities of the FPL fleet, while
characterized by Florida Rising as “overbuilt,” result in lower operation and maintenance
expenses and a high degree of reliability28 while maintaining relatively low base rates. And while
FAIR Witness Mac Mathuna offered an expert opinion that FPL could deliver this same reliable
and safe service at lower rates than those requested in the 2021 Settlement, we find more
persuasive the evidence presented by FPL that the rate increases proposed in the 2021 Settlement
Agreement are needed to maintain an ROE in the authorized range, are based on a sound analysis
of current and projected conditions in light of historical performance, and result in rates that are
fair, just, and reasonable. 29 We also note that these amounts were reduced from the original ask
and are the result of compromise among the Signatories.
Issue 2: Return on Equity Range
The 2021 Settlement sets the regulatory return on common equity (ROE) at 10.6 percent
for all purposes, with an authorized ROE range of 9.7 percent to 11.7 percent. This range is 90
basis points below the request contained in FPL’s original rate filing. If, at any time during the
Term, but no more than once during the Term, the average 30-year United States Treasury Bond
yield rate for any period of six consecutive months is at least 50 basis points greater than the
yield rate on the date that the 2021 Settlement is filed with the Commission (Trigger), after filing
notice with the Commission, FPL’s authorized ROE shall be increased by 20 basis points to be
within a range of 9.8 percent to 11.8 percent, with a mid-point of 10.8 percent. 	This rate shall
remain in effect from the Trigger date through the remainder of the Term, for any period in
which FPL’s rates continue in effect after December 31, 2025, and/or until a final order is issued
in a future proceeding changing FPL’s rates and its authorized ROE.
Florida Rising contends that this ROE is out-of-step with national trends. Citing the
testimony of OPC Witness Woolridge, Florida Rising notes that the average authorized ROE for
electric companies from 2000-2020 have slowly decreased from 12.5 percent to 9.39 percent.
Florida Rising also notes that we approved a 9.85 percent ROE mid-point for Duke Energy
Florida30 and 9.95 percent for Tampa Electric Company31 in rate cases filed the same calendar
year as FPL’s.32
addressing rates and the “efficiency” of facilities” reinforces our conclusion that our inquiry is to include overall
utility performance beyond cost.
27 FPL residential bills are 40 percent below the average of the 20 largest (by number of customers) investor-owned
utilities in the country.
28 FPL’s reliability is 58 percent better than the national average.
29 FPL Witness Bores identified the drivers of the increased revenue requirement behind the requested rate increases
for 2022 and 2023. Each of these drivers that has been specifically contested by Intervenors is discussed in the
section of this Order under the specific issue headings.
30 Order No. PSC-2021-0202-AS-EI, issued June 4, 2021, in Docket No. 20210016-EI, In re: Petition for Limited
Proceeding to Approve 2021 Settlement Agreement, Including General Base Rate Increase, by Duke Energy
Florida, LLC.
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FAIR argues that a fair and reasonable ROE for FPL would be between 8.50 percent and
9.55 percent, depending on the corresponding capital structure (equity to debt ratio). FAIR
Witness Mac Mathuna’s ultimate conclusion is “that the fair and reasonable ROE for FPL should
be set at 8.56 percent and that FPL’s equity ratio should be set at 55.4 percent for purposes of
setting FPL’s revenue requirements for 2022.”33
FPL argues that its infrastructure risk profile is higher than most other utilities and that a
higher ROE is necessary to attract investment due to this volatility. One aspect of this risk is
created by Florida’s geography and FPL’s territory. FPL territory includes much of the west and
east coasts of Florida peninsula and now encompasses the former Gulf territory in the
westernmost portions of the state’s panhandle. This expanse of low-lying coastline makes FPL’s
territory especially vulnerable in the short term to tropical storm impacts and in the long-term to
the effects of sea level rise. Based on current climate predictions, this risk is expected to
increase. Additionally, nearly 40 percent of FPL’s customer accounts – 5.6 million – are located
at the southern tip of the state in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, the geography of which
heightens transmission and reliability challenges.
Nuclear generation comprises 22 percent of FPL’s energy mix. Investors perceive risk
with such generation, and this increased risk perception in turn requires a higher return to
encourage investment.
In support of the as-filed request, FPL Witness Coyne testified that an ROE in the range
of 10.5 to 11.5 percent would be reasonable based upon his cost of equity analyses. In reaching
this conclusion, Witness Coyne used four modeling methodologies “to provide a robust
analytical framework for determining FPL’s ROE without the undue influence of any single
approach or set of assumptions.”34 Witness Coyne also testified that these models and their
results should be examined in the context of current and projected market conditions. The global
outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and the measures taken to address it had an
immediate and drastic effect on the 2020 economy. Higher volatility and uncertainty is expected
to persist. According to Witness Coyne, actions the Federal Reserve has taken to address these
market uncertainties and stimulus packages being considered by the United States Congress may
increase inflation and cause interest rates to spike. Witness Coyne supports the lower ROE set
forth in the 2021 Settlement Agreement, though lower than what he recommended, stating that it
“is within the reasonable range” established by his comprehensive modeling methodologies.
Witness Barrett’s prefiled testimony sets forth in detail FPL’s ability to meet the
unprecedented challenges posed by effects of the global outbreak of COVID-19 based on its
financial position. Witness Barrett also testified regarding FPL’s continued financial strength
31 Order No. PSC-2021-0423-S-EI, issued November 10, 2021, in Docket No. 20210034-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Tampa Electric Company.
32 We have long recognized that the ROE we approve for one company does not mandate that we approve a similar
ROE for a different company. See United Telephone Co. v. Mayo, 345 So. 2d 648, 654 (Fla. 1977).
33 T. Vol. 12 at 2594.
34 T. Vol. 9 at 2082.
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during the recent volatility of utility investments. “FPL’s successful financing contrasts with
other, lower credit issuers, who attempted to raise debt but ultimately had to pull their issuances
from the market or saw significant higher spreads.”35
The Florida Supreme Court wrote as follows regarding general considerations applicable
to establishing the boundaries of an appropriate ROE range:
The rate of return which public utility companies may be allowed to earn is a
question of vital importance to both rate payers and investors. An inadequate
return 	may 	prevent 	satisfactory 	services 	to 	the 	public 	and 	concomitantly
disappoint investors who will look for alternative sources of investment. The
Public Service Commission is given the power to fix the return within certain
limits. That return cannot be set so low as to confiscate the property of the utility,
nor can it be made so high as to provide greater than a reasonable rate of return,
thereby prejudicing the consumer. 36
In fixing a reasonable rate of return within this range, we are guided by the long-established
Hope 	and 	Bluefield 	standard.37 	Under 	this 	standard, 	a 	reasonable 	return 	is 	one 	that 	is
commensurate with the return investors would expect from like investments of comparable risk,
is reasonably sufficient to assure investor confidence that the utility is financially sound, and is
adequate to attract capital on reasonable terms.38
Regarding comparable risk, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that FPL’s
infrastructure risk profile is different from most utilities, including those in the various proxy
groups.39 Especially with the acquisition of Gulf, FPL’s territory includes appreciable expanses
of low-lying coastline that bring inherent risk. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates
that this risk is likely to continue to increase over time due to storm frequency and severity as
well as sea-level rise. Additionally, FPL faces investor uncertainty due to the perceived risks of
nuclear-fueled energy. FPL must have an adequate ROE in order to attract capital on reasonable
terms throughout a multi-year rate plan.
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the Company’s overall capital
structure has contributed to its ability to provide customers reliable service at reasonable rates
while weathering tropical and financial storms. Continuing this strong capital structure can
assure investors that the utility is financially sound, which in turn benefits all customers by
attracting capital on reasonable terms.
35 T. Vol. 10 at 2258.
36 United Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Mayo, 345 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 1977).
37 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Bluefield Water Works and Improvement
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
38 Hope, 320 U.S. at 603; Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 692-93.
39 The proxy groups also include both vertically integrated utilities that own generation assets, like FPL, and utilities
that own no such assets (transmission and distribution utilities). Vertically integrated utilities have a higher business
risk.
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Based on this record, we conclude that a regulatory ROE of 10.6 percent for all purposes,
with an authorized ROE range of 9.7 percent to 11.7 percent, as set forth in the 2021 Settlement,
is appropriate and in the public interest. We note that if the United States Treasury Bond yield
meets the specified thresholds and this ROE is increased from 9.8 percent to 11.8 percent, base
rates will not increase.
FAIR, Florida Rising, and FPL presented the testimony of numerous, well-qualified
experts on this issue.40 Our ultimate determination rests in large part on the relative weight we
have afforded the opinions of these experts. “[A] ‘battle of the experts’ has become the norm in
modern trials. Courts must resolve the issues upon which the experts differ; that is their job in the
absence of a jury, no matter how difficult or complex the issue becomes.” 41 The finder of fact “is
free to weigh the opinion testimony of expert witnesses, and either accept, reject or give that
testimony such weight as it deserves considering the witnesses' qualifications, the reasons given
by the witness for the opinion expressed, and all the other evidence in the case, including lay
testimony.” 42 In a prior case involving “a divergence of expert opinion as to the proper rate of
return to be granted,” the Florida Supreme Court specifically held that “[i]t is the Commission’s
prerogative to evaluate the testimony of competing experts and accord whatever weight to the
conflicting opinions it deems appropriate.”43
While all witnesses on these issues are extremely qualified in their areas of expertise and
provided comprehensive analyses and well-reasoned conclusions based on the facts in this
record, we find the testimony of FPL Witnesses Coyne and Barrett in this record to be more
persuasive. Accordingly, we afford their testimony greater weight than the testimony offered by
the other experts in making our specific findings and reaching our conclusions regarding both
ROE and equity to debt ratio (discussed immediately below).
Issue 3: Equity to Debt Ratio
FPL proposes an equity ratio of 59.6 percent. This equity ratio is higher than the ratios we
approved for TECO (54 percent)44 and DEF (53 percent)45 and above the average for the
operating companies in the proxy group.46 Florida Rising argues that there is no record evidence
to support a higher ratio for FPL, and argues that our approval should be in the range of 50-55
40 We have also reviewed and weighed the testimony relied upon by FAIR and Florida Rising that had been prefiled
by OPC prior to entering the 2021 Settlement.
41 Rossi v. Brown, 581 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
42 Wald v. Grainger, 64 So. 3d 1201, 1205 (Fla. 2011); see also Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35
So. 3d 84, 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“[T]he finder of fact is free to determine the reliability and credibility of expert
opinions and, if conflicting, to weigh them as the finder sees fit.”).
43 Mayo, 345 So.2d at 654.
44 Order No. PSC-2021-0423-S-EI, issued November 10, 2021, in Docket No. 20210034-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Tampa Electric Company.
45 Order No. PSC-2021-0202-AS-EI, issued June 4, 2021, in Docket No. 20210016-EI, In re: Petition for Limited
Proceeding to Approve 2021 Settlement Agreement, Including General Base Rate Increase, by Duke Energy
Florida, LLC.
46 OPC Witness Woolridge calculated an average ratio of 44.5 percent using his proxy group and an average of 45.4
percent using FPL Witness Coyne’s proxy group.
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percent. FAIR Witness Mac Mathuna’s ultimate conclusion is “that the fair and reasonable ROE
for FPL should be set at 8.56 percent and that FPL’s equity ratio should be set at 55.4 percent for
purposes of setting FPL’s revenue requirements for 2022.”47
FPL’s proposed equity ratio of 59.6 percent is consistent with the ratios we have
approved for FPL over the past twenty years. The preponderance of the evidence in this record
supports continuing this ratio. As discussed above, we find that FPL has a unique risk profile,
and the equity to debt ratio is part of FPL’s overall strategy to maintain financial strength and
flexibility.
Many of Intervenors’ factual arguments with respect to the equity to debt ratio mirror
those with respect to the ROE. The remainder are variations on a common theme: that is, the
combination of the equity ratio and ROE produce rates that are not fair, just, and reasonable. For
the reasons discussed in this Order, we reach the contrary conclusion and find that the capital
structure works as part of the 2021 Settlement Agreement as a whole to further the public interest
and result in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 4: Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism (RSAM)
As part of its original filing in this docket, FPL submitted a depreciation study performed
by FPL Witness Allis. Based on the application of the parameters resulting from FPL’s 2021
Depreciation Study, Witness Allis concluded that FPL had a “theoretical reserve imbalance of
$437 million.” Put plainly, the analysis estimated that FPL had under-collected from its
ratepayers, and had a $437 million theoretical reserve deficit as a result. Witness Allis explained
his conclusion and its import as follows:
The terms “correct” or “incorrect” and the precision or exactness that they imply
have no application in this context; rather, the theoretical reserve is an estimate at
any given point in time based on the current plant balances and current life and
net salvage estimates. It can provide a benchmark of a Company’s reserve
position, but it should not be thought of as the “correct” reserve amount. 48
FPL then performed an alternative depreciation analysis using increased plant lives for
the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (60 years to 80 years), all combined cycle generating plants (40 years
to 50 years), and all solar generating plants (30 years to 35 years). For transmission, distribution,
and general plant functions, FPL adopted the lives and/or net salvage values from “either the
2016 FPL Rate Settlement or FPL witness Allis’ 2021 Depreciation Study whichever results in
longer lives and/or higher net salvage.”49 Using the alternative depreciation parameters, FPL has
a theoretical depreciation reserve surplus of $1.45 billion.
A preponderance of the evidence supports use of the alternative depreciation parameters.
The St. Lucie Nuclear Plant extension is based on a reasonable expectation that the license
47 T. Vol. 12 at 2594.
48 T. Vol. 3 at 730-31.
49 T. Vol. 4 at 751.
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renewal to be filed in 2021 will be granted. The Company has a record of above-average plant
performance, plant upgrades, and plans for the potential utilization of green hydrogen, all of
which support extending the life of its combined cycle facilities from 40 years to 50 years.
Recent data indicate that a 35-year life for solar facilities is feasible.
Whereas 	the 	theoretical 	reserve 	imbalance 	from 	the 	original 	depreciation 	study
represented an under-collection, the reserve amount resulting from utilization of the alternative
depreciation parameters represents an over-collection from the ratepayers. The RSAM is the
accounting tool that governs FPL’s use of this reserve amount. Under the RSAM, FPL uses the
reserve amount to absorb revenues and expenses such that it maintains a return on equity within
its approved range. The Company records the increases and decreases in expenses that have been
addressed by the RSAM in its surveillance reports.
The RSAM operates under numerous conditions and limitations. The amount to be
amortized is capped at $200 million in 2022, but is discretionary with FPL for each year
thereafter. 	Amortization in each year of the Settlement Term is subject to the following
conditions: (1) for any surveillance reports submitted by FPL in which its 12-month period ROE
would otherwise fall below the bottom of the authorized range, FPL must amortize at least the
amount necessary to maintain an ROE of at least the bottom of the authorized range; (2) FPL
may not amortize an amount that would result in an ROE greater than the top of the authorized
range for any 12-month period; and (3) FPL must debit depreciation expense and credit
depreciation reserve in order not to exceed the top of its authorized range. Any unfunded storm
reserve balance must be depleted prior to using the funded reserve to recover storm costs.
During the Term, FPL must use all of its Reserve Amount to increase its ROE above the bottom
of the ROE range before it may initiate a petition to increase base rates.
Florida Rising contends that we should not allow FPL to use the RSAM at its discretion
because the Company has earned at the top of its regulatory range since the original adoption of
the RSAM, and that such a return is not fair and reasonable. FAIR agrees with Florida Rising,
and further argues that the RSAM provisions in the 2021 Settlement allow the transfer of a
customer-created reserve to FPL investors via earnings at the top of the authorized range. FAIR
argues that the RSAM should be limited in its application to those situations where FPL must
utilize it to stay at the midpoint of its authorized range, and should not be available to earn above
the midpoint.
FPL counters that the RSAM is essential for the Company to implement a four-year rate
plan without the need to seek a change in rates. The RSAM allows the Company to address
unexpected situations and changes in circumstances.
The RSAM has been in place since 2013 and has been a key to FPL implementing multi-
year rate terms and avoiding multiple rate cases. During the most recent period (2017-2020)
when FPL was operating under the 2016 Settlement, FPL was able to employ the RSAM to react
to the 2017 Tax Reform and Jobs Act and address the unprecedented impacts related to the
COVID pandemic without seeking a rate change. Even with those unexpected events, FPL was
able to extend the term under its 2016 Settlement such that the rate increases sought here are
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effective January 2022 instead of January 2021. The RSAM has provided this degree of rate
stability since 2013. We find such rate stability, especially when accompanied by the low base
rates as detailed in this Order, to be in the public interest.50
Intervenors also argue that the RSAM is a financial tool that is essentially a “slush fund”
used by FPL to maintain earnings at the top of its range, and that such an application of this
mechanism is not in the public interest. The RSAM is used to respond to events and expenses not
anticipated in the normal course of business. Day-to-day utility operations are generating
revenues, and the combination of any number of factors in those operations can result in higher
(or lower) earnings.51 The RSAM can (and does) serve as a tool to address the unexpected as
FPL implements its plans over time. In that manner, the RSAM may indirectly contribute to
higher earnings.
Issue 5: Rate base investments – SoBRA
The 2021 Settlement authorizes FPL to construct 1,788 megawatts (MW) of solar
facilities projected to go into service in 2024 and 2025 or within one year following expiration of
the minimum term. These projects are subject to an installed cost cap of $1,250 per kilowatt of
AC power (kWAC ) , less the cost of any land component allocated to such projects when the land
is already included in rate base as Plant Held for Future Use. If leased land is used to construct a
project, the lease expense will be converted to a capital cost surrogate in accordance with our
precedent and used to measure performance against the $1,250 per kWAC price cap.
FPL is authorized to make Solar Base Rate Adjustments (SoBRA) during the Settlement
Term to recover the costs of these projects. FPL must file a request for cost recovery approval of
the subject solar generation project in the Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Recovery Clause in
the year before that project goes into service. In that proceeding, we will consider whether FPL’s
cumulative present value of revenue requirements (CPVRR) 52 is lower with the generation
project than without, and will also determine the associated adjustments to rates and riders.
For each solar project that is approved for cost recovery, FPL’s base rates will be
increased 	by 	the 	incremental 	annualized 	base 	revenue 	requirement 	(excluding 	any 	land
component that is already included in base rates as Plant Held for Future Use) for the first 12
months of operation, but such recovery will not commence before the entire solar project is in
service. 	Battery storage can be paired with the solar projects so long as the total cost remains
below the $1,250 per kWAC cap and the project is cost effective.
50 Long-term rate stability and the resulting avoidance of the cost and expense of multiple rate cases as beneficial to
ratepayers. See, e.g., Order No. PSC-01-0759-FOF-SU, issued March 26, 2001, in Docket No. 9709910SU, In re:
Investigation into Rates and Charges of Florida Cities Water Co. – Lee Division (South Ft. Myers Wastewater
System) for Potential Overearnings.
51 For instance, “FPL’s non-fuel O&M expense per customer and per MWh in 2019 were best in the nation by a
wide margin.”
52 CPVRR means the total amount of revenue over the relevant term needed to cover capital and other expenses,
operations and maintenance, depreciation, and the regulatory return on equity, discounted to present value.
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Florida Rising contends that we are without authority to approve this mechanism for two
reasons. First, Florida Rising argues that to approve future rate increases based on planned
construction of solar facilities violates Section 366.06, F.S. Second, Florida Rising argues that
interim rate increases are allowed under Section 366.07, F.S., only upon a showing by the utility
that it is not earning within its range of return. The gist of both arguments is Florida Rising’s
contention that we must conduct a hearing and make an appropriate determination at the time we
allow interim rate hikes, and that to do so in advance violates the cited statutes and is illegal.
The Florida Supreme Court did not remand this matter for us to reconsider our authority
to approve the SoBRA mechanism. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to whether approval of
this mechanism is in the public interest in light of the factors identified by the Court in its
remand.
The SoBRA mechanism was contained in the settlement agreements that we approved to
resolve the FPL rate cases in both 2012 and 2016. 53 This 	mechanism 	allows 	FPL 	to 	increase
cost-effective solar incrementally over a defined period, with concurrent, gradual increases to
rate base. Implementation of the SoBRA-based solar program has provided savings to customers
while bringing a considerable number of solar projects into service. This increase in solar
generation furthers Section 366.91(6), F.S., which provides:
The Legislature finds that it is in the public interest to promote the development
of renewable energy resources in this state. Renewable energy resources have the
potential to help diversify fuel types to meet Florida’s growing dependency on
natural gas for electric production, minimize the volatility of fuel costs, encourage
investment within the state, improve environmental conditions, and make Florida
a leader in new and innovative technologies.
The opportunity for FPL to add solar generation during the Settlement Term furthers legislative
intent to promote the development of renewable energy resources, to diversify the types of fuel
used to generate electricity, and to improve environmental conditions. The rate increases that
accompany the addition of this generation are gradual and predictable, thereby supporting rate
stability over the Term.
Issue 6: SolarTogether expansion
We approved the SolarTogether program (Phase I) the year before this rate case was filed
by Order No. PSC-2020-0084-S-EI.54 This Order approved a Settlement Agreement executed by
FPL, the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Vote Solar, and Walmart, Inc., and supported by
amicus curiae Duke Energy Florida, LLC. Generally stated, SolarTogether is a voluntary
program that provides FPL customers the opportunity to subscribe to a portion of new solar
53 Order No. PSC-13-0023-S-EI, issued January 14, 2013, in In re Petition for Increase in Rates by Florida Power &
Light Co.; Order No. PSC-16-0560-AS-EI, issued December 15, 2016, in In re Petition for Rate Increase by Florida
Power & Light Co.
54 Order No. PSC-2020-0084-S-EI, issued March 20, 2020, in Docket No. 20190061-EI, In re: Petition for approval
of FPL SolarTogether program and tariff by Florida Power & Light Company.
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capacity built through the program by paying a subscription charge. This subscription charge (or
fee) reflects the revenue requirement associated with constructing the solar facilities, and is
recorded by FPL in base revenues as sales from electricity. Those participants will receive a
subscription credit representing a portion of the system savings produced by that solar capacity.
The credit will be recovered through the Fuel Clause.
The original approved size of the program (Phase I) is 1,490 MW, consisting of 20
individual solar power plants sized at 74.5 MW each. The 1,490 MW capacity is allocated 75
percent (1,117.5 MW) to commercial, industrial, and governmental customers and 25 percent
(372.5 MW) to residential and small business. Customers may elect a subscription level
equivalent to the capacity that would generate up to 100 percent of their previous 12 months’
total kilowatt-hour usage, subject to capacity availability. Participation in the Program is
voluntary. The 1,490 MW of solar generation is projected to save customers $249 million. FPL
estimates that 55 percent of the projected program benefits will flow to participants and 45
percent to the general body of customers.
The 2021 Settlement55 proposes to expand the program by an additional 1,788 MW at
FPL’s discretion through 2025 such that the total capacity of SolarTogether would equal 3,278
MW. 	The 1,788 MW of incremental capacity will be allocated 40 percent to residential and
small business customers (45 MW reserved for low-income participants) and 60 percent
allocated to commercial, industrial, and governmental (20 percent of this commercial, industrial,
and governmental capacity is reserved for participants located in the former Gulf territory). The
allocation of benefits remains the same at 55 percent to participants and 45 percent to the general
body of customers. The program is designed such that participants will receive 55 percent of the
program benefits ($357 million), realizing full pay-back of their subscription fees by year 7,
while paying 103.26 percent of the program’s revenue requirements. The general body of
ratepayers will receive 45 percent ($292 million) of the program benefits and pay no subscription
fee. Of this amount, $95 million is fixed.56
Florida Rising contends that the program allocations in the program, as modified in the
2021 Settlement’ are discriminatory in that they do not match actual power consumption by FPL
customers. Specifically, Florida Rising notes that residential consumption makes up 63 percent
of FPL energy sales, yet residential customers are allocated less than that share in the current
proposal. Another feature of the SolarTogether program contested by Florida Rising involves the
calculation of credits to those who participate in the program and benefits to the general body of
ratepayers. Specifically, Florida Rising contends that the benefits to participants are much greater
than those realized by non-participants, and are subsidized by the general body of ratepayers.
Finally, Florida Rising also argues that FPL’s projections are skewed and SolarTogether is not a
cost-effective way in which to construct the planned solar.
55 We note that the Office of Public Counsel and Florida Industrial Power Users Group opposed our original
approval of SolarTogether and contested the proposed settlement in 2020, but are signatories to the 2021 Settlement
Agreement and do not oppose the expanded program.
56 This amount is included in the difference between 100 percent of base revenue requirements for the program and
the amount paid by participants (103.26 percent) over the life of the program.
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FPL’s overarching response to the specific arguments regarding the cost-effectiveness of
SolarTogether is that the costs and benefits must be examined (1) over the life of the program
and (2) as compared to the costs and benefits of continuing to construct non-solar power
generation facilities. Over its life, the SolarTogether extension alone is projected to provide $425
million of CPVRR savings compared to the same time period without SolarTogether. Coupled
with the 2020 SolarTogether (Phase I) approval, the total CPVRR for the program is projected to
be $648 million. FPL estimates 55 percent of the projected benefits will flow to participants and
45 percent to the general body of customers.
Our initial approval of SolarTogether by Order No. PSC-2020-0084-S-EI expressly
contemplates 	the 	possibility 	of 	FPL 	proposing 	an 	“FPL 	SolarTogether 	Phase 	II.”57 	The
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that this expansion of SolarTogether is cost-
effective and in the public interest.
FPL used the same cost-effectiveness analysis for this expansion as it did for the original
program. This analysis basically compares the FPL fleet with and without the additional
proposed solar generation, and supports the conclusion that the total CPVRR of the extended
program is $648 million. Witness Bores convincingly demonstrated that the calculations offered
by Florida Rising in support of their claim of an unduly discriminatory rate structure were based
on a flawed assumption. We find the comprehensive analysis performed over the life of the
extended SolarTogether program under the direction of FPL Witness Bores and its conclusion
regarding CPVRR benefits to be more persuasive than mathematical snapshots offered by
Florida Rising as impeachment of that analysis.
Further, we find the allocation of 55 percent of these projected benefits to participants
and 45 percent to the general body of customers to be in the public interest and, as discussed
below, to be part of a framework that results in fair, just, and reasonable rates. We also find that
SolarTogether fairly distributes the new solar generation among classes, with Phase II increasing
availability 	for 	residential 	and 	small 	business 	customers. 	Because 	SolarTogether 	fairly
distributes generation and benefits among ratepayers, we reject Florida Rising’s argument that
the program is unduly discriminatory.
Finally, as discussed below in the Public Interest section of this Order, our approval of
Phase II of SolarTogether serves “the public interest to promote the development of renewable
energy resources in this state.”58
Issue 7: Pilot programs
Approval of the 2021 Settlement Agreement authorizes several pilot programs, three of
which are challenged by Intervenors as set forth below.
57 Order at 10, Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ⁋ 4(e).
58 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(6).
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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Electric vehicle chargers
The Settlement Agreement authorizes six programs related to electric vehicles (EVs): (1)
EVolution, a program to gather data and better plan for and design future EV investments ($30
million); (2) public fast charging program, designed to place utility-owned public EV fast
charging 	stations 	($100 	million); 	(3) 	residential 	EV 	charging 	services 	pilot, 	providing
opportunity for residential customers to have an EV charger installed, owned, operated, and
maintained by FPL ($25 million); (4) commercial EV charging services pilot, providing
opportunity for commercial customers to pay a fixed monthly charge for EV charging services
via Company-owned, operated, and maintained equipment for fleet vehicles ($25 million); (5)
new technologies and software, designed to evaluate emerging electric technologies and enhance
service and resiliency for customers ($20 million); and (6) education and awareness, a suite of
programs including school curriculums, promotion at conferences and gathering, and providing
resources about electric options ($5 million). The EVolution program was presented by FPL in
its original request and direct testimony. The other five programs were added by the 2021
Settlement.
The 2021 Settlement Agreement authorizes FPL to implement and recover the costs
associated with these EV programs. Pursuant to the 2021 Settlement, only the reasonableness of
amounts actually expended may be challenged. 	The cost of the infrastructure of the EV
programs, including the installation and removal costs, are included in the jurisdictional rate base
until recovered from customers. This total cost is estimated at $205 million over the Term, with
certain offsets expected. Customer pricing for the commercial EV pilot is designed to recover all
costs and expenses over the life of the assets and to be CPVRR neutral to the general body of
ratepayers over the Term. The revenue requirements of the public fast charging program will be
partially offset by revenue received under FPL’s tariff approved in Docket No. 20200170-EI,
which establishes a rate for utility-owned public EV fast charging stations.
Florida Rising contends that these EV charging costs do not belong in rate base because
they do not generate or provide electricity to the general body of customers and are not supported
by any cost-benefit analysis.
Beginning in 1995 and continuing through the present, we have approved pilot EV
programs for several Florida public utilities, including FPL.59 While each program differs in
detail, they all serve the same general public interest goals.
59 Order No. PSC-95-0853-FOF-EG, issued July 17, 1995, in Docket No. 950517-EG, In re: Petition for Approval of
New Experimental Electric Vehicle Tariff by Tampa Electric Company; Order No. PSC-17-0178-S-EI, issued May
16, 2017, in Docket No. 160170-EI, In re: Petition for approval of 2016 depreciation and dismantlement studies,
approval of proposed depreciation rates and annual dismantlement accruals and Plant Smith Units 1 and 2
regulatory asset amortization, by Gulf Power Company; Order No. PSC-2017-0451-AS-EU, issued November 20,
2019, in Docket No. 20170183-EI, In re: Application for limited proceeding to approve 2017 second revised and
restated settlement agreement, including certain rate adjustments, by Duke Energy Florida, LLC; Order No. PSC-
2020-0512-TRF-EI, issued December 21, 2020, in Docket No. 20200170-EI, In re: Petition for approval of optional
electric vehicle public charging pilot tariffs, by Florida Power & Light Company; and Order No. PSC-2021-0144-
PAA-EI, issued April 21, 2021, in Docket No. 20200220-EI, In re: Petition for approval of electric vehicle charging
pilot program, by Tampa Electric Company.
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As we have in those prior dockets, we find that understanding the impacts EVs will have
on the local grid is in the public interest. The programs proposed by FPL are an effective means
of gathering this information.60 Specifically, as EV ownership increases, utilities must increase
their awareness of the impacts of EV charging on grid reliability and customer usage patterns.
These programs will provide FPL with the data points needed to plan for these impacts.
Green hydrogen
FPL is authorized to implement a Green Hydrogen pilot project to evaluate how its
combustion turbine units operate with a hydrogen fuel mix and learn how a hydrogen fuel
production facility can be effectively used on-site with combustion turbine units. The pilot will
be conducted at the existing Okeechobee Clean Energy Center and a 25 MW electrolyzer and
storage facility will be built there. The estimated cost of this pilot program is $65 million with a
projected in-service date of 2023. 	This estimated cost is included in rate base and is subject to
challenge at a later date.
Florida Rising contends that the Green Hydrogen pilot is uneconomic, inefficient, and
“ultimately an attempt by FPL to use its monopoly power to extract R&D rents from captive rate
payers to subsidize its possible entry into wholesale sales of hydrogen.” Florida Rising Witness
Rabago testified that hydrogen is categorically uneconomic on the scale proposed by FPL, and
that even small-scale usage will be inefficient.
FPL Witness Valle testified that the Green Hydrogen pilot is designed, in part, to address
the “curtailment” problem with solar energy. As detailed by Witness Valle, there is more
instantaneous solar generation available at any given time than there is instantaneous customer
demand. The pilot will use these peaks of solar energy to split water molecules into hydrogen
and oxygen, with the hydrogen then being used as up to 5 percent of the fuel for one combustion
turbine.
The Green Hydrogen pilot serves the recognized public interest in developing renewable
energy sources.61 The dispute among the parties is whether this proposal is cost-effective. Florida
Rising would have us conclude that this pilot should not be approved because separating and
utilizing hydrogen as a fuel is not currently economic, i.e., cost-effective. We find the testimony
of Witness Valle regarding the potential short and long-term benefits flowing from this pilot
compared to its relatively small costs to be more persuasive on this issue, and to demonstrate that
the Green Hydrogen pilot furthers the legislative intent to develop renewable energy resources.
60 The investments in these six pilots will be partially offset by any revenues received under the EV public charging
pilot we approved for FPL in Order No. PSC-2020-0512-TRF-EI.
61 Hydrogen “produced or resulting from sources other than fossil fuels” – i.e., green hydrogen – is included in
applicable statutory definition of “renewable energy.”§ 366.91(2), Fla. Stat.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 24
Solar power facilities
Under the 2021 Settlement, FPL is authorized to offer a four-year solar power facilities
pilot program where commercial and industrial customers on a metered rate may elect to have
FPL install and maintain a solar facility on their site for a monthly tariff charge. All project costs
and expenses will be recovered from participants through a fixed monthly charge over a ten-year
term.
Florida Rising argues that this program does not serve the ratepayers at large and is not in
useful service and, accordingly, is not allowable for inclusion in rate base for cost recovery.
Florida Rising argues that the provision of this type of solar infrastructure is and should continue
to be addressed by public sector.
This 	pilot 	program 	serves 	the 	public 	interest 	in 	solar 	generation 	and 	energy
diversification. Participation is voluntary and all costs and expenses are paid by participants.
Issue 8: $25 minimum bill
FPL’s customer charge 62 for residential customers is $8.99 per month. The same charge
for small commercial, non-demand customers is $12.51. The 2021 Settlement provides for the
addition of a new minimum base bill of $25 for all residential and general service non-demand
customers. Under this proposal, any customer whose volumetric charges and base charge
combined are less than $25 for any month would receive a bill for $25. FPL data indicate that
this proposal would apply to over 375,000 customers.
Florida Rising contends that the minimum base bill violates the principle of cost
causation, which they describe as the principle “that customers should pay for cost they create,
and not more or less, to the extent possible.”63 Florida Rising also contends that the minimum
base bill discourages customer investment in energy efficiency and distributed generation.
The purpose of the minimum base bill, as stated by FPL, is to ensure that all ratepayers
contribute their share to fixed system costs. FPL notes that all ratepayers receive service from the
same general transmission and distribution system, with wires and poles necessarily connecting
high and low usage customers alike. The base charge applicable to each customer covers only
billing, metering, and customer service costs. Zero usage and low usage customers who pay only
the base charge are not contributing to recovery for fixed transmission and distribution costs and
are being subsidized by the remainder of the ratepayers.
We agree that low usage customers and seasonal residents rely on the same portions of
the system as other customers. As the evidence shows, adding a minimum base bill ensures that
those customers contribute to the costs of that system. We find that the minimum base bill more
62 FPL is changing reference to this charge from “customer charge” to “base charge.” The base charge is included in
the new proposed minimum bill.
63 T. Vol. 10 at 2701.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 25
reasonably allocates fixed costs not covered by the base bill among all of these customers, and
that recovering this amount results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 9: Extension of time to recover retirement costs
FPL proposed in the filed rate case to amortize the costs of retired power plants and
transmission facilities over ten years. The 2021 Settlement extends this retirement period from
ten to twenty years. Florida Rising argues that this extension of the amortization period for
retired 	assets 	unnecessarily 	increases 	costs 	to 	ratepayers 	and 	results 	in 	intergenerational
inequities. Florida Rising Witness Rabago estimated64 the total cost of this extension to be $1.4
billion.
FPL Witness Bores testified that the extension of the amortization period allowed for a
“significant reduction” in revenue requirements over the Term. As to the intergenerational
argument, Witness Bores stated that the customers who pay for the retirements over the twenty-
year period will realize the benefits of retiring plants in favor of more-efficient, lower-emission
generation. Witness Bores estimated the nominal cost of this extension to be $600 million, and
that customers would be “relatively indifferent” to the impact of this amount on a discounted
basis over the 10- to 20-year period.
Extending the amortization period from ten to twenty years reduces the revenue
requirements for FPL over the Term. The customers who will pay these costs over the twenty-
year period will be those who realize benefits from retiring the plants in question and replacing
them with upgraded generation. We find this extension to be fair and to benefit the general body
of ratepayers, while also resulting in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 10: Revenue allocations between classes
Intervenors argue that the revenue allocations between classes are flawed because FPL
did not conduct a cost-of-service study and then base its allocations on the results of that study.
Florida Rising Witness Rabago testified that the proposed rate structure is inequitable, and
results in small business and residential customers subsidizing the electric bills of FPL’s larger,
general service customers. Witness Rabago calculated this subsidy to be $1 billion over the
Term.
FPL Witness Cohen testified that the revenue allocation under the 2021 Settlement is the
result of a negotiated compromise. The resulting revenue allocation to the residential classes in
the 2021 Settlement (59 percent) is slightly higher than that originally proposed but lower than
the allocation we approved in the 2016 Settlement (66 percent). Witness Cohen stated that this
allocation is consistent with prior settlements and complies with our principle of gradualism,
“which limits the revenue increase for each rate class to 1.5 times the total system average
increase, including adjustment clauses, and provides that no rate class receives a decrease in
64 Witness Rabago stated that he could not “precisely” calculate this impact.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 26
rate.”65 Under the 2021 Settlement, the typical residential bill for customers in the former FPL
service area will increase by 2.5 percent over the Settlement Term as compared to 3.4 percent
under the original filing.
We find these revenue allocations to be reasonable. They are consistent with our past
settlement approvals and comply with the principle of gradualism. The overall impact to the
residential rate classes was reduced through the negotiation process and, as discussed below,
results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 11: FPL system overbuilt
Florida Rising contends that FPL’s investments in power plants and transmission and
distribution are excessive and result in an unjustifiable rate base expansion. Florida Rising
specifically contends that the Gulf Clean Energy Center 8 that FPL is constructing is unnecessary
because it increases the reserve margin and decreases the loss of load probability (LOLP) 66 far
beyond currently-established thresholds. Florida Rising contends that the scenarios upon which
FPL relies to justify this construction are unlikely or, in some cases, “absurdist and not worth
further responding to.” Florida Rising also contends the transmission and distribution system is
overbuilt, pointing specifically to the North Florida Resiliency Connection (NFRC). The end
result, concludes Florida Rising, is that the FPL system is greatly overbuilt and overdependent on
natural gas.67
We find that the greater weight of the evidence supports approval of the generation,
transmission, and distribution system proposed by FPL. We do not agree with Florida Rising that
FPL’s assumptions are unreasonable. The public interest dictates that a utility consider a wide
range of possibilities in planning for a reliable system. FPL has done so. The choices the
Company has made to account for contingencies are based on a thorough analysis of the
available data.
We also do not agree with Florida Rising that the future of FPL is one that is overly-
dependent on natural gas for generation. Natural gas is a reliable and primary means of providing
base load generation. As discussed above, FPL has committed to a substantial expansion of its
solar generation specifically to address climate change and generation diversity, including the
pilot Green Hydrogen program.
65 T. Vol. 12 at 2796.
66 The LOLP is the probability that available generation capacity will not be able to meet a peak customer demand.
Reserve margin is the amount of generation constructed to account for variations in load and unit availability. See
Order No. 24989, issued August 29, 1991, in In re: Load Forecasts Generation Expansion Plans and Cogeneration
Prices for Florida’s Electric Utilities.
67 To the extent Florida Rising is inviting a project-by-project prudence review, we decline to do so. See Sierra Club
v. Brown, 243 So. 3d 903, 911-12 (Fla. 2018).
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 27
Issue 12: Storm cost recovery mechanism
Under the 2021 Settlement, FPL is allowed to seek recovery of costs associated with any
tropical storm or its successor without the application of any form of earnings test or measure
and irrespective of previous or current base rate earnings or the remaining unamortized storm
reserve.68 	FPL’s recovery of storm costs on an interim basis will begin 60 days following the
filing of a cost recovery petition and tariffs and will be based on a 12-month recovery period if
the storm costs do not exceed $4.00/1,000 kWh on a monthly residential bill. 	Any additional
costs exceeding $4.00/1,000 kWh may be recovered in subsequent years(s) as determined by the
us. Storm related costs subject to interim recovery will be calculated and disposed of pursuant to
Rule 25-6.0143, F.A.C. 	The storm reserve will be no less than $150 million. 	In the event that
FPL incurs in excess of $800 million of qualifying storm costs in a given calendar year, it may
petition to increase the initial recovery beyond $4.00/1,000 kWh. 	Storm cost recovery
proceedings shall not be a vehicle for a “rate case” inquiry concerning FPL’s expenses,
investment, or financial results.
Florida Rising contends that the storm cost recovery mechanism violates Sections 366.06
and 366.07, F.S., because it allows new rate increases prior to us holding a public hearing and
making a determination regarding “the sufficiency of current recovery structures.” FPL responds
that the mechanism is squarely within our rate-making authority, as evidenced by prior
approvals, and serves the public interest, as demonstrated by the mechanism’s successful
application over time.
To the extent these arguments are directed to our jurisdiction to consider this mechanism,
we need not revisit them. We find that the storm recovery mechanism serves an important public
interest, especially in the context of the four-year rate plan. The ability to quickly seek approval
and begin collecting a surcharge for storm recovery reduces regulatory lag and creates a more
stable post-storm financial environment. This surcharge is followed by a final true-up hearing to
ensure the correct amounts have been charged and collected. Finally, substantially affected
parties are afforded a point-of-entry to participate in this hearing and contest the proposed
recovery, ensuring that any aggrieved ratepayer has the opportunity to be heard.
Issue 13: Federal tax adjustment
If permanent federal or state tax changes are enacted effective for any of the tax years
2022 through the Term, the 2021 Settlement Agreement allows the base revenue requirement to
be adjusted for the impacts of those changes within the latter of 90 days from when the tax
becomes law or the effective date of the law, but in no instance prior to January 1, 2022. This
adjustment will be made for all retail customers through a prospective adjustment to base rates.
Any effects of a change in taxes on retail revenue requirements will be flowed back to, or
collected from, customers through the Conservation Cost Recovery Clause on the same basis as
used in any base rate adjustment.
68 We have approved substantially the same mechanism in settlements of FPL’s last three rate cases. See Order Nos.
PSC-2016-0560-AS-EI, PSC-2013-0023-S-EI, and PSC-2011-0089-S-EI.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 28
Citing Section 366.07, F.S., Florida Rising contends that this provision allows for an
unlawful “unilateral” adjustment to rates without a hearing and determination that FPL is earning
below its authorized allowable range of return.
To the extent these arguments are directed to our jurisdiction to consider this mechanism,
we need not revisit them.
Allowing an adjustment to the revenue requirement to account for a tax change without
the need for a full rate case is in the public interest. Any decrease can be quickly flowed to the
ratepayers. Any upward adjustment allows FPL to keep its earnings at the level we are approving
in this Order, which will in turn allow the Company to continue providing service at present-day
cost and value. We review any such changes and corresponding adjustments when FPL files a
petition seeking approval for its proposed treatment of tax changes. Substantially affected
persons – ratepayers – would have a point-of-entry at that time to present any evidence and
argument regarding the proposed treatment.
Issue 14: Incentive mechanism for asset optimization
We first approved FPL’s asset optimization program as a four-year pilot as part of the
2012 Settlement in Order No. PSC-2013-0023-S-EI.69 The program was designed to allow FPL
to create gains through electric wholesale purchases and sales,70 and asset optimization.
Allowable asset optimization under the pilot included gas storage utilization, production gas
sales, capacity release of gas transportation and electric transmission, and asset management
agreements.71 The overwhelming majority of the value from these activities was to be flowed to
the customers through the Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Recovery Clause (Fuel Clause),
thereby reducing customers’ annual fuel costs. As an incentive to maximize asset optimization,
FPL would be entitled to a share of this added value if certain thresholds were exceeded. The
Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	affirmed 	our 	Order 	approving 	the 	2012 	Settlement, 	specifically
upholding our approval of the pilot incentive program. 72
At the end of the initial pilot’s term, we authorized FPL to continue the program, subject
to certain modifications, in Order No. PSC-2016-0560-AS-EI.73 Under the program as modified
in 2016, customers receive 100 percent of the first $40 million in savings realized from listed
69 Order No. PSC-2013-0023-S-EI, issued January 14, 2013, in Docket No. 120015-EI, In re: Petition for increase
in rates by Florida Power & Light Company.
70 Prior to the pilot program, the only allowed activity under our standard sharing mechanism was economy power
sales.
71 Order No. PSC-2013-0023-S-EI at p. 4.
72 Citizens of State v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 146 So. 3d 1143, 1172 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]he Commission’s conclusion
that the asset optimization incentive program is in the public interest and part of a reasonable resolution of disputed
issues is supported by competent, substantial evidence.”).
73 Order No. PSC-2016-0560-AS-EI, issued December 15, 2016, in Docket No. 160021-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Florida Power & Light Company. This Order was appealed and affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court.
Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So. 3d 903 (Fla. 2018). The Court’s opinion makes no specific mention of the incentive
program.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 29
activities. For all savings between $40 and $100 million, customers receive 40 percent and FPL
receives 60 percent. For all savings above $100 million, FPL and its customers each receive 50
percent. From 2013-2022, after netting out incremental O&M expenses, the program has resulted
in a total benefit of $406.7 million. Of this total, customers received $354.5 million (87 percent).
FPL received $52.2 million (13 percent).
Pursuant to the 2021 Settlement, the program is modified to apply to all fuel sources (not
gas 	only) 	when 	it 	is 	reasonable 	and 	in 	the 	customers’ 	best 	interests 	based 	on 	system
requirements, market demand, and the current market price of fuel or capacity. This includes
renewable energy credits (RECs), which may be monetized and sold. Three annual savings
thresholds are set: (1) FPL customers will receive 100 percent of the incentive mechanism gain
up to $42.5 million; (2) FPL customers will receive 40 percent and FPL will receive 60 percent
of incremental mechanism gains between $42.5 million and $100 million; and (3) FPL and its
customers will each receive 50 percent of incremental mechanism gains in excess of $100
million. The per-MWh variable power O&M rate is set at $0.48/MWh. Optimization activities,
variable power plant O&M rates, and savings thresholds will be considered “adjustable
parameters” that FPL can request be reviewed and adjusted every four years in the Fuel Clause
docket. Expenses, including incremental O&M costs, personnel, software and association
hardware costs, will be recovered from customers through the Fuel Clause.
Florida Rising contends that this program seeks recovery of costs that are not related to
the generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, that the savings from activities under
the program are required to be kept in a separate account pursuant to Section 366.05, F.S., and,
therefore, “the Commission does not have the legal authority to approve the mechanism.”
The Supreme Court affirmed our approval of this program as a pilot,74 and subsequently
confirmed our jurisdiction to approve the current mechanism. 75 We are well within the bounds of
our the legal authority in approving the amended program because the allowable activities – the
purchase and sale of power, the creation and monetization of RECs, the sale of unneeded
transmission rights, and the sale of gas, gas transportation, and gas storage – all involve the
generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, whether by gas or another fuel source.
We do not somehow lose the authority to approve the mechanism because FPL is not
maintaining the savings in a separate account, as maintained by Florida Rising. The requirement
to maintain separate accounts is found in Section 366.05(2), F.S., which provides in part:
Every public utility, as defined in s. 366.02 which in addition to the production,
transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light, or power also sells appliances
or other merchandise shall keep separate and individual accounts for the sale and
profit deriving from such sales.
74 Citizens, 146 So. 3d at 1172.
75 FAIR, 371 So.2d at 907 fn. 2.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 30
The prescribed activities in the program do not involve the sale of appliances or other
merchandise. We conclude that this subsection is not applicable to the incentive program.
Turning to the Settlement Agreement, the modest proposed changes to the incentive
program do not change its basic structure and operation. The program is reasonably expected to
continue to provide savings through the efficient use of existing assets.76 The history of the
program demonstrate that the overwhelming savings realized from Company actions have and
will be flowed to the ratepayers. The amended thresholds continue to provide appropriate
customer benefit and Company incentive. The inclusion of all fuel types – and renewable energy
credits – in the program will allow it to evolve with the energy landscape and bring more
customer benefit.
We find that the incentive program has and will continue to provide substantial benefit to
the ratepayers and appropriate incentives to the Company, and is in the public interest. With the
newly-approved program now applying to all fuel types, we find it appropriate for the incentive
program to be administered through the Fuel Clause as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
Issue 15: Solar cost cap incentive
The Settlement Agreement contains another incentive, this one found in the SoBRA
program and referred to as “the solar cost cap incentive.” Florida Rising contends that this
incentive provides FPL an illegal bonus payment over the “actual legitimate” cost of the installed
facility. It argues that 100 percent of any savings, not just the 75 percent under this incentive
program, must be credited (or never charged) to the ratepayers.
Under the solar cost cap incentive, if the actual installed cost for any SoBRA project is
less than the $1,250 kWAC cap or adjusted cap, customers and FPL will share the difference
between the actual cost and $1,250 kWAC cap, or adjusted cap, with 75 percent of the difference
benefiting customers and 25 percent of the difference benefiting FPL. 	The lower installed cost
shall be the basis for the full revenue requirements and a one-time credit will be made through
the Capital Cost Recovery Clause (CCRC). 	In order to determine the amount of this credit, a
revised SoBRA factor will be computed using the same data and methodology incorporated into
the initial SoBRA factor established under the terms of the 2021 Settlement. 	In lieu of capital
expenditures on which the Annualized Base Revenue Requirement was based, the calculation of
the installed cost will use the actual installed cost adjusted to reflect the incentive. 	Going
forward, base rates will be adjusted to reflect the revised SoBRA factor. The difference between
the cumulative base revenues since the implementation of the initial SoBRA factor and the
cumulative base revenues that would have resulted from the revised SoBRA factor had it been in
76 We do not find the holding in Citizens of Fla. v. Graham, 191 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 2016) to be applicable in this
instance. The activities allowed under the program as modified all involve maximizing the use of existing utility
assets presently employed for the transmission, generation, or distribution of electricity, whereas the questioned
activity in Graham was the exploration of potential gas reserves for future applications.
ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 31
place during the same period will be credited to customers through the CCRC with interest at the
30-day commercial paper rate.77
FPL notes that the revenue requirement related to the SoBRAs is based on “the base
revenue requirements for the first twelve months of operation of the cost-effective solar
projects,” such that any reduction realized by virtue of the incentive will also reduce the revenue
requirement. Thus, the operation of the cost cap will never cause an increase of additional
revenues from the SoBRAs above the estimated $140 million annually in 2024 and 2025.
No matter if it is labeled an “illegal bonus” or “incentive,” we look to the substance and
operation of this provision to determine whether it should be approved. The provision is
designed to encourage FPL to construct solar facilities in the most cost-efficient manner. It
works in coordination with the overall efforts of FPL to ensure all equipment and contractors are
subject to a competitive bidding process in order to produce the lowest cost. The ratepayers
ultimately benefit by both the lower overall cost and the shared savings. The greater weight of
the evidence demonstrates that providing this incentive promotes the construction of cost-
efficient solar generation and is in the public interest.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
After making factual findings, the second step in our analysis of a settlement agreement
is for us to “decide[] whether the settlement agreement, in light of [our] findings of fact, is in the
public interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.”78 We review settlement
agreements as a whole to determine whether to approve them as being in the public interest.79
We initially note that the 2021 Settlement Agreement has been executed by numerous
organizations with distinct and independent interests. The Office of Public Counsel, Florida
Industrial Power Users Group, Florida Retail Federation, and Southern Alliance for Clean
Energy originally joined the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. On August 24, 2021, FPL
filed notice that additional parties Vote Solar and the CLEO Institute, Inc. had joined in the
Agreement. On August 27, 2021, FPL filed notice that the Federal Executive Agencies had also
joined the Agreement. While not every party participated in negotiations or joined in the 2021
Agreement, the organizations who did participate and reached consensus represent a broad
spectrum of ratepayers and interests.
The ultimate decision of whether a proposed, comprehensive resolution to a rate case
should be approved rests on a determination of whether that resolution meets the very high
threshold of being in the public interest. Even though this burden is substantial, the public
interest remains a threshold. It does not require that the resolution be best for every ratepayer at
77 If the actual capital costs for a solar generation project are higher than the $1,250 kWAC cap or adjusted cap, FPL
may initiate a limited proceeding on the issue of whether it has met the requirements of Rule 25-22.082(15), F.A.C.
If we find that the requirements of Rule 25-22.082(15), F.A.C., have been met, FPL shall be allowed to increase the
SoBRA by a corresponding incremental revenue requirement.
78 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 910.
79 See Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So.3d 903, 909 (Fla. 2018).
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all times in all situations. The question is whether the agreement as a whole is in the public
interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable, and the answer is gleaned from the
record presented to us.
1. 	Mandatory factors
In FAIR, the Court highlighted two statutory provisions that we are to apply to our review
of the 2021 Settlement Agreement on remand.
The Legislature has provided that the Commission, in “fixing fair, just, and
reasonable rates for each customer class, ... shall, to the extent practicable,
consider the cost of providing service to the class, as well as the rate history,
value of service, and experience of the public utility; the consumption and load
characteristics of the various classes of customers; and public acceptance of rate
structures.” § 366.06(1). The Commission “shall also consider the performance of
each utility pursuant to [the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act]
when establishing rates for those utilities over which the commission has
ratesetting authority.” § 366.82(10), Fla. Stat. (2021). A reasonably explained
decision 	from 	the 	Commission 	must 	reflect 	that 	those 	factors 	have 	been
considered to the extent practicable.80
As to Section 366.06(1), F.S., we begin our analysis with consideration of FPL’s capital
structure. As previously discussed, the analyses used to support ROE and equity to debt ratio are
sound. We agree with the conclusions of those analyses that FPL’s geographic challenges and
business risk, primary among other factors, justify the ROE and ratio established in the 2021
Settlement Agreement. Our approval of a regulatory ROE of 10.6 percent for all purposes, with
an authorized ROE range of 9.7 percent to 11.7 percent, and equity ratio of 59.6 percent, as set
forth in the 2021 Settlement, will ensure that FPL has adequate and timely access to capital in
order to continue supplying reliable service. We do not agree with the conclusions of
Intevernors’ witnesses that FPL would enjoy the same or similar access to capital with a lower
ROE and restructured equity to debt ratio, and find the opinions of FPL’s experts supporting this
capital structure to be more persuasive.
As set forth in detail above, this overall capital structure is supported by mechanisms
designed to support a four-year rate plan. One of those mechanisms is the RSAM. Our approval
of the alternative depreciation study and the RSAM provides FPL with a tool to address
unexpected expense and revenue impacts over the Settlement Term without the need to seek a
rate increase. Without the RSAM, the multiyear rate plan would not be possible, and ratepayers
would not enjoy long-term bill stability. FPL’s use of the RSAM in the unexpectedly challenging
economic environment of the most recent rate period (2016-2020) evidences how ratepayers
benefit by having this mechanism available.
80 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 912.
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As our findings above demonstrate, other mechanisms in the 2021 Settlement Agreement
also contribute to FPL’s financial ability to operate under a multiyear rate plan. The storm cost
recovery 	mechanism 	addresses 	unpredictable, 	but 	expected, 	tropical 	events. 	The 	process
established under this mechanism allows FPL to obtain cost recovery in a timely manner and
avoid regulatory lag. The subsequent true-up proceeding provides us and ratepayers with the
opportunity to review incurred costs and total recovery.
The 2021 Settlement Agreement also contains provisions specifically designed to keep
rates low over the Term. FPL extended the time to recover the retirement costs of certain plants
and transmission facilities, thereby reducing revenue requirements and, ultimately, rates. FPL is
also continuing, with slight modifications, its incentive mechanism for asset optimization. This
program has already directed $354.5 million to customers. With the current modifications, these
monetary benefits are expected to increase. Finally, FPL has instituted a voluntary solar cost cap
initiative, whereby it self-incentivizes the construction of solar generation under the SoBRA
program at a lower total cost.
Turning specifically to the cost of service, we note that the class allocations in the 2021
Settlement are the result of negotiations. Thus, as has been the case in prior settlements, these
allocations are not accompanied by a separate cost-of-service study. The class allocations,
however, were not cut from whole cloth and presented to us for a first-time review. 	The 2021
Settlement class allocations are consistent with prior, approved FPL settlements. Using those
settlements and the recent rate history of FPL using those allocations as the most practical
guideposts, we find that the 2021 Settlement class allocations result in fair, just, and reasonable
rates. We also note that the percentage increases in rates for residential and small business
customer classes are lower in the 2021 Settlement as compared to the original filing, and comply
with the concept of gradualism as discussed above.
The input we received during the customer service hearings fully supports the conclusion
that FPL has a history of providing excellent service to its customers. FPL also has a favorable
rate history with its customers, with the typical 1000 kWh residential customer bill being about
10 percent lower than it was fifteen years ago.81
The expert testimony supports our conclusion that the ROE requested by FPL is
reasonable. Moreover, the requested rate increase amount as well as the ROE were reduced as a
result of a negotiated settlement. Those same negotiations results in a significant boost in FPL’s
commitment to the use and development of renewable energy resources.
Based on our consideration of all of the above, we find that the 2021 Settlement, taken as
a whole, is in the public interest, and establishes rates that are fair, just, and reasonable in
accordance with Section 366.06(1), F.S.
The second statute the Court directed us to consider in our determination of whether the
2021 Settlement should be approved is Section 366.82(10)¸ F.S. This provision is found in the
81 See Fla. Stat. § 366.041(1).
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Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA), the entirety of which is codified in
sections 366.80 through 366.83, and 403.519, F.S. When enacted in 1980, FEECA required us to
adopt appropriate goals to increase the efficiency of energy consumption. In 2008, the
Legislature 	amended 	FEECA 	to 	require 	us 	to 	adopt 	appropriate 	goals 	to 	increase 	the
development of demand-side renewable energy systems. Pursuant to Section 366.82(6), F.S., we
must review the goals of each utility subject to FEECA at least every five years. We last
established goals for FPL in 2019.82
Section 	366.82(11), 	F.S., 	establishes 	our 	ratesetting 	authority 	over 	utility 	energy
conservation program costs. Rule 25-17.015, F.A.C., establishes the energy conservation cost
recovery clause (ECCR) as the mechanism for electric utilities, such as FPL, to seek approval of
reasonable energy conservation expenses.
Pursuant to Rule 25-17.0021(4), F.A.C., within 90 days of a final order establishing or
modifying goals, each investor-owned electric utility (IOU) must submit for our approval a
Demand Side Management (DSM) plan designed to meet the utility’s approved goals, including
information about the programs proposed within the plan. We last approved FPL’s DSM plan in
2020.83
Intervenors84 argue that FPL’s established DSM programs should be reanalyzed and
changed in this docket. We do not agree, and find that these wide-ranging arguments are more
appropriately raised in FPL’s 2024 goal-setting,85 DSM plan, and the annual ECCR dockets.
While goals and DSM plans and programs are generally86 not subject to reexamination in
a base rate case, FEECA does influence some of the underlying analyses. FPL properly
accounted for incremental DSM in its load forecasts. Additionally, the resource analyses
conducted by FPL in this case followed and is consistent with our most recent order on
conservation goals.
82 Order No. PSC-2018-0509-FOF-EG, issued November 26, 2019, in Docket No. 20190015-EG, In re: Commission
review of numeric conservation goals (Florida Power & Light Company).
83 Order No. PSC-2020-0274-PAA-EG, issued August 3, 2020, in Docket No. 20200056-EG, In re: Petition for
approval of demand-side management plan and request for modify residential and business on call tariff, sheets, by
Florida Power & Light Company.
84 Much of the testimony regarding DSM and FEECA was provided by witnesses for parties who entered into the
2021 Settlement (The Cleo Institute and Vote Solar).
85 Docket No. 20240015-EG.
86 In FPL’s 2020 DSM docket, we specifically deferred consideration of two matters to this proceeding Order No.
PSC-2020-0274-PAA-EG, issued August 3, 2020, in Docket No. 20200056-EG, In re: Petition for approval of
demand-side management plan and request for modify residential and business on call tariff, sheets, by Florida
Power & Light Company, at p. 4 (“Florida Power & Light Company’s Commercial/Industrial Demand Reduction
and Commercial/Industrial Load Control programs shall be addressed during the next Florida Power & Light
Company base rate proceeding”). We find that the greater weight of the evidence in this record supports the
requested revisions to those two measures. The specific testimony regarding the benefits of program revisions is
more persuasive than Witness Rabago’s suggestion that the preferable solution is for FPL “to aggressively pursue
program enrollment growth” under existing conditions.
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We have considered the record evidence presented by all parties regarding FEECA as it
relates to the issues that were identified and litigated, and find that the 2021 Settlement
Agreement is in the public interest and establishes rates that are fair, just, and reasonable,
consistent with section 366.82(10), F.S.
2. 	Case-specific factors
The Court in remanding this matter also listed several statutory provisions that “may” be
germane to our disposition. One of the statutes cited by the Court expresses the Legislature’s
intent “that it is in the public interest to promote the development of renewable energy resources
in this state,”87 and is directly relevant to our finding that the 2021 Settlement is in the public
interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
The Legislature included both solar energy and green hydrogen in the definition of
“renewable energy” resources.88 The 2021 Settlement promotes the development of both. Using
the SoBRA mechanism, FPL will construct 1,788 megawatts (MW) of solar generation through
the Term. Phase II SolarTogether directly serves the purposes outlined in this statute by
expanding the program by an additional 1,788 MW at FPL’s discretion through 2025 such that
the total capacity of SolarTogether would equal 3,278 MW. The pilot solar power program will
make on-site solar available on a voluntary basis to eligible participants. These approvals are
consistent with and further the legislative public interest direction on renewable energy
development. To ensure resulting rates are fair, just, and reasonable, SolarTogether and the pilot
solar program are funded by program participants. The benefits of SolarTogether are shared
among all ratepayers to ensure that the program is not unduly discriminatory in favor of either
participants or non-participants. SoBRAs are funded by incremental base rate increases that must
be first approved after a hearing to address cost-effectiveness.
The pilot program for green hydrogen aligns with this same legislative direction.
Intervenors 	argue 	that 	this 	pilot 	should 	be 	rejected 	as 	ratepayer-funded 	research 	and
development. This critique is misplaced. The Legislature has specifically directed that “it is in
the public interest to promote the development of renewable energy resources.”89 “Development”
includes “the act, process, or result of developing.” 90 The statute does not state that the public
interest is served only by the generation of power with renewable energy, which would be the
result of successful development. The process of developing renewable energy is part of
promoting its development, and that is exactly what is accomplished by the Green Hydrogen
pilot.
The Court also stated that we may consider “the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of
the facilities provided and the services rendered; the cost of providing such service and the value
87 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(1).
88 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(2)(e).
89 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(1) (emphasis added).
90 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/development, last checked 01/31/24.
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of such service to the public; the ability of the utility to improve such service and facilities; and
energy conservation and the efficient use of alternative energy resources.”91
FPL has delivered high value service to its customers at a relatively low cost. Residential
rates are at least 20 percent lower than the national average92 and below those charged by other
Florida investor-owned-utilities. FPL has lower operation and maintenance expenses, with the
best non-fuel O & M cost performance in the industry. The framework approved in the 2021
Settlement 	Agreement 	will 	foster 	continuation 	of 	these 	efficiencies, 	consistent 	with 	the
legislative direction in Section 366.041(1), F.S.
CONCLUSION
When presented with a settlement agreement . . . , the Commission’s review shifts
to the public interest standard: whether the agreement – as a whole – resolved all
the issues, “establish rates that were just, reasonable, and fair, and that the
agreement is in the public interest.93
Consistent with this Court’s direction in FAIR, we have considered each of the parties’
competing arguments. In the final analysis, however, we are to examine the 2021 Settlement as a
whole in making our ultimate determination. Taken as a whole and as supported by the record,
the 2021 Settlement Agreement addresses and provides a full resolution of all issues in this
docket. That resolution involves, among other compromises, reductions in proposed rate
increases and a lowered ROE as compared to the as-filed request. Based on the host of
compromises, the 2021 Settlement was signed by most of the parties to this docket. These parties
represent a broad cross-section of ratepayers and interests. Those Intervenors who chose to not
sign the 2021 Settlement Agreement were provided a full and fair opportunity to contest that
proposed resolution consistent with the requirements of due process.
The preponderance of the evidence in this record demonstrates that the 2021 Settlement
Agreement supports a multi-year rate plan, which in turn benefits customers and serves the
public interest by providing long-term stability and predictability with respect to base rates. FPL
is bringing an appreciable amount of renewable energy online with the SoBRA mechanism and
Phase II of SolarTogether, and has proposed additional programs to promote the development of
future renewable energy resources consistent with legislative direction. FPL has built a system
that consistently ranks near the top nationally for reliability. FPL residential customer rates
remain among the lowest in the state and nation.
91 Fla. Stat. § 366.041(1).
92 The Court in FAIR also stated that we could rely upon non-statutory metrics, if such were demonstrated to be
relevant, specifically referring to the findings in our 2021 Final Order regarding the comparison of FPL’s average
1000 kWh bill to the national average. As we have discussed herein, such comparisons provide a useful metric in
determining the “value” of service as required by sections 366.06(1) and 366.041(1), F.S., and are within the
statutory scope of our review.
93 Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So.3d 903, 909 (Fla. 2018)(quoting Citizens of State v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146
So.3d 1143, 1164 (Fla. 2014)).
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Based upon our findings and conclusions above, we conclude that the 2021 Settlement is
in the public interest, and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED by the Florida Public Service Commission that Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-
EI, as amended by Order No. PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI and supplemented by this Supplemental
Final Order, is affirmed. It is further
SPS
ORDERED that this docket shal l be closed.
By ORDER of the Florida Public Service Commission this 25th day of March, 2024.
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
(850) 413-6770
www.floridapsc.com
Copies furnished: 	A copy of this document is
provided to the parties of record at the time of
issuance and, if applicable, interested persons.
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NOTICE OF FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Florida Public Service Commission is required by Section 120.569(1), Florida
Statutes, to notify parties of any administrative hearing or judicial review of Commission orders
that is available under Sections 120.57 or 120.68, Florida Statutes, as well as the procedures and
time limits that apply. 	This notice should not be construed to mean all requests for an
administrative hearing or judicial review will be granted or result in the relief sought.
Any party adversely affected by the Commission's final action in this matter may request:
1) reconsideration of the decision by filing a motion for reconsideration with the Office of
Commission Clerk, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, within
fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order in the form prescribed by Rule 25-22.060, Florida
Administrative Code; or 2) judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court in the case of an
electric, gas or telephone utility or the First District Court of Appeal in the case of a water and/or
wastewater utility by filing a notice of appeal with the Office of Commission Clerk, and filing a
copy of the notice of appeal and the filing fee with the appropriate court. 	This filing must be
completed within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this order, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 	The notice of appeal must be in the form specified in Rule
9.900(a), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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FILED 3/25/2024 DOCUMENT NO. 01294-2024 FPSC - COMMISSION CLERK
BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Power & Light Company.
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI ISSUED: March 25, 2024
The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter:
MIKE LA ROSA, Chairman ART GRAHAM GARY F. CLARK ANDREW GILES FAY GABRIELLA PASSIDOMO
APPEARANCES:
R. WADE LITCHFIELD, Vice President and General Counsel; JOHN T. BURNETT, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel; MARIA J. MONCADA, Senior Attorney, and CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, ESQUIRE, Florida Power & Light Company, 700 Universe Boulevard, Juno Beach, FL 33408
On behalf of Florida Power & Light Company (FPL).
RICHARD GENTRY, Public Counsel; PATRICIA A. CHRISTENSEN, Associate Public Counsel; ANASTACIA PIRRELLO, Associate Public Counsel; and CHARLES REHWINKEL, Deputy Public Counsel; Office of Public Counsel, c/o The Florida Legislature, 111 West Madison Street, Room 812, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400
On behalf of Office of the Public Counsel (OPC).
WILLIAM C. GARNER, ESQUIRE, Law Office of William C. Garner, PLLC, 3425 Bannerman Road, Unit 105, #414, Tallahassee, FL 32312 On behalf of the CLEO Institute Inc. (CLEO).
ROBERT SCHEFFEL WRIGHT and JOHN T. LAVIA, III, ESQUIRES, Gardner, Bist, Bowden, Dee, LaVia, Wright, Perry & Harper, P.A., 1300 Thomaswood Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32308 On behalf of Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. (FAIR).
SCOTT L. KIRK, MAJ, USAF, AF/JAOE-ULFSC, ESQUIRE, 139 Barnes Drive, Suite 1, Tyndall Air Force Base, FL 32403 On behalf of the Federal Executive Agencies (FEA).

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 2
JON C. MOYLE, JR. and KAREN PUTNAL, ESQUIRES, Moyle 	Law 	Firm,
P.A., 118 North Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, FL 32312
On behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG).
FLOYD R. SELF, ESQUIRE, Berger Singerman, LLP, 313 North Monroe Street,
Suite 301, Tallahassee, FL 32301 and T. SCOTT THOMPSON, ESQUIRE,
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., 555 12th Street NW, Suite
1100, Washington, DC 20004
On behalf of Florida Internet & Television Association, Inc. (FIT).
JAMES W. BREW and LAURA WYNN BAKER, ESQUIRES, Stone Mattheis
Xenopoulos & Brew, PC, 1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Eighth Floor, West
Tower, Washington, D.C. 20007
On behalf of Florida Retail Federation (FRF).
BRADLEY 	MARSHALL 	and 	JORDAN 	LUEBKEMANN, 	ESQUIRES,
Earthjustice, 111 S. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., Tallahassee, Florida 32301 and
CHRISTINA I. REICHERT, ESQUIRE, Earthjustice, 4500 Biscayne Blvd., Ste.
201, Miami, Florida 33137
On behalf of Florida Rising, Inc., League of United Latin American Citizens of
Florida, and Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Inc. (Fla. Rising,
LULAC, ECOSWF).
NATHAN A. SKOP, ESQUIRE, 420 NW 50th Boulevard, Gainesville, FL 32607
On behalf of Daniel and Alexandria Larson (Larsons).
GEORGE CAVROS, ESQUIRE, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, 120 E.
Oakland Park Blvd., Suite 105, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33334
On behalf of Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE).
KATIE CHILES OTTENWELLER, ESQUIRE, Southeast Director, Vote Solar,
838 Barton Woods Road, Atlanta, GA 30307
On behalf of Vote Solar.
STEPHANIE U. EATON, ESQUIRE, Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, 110
Oakwood Drive, Suite 500, Winston-Salem, NC 27103
On behalf of Walmart Inc. (Walmart).
SUZANNE S. BROWNLESS, SHAW P. STILLER, and BIANCA LHERISSON,
ESQUIRES, Florida Public Service Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850
On behalf of the Florida Public Service Commission (Staff).

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 3
MARY ANNE HELTON, ESQUIRE, Deputy General Counsel, Florida Public
Service Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-
0850
Advisor to the Florida Public Service Commission.
KEITH C. HETRICK, ESQUIRE, General Counsel, Florida Public Service
Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850
Florida Public Service Commission General Counsel.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINAL ORDER
BY THE COMMISSION:
BACKGROUND
This proceeding is before us on remand from the Florida Supreme Court.1 Before
addressing the substance of this remand, we provide the following brief synopsis of the
procedural history of this matter.
This docket was opened January 11, 2021, when the Florida Power & Light Company
(FPL or Company) filed a letter notifying us that it would file a request for a base rate increase.
On March 12, 2021, FPL filed its petition, minimum filing requirements, and testimony for a
base rate increase effective January 2022. Numerous parties intervened in this docket and
undertook substantial discovery.
One week prior to the scheduled commencement of the final hearing, FPL and several
intervening parties in this docket (Signatories)2 filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement
Agreement, with a copy of the subject Stipulation and Settlement (2021 Settlement). Intervenors
Floridians Against Increased Rates (FAIR), the Environmental Confederation of Southwest
Florida (ECOSWF), Florida Rising, Inc., and League of United Latin American Citizens of
Florida (LULAC) (collectively “Intervenors”) did not join the Agreement and opposed the Joint
Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement.
On September 20, 2021, we conducted a final hearing on FPL’s base rate petition as well
as the Joint Motion for Approval of the 2021 Settlement. On December 2, 2021, we entered a
Final Order Approving 2021 Stipulation and Settlement Agreement.3 On December 9, 2021, we
entered an Ordering Amending that Final Order to correct several non-substantive scrivener’s
1 Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark, 371 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 2023) (referred to hereafter as FAIR).
2 The Office of Public Counsel, Florida Industrial Power Users Group, Florida Retail Federation, and Southern
Alliance for Clean Energy joined the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. On August 24, 2021, FPL filed notice
that additional parties Vote Solar and the CLEO Institute, Inc. had joined in the Agreement. On August 27, 2021,
FPL filed notice that the Federal Executive Agencies had also joined the Agreement.
3 Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI, issued December 2, 2021, in Docket No. 20210015-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Florida Power & Light Company.

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errors relating to dates and references.4 This Order and Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI will be
referred to collectively as “the 2021 Final Order” in this Order. Copies of these Orders are
appended hereto as Attachments A (PSC-2021-0446-S-EI) and B (PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI).
On December 28, 2021, FAIR timely filed an appeal of the 2021 Final Order. On January
3, Florida Rising, ECOSWF and LULAC (collectively “Florida Rising”) timely filed their appeal
of the 2021 Final Order. The Florida Supreme Court consolidated these appeals and, on
September 28, 2023, remanded this matter for further proceedings.
We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Court’s remand and the provisions
of Chapter 120 and Sections 366.04, 366.05, and 366.06, Florida Statutes (F.S.).
SCOPE OF REMAND
The 2021 Final Order that was appealed and remanded addressed the numerous issues
raised by the parties in three groups, described as follows:
[1] standing – whether FAIR’s request to intervene should be granted; [2]
jurisdictional - whether we have the statutory authority to approve proposed rate
recovery mechanisms as part of the 2021 Settlement; and [3] whether the 2021
Settlement should be approved.
As to the first issue group, no party appealed or cross-appealed the issue of FAIR’s standing and,
accordingly, it was not the subject of the Supreme Court’s remand. We are not entering
supplemental findings or conclusions regarding FAIR’s standing, and that section of the 2021
Final Order remains unchanged.
Turning to the second issue group, the Court did not question our statutory authority to
consider the various tools and accounting approaches set forth in the 2021 Settlement.
Appellants raise other arguments in opposition to the Commission's approval of
the 	settlement 	agreement. 	These 	arguments 	include 	challenges 	to 	the
Commission's statutory authority to approve various pieces of the settlement
agreement: 	the 	Storm 	Cost 	Recovery 	Mechanism; 	the 	Reserve 	Surplus
Amortization Mechanism; the Asset Optimization Incentive, which includes the
monetization of renewable energy credits; a corporate tax adjustment; the Solar
Base Rate Adjustment mechanism (SoBRA); a construction incentive for solar
generation sites constructed pursuant to SoBRA; and cost recovery related to the
Green Hydrogen Pilot Program and a consummation payment FPL made to
Jacksonville Electric Authority concerning the retirement of a coal-fired power
generation unit. To the extent any of these challenges to the Commission's
4 Order No. PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI, issued December 2, 2021, in Docket No. 20210015-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Florida Power & Light Company. We will refer to this Order and Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI
collectively as the 2021 Final Order.

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 5
statutory authority is preserved, none gives us a reason to set aside the order under
review.5
Because the Court found our stated bases for jurisdiction to be sufficient, we are not entering
supplemental findings or conclusions regarding our jurisdiction to consider the 2021 Settlement,
and that section of the 2021 Final Order remains unchanged.
The only issue the Court remanded to us is whether the 2021 Settlement should be
approved as being in the public interest.6 The Court neither affirmed nor reversed our prior
conclusion that the 2021 Settlement is in the public interest. The Court did not vacate the 2021
Final Order. Instead, the Court remanded for a further explanation of our approval, directing that
we specifically address certain matters:
That includes considering [A] the competing arguments made by the parties
below in light of [B] the factors relevant to the Commission’s decision, and
supplying, given these arguments and factors, an explanation of how the evidence
presented led to its decision.7
A. Competing Arguments made by the Parties
The Court identified the arguments forwarded by FAIR, LULAC, and ECOSWF as
follows:
1. 	Need for the rate increases in the settlement agreement
2. 	ROE range.
3. 	Equity-to-debt ratio.
4. 	RSAM.
5. 	Rate base investments (SoBRA).
6. 	Pilot programs (electric vehicle chargers, Green Hydrogen, Solar Power
Facilities.
7. 	SolarTogether.
8. 	Minimum bill.
9. 	Extension of time for recovery of retirement costs of certain assets.8
We have thoroughly reviewed Intervenors’ Prehearing Statements and Post Hearing Briefs to
determine if there are any additional disagreements between, or arguments raised by, the parties
that were not specifically identified by the Court. We found six arguments raised before us that
were 	not 	expressly 	mentioned 	in 	the 	above-quoted 	paragraph. 	On 	November 	9, 	2023,
Commission staff conducted an informal meeting with the parties to this docket who were also
5 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 907.
6 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 905 (“[W]e remand this case to the Commission for an explanation of its decision consistent
with the governing law as set forth in our case law and reiterated here.”).
7 FAIR, 371 So. 3d 912.
8 FAIR, 371 So. 3d 908-09.

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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PAGE 6
parties to the Supreme Court appeal – Intervenors and FPL – and presented the above list of
arguments. These parties agreed to that list with the following additional issues:
10. 	Revenue allocation between classes.
11. 	FPL system overbuilt.
12. 	Storm cost recovery mechanism.
13. 	Federal tax adjustments.
14. 	Incentive mechanism for asset optimization.
15. 	Solar cap cost incentive.
B. Factors Relevant to the Commission’s Decision
The Court identified certain factors that we must consider in this remand when we
address these competing arguments:
The Legislature has provided that the Commission, in “fixing fair, just, and
reasonable rates for each customer class, ... shall, to the extent practicable,
consider the cost of providing service to the class, as well as the rate history,
value of service, and experience of the public utility; the consumption and load
characteristics of the various classes of customers; and public acceptance of rate
structures.” § 366.06(1). The Commission “shall also consider 	the performance
of each utility pursuant to [the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act]
when establishing rates for those utilities over which the commission has
ratesetting authority.” § 366.82(10), Fla. Stat. (2021). A reasonably explained
decision 	from 	the 	Commission 	must 	reflect 	that 	those 	factors 	have 	been
considered to the extent practicable.9
The Court also noted additional factors that we may consider in appropriate circumstances at our
discretion:
[T]he Commission can consider “the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the
facilities provided and the services rendered; the cost of providing such service
and the value of such service to the public; the ability of the utility to improve
such service and facilities; and energy conservation and the efficient use of
alternative energy resources.” § 366.041(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). And the Legislature
has made clear that “it is in the public interest to promote the development of
renewable energy resources in this state.” § 366.91(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). Evidence
that these factors have been considered—where they are germane to determining
whether the settlement agreement is in the public interest and results in rates that
are 	fair, 	just, 	and 	reasonable—permits 	meaningful 	judicial 	review 	of 	the
Commission’s conclusions.
The Commission can also consider non-statutory factors if it explains why they
9 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).

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PAGE 7
are relevant and how they relate to the Commission’s “historical and statutory
role.” Sierra Club, 243 So. 3d at 911. For example, in the order under review, the
Commission supported its decision by stating that “FPL’s residential 1,000 kWh
bill [is] projected to remain 21% below the current national average” under the
settlement agreement. Assuming that it can explain the relevance of this metric in
light of “the purpose of the Commission,” id., the Commission can permissibly
consider it in making its decision.10
C. 	Procedure and the Record
Citing the Court’s direction that we “shall also consider the performance of each utility
pursuant to [the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act] when establishing rates for
those utilities over which the commission has ratesetting authority”11 and the discretion afforded
us in conducting this remand, FAIR filed a Motion to Reopen the Evidentiary Record on
February 6, 2024. In the Motion, FAIR requests that we reopen the evidentiary record for the
limited and sole purpose of admitting the Annual Report of Activities Pursuant to the Florida
Energy and Conservation Act for 2021 (FEECA Report). FAIR asserts that we must have the
FEECA Report to comply with the Supreme Court’s remand.
FPL filed its response in opposition, arguing first that the existing record on FEECA is
sufficient. FPL submitted prefiled testimony on a number of areas relevant to FEECA. FPL states
that all Intervenors had the opportunity to respond to this testimony, and that several did present
FEECA-related testimony. FPL also notes that virtually all of the documents sought to be
submitted were not in existence when we made our original decision.
The FEECA Report was prepared by us pursuant to Section 366.82(10), F.S., which
provides, in pertinent part, that “[]the commission shall require periodic reports from each utility
and shall provide the Legislature and the Governor with an annual report by March 1 of the goals
it has adopted and its progress toward meeting those goals.”12 The FEECA Report bears an
issuance date of November 2021. The final evidentiary hearing in the base rate case concluded
September 20, 2021. We voted to approve the stipulation and settlement on October 26, 2021.
The FEECA Report was not in existence on either of these dates.
Because we prepared the FEECA Report pursuant to a statutory duty, it may be
admissible in a proceeding in which it is relevant.13 However, the FEECA Report did not exist in
this form until the record in this proceeding was closed and the decision made. We find that it
10 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
12 Pursuant to Section 366.82(6), F.S., we must review the conservation goals of each utility subject to FEECA at
least every five years. We last established conservation goals for FPL in 2019. Order No. PSC-2018-0509-FOF-EG,
issued November 26, 2019, in Docket No. 20190015-EG, In re: Commission review of numeric conservation goals
(Florida Power & Light Company).
13 See Lee v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 698 So. 2d 1194, 1200 (Fla. 1997).

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 8
would not be appropriate to place documents created post-hearing, post-decision in the record for
purposes of making additional findings.14
Additionally, FAIR’s request would necessitate opening the proceeding to provide FPL
due process,15 leading to a potential procedural morass.
If one side were permitted to produce additional evidence, as suggested . . . , then
the other side would necessarily have to be given the same privilege, and each
side would of necessity have to be given the right of confrontation and cross-
examination of the additional witnesses, and possibly rebuttal. We do not envision
the Administrative Procedures Act as permitting such a never-ending process.16
Because we could not have relied on this evidence when making the original decision, it
would be improper to do so now and admit the FEECA Report. Moreover, granting the Motion
would create numerous fundamental procedural issues. We have in this Supplemental Order
complied with the Florida Supreme Court’s direction that we consider FEECA performance “to
the extent practical.” For all of these reasons, FAIR’s Motion to Reopen the Record is denied.
Citing the same provisions in the FAIR opinion discussed immediately above, Florida
Rising filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on February 7, 2024. While similar to FAIR’s
Motion, Florida Rising seeks broader relief. Florida Rising first requests that we schedule an
evidentiary hearing solely on FPL’s FEECA performance. Alternatively, Florida Rising seeks
to submit the FEECA Reports covering the years 2020, 2021, and 2023. By comparison, FAIR
only sought to submit the 2021 FEECA Report. Florida Rising also seeks to submit the
Demand Side Management (DSM) Reports from FPL for this same, three-year time period.
Finally, 	Florida 	Rising 	seeks 	to 	submit 	data 	compiled 	by 	the 	United 	States 	Energy
Information Agency (EIA) for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022. Florida Rising contends that
we must have this information in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s remand and the
consideration of FPL’s FEECA performance. 	FPL filed its response in opposition, arguing
first that the existing record on FEECA is sufficient. FPL submitted prefiled testimony on a
number of areas relevant to FEECA. FPL states that all Intervenors had the opportunity to
respond to this testimony, and that several did present FEECA-related testimony. FPL also notes
that virtually all of the documents sought to be submitted were not in existence when we made
our original decision.
As to the materials that were not in existence when we made our prior decision and the
request for an evidentiary hearing on those materials, the same analysis applies as set forth
14 Cf. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d 421, 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
(“Official recognition is not a device for agencies to circumvent the hearing officer's findings of fact by building a
new record on which to make new findings.”).
15 See Citizens of State of Fla. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 383 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 1980) (official recognition
“guarantees parties the basic rudiments of procedural due process notice and an opportunity to be heard before
permitting agency action which may affect their vital interests”).
16 Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
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PAGE 9
immediately above. The request by Florida Rising’s that we reopen the record to consider this
data suffers the same flaws as FAIR’s Motion and is denied for the same reasons.
The EIA information in existence prior to October 2021 and the 2020 FEECA and DSM
Reports were in existence when we made our prior decision. Accordingly, Florida Rising could
have sought to submit them in 2021 when this docket was litigated. No good cause for this
failure is set forth in the Motion.
Allowing 	Florida 	Rising 	to 	submit 	this 	material 	would 	necessitate 	some 	sort 	of
evidentiary hearing to comport with due process. Again, Florida Rising has demonstrated no
cause for us to take the extraordinary step of reopening a rate case to allow the presentation of
evidence that could have been, but was not, introduced at the rate hearing.
The request that we conduct a limited hearing specifically on FEECA is beyond the scope
of this remand. As to the request to submit additional documentary evidence, virtually all of the
evidence Florida Rising seeks to submit for consideration was not in existence at the time we
made the original decision. Because we could not have relied on this evidence when that decision
was made, it would be improper to now admit the various reports cited by Florida Rising (or
have an evidentiary hearing on them). Moreover, granting the Motion would create numerous
fundamental procedural issues. These same procedural concerns apply with equal weight to the
materials proffered by Florida Rising that were in existence when we made our prior decision.
Reopening the record for purposes of admitting these materials would result in, essentially, a
new hearing, when these materials could have been but were not admitted in the original rate
case. For these reasons, we deny Florida Rising’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.
D. 	Conclusion
Consistent with the Court’s direction, we provide below our explanation of how the
evidence presented on the parties’ competing arguments, in light of the identified factors, leads
to our conclusion that approving the 2021 Settlement is in the public interest. We do so based on
the existing record. All aspects of Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI and Order No. PSC-2021-
0446A-S-EI remain unchanged.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
In reviewing a settlement agreement, we first “make[] factual findings based on the
evidence presented by the parties.”17 As the finder of fact, we must “consider all the evidence
presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the
evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based on competent substantial evidence.”18 Each
of those ultimate findings of fact must be based on a preponderance of the record evidence.19 The
Florida Supreme Court defines “preponderance of the evidence” as follows:
17 FAIR¸371 So. 3d at 910.
18 Martuccio v. Dep't of Pro. Regul., Bd. of Optometry, 622 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (citation omitted).
19 Fla. Stat. § 120.57(1)(j).

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The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater
number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most
convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free
the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and
impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.20
Our findings of fact regarding the competing arguments presented by the parties are set forth
below.
Issue 1: The need for the rate increases in the Settlement Agreement.
In the original filing, FPL requested a comprehensive base revenue increase in 2022 of
$1.108 billion, a subsequent year adjustment in 2023 of $607 million, and adjustments in 2024
and 2025 solely for solar generation (discussed below in Issue 5, Solar Base Rate Adjustment).
Capital initiatives account for most of the requested increases in 2022 and 2023, with inflation,
customer growth, and changes in the weighted average cost of capital also affecting to the total.
The capital initiatives include improvements to reliability, upgrades and additions to the
generation fleet, and hardening infrastructure. Id.
The 	2021 	Settlement 	lowers 	the 	rate 	increases 	originally 	proposed 	by 	FPL. 	The
Agreement authorizes FPL to increase its base rates and service charges effective January 1,
2022, to generate an additional $692 million of annual revenue. 	The 2021 Settlement further
authorizes FPL to increase its base rates and service charges effective January 1, 2023, to
generate an additional $560 million of annual revenue.
FAIR asserts that the increase proposed in the 2021 Settlement – the largest (by dollar
amount) in history for an investor-owned Florida utility – imposes rates that are unfair, unjust,
and unreasonable because they exceed the level that FPL needs to fulfill its duty of providing
safe and reliable service at the lowest possible cost. FAIR Witness Herndon testified that FPL
can provide services at its current (2021) rates, and that only modest rate increases during the
term of the 2021 Settlement (Settlement Term) are justified. Florida Rising argues that FPL’s
rate base has quadrupled in sixteen years (2010-2025) and that the current increase in base rates
reflects this continuing overspending pattern.
In support of the need for the requested rate increases, FPL presented testimony that its
2022 test year jurisdictional adjusted ROE is projected to be 8.40 percent. This ROE is below the
bottom of the currently-authorized ROE range. Id. FPL’s projected 2023 jurisdictional ROE is
projected to be 7.03 percent, also below the bottom of FPL’s currently-authorized ranged.
Accordingly, continues FPL, the rate increases are necessary to ensure a fair return within the
authorized range.
FPL notes that the base rate increases in the 2021 Settlement represent a $383 million
reduction from FPL’s original request for 2022 base rates, and a $45 million reduction from the
20 S. Fla. Water Mgmt. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So. 3d 869, 872 n.1 (Fla. 2014).

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PAGE 11
request for 2023.21 FPL argues that even with the rate increases set forth in the 2021 Settlement,
its typical residential customer bills remain twenty percent below the national average, and will
remain stable and predictable over the Settlement Term.
The common theme among Intervenors’ arguments is that FPL can provide reliable
service to its customers at a far lower cost than requested in the 2021 Settlement. FPL’s response
is that the entire financial and capital structure it has proposed – including the base rate increases
– is necessary for it to continue providing current levels of service and value at a reasonable cost.
Virtually all of the operative provisions of the 2021 Settlement and the projects that are
being placed into rate base are not new.22 With the exception of the Pilot Programs discussed
below under Issue 7 and the minimum bill, every mechanism in the 2021 Settlement is a
continuation, expansion, or modification of a prior approval. The requested debt to equity ratio is
unchanged. Because FPL is continuing an existing path, we first examine existing rates and
utility operations. While we must pass on each proposal on its merits on the record before us, an
examination of utility performance under prior approvals can educate our decision-making.
In making this observation, we are guided by Section 366.06(1), F.S.:
In fixing fair, just, and reasonable rates for each customer class, the commission
shall, to the extent practicable, consider the cost of providing service to the class,
as well as the rate history, value of service, and experience of the public utility;
the consumption and load characteristics of the various classes of customers; and
public acceptance of rate structures.
In this same statute, the Legislature has directed us to “consider the cost of providing service to
the class, as well as . . . the value of service.”23 Because Chapter 366, Florida Statutes, does not
define “cost” or “value,” we look to dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain and ordinary
meaning of “cost” and “value.” 24 “Cost” is defined as “the amount or equivalent paid or charged
for something.” 25 “Value” is defined as “relative worth, utility, or importance.”26
21 The solar adjustments in 2024 and 2025 were not changed by the 2021 Settlement.
22 We need not discuss the prudence of every project being placed into rate base in determining whether a settlement
agreement is in the public interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable. See Sierra Club v. Brown,
243 So. 3d 903, 911-12 (Fla. 2018).
23 Fla. Stat. § 366.06(1) (emphasis added).
24 Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 891–92 (Fla. 2022).
25 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cost, last checked 01/31/24.
26 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/value, last checked 01/19/24. Some common definitions of “value”
are virtually the same as “cost.” However, assigning both terms the same definition and treating them as the same
would not be consistent with the legislative directive that we consider cost as well as value. Moreover, courts have
cautioned against ascribing the same meaning to two different terms when the legislature uses them in the statute.
“The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different
meanings were intended.” Department of Business Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1984).
The placement of “value” in this statute between two retrospective terms – “rate history” and “experience of the
public utility” – directs us to make an examination of the relative value of past service a part of our inquiry.
Additionally, the Legislature’s use of the phrase “the value of such service to the public” in a different statute also

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PAGE 12
The evidence in this record demonstrates that FPL has delivered value to its customers at
a relatively low cost. Residential rates remain well below the national average27 and below those
charged by other Florida investor-owned-utilities. The capabilities of the FPL fleet, while
characterized by Florida Rising as “overbuilt,” result in lower operation and maintenance
expenses and a high degree of reliability28 while maintaining relatively low base rates. And while
FAIR Witness Mac Mathuna offered an expert opinion that FPL could deliver this same reliable
and safe service at lower rates than those requested in the 2021 Settlement, we find more
persuasive the evidence presented by FPL that the rate increases proposed in the 2021 Settlement
Agreement are needed to maintain an ROE in the authorized range, are based on a sound analysis
of current and projected conditions in light of historical performance, and result in rates that are
fair, just, and reasonable. 29 We also note that these amounts were reduced from the original ask
and are the result of compromise among the Signatories.
Issue 2: Return on Equity Range
The 2021 Settlement sets the regulatory return on common equity (ROE) at 10.6 percent
for all purposes, with an authorized ROE range of 9.7 percent to 11.7 percent. This range is 90
basis points below the request contained in FPL’s original rate filing. If, at any time during the
Term, but no more than once during the Term, the average 30-year United States Treasury Bond
yield rate for any period of six consecutive months is at least 50 basis points greater than the
yield rate on the date that the 2021 Settlement is filed with the Commission (Trigger), after filing
notice with the Commission, FPL’s authorized ROE shall be increased by 20 basis points to be
within a range of 9.8 percent to 11.8 percent, with a mid-point of 10.8 percent. 	This rate shall
remain in effect from the Trigger date through the remainder of the Term, for any period in
which FPL’s rates continue in effect after December 31, 2025, and/or until a final order is issued
in a future proceeding changing FPL’s rates and its authorized ROE.
Florida Rising contends that this ROE is out-of-step with national trends. Citing the
testimony of OPC Witness Woolridge, Florida Rising notes that the average authorized ROE for
electric companies from 2000-2020 have slowly decreased from 12.5 percent to 9.39 percent.
Florida Rising also notes that we approved a 9.85 percent ROE mid-point for Duke Energy
Florida30 and 9.95 percent for Tampa Electric Company31 in rate cases filed the same calendar
year as FPL’s.32
addressing rates and the “efficiency” of facilities” reinforces our conclusion that our inquiry is to include overall
utility performance beyond cost.
27 FPL residential bills are 40 percent below the average of the 20 largest (by number of customers) investor-owned
utilities in the country.
28 FPL’s reliability is 58 percent better than the national average.
29 FPL Witness Bores identified the drivers of the increased revenue requirement behind the requested rate increases
for 2022 and 2023. Each of these drivers that has been specifically contested by Intervenors is discussed in the
section of this Order under the specific issue headings.
30 Order No. PSC-2021-0202-AS-EI, issued June 4, 2021, in Docket No. 20210016-EI, In re: Petition for Limited
Proceeding to Approve 2021 Settlement Agreement, Including General Base Rate Increase, by Duke Energy
Florida, LLC.

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FAIR argues that a fair and reasonable ROE for FPL would be between 8.50 percent and
9.55 percent, depending on the corresponding capital structure (equity to debt ratio). FAIR
Witness Mac Mathuna’s ultimate conclusion is “that the fair and reasonable ROE for FPL should
be set at 8.56 percent and that FPL’s equity ratio should be set at 55.4 percent for purposes of
setting FPL’s revenue requirements for 2022.”33
FPL argues that its infrastructure risk profile is higher than most other utilities and that a
higher ROE is necessary to attract investment due to this volatility. One aspect of this risk is
created by Florida’s geography and FPL’s territory. FPL territory includes much of the west and
east coasts of Florida peninsula and now encompasses the former Gulf territory in the
westernmost portions of the state’s panhandle. This expanse of low-lying coastline makes FPL’s
territory especially vulnerable in the short term to tropical storm impacts and in the long-term to
the effects of sea level rise. Based on current climate predictions, this risk is expected to
increase. Additionally, nearly 40 percent of FPL’s customer accounts – 5.6 million – are located
at the southern tip of the state in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, the geography of which
heightens transmission and reliability challenges.
Nuclear generation comprises 22 percent of FPL’s energy mix. Investors perceive risk
with such generation, and this increased risk perception in turn requires a higher return to
encourage investment.
In support of the as-filed request, FPL Witness Coyne testified that an ROE in the range
of 10.5 to 11.5 percent would be reasonable based upon his cost of equity analyses. In reaching
this conclusion, Witness Coyne used four modeling methodologies “to provide a robust
analytical framework for determining FPL’s ROE without the undue influence of any single
approach or set of assumptions.”34 Witness Coyne also testified that these models and their
results should be examined in the context of current and projected market conditions. The global
outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and the measures taken to address it had an
immediate and drastic effect on the 2020 economy. Higher volatility and uncertainty is expected
to persist. According to Witness Coyne, actions the Federal Reserve has taken to address these
market uncertainties and stimulus packages being considered by the United States Congress may
increase inflation and cause interest rates to spike. Witness Coyne supports the lower ROE set
forth in the 2021 Settlement Agreement, though lower than what he recommended, stating that it
“is within the reasonable range” established by his comprehensive modeling methodologies.
Witness Barrett’s prefiled testimony sets forth in detail FPL’s ability to meet the
unprecedented challenges posed by effects of the global outbreak of COVID-19 based on its
financial position. Witness Barrett also testified regarding FPL’s continued financial strength
31 Order No. PSC-2021-0423-S-EI, issued November 10, 2021, in Docket No. 20210034-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Tampa Electric Company.
32 We have long recognized that the ROE we approve for one company does not mandate that we approve a similar
ROE for a different company. See United Telephone Co. v. Mayo, 345 So. 2d 648, 654 (Fla. 1977).
33 T. Vol. 12 at 2594.
34 T. Vol. 9 at 2082.

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during the recent volatility of utility investments. “FPL’s successful financing contrasts with
other, lower credit issuers, who attempted to raise debt but ultimately had to pull their issuances
from the market or saw significant higher spreads.”35
The Florida Supreme Court wrote as follows regarding general considerations applicable
to establishing the boundaries of an appropriate ROE range:
The rate of return which public utility companies may be allowed to earn is a
question of vital importance to both rate payers and investors. An inadequate
return 	may 	prevent 	satisfactory 	services 	to 	the 	public 	and 	concomitantly
disappoint investors who will look for alternative sources of investment. The
Public Service Commission is given the power to fix the return within certain
limits. That return cannot be set so low as to confiscate the property of the utility,
nor can it be made so high as to provide greater than a reasonable rate of return,
thereby prejudicing the consumer. 36
In fixing a reasonable rate of return within this range, we are guided by the long-established
Hope 	and 	Bluefield 	standard.37 	Under 	this 	standard, 	a 	reasonable 	return 	is 	one 	that 	is
commensurate with the return investors would expect from like investments of comparable risk,
is reasonably sufficient to assure investor confidence that the utility is financially sound, and is
adequate to attract capital on reasonable terms.38
Regarding comparable risk, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that FPL’s
infrastructure risk profile is different from most utilities, including those in the various proxy
groups.39 Especially with the acquisition of Gulf, FPL’s territory includes appreciable expanses
of low-lying coastline that bring inherent risk. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates
that this risk is likely to continue to increase over time due to storm frequency and severity as
well as sea-level rise. Additionally, FPL faces investor uncertainty due to the perceived risks of
nuclear-fueled energy. FPL must have an adequate ROE in order to attract capital on reasonable
terms throughout a multi-year rate plan.
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the Company’s overall capital
structure has contributed to its ability to provide customers reliable service at reasonable rates
while weathering tropical and financial storms. Continuing this strong capital structure can
assure investors that the utility is financially sound, which in turn benefits all customers by
attracting capital on reasonable terms.
35 T. Vol. 10 at 2258.
36 United Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Mayo, 345 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 1977).
37 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Bluefield Water Works and Improvement
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
38 Hope, 320 U.S. at 603; Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 692-93.
39 The proxy groups also include both vertically integrated utilities that own generation assets, like FPL, and utilities
that own no such assets (transmission and distribution utilities). Vertically integrated utilities have a higher business
risk.

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PAGE 15
Based on this record, we conclude that a regulatory ROE of 10.6 percent for all purposes,
with an authorized ROE range of 9.7 percent to 11.7 percent, as set forth in the 2021 Settlement,
is appropriate and in the public interest. We note that if the United States Treasury Bond yield
meets the specified thresholds and this ROE is increased from 9.8 percent to 11.8 percent, base
rates will not increase.
FAIR, Florida Rising, and FPL presented the testimony of numerous, well-qualified
experts on this issue.40 Our ultimate determination rests in large part on the relative weight we
have afforded the opinions of these experts. “[A] ‘battle of the experts’ has become the norm in
modern trials. Courts must resolve the issues upon which the experts differ; that is their job in the
absence of a jury, no matter how difficult or complex the issue becomes.” 41 The finder of fact “is
free to weigh the opinion testimony of expert witnesses, and either accept, reject or give that
testimony such weight as it deserves considering the witnesses' qualifications, the reasons given
by the witness for the opinion expressed, and all the other evidence in the case, including lay
testimony.” 42 In a prior case involving “a divergence of expert opinion as to the proper rate of
return to be granted,” the Florida Supreme Court specifically held that “[i]t is the Commission’s
prerogative to evaluate the testimony of competing experts and accord whatever weight to the
conflicting opinions it deems appropriate.”43
While all witnesses on these issues are extremely qualified in their areas of expertise and
provided comprehensive analyses and well-reasoned conclusions based on the facts in this
record, we find the testimony of FPL Witnesses Coyne and Barrett in this record to be more
persuasive. Accordingly, we afford their testimony greater weight than the testimony offered by
the other experts in making our specific findings and reaching our conclusions regarding both
ROE and equity to debt ratio (discussed immediately below).
Issue 3: Equity to Debt Ratio
FPL proposes an equity ratio of 59.6 percent. This equity ratio is higher than the ratios we
approved for TECO (54 percent)44 and DEF (53 percent)45 and above the average for the
operating companies in the proxy group.46 Florida Rising argues that there is no record evidence
to support a higher ratio for FPL, and argues that our approval should be in the range of 50-55
40 We have also reviewed and weighed the testimony relied upon by FAIR and Florida Rising that had been prefiled
by OPC prior to entering the 2021 Settlement.
41 Rossi v. Brown, 581 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
42 Wald v. Grainger, 64 So. 3d 1201, 1205 (Fla. 2011); see also Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35
So. 3d 84, 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“[T]he finder of fact is free to determine the reliability and credibility of expert
opinions and, if conflicting, to weigh them as the finder sees fit.”).
43 Mayo, 345 So.2d at 654.
44 Order No. PSC-2021-0423-S-EI, issued November 10, 2021, in Docket No. 20210034-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Tampa Electric Company.
45 Order No. PSC-2021-0202-AS-EI, issued June 4, 2021, in Docket No. 20210016-EI, In re: Petition for Limited
Proceeding to Approve 2021 Settlement Agreement, Including General Base Rate Increase, by Duke Energy
Florida, LLC.
46 OPC Witness Woolridge calculated an average ratio of 44.5 percent using his proxy group and an average of 45.4
percent using FPL Witness Coyne’s proxy group.

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percent. FAIR Witness Mac Mathuna’s ultimate conclusion is “that the fair and reasonable ROE
for FPL should be set at 8.56 percent and that FPL’s equity ratio should be set at 55.4 percent for
purposes of setting FPL’s revenue requirements for 2022.”47
FPL’s proposed equity ratio of 59.6 percent is consistent with the ratios we have
approved for FPL over the past twenty years. The preponderance of the evidence in this record
supports continuing this ratio. As discussed above, we find that FPL has a unique risk profile,
and the equity to debt ratio is part of FPL’s overall strategy to maintain financial strength and
flexibility.
Many of Intervenors’ factual arguments with respect to the equity to debt ratio mirror
those with respect to the ROE. The remainder are variations on a common theme: that is, the
combination of the equity ratio and ROE produce rates that are not fair, just, and reasonable. For
the reasons discussed in this Order, we reach the contrary conclusion and find that the capital
structure works as part of the 2021 Settlement Agreement as a whole to further the public interest
and result in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 4: Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism (RSAM)
As part of its original filing in this docket, FPL submitted a depreciation study performed
by FPL Witness Allis. Based on the application of the parameters resulting from FPL’s 2021
Depreciation Study, Witness Allis concluded that FPL had a “theoretical reserve imbalance of
$437 million.” Put plainly, the analysis estimated that FPL had under-collected from its
ratepayers, and had a $437 million theoretical reserve deficit as a result. Witness Allis explained
his conclusion and its import as follows:
The terms “correct” or “incorrect” and the precision or exactness that they imply
have no application in this context; rather, the theoretical reserve is an estimate at
any given point in time based on the current plant balances and current life and
net salvage estimates. It can provide a benchmark of a Company’s reserve
position, but it should not be thought of as the “correct” reserve amount. 48
FPL then performed an alternative depreciation analysis using increased plant lives for
the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (60 years to 80 years), all combined cycle generating plants (40 years
to 50 years), and all solar generating plants (30 years to 35 years). For transmission, distribution,
and general plant functions, FPL adopted the lives and/or net salvage values from “either the
2016 FPL Rate Settlement or FPL witness Allis’ 2021 Depreciation Study whichever results in
longer lives and/or higher net salvage.”49 Using the alternative depreciation parameters, FPL has
a theoretical depreciation reserve surplus of $1.45 billion.
A preponderance of the evidence supports use of the alternative depreciation parameters.
The St. Lucie Nuclear Plant extension is based on a reasonable expectation that the license
47 T. Vol. 12 at 2594.
48 T. Vol. 3 at 730-31.
49 T. Vol. 4 at 751.

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renewal to be filed in 2021 will be granted. The Company has a record of above-average plant
performance, plant upgrades, and plans for the potential utilization of green hydrogen, all of
which support extending the life of its combined cycle facilities from 40 years to 50 years.
Recent data indicate that a 35-year life for solar facilities is feasible.
Whereas 	the 	theoretical 	reserve 	imbalance 	from 	the 	original 	depreciation 	study
represented an under-collection, the reserve amount resulting from utilization of the alternative
depreciation parameters represents an over-collection from the ratepayers. The RSAM is the
accounting tool that governs FPL’s use of this reserve amount. Under the RSAM, FPL uses the
reserve amount to absorb revenues and expenses such that it maintains a return on equity within
its approved range. The Company records the increases and decreases in expenses that have been
addressed by the RSAM in its surveillance reports.
The RSAM operates under numerous conditions and limitations. The amount to be
amortized is capped at $200 million in 2022, but is discretionary with FPL for each year
thereafter. 	Amortization in each year of the Settlement Term is subject to the following
conditions: (1) for any surveillance reports submitted by FPL in which its 12-month period ROE
would otherwise fall below the bottom of the authorized range, FPL must amortize at least the
amount necessary to maintain an ROE of at least the bottom of the authorized range; (2) FPL
may not amortize an amount that would result in an ROE greater than the top of the authorized
range for any 12-month period; and (3) FPL must debit depreciation expense and credit
depreciation reserve in order not to exceed the top of its authorized range. Any unfunded storm
reserve balance must be depleted prior to using the funded reserve to recover storm costs.
During the Term, FPL must use all of its Reserve Amount to increase its ROE above the bottom
of the ROE range before it may initiate a petition to increase base rates.
Florida Rising contends that we should not allow FPL to use the RSAM at its discretion
because the Company has earned at the top of its regulatory range since the original adoption of
the RSAM, and that such a return is not fair and reasonable. FAIR agrees with Florida Rising,
and further argues that the RSAM provisions in the 2021 Settlement allow the transfer of a
customer-created reserve to FPL investors via earnings at the top of the authorized range. FAIR
argues that the RSAM should be limited in its application to those situations where FPL must
utilize it to stay at the midpoint of its authorized range, and should not be available to earn above
the midpoint.
FPL counters that the RSAM is essential for the Company to implement a four-year rate
plan without the need to seek a change in rates. The RSAM allows the Company to address
unexpected situations and changes in circumstances.
The RSAM has been in place since 2013 and has been a key to FPL implementing multi-
year rate terms and avoiding multiple rate cases. During the most recent period (2017-2020)
when FPL was operating under the 2016 Settlement, FPL was able to employ the RSAM to react
to the 2017 Tax Reform and Jobs Act and address the unprecedented impacts related to the
COVID pandemic without seeking a rate change. Even with those unexpected events, FPL was
able to extend the term under its 2016 Settlement such that the rate increases sought here are

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PAGE 18
effective January 2022 instead of January 2021. The RSAM has provided this degree of rate
stability since 2013. We find such rate stability, especially when accompanied by the low base
rates as detailed in this Order, to be in the public interest.50
Intervenors also argue that the RSAM is a financial tool that is essentially a “slush fund”
used by FPL to maintain earnings at the top of its range, and that such an application of this
mechanism is not in the public interest. The RSAM is used to respond to events and expenses not
anticipated in the normal course of business. Day-to-day utility operations are generating
revenues, and the combination of any number of factors in those operations can result in higher
(or lower) earnings.51 The RSAM can (and does) serve as a tool to address the unexpected as
FPL implements its plans over time. In that manner, the RSAM may indirectly contribute to
higher earnings.
Issue 5: Rate base investments – SoBRA
The 2021 Settlement authorizes FPL to construct 1,788 megawatts (MW) of solar
facilities projected to go into service in 2024 and 2025 or within one year following expiration of
the minimum term. These projects are subject to an installed cost cap of $1,250 per kilowatt of
AC power (kWAC ) , less the cost of any land component allocated to such projects when the land
is already included in rate base as Plant Held for Future Use. If leased land is used to construct a
project, the lease expense will be converted to a capital cost surrogate in accordance with our
precedent and used to measure performance against the $1,250 per kWAC price cap.
FPL is authorized to make Solar Base Rate Adjustments (SoBRA) during the Settlement
Term to recover the costs of these projects. FPL must file a request for cost recovery approval of
the subject solar generation project in the Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Recovery Clause in
the year before that project goes into service. In that proceeding, we will consider whether FPL’s
cumulative present value of revenue requirements (CPVRR) 52 is lower with the generation
project than without, and will also determine the associated adjustments to rates and riders.
For each solar project that is approved for cost recovery, FPL’s base rates will be
increased 	by 	the 	incremental 	annualized 	base 	revenue 	requirement 	(excluding 	any 	land
component that is already included in base rates as Plant Held for Future Use) for the first 12
months of operation, but such recovery will not commence before the entire solar project is in
service. 	Battery storage can be paired with the solar projects so long as the total cost remains
below the $1,250 per kWAC cap and the project is cost effective.
50 Long-term rate stability and the resulting avoidance of the cost and expense of multiple rate cases as beneficial to
ratepayers. See, e.g., Order No. PSC-01-0759-FOF-SU, issued March 26, 2001, in Docket No. 9709910SU, In re:
Investigation into Rates and Charges of Florida Cities Water Co. – Lee Division (South Ft. Myers Wastewater
System) for Potential Overearnings.
51 For instance, “FPL’s non-fuel O&M expense per customer and per MWh in 2019 were best in the nation by a
wide margin.”
52 CPVRR means the total amount of revenue over the relevant term needed to cover capital and other expenses,
operations and maintenance, depreciation, and the regulatory return on equity, discounted to present value.

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Florida Rising contends that we are without authority to approve this mechanism for two
reasons. First, Florida Rising argues that to approve future rate increases based on planned
construction of solar facilities violates Section 366.06, F.S. Second, Florida Rising argues that
interim rate increases are allowed under Section 366.07, F.S., only upon a showing by the utility
that it is not earning within its range of return. The gist of both arguments is Florida Rising’s
contention that we must conduct a hearing and make an appropriate determination at the time we
allow interim rate hikes, and that to do so in advance violates the cited statutes and is illegal.
The Florida Supreme Court did not remand this matter for us to reconsider our authority
to approve the SoBRA mechanism. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to whether approval of
this mechanism is in the public interest in light of the factors identified by the Court in its
remand.
The SoBRA mechanism was contained in the settlement agreements that we approved to
resolve the FPL rate cases in both 2012 and 2016. 53 This 	mechanism 	allows 	FPL 	to 	increase
cost-effective solar incrementally over a defined period, with concurrent, gradual increases to
rate base. Implementation of the SoBRA-based solar program has provided savings to customers
while bringing a considerable number of solar projects into service. This increase in solar
generation furthers Section 366.91(6), F.S., which provides:
The Legislature finds that it is in the public interest to promote the development
of renewable energy resources in this state. Renewable energy resources have the
potential to help diversify fuel types to meet Florida’s growing dependency on
natural gas for electric production, minimize the volatility of fuel costs, encourage
investment within the state, improve environmental conditions, and make Florida
a leader in new and innovative technologies.
The opportunity for FPL to add solar generation during the Settlement Term furthers legislative
intent to promote the development of renewable energy resources, to diversify the types of fuel
used to generate electricity, and to improve environmental conditions. The rate increases that
accompany the addition of this generation are gradual and predictable, thereby supporting rate
stability over the Term.
Issue 6: SolarTogether expansion
We approved the SolarTogether program (Phase I) the year before this rate case was filed
by Order No. PSC-2020-0084-S-EI.54 This Order approved a Settlement Agreement executed by
FPL, the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Vote Solar, and Walmart, Inc., and supported by
amicus curiae Duke Energy Florida, LLC. Generally stated, SolarTogether is a voluntary
program that provides FPL customers the opportunity to subscribe to a portion of new solar
53 Order No. PSC-13-0023-S-EI, issued January 14, 2013, in In re Petition for Increase in Rates by Florida Power &
Light Co.; Order No. PSC-16-0560-AS-EI, issued December 15, 2016, in In re Petition for Rate Increase by Florida
Power & Light Co.
54 Order No. PSC-2020-0084-S-EI, issued March 20, 2020, in Docket No. 20190061-EI, In re: Petition for approval
of FPL SolarTogether program and tariff by Florida Power & Light Company.

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capacity built through the program by paying a subscription charge. This subscription charge (or
fee) reflects the revenue requirement associated with constructing the solar facilities, and is
recorded by FPL in base revenues as sales from electricity. Those participants will receive a
subscription credit representing a portion of the system savings produced by that solar capacity.
The credit will be recovered through the Fuel Clause.
The original approved size of the program (Phase I) is 1,490 MW, consisting of 20
individual solar power plants sized at 74.5 MW each. The 1,490 MW capacity is allocated 75
percent (1,117.5 MW) to commercial, industrial, and governmental customers and 25 percent
(372.5 MW) to residential and small business. Customers may elect a subscription level
equivalent to the capacity that would generate up to 100 percent of their previous 12 months’
total kilowatt-hour usage, subject to capacity availability. Participation in the Program is
voluntary. The 1,490 MW of solar generation is projected to save customers $249 million. FPL
estimates that 55 percent of the projected program benefits will flow to participants and 45
percent to the general body of customers.
The 2021 Settlement55 proposes to expand the program by an additional 1,788 MW at
FPL’s discretion through 2025 such that the total capacity of SolarTogether would equal 3,278
MW. 	The 1,788 MW of incremental capacity will be allocated 40 percent to residential and
small business customers (45 MW reserved for low-income participants) and 60 percent
allocated to commercial, industrial, and governmental (20 percent of this commercial, industrial,
and governmental capacity is reserved for participants located in the former Gulf territory). The
allocation of benefits remains the same at 55 percent to participants and 45 percent to the general
body of customers. The program is designed such that participants will receive 55 percent of the
program benefits ($357 million), realizing full pay-back of their subscription fees by year 7,
while paying 103.26 percent of the program’s revenue requirements. The general body of
ratepayers will receive 45 percent ($292 million) of the program benefits and pay no subscription
fee. Of this amount, $95 million is fixed.56
Florida Rising contends that the program allocations in the program, as modified in the
2021 Settlement’ are discriminatory in that they do not match actual power consumption by FPL
customers. Specifically, Florida Rising notes that residential consumption makes up 63 percent
of FPL energy sales, yet residential customers are allocated less than that share in the current
proposal. Another feature of the SolarTogether program contested by Florida Rising involves the
calculation of credits to those who participate in the program and benefits to the general body of
ratepayers. Specifically, Florida Rising contends that the benefits to participants are much greater
than those realized by non-participants, and are subsidized by the general body of ratepayers.
Finally, Florida Rising also argues that FPL’s projections are skewed and SolarTogether is not a
cost-effective way in which to construct the planned solar.
55 We note that the Office of Public Counsel and Florida Industrial Power Users Group opposed our original
approval of SolarTogether and contested the proposed settlement in 2020, but are signatories to the 2021 Settlement
Agreement and do not oppose the expanded program.
56 This amount is included in the difference between 100 percent of base revenue requirements for the program and
the amount paid by participants (103.26 percent) over the life of the program.

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FPL’s overarching response to the specific arguments regarding the cost-effectiveness of
SolarTogether is that the costs and benefits must be examined (1) over the life of the program
and (2) as compared to the costs and benefits of continuing to construct non-solar power
generation facilities. Over its life, the SolarTogether extension alone is projected to provide $425
million of CPVRR savings compared to the same time period without SolarTogether. Coupled
with the 2020 SolarTogether (Phase I) approval, the total CPVRR for the program is projected to
be $648 million. FPL estimates 55 percent of the projected benefits will flow to participants and
45 percent to the general body of customers.
Our initial approval of SolarTogether by Order No. PSC-2020-0084-S-EI expressly
contemplates 	the 	possibility 	of 	FPL 	proposing 	an 	“FPL 	SolarTogether 	Phase 	II.”57 	The
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that this expansion of SolarTogether is cost-
effective and in the public interest.
FPL used the same cost-effectiveness analysis for this expansion as it did for the original
program. This analysis basically compares the FPL fleet with and without the additional
proposed solar generation, and supports the conclusion that the total CPVRR of the extended
program is $648 million. Witness Bores convincingly demonstrated that the calculations offered
by Florida Rising in support of their claim of an unduly discriminatory rate structure were based
on a flawed assumption. We find the comprehensive analysis performed over the life of the
extended SolarTogether program under the direction of FPL Witness Bores and its conclusion
regarding CPVRR benefits to be more persuasive than mathematical snapshots offered by
Florida Rising as impeachment of that analysis.
Further, we find the allocation of 55 percent of these projected benefits to participants
and 45 percent to the general body of customers to be in the public interest and, as discussed
below, to be part of a framework that results in fair, just, and reasonable rates. We also find that
SolarTogether fairly distributes the new solar generation among classes, with Phase II increasing
availability 	for 	residential 	and 	small 	business 	customers. 	Because 	SolarTogether 	fairly
distributes generation and benefits among ratepayers, we reject Florida Rising’s argument that
the program is unduly discriminatory.
Finally, as discussed below in the Public Interest section of this Order, our approval of
Phase II of SolarTogether serves “the public interest to promote the development of renewable
energy resources in this state.”58
Issue 7: Pilot programs
Approval of the 2021 Settlement Agreement authorizes several pilot programs, three of
which are challenged by Intervenors as set forth below.
57 Order at 10, Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ⁋ 4(e).
58 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(6).

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Electric vehicle chargers
The Settlement Agreement authorizes six programs related to electric vehicles (EVs): (1)
EVolution, a program to gather data and better plan for and design future EV investments ($30
million); (2) public fast charging program, designed to place utility-owned public EV fast
charging 	stations 	($100 	million); 	(3) 	residential 	EV 	charging 	services 	pilot, 	providing
opportunity for residential customers to have an EV charger installed, owned, operated, and
maintained by FPL ($25 million); (4) commercial EV charging services pilot, providing
opportunity for commercial customers to pay a fixed monthly charge for EV charging services
via Company-owned, operated, and maintained equipment for fleet vehicles ($25 million); (5)
new technologies and software, designed to evaluate emerging electric technologies and enhance
service and resiliency for customers ($20 million); and (6) education and awareness, a suite of
programs including school curriculums, promotion at conferences and gathering, and providing
resources about electric options ($5 million). The EVolution program was presented by FPL in
its original request and direct testimony. The other five programs were added by the 2021
Settlement.
The 2021 Settlement Agreement authorizes FPL to implement and recover the costs
associated with these EV programs. Pursuant to the 2021 Settlement, only the reasonableness of
amounts actually expended may be challenged. 	The cost of the infrastructure of the EV
programs, including the installation and removal costs, are included in the jurisdictional rate base
until recovered from customers. This total cost is estimated at $205 million over the Term, with
certain offsets expected. Customer pricing for the commercial EV pilot is designed to recover all
costs and expenses over the life of the assets and to be CPVRR neutral to the general body of
ratepayers over the Term. The revenue requirements of the public fast charging program will be
partially offset by revenue received under FPL’s tariff approved in Docket No. 20200170-EI,
which establishes a rate for utility-owned public EV fast charging stations.
Florida Rising contends that these EV charging costs do not belong in rate base because
they do not generate or provide electricity to the general body of customers and are not supported
by any cost-benefit analysis.
Beginning in 1995 and continuing through the present, we have approved pilot EV
programs for several Florida public utilities, including FPL.59 While each program differs in
detail, they all serve the same general public interest goals.
59 Order No. PSC-95-0853-FOF-EG, issued July 17, 1995, in Docket No. 950517-EG, In re: Petition for Approval of
New Experimental Electric Vehicle Tariff by Tampa Electric Company; Order No. PSC-17-0178-S-EI, issued May
16, 2017, in Docket No. 160170-EI, In re: Petition for approval of 2016 depreciation and dismantlement studies,
approval of proposed depreciation rates and annual dismantlement accruals and Plant Smith Units 1 and 2
regulatory asset amortization, by Gulf Power Company; Order No. PSC-2017-0451-AS-EU, issued November 20,
2019, in Docket No. 20170183-EI, In re: Application for limited proceeding to approve 2017 second revised and
restated settlement agreement, including certain rate adjustments, by Duke Energy Florida, LLC; Order No. PSC-
2020-0512-TRF-EI, issued December 21, 2020, in Docket No. 20200170-EI, In re: Petition for approval of optional
electric vehicle public charging pilot tariffs, by Florida Power & Light Company; and Order No. PSC-2021-0144-
PAA-EI, issued April 21, 2021, in Docket No. 20200220-EI, In re: Petition for approval of electric vehicle charging
pilot program, by Tampa Electric Company.

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As we have in those prior dockets, we find that understanding the impacts EVs will have
on the local grid is in the public interest. The programs proposed by FPL are an effective means
of gathering this information.60 Specifically, as EV ownership increases, utilities must increase
their awareness of the impacts of EV charging on grid reliability and customer usage patterns.
These programs will provide FPL with the data points needed to plan for these impacts.
Green hydrogen
FPL is authorized to implement a Green Hydrogen pilot project to evaluate how its
combustion turbine units operate with a hydrogen fuel mix and learn how a hydrogen fuel
production facility can be effectively used on-site with combustion turbine units. The pilot will
be conducted at the existing Okeechobee Clean Energy Center and a 25 MW electrolyzer and
storage facility will be built there. The estimated cost of this pilot program is $65 million with a
projected in-service date of 2023. 	This estimated cost is included in rate base and is subject to
challenge at a later date.
Florida Rising contends that the Green Hydrogen pilot is uneconomic, inefficient, and
“ultimately an attempt by FPL to use its monopoly power to extract R&D rents from captive rate
payers to subsidize its possible entry into wholesale sales of hydrogen.” Florida Rising Witness
Rabago testified that hydrogen is categorically uneconomic on the scale proposed by FPL, and
that even small-scale usage will be inefficient.
FPL Witness Valle testified that the Green Hydrogen pilot is designed, in part, to address
the “curtailment” problem with solar energy. As detailed by Witness Valle, there is more
instantaneous solar generation available at any given time than there is instantaneous customer
demand. The pilot will use these peaks of solar energy to split water molecules into hydrogen
and oxygen, with the hydrogen then being used as up to 5 percent of the fuel for one combustion
turbine.
The Green Hydrogen pilot serves the recognized public interest in developing renewable
energy sources.61 The dispute among the parties is whether this proposal is cost-effective. Florida
Rising would have us conclude that this pilot should not be approved because separating and
utilizing hydrogen as a fuel is not currently economic, i.e., cost-effective. We find the testimony
of Witness Valle regarding the potential short and long-term benefits flowing from this pilot
compared to its relatively small costs to be more persuasive on this issue, and to demonstrate that
the Green Hydrogen pilot furthers the legislative intent to develop renewable energy resources.
60 The investments in these six pilots will be partially offset by any revenues received under the EV public charging
pilot we approved for FPL in Order No. PSC-2020-0512-TRF-EI.
61 Hydrogen “produced or resulting from sources other than fossil fuels” – i.e., green hydrogen – is included in
applicable statutory definition of “renewable energy.”§ 366.91(2), Fla. Stat.

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Solar power facilities
Under the 2021 Settlement, FPL is authorized to offer a four-year solar power facilities
pilot program where commercial and industrial customers on a metered rate may elect to have
FPL install and maintain a solar facility on their site for a monthly tariff charge. All project costs
and expenses will be recovered from participants through a fixed monthly charge over a ten-year
term.
Florida Rising argues that this program does not serve the ratepayers at large and is not in
useful service and, accordingly, is not allowable for inclusion in rate base for cost recovery.
Florida Rising argues that the provision of this type of solar infrastructure is and should continue
to be addressed by public sector.
This 	pilot 	program 	serves 	the 	public 	interest 	in 	solar 	generation 	and 	energy
diversification. Participation is voluntary and all costs and expenses are paid by participants.
Issue 8: $25 minimum bill
FPL’s customer charge 62 for residential customers is $8.99 per month. The same charge
for small commercial, non-demand customers is $12.51. The 2021 Settlement provides for the
addition of a new minimum base bill of $25 for all residential and general service non-demand
customers. Under this proposal, any customer whose volumetric charges and base charge
combined are less than $25 for any month would receive a bill for $25. FPL data indicate that
this proposal would apply to over 375,000 customers.
Florida Rising contends that the minimum base bill violates the principle of cost
causation, which they describe as the principle “that customers should pay for cost they create,
and not more or less, to the extent possible.”63 Florida Rising also contends that the minimum
base bill discourages customer investment in energy efficiency and distributed generation.
The purpose of the minimum base bill, as stated by FPL, is to ensure that all ratepayers
contribute their share to fixed system costs. FPL notes that all ratepayers receive service from the
same general transmission and distribution system, with wires and poles necessarily connecting
high and low usage customers alike. The base charge applicable to each customer covers only
billing, metering, and customer service costs. Zero usage and low usage customers who pay only
the base charge are not contributing to recovery for fixed transmission and distribution costs and
are being subsidized by the remainder of the ratepayers.
We agree that low usage customers and seasonal residents rely on the same portions of
the system as other customers. As the evidence shows, adding a minimum base bill ensures that
those customers contribute to the costs of that system. We find that the minimum base bill more
62 FPL is changing reference to this charge from “customer charge” to “base charge.” The base charge is included in
the new proposed minimum bill.
63 T. Vol. 10 at 2701.

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reasonably allocates fixed costs not covered by the base bill among all of these customers, and
that recovering this amount results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 9: Extension of time to recover retirement costs
FPL proposed in the filed rate case to amortize the costs of retired power plants and
transmission facilities over ten years. The 2021 Settlement extends this retirement period from
ten to twenty years. Florida Rising argues that this extension of the amortization period for
retired 	assets 	unnecessarily 	increases 	costs 	to 	ratepayers 	and 	results 	in 	intergenerational
inequities. Florida Rising Witness Rabago estimated64 the total cost of this extension to be $1.4
billion.
FPL Witness Bores testified that the extension of the amortization period allowed for a
“significant reduction” in revenue requirements over the Term. As to the intergenerational
argument, Witness Bores stated that the customers who pay for the retirements over the twenty-
year period will realize the benefits of retiring plants in favor of more-efficient, lower-emission
generation. Witness Bores estimated the nominal cost of this extension to be $600 million, and
that customers would be “relatively indifferent” to the impact of this amount on a discounted
basis over the 10- to 20-year period.
Extending the amortization period from ten to twenty years reduces the revenue
requirements for FPL over the Term. The customers who will pay these costs over the twenty-
year period will be those who realize benefits from retiring the plants in question and replacing
them with upgraded generation. We find this extension to be fair and to benefit the general body
of ratepayers, while also resulting in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 10: Revenue allocations between classes
Intervenors argue that the revenue allocations between classes are flawed because FPL
did not conduct a cost-of-service study and then base its allocations on the results of that study.
Florida Rising Witness Rabago testified that the proposed rate structure is inequitable, and
results in small business and residential customers subsidizing the electric bills of FPL’s larger,
general service customers. Witness Rabago calculated this subsidy to be $1 billion over the
Term.
FPL Witness Cohen testified that the revenue allocation under the 2021 Settlement is the
result of a negotiated compromise. The resulting revenue allocation to the residential classes in
the 2021 Settlement (59 percent) is slightly higher than that originally proposed but lower than
the allocation we approved in the 2016 Settlement (66 percent). Witness Cohen stated that this
allocation is consistent with prior settlements and complies with our principle of gradualism,
“which limits the revenue increase for each rate class to 1.5 times the total system average
increase, including adjustment clauses, and provides that no rate class receives a decrease in
64 Witness Rabago stated that he could not “precisely” calculate this impact.

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rate.”65 Under the 2021 Settlement, the typical residential bill for customers in the former FPL
service area will increase by 2.5 percent over the Settlement Term as compared to 3.4 percent
under the original filing.
We find these revenue allocations to be reasonable. They are consistent with our past
settlement approvals and comply with the principle of gradualism. The overall impact to the
residential rate classes was reduced through the negotiation process and, as discussed below,
results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Issue 11: FPL system overbuilt
Florida Rising contends that FPL’s investments in power plants and transmission and
distribution are excessive and result in an unjustifiable rate base expansion. Florida Rising
specifically contends that the Gulf Clean Energy Center 8 that FPL is constructing is unnecessary
because it increases the reserve margin and decreases the loss of load probability (LOLP) 66 far
beyond currently-established thresholds. Florida Rising contends that the scenarios upon which
FPL relies to justify this construction are unlikely or, in some cases, “absurdist and not worth
further responding to.” Florida Rising also contends the transmission and distribution system is
overbuilt, pointing specifically to the North Florida Resiliency Connection (NFRC). The end
result, concludes Florida Rising, is that the FPL system is greatly overbuilt and overdependent on
natural gas.67
We find that the greater weight of the evidence supports approval of the generation,
transmission, and distribution system proposed by FPL. We do not agree with Florida Rising that
FPL’s assumptions are unreasonable. The public interest dictates that a utility consider a wide
range of possibilities in planning for a reliable system. FPL has done so. The choices the
Company has made to account for contingencies are based on a thorough analysis of the
available data.
We also do not agree with Florida Rising that the future of FPL is one that is overly-
dependent on natural gas for generation. Natural gas is a reliable and primary means of providing
base load generation. As discussed above, FPL has committed to a substantial expansion of its
solar generation specifically to address climate change and generation diversity, including the
pilot Green Hydrogen program.
65 T. Vol. 12 at 2796.
66 The LOLP is the probability that available generation capacity will not be able to meet a peak customer demand.
Reserve margin is the amount of generation constructed to account for variations in load and unit availability. See
Order No. 24989, issued August 29, 1991, in In re: Load Forecasts Generation Expansion Plans and Cogeneration
Prices for Florida’s Electric Utilities.
67 To the extent Florida Rising is inviting a project-by-project prudence review, we decline to do so. See Sierra Club
v. Brown, 243 So. 3d 903, 911-12 (Fla. 2018).

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Issue 12: Storm cost recovery mechanism
Under the 2021 Settlement, FPL is allowed to seek recovery of costs associated with any
tropical storm or its successor without the application of any form of earnings test or measure
and irrespective of previous or current base rate earnings or the remaining unamortized storm
reserve.68 	FPL’s recovery of storm costs on an interim basis will begin 60 days following the
filing of a cost recovery petition and tariffs and will be based on a 12-month recovery period if
the storm costs do not exceed $4.00/1,000 kWh on a monthly residential bill. 	Any additional
costs exceeding $4.00/1,000 kWh may be recovered in subsequent years(s) as determined by the
us. Storm related costs subject to interim recovery will be calculated and disposed of pursuant to
Rule 25-6.0143, F.A.C. 	The storm reserve will be no less than $150 million. 	In the event that
FPL incurs in excess of $800 million of qualifying storm costs in a given calendar year, it may
petition to increase the initial recovery beyond $4.00/1,000 kWh. 	Storm cost recovery
proceedings shall not be a vehicle for a “rate case” inquiry concerning FPL’s expenses,
investment, or financial results.
Florida Rising contends that the storm cost recovery mechanism violates Sections 366.06
and 366.07, F.S., because it allows new rate increases prior to us holding a public hearing and
making a determination regarding “the sufficiency of current recovery structures.” FPL responds
that the mechanism is squarely within our rate-making authority, as evidenced by prior
approvals, and serves the public interest, as demonstrated by the mechanism’s successful
application over time.
To the extent these arguments are directed to our jurisdiction to consider this mechanism,
we need not revisit them. We find that the storm recovery mechanism serves an important public
interest, especially in the context of the four-year rate plan. The ability to quickly seek approval
and begin collecting a surcharge for storm recovery reduces regulatory lag and creates a more
stable post-storm financial environment. This surcharge is followed by a final true-up hearing to
ensure the correct amounts have been charged and collected. Finally, substantially affected
parties are afforded a point-of-entry to participate in this hearing and contest the proposed
recovery, ensuring that any aggrieved ratepayer has the opportunity to be heard.
Issue 13: Federal tax adjustment
If permanent federal or state tax changes are enacted effective for any of the tax years
2022 through the Term, the 2021 Settlement Agreement allows the base revenue requirement to
be adjusted for the impacts of those changes within the latter of 90 days from when the tax
becomes law or the effective date of the law, but in no instance prior to January 1, 2022. This
adjustment will be made for all retail customers through a prospective adjustment to base rates.
Any effects of a change in taxes on retail revenue requirements will be flowed back to, or
collected from, customers through the Conservation Cost Recovery Clause on the same basis as
used in any base rate adjustment.
68 We have approved substantially the same mechanism in settlements of FPL’s last three rate cases. See Order Nos.
PSC-2016-0560-AS-EI, PSC-2013-0023-S-EI, and PSC-2011-0089-S-EI.

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Citing Section 366.07, F.S., Florida Rising contends that this provision allows for an
unlawful “unilateral” adjustment to rates without a hearing and determination that FPL is earning
below its authorized allowable range of return.
To the extent these arguments are directed to our jurisdiction to consider this mechanism,
we need not revisit them.
Allowing an adjustment to the revenue requirement to account for a tax change without
the need for a full rate case is in the public interest. Any decrease can be quickly flowed to the
ratepayers. Any upward adjustment allows FPL to keep its earnings at the level we are approving
in this Order, which will in turn allow the Company to continue providing service at present-day
cost and value. We review any such changes and corresponding adjustments when FPL files a
petition seeking approval for its proposed treatment of tax changes. Substantially affected
persons – ratepayers – would have a point-of-entry at that time to present any evidence and
argument regarding the proposed treatment.
Issue 14: Incentive mechanism for asset optimization
We first approved FPL’s asset optimization program as a four-year pilot as part of the
2012 Settlement in Order No. PSC-2013-0023-S-EI.69 The program was designed to allow FPL
to create gains through electric wholesale purchases and sales,70 and asset optimization.
Allowable asset optimization under the pilot included gas storage utilization, production gas
sales, capacity release of gas transportation and electric transmission, and asset management
agreements.71 The overwhelming majority of the value from these activities was to be flowed to
the customers through the Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Recovery Clause (Fuel Clause),
thereby reducing customers’ annual fuel costs. As an incentive to maximize asset optimization,
FPL would be entitled to a share of this added value if certain thresholds were exceeded. The
Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	affirmed 	our 	Order 	approving 	the 	2012 	Settlement, 	specifically
upholding our approval of the pilot incentive program. 72
At the end of the initial pilot’s term, we authorized FPL to continue the program, subject
to certain modifications, in Order No. PSC-2016-0560-AS-EI.73 Under the program as modified
in 2016, customers receive 100 percent of the first $40 million in savings realized from listed
69 Order No. PSC-2013-0023-S-EI, issued January 14, 2013, in Docket No. 120015-EI, In re: Petition for increase
in rates by Florida Power & Light Company.
70 Prior to the pilot program, the only allowed activity under our standard sharing mechanism was economy power
sales.
71 Order No. PSC-2013-0023-S-EI at p. 4.
72 Citizens of State v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 146 So. 3d 1143, 1172 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]he Commission’s conclusion
that the asset optimization incentive program is in the public interest and part of a reasonable resolution of disputed
issues is supported by competent, substantial evidence.”).
73 Order No. PSC-2016-0560-AS-EI, issued December 15, 2016, in Docket No. 160021-EI, In re: Petition for rate
increase by Florida Power & Light Company. This Order was appealed and affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court.
Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So. 3d 903 (Fla. 2018). The Court’s opinion makes no specific mention of the incentive
program.

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activities. For all savings between $40 and $100 million, customers receive 40 percent and FPL
receives 60 percent. For all savings above $100 million, FPL and its customers each receive 50
percent. From 2013-2022, after netting out incremental O&M expenses, the program has resulted
in a total benefit of $406.7 million. Of this total, customers received $354.5 million (87 percent).
FPL received $52.2 million (13 percent).
Pursuant to the 2021 Settlement, the program is modified to apply to all fuel sources (not
gas 	only) 	when 	it 	is 	reasonable 	and 	in 	the 	customers’ 	best 	interests 	based 	on 	system
requirements, market demand, and the current market price of fuel or capacity. This includes
renewable energy credits (RECs), which may be monetized and sold. Three annual savings
thresholds are set: (1) FPL customers will receive 100 percent of the incentive mechanism gain
up to $42.5 million; (2) FPL customers will receive 40 percent and FPL will receive 60 percent
of incremental mechanism gains between $42.5 million and $100 million; and (3) FPL and its
customers will each receive 50 percent of incremental mechanism gains in excess of $100
million. The per-MWh variable power O&M rate is set at $0.48/MWh. Optimization activities,
variable power plant O&M rates, and savings thresholds will be considered “adjustable
parameters” that FPL can request be reviewed and adjusted every four years in the Fuel Clause
docket. Expenses, including incremental O&M costs, personnel, software and association
hardware costs, will be recovered from customers through the Fuel Clause.
Florida Rising contends that this program seeks recovery of costs that are not related to
the generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, that the savings from activities under
the program are required to be kept in a separate account pursuant to Section 366.05, F.S., and,
therefore, “the Commission does not have the legal authority to approve the mechanism.”
The Supreme Court affirmed our approval of this program as a pilot,74 and subsequently
confirmed our jurisdiction to approve the current mechanism. 75 We are well within the bounds of
our the legal authority in approving the amended program because the allowable activities – the
purchase and sale of power, the creation and monetization of RECs, the sale of unneeded
transmission rights, and the sale of gas, gas transportation, and gas storage – all involve the
generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, whether by gas or another fuel source.
We do not somehow lose the authority to approve the mechanism because FPL is not
maintaining the savings in a separate account, as maintained by Florida Rising. The requirement
to maintain separate accounts is found in Section 366.05(2), F.S., which provides in part:
Every public utility, as defined in s. 366.02 which in addition to the production,
transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light, or power also sells appliances
or other merchandise shall keep separate and individual accounts for the sale and
profit deriving from such sales.
74 Citizens, 146 So. 3d at 1172.
75 FAIR, 371 So.2d at 907 fn. 2.

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The prescribed activities in the program do not involve the sale of appliances or other
merchandise. We conclude that this subsection is not applicable to the incentive program.
Turning to the Settlement Agreement, the modest proposed changes to the incentive
program do not change its basic structure and operation. The program is reasonably expected to
continue to provide savings through the efficient use of existing assets.76 The history of the
program demonstrate that the overwhelming savings realized from Company actions have and
will be flowed to the ratepayers. The amended thresholds continue to provide appropriate
customer benefit and Company incentive. The inclusion of all fuel types – and renewable energy
credits – in the program will allow it to evolve with the energy landscape and bring more
customer benefit.
We find that the incentive program has and will continue to provide substantial benefit to
the ratepayers and appropriate incentives to the Company, and is in the public interest. With the
newly-approved program now applying to all fuel types, we find it appropriate for the incentive
program to be administered through the Fuel Clause as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
Issue 15: Solar cost cap incentive
The Settlement Agreement contains another incentive, this one found in the SoBRA
program and referred to as “the solar cost cap incentive.” Florida Rising contends that this
incentive provides FPL an illegal bonus payment over the “actual legitimate” cost of the installed
facility. It argues that 100 percent of any savings, not just the 75 percent under this incentive
program, must be credited (or never charged) to the ratepayers.
Under the solar cost cap incentive, if the actual installed cost for any SoBRA project is
less than the $1,250 kWAC cap or adjusted cap, customers and FPL will share the difference
between the actual cost and $1,250 kWAC cap, or adjusted cap, with 75 percent of the difference
benefiting customers and 25 percent of the difference benefiting FPL. 	The lower installed cost
shall be the basis for the full revenue requirements and a one-time credit will be made through
the Capital Cost Recovery Clause (CCRC). 	In order to determine the amount of this credit, a
revised SoBRA factor will be computed using the same data and methodology incorporated into
the initial SoBRA factor established under the terms of the 2021 Settlement. 	In lieu of capital
expenditures on which the Annualized Base Revenue Requirement was based, the calculation of
the installed cost will use the actual installed cost adjusted to reflect the incentive. 	Going
forward, base rates will be adjusted to reflect the revised SoBRA factor. The difference between
the cumulative base revenues since the implementation of the initial SoBRA factor and the
cumulative base revenues that would have resulted from the revised SoBRA factor had it been in
76 We do not find the holding in Citizens of Fla. v. Graham, 191 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 2016) to be applicable in this
instance. The activities allowed under the program as modified all involve maximizing the use of existing utility
assets presently employed for the transmission, generation, or distribution of electricity, whereas the questioned
activity in Graham was the exploration of potential gas reserves for future applications.

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place during the same period will be credited to customers through the CCRC with interest at the
30-day commercial paper rate.77
FPL notes that the revenue requirement related to the SoBRAs is based on “the base
revenue requirements for the first twelve months of operation of the cost-effective solar
projects,” such that any reduction realized by virtue of the incentive will also reduce the revenue
requirement. Thus, the operation of the cost cap will never cause an increase of additional
revenues from the SoBRAs above the estimated $140 million annually in 2024 and 2025.
No matter if it is labeled an “illegal bonus” or “incentive,” we look to the substance and
operation of this provision to determine whether it should be approved. The provision is
designed to encourage FPL to construct solar facilities in the most cost-efficient manner. It
works in coordination with the overall efforts of FPL to ensure all equipment and contractors are
subject to a competitive bidding process in order to produce the lowest cost. The ratepayers
ultimately benefit by both the lower overall cost and the shared savings. The greater weight of
the evidence demonstrates that providing this incentive promotes the construction of cost-
efficient solar generation and is in the public interest.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
After making factual findings, the second step in our analysis of a settlement agreement
is for us to “decide[] whether the settlement agreement, in light of [our] findings of fact, is in the
public interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.”78 We review settlement
agreements as a whole to determine whether to approve them as being in the public interest.79
We initially note that the 2021 Settlement Agreement has been executed by numerous
organizations with distinct and independent interests. The Office of Public Counsel, Florida
Industrial Power Users Group, Florida Retail Federation, and Southern Alliance for Clean
Energy originally joined the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. On August 24, 2021, FPL
filed notice that additional parties Vote Solar and the CLEO Institute, Inc. had joined in the
Agreement. On August 27, 2021, FPL filed notice that the Federal Executive Agencies had also
joined the Agreement. While not every party participated in negotiations or joined in the 2021
Agreement, the organizations who did participate and reached consensus represent a broad
spectrum of ratepayers and interests.
The ultimate decision of whether a proposed, comprehensive resolution to a rate case
should be approved rests on a determination of whether that resolution meets the very high
threshold of being in the public interest. Even though this burden is substantial, the public
interest remains a threshold. It does not require that the resolution be best for every ratepayer at
77 If the actual capital costs for a solar generation project are higher than the $1,250 kWAC cap or adjusted cap, FPL
may initiate a limited proceeding on the issue of whether it has met the requirements of Rule 25-22.082(15), F.A.C.
If we find that the requirements of Rule 25-22.082(15), F.A.C., have been met, FPL shall be allowed to increase the
SoBRA by a corresponding incremental revenue requirement.
78 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 910.
79 See Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So.3d 903, 909 (Fla. 2018).

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all times in all situations. The question is whether the agreement as a whole is in the public
interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable, and the answer is gleaned from the
record presented to us.
1. 	Mandatory factors
In FAIR, the Court highlighted two statutory provisions that we are to apply to our review
of the 2021 Settlement Agreement on remand.
The Legislature has provided that the Commission, in “fixing fair, just, and
reasonable rates for each customer class, ... shall, to the extent practicable,
consider the cost of providing service to the class, as well as the rate history,
value of service, and experience of the public utility; the consumption and load
characteristics of the various classes of customers; and public acceptance of rate
structures.” § 366.06(1). The Commission “shall also consider the performance of
each utility pursuant to [the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act]
when establishing rates for those utilities over which the commission has
ratesetting authority.” § 366.82(10), Fla. Stat. (2021). A reasonably explained
decision 	from 	the 	Commission 	must 	reflect 	that 	those 	factors 	have 	been
considered to the extent practicable.80
As to Section 366.06(1), F.S., we begin our analysis with consideration of FPL’s capital
structure. As previously discussed, the analyses used to support ROE and equity to debt ratio are
sound. We agree with the conclusions of those analyses that FPL’s geographic challenges and
business risk, primary among other factors, justify the ROE and ratio established in the 2021
Settlement Agreement. Our approval of a regulatory ROE of 10.6 percent for all purposes, with
an authorized ROE range of 9.7 percent to 11.7 percent, and equity ratio of 59.6 percent, as set
forth in the 2021 Settlement, will ensure that FPL has adequate and timely access to capital in
order to continue supplying reliable service. We do not agree with the conclusions of
Intevernors’ witnesses that FPL would enjoy the same or similar access to capital with a lower
ROE and restructured equity to debt ratio, and find the opinions of FPL’s experts supporting this
capital structure to be more persuasive.
As set forth in detail above, this overall capital structure is supported by mechanisms
designed to support a four-year rate plan. One of those mechanisms is the RSAM. Our approval
of the alternative depreciation study and the RSAM provides FPL with a tool to address
unexpected expense and revenue impacts over the Settlement Term without the need to seek a
rate increase. Without the RSAM, the multiyear rate plan would not be possible, and ratepayers
would not enjoy long-term bill stability. FPL’s use of the RSAM in the unexpectedly challenging
economic environment of the most recent rate period (2016-2020) evidences how ratepayers
benefit by having this mechanism available.
80 FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 912.

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As our findings above demonstrate, other mechanisms in the 2021 Settlement Agreement
also contribute to FPL’s financial ability to operate under a multiyear rate plan. The storm cost
recovery 	mechanism 	addresses 	unpredictable, 	but 	expected, 	tropical 	events. 	The 	process
established under this mechanism allows FPL to obtain cost recovery in a timely manner and
avoid regulatory lag. The subsequent true-up proceeding provides us and ratepayers with the
opportunity to review incurred costs and total recovery.
The 2021 Settlement Agreement also contains provisions specifically designed to keep
rates low over the Term. FPL extended the time to recover the retirement costs of certain plants
and transmission facilities, thereby reducing revenue requirements and, ultimately, rates. FPL is
also continuing, with slight modifications, its incentive mechanism for asset optimization. This
program has already directed $354.5 million to customers. With the current modifications, these
monetary benefits are expected to increase. Finally, FPL has instituted a voluntary solar cost cap
initiative, whereby it self-incentivizes the construction of solar generation under the SoBRA
program at a lower total cost.
Turning specifically to the cost of service, we note that the class allocations in the 2021
Settlement are the result of negotiations. Thus, as has been the case in prior settlements, these
allocations are not accompanied by a separate cost-of-service study. The class allocations,
however, were not cut from whole cloth and presented to us for a first-time review. 	The 2021
Settlement class allocations are consistent with prior, approved FPL settlements. Using those
settlements and the recent rate history of FPL using those allocations as the most practical
guideposts, we find that the 2021 Settlement class allocations result in fair, just, and reasonable
rates. We also note that the percentage increases in rates for residential and small business
customer classes are lower in the 2021 Settlement as compared to the original filing, and comply
with the concept of gradualism as discussed above.
The input we received during the customer service hearings fully supports the conclusion
that FPL has a history of providing excellent service to its customers. FPL also has a favorable
rate history with its customers, with the typical 1000 kWh residential customer bill being about
10 percent lower than it was fifteen years ago.81
The expert testimony supports our conclusion that the ROE requested by FPL is
reasonable. Moreover, the requested rate increase amount as well as the ROE were reduced as a
result of a negotiated settlement. Those same negotiations results in a significant boost in FPL’s
commitment to the use and development of renewable energy resources.
Based on our consideration of all of the above, we find that the 2021 Settlement, taken as
a whole, is in the public interest, and establishes rates that are fair, just, and reasonable in
accordance with Section 366.06(1), F.S.
The second statute the Court directed us to consider in our determination of whether the
2021 Settlement should be approved is Section 366.82(10)¸ F.S. This provision is found in the
81 See Fla. Stat. § 366.041(1).

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Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA), the entirety of which is codified in
sections 366.80 through 366.83, and 403.519, F.S. When enacted in 1980, FEECA required us to
adopt appropriate goals to increase the efficiency of energy consumption. In 2008, the
Legislature 	amended 	FEECA 	to 	require 	us 	to 	adopt 	appropriate 	goals 	to 	increase 	the
development of demand-side renewable energy systems. Pursuant to Section 366.82(6), F.S., we
must review the goals of each utility subject to FEECA at least every five years. We last
established goals for FPL in 2019.82
Section 	366.82(11), 	F.S., 	establishes 	our 	ratesetting 	authority 	over 	utility 	energy
conservation program costs. Rule 25-17.015, F.A.C., establishes the energy conservation cost
recovery clause (ECCR) as the mechanism for electric utilities, such as FPL, to seek approval of
reasonable energy conservation expenses.
Pursuant to Rule 25-17.0021(4), F.A.C., within 90 days of a final order establishing or
modifying goals, each investor-owned electric utility (IOU) must submit for our approval a
Demand Side Management (DSM) plan designed to meet the utility’s approved goals, including
information about the programs proposed within the plan. We last approved FPL’s DSM plan in
2020.83
Intervenors84 argue that FPL’s established DSM programs should be reanalyzed and
changed in this docket. We do not agree, and find that these wide-ranging arguments are more
appropriately raised in FPL’s 2024 goal-setting,85 DSM plan, and the annual ECCR dockets.
While goals and DSM plans and programs are generally86 not subject to reexamination in
a base rate case, FEECA does influence some of the underlying analyses. FPL properly
accounted for incremental DSM in its load forecasts. Additionally, the resource analyses
conducted by FPL in this case followed and is consistent with our most recent order on
conservation goals.
82 Order No. PSC-2018-0509-FOF-EG, issued November 26, 2019, in Docket No. 20190015-EG, In re: Commission
review of numeric conservation goals (Florida Power & Light Company).
83 Order No. PSC-2020-0274-PAA-EG, issued August 3, 2020, in Docket No. 20200056-EG, In re: Petition for
approval of demand-side management plan and request for modify residential and business on call tariff, sheets, by
Florida Power & Light Company.
84 Much of the testimony regarding DSM and FEECA was provided by witnesses for parties who entered into the
2021 Settlement (The Cleo Institute and Vote Solar).
85 Docket No. 20240015-EG.
86 In FPL’s 2020 DSM docket, we specifically deferred consideration of two matters to this proceeding Order No.
PSC-2020-0274-PAA-EG, issued August 3, 2020, in Docket No. 20200056-EG, In re: Petition for approval of
demand-side management plan and request for modify residential and business on call tariff, sheets, by Florida
Power & Light Company, at p. 4 (“Florida Power & Light Company’s Commercial/Industrial Demand Reduction
and Commercial/Industrial Load Control programs shall be addressed during the next Florida Power & Light
Company base rate proceeding”). We find that the greater weight of the evidence in this record supports the
requested revisions to those two measures. The specific testimony regarding the benefits of program revisions is
more persuasive than Witness Rabago’s suggestion that the preferable solution is for FPL “to aggressively pursue
program enrollment growth” under existing conditions.

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We have considered the record evidence presented by all parties regarding FEECA as it
relates to the issues that were identified and litigated, and find that the 2021 Settlement
Agreement is in the public interest and establishes rates that are fair, just, and reasonable,
consistent with section 366.82(10), F.S.
2. 	Case-specific factors
The Court in remanding this matter also listed several statutory provisions that “may” be
germane to our disposition. One of the statutes cited by the Court expresses the Legislature’s
intent “that it is in the public interest to promote the development of renewable energy resources
in this state,”87 and is directly relevant to our finding that the 2021 Settlement is in the public
interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
The Legislature included both solar energy and green hydrogen in the definition of
“renewable energy” resources.88 The 2021 Settlement promotes the development of both. Using
the SoBRA mechanism, FPL will construct 1,788 megawatts (MW) of solar generation through
the Term. Phase II SolarTogether directly serves the purposes outlined in this statute by
expanding the program by an additional 1,788 MW at FPL’s discretion through 2025 such that
the total capacity of SolarTogether would equal 3,278 MW. The pilot solar power program will
make on-site solar available on a voluntary basis to eligible participants. These approvals are
consistent with and further the legislative public interest direction on renewable energy
development. To ensure resulting rates are fair, just, and reasonable, SolarTogether and the pilot
solar program are funded by program participants. The benefits of SolarTogether are shared
among all ratepayers to ensure that the program is not unduly discriminatory in favor of either
participants or non-participants. SoBRAs are funded by incremental base rate increases that must
be first approved after a hearing to address cost-effectiveness.
The pilot program for green hydrogen aligns with this same legislative direction.
Intervenors 	argue 	that 	this 	pilot 	should 	be 	rejected 	as 	ratepayer-funded 	research 	and
development. This critique is misplaced. The Legislature has specifically directed that “it is in
the public interest to promote the development of renewable energy resources.”89 “Development”
includes “the act, process, or result of developing.” 90 The statute does not state that the public
interest is served only by the generation of power with renewable energy, which would be the
result of successful development. The process of developing renewable energy is part of
promoting its development, and that is exactly what is accomplished by the Green Hydrogen
pilot.
The Court also stated that we may consider “the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of
the facilities provided and the services rendered; the cost of providing such service and the value
87 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(1).
88 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(2)(e).
89 Fla. Stat. § 366.91(1) (emphasis added).
90 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/development, last checked 01/31/24.

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of such service to the public; the ability of the utility to improve such service and facilities; and
energy conservation and the efficient use of alternative energy resources.”91
FPL has delivered high value service to its customers at a relatively low cost. Residential
rates are at least 20 percent lower than the national average92 and below those charged by other
Florida investor-owned-utilities. FPL has lower operation and maintenance expenses, with the
best non-fuel O & M cost performance in the industry. The framework approved in the 2021
Settlement 	Agreement 	will 	foster 	continuation 	of 	these 	efficiencies, 	consistent 	with 	the
legislative direction in Section 366.041(1), F.S.
CONCLUSION
When presented with a settlement agreement . . . , the Commission’s review shifts
to the public interest standard: whether the agreement – as a whole – resolved all
the issues, “establish rates that were just, reasonable, and fair, and that the
agreement is in the public interest.93
Consistent with this Court’s direction in FAIR, we have considered each of the parties’
competing arguments. In the final analysis, however, we are to examine the 2021 Settlement as a
whole in making our ultimate determination. Taken as a whole and as supported by the record,
the 2021 Settlement Agreement addresses and provides a full resolution of all issues in this
docket. That resolution involves, among other compromises, reductions in proposed rate
increases and a lowered ROE as compared to the as-filed request. Based on the host of
compromises, the 2021 Settlement was signed by most of the parties to this docket. These parties
represent a broad cross-section of ratepayers and interests. Those Intervenors who chose to not
sign the 2021 Settlement Agreement were provided a full and fair opportunity to contest that
proposed resolution consistent with the requirements of due process.
The preponderance of the evidence in this record demonstrates that the 2021 Settlement
Agreement supports a multi-year rate plan, which in turn benefits customers and serves the
public interest by providing long-term stability and predictability with respect to base rates. FPL
is bringing an appreciable amount of renewable energy online with the SoBRA mechanism and
Phase II of SolarTogether, and has proposed additional programs to promote the development of
future renewable energy resources consistent with legislative direction. FPL has built a system
that consistently ranks near the top nationally for reliability. FPL residential customer rates
remain among the lowest in the state and nation.
91 Fla. Stat. § 366.041(1).
92 The Court in FAIR also stated that we could rely upon non-statutory metrics, if such were demonstrated to be
relevant, specifically referring to the findings in our 2021 Final Order regarding the comparison of FPL’s average
1000 kWh bill to the national average. As we have discussed herein, such comparisons provide a useful metric in
determining the “value” of service as required by sections 366.06(1) and 366.041(1), F.S., and are within the
statutory scope of our review.
93 Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So.3d 903, 909 (Fla. 2018)(quoting Citizens of State v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146
So.3d 1143, 1164 (Fla. 2014)).

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Based upon our findings and conclusions above, we conclude that the 2021 Settlement is
in the public interest, and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED by the Florida Public Service Commission that Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-
EI, as amended by Order No. PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI and supplemented by this Supplemental
Final Order, is affirmed. It is further
SPS
ORDERED that this docket shal l be closed.
By ORDER of the Florida Public Service Commission this 25th day of March, 2024.
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
(850) 413-6770
www.floridapsc.com
Copies furnished: 	A copy of this document is
provided to the parties of record at the time of
issuance and, if applicable, interested persons.

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NOTICE OF FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Florida Public Service Commission is required by Section 120.569(1), Florida
Statutes, to notify parties of any administrative hearing or judicial review of Commission orders
that is available under Sections 120.57 or 120.68, Florida Statutes, as well as the procedures and
time limits that apply. 	This notice should not be construed to mean all requests for an
administrative hearing or judicial review will be granted or result in the relief sought.
Any party adversely affected by the Commission's final action in this matter may request:
1) reconsideration of the decision by filing a motion for reconsideration with the Office of
Commission Clerk, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, within
fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order in the form prescribed by Rule 25-22.060, Florida
Administrative Code; or 2) judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court in the case of an
electric, gas or telephone utility or the First District Court of Appeal in the case of a water and/or
wastewater utility by filing a notice of appeal with the Office of Commission Clerk, and filing a
copy of the notice of appeal and the filing fee with the appropriate court. 	This filing must be
completed within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this order, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 	The notice of appeal must be in the form specified in Rule
9.900(a), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI PAGE 39
Attachment A
FILED 12/2/2021 DOCUMENT NO. 12919-2021 FPSC - COMMISSION CLERK
BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Power & Light Company.
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI ISSUED: December 2, 2021
The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter:
GARY F. CLARK, Chairman ART GRAHAM ANDREW GILES FAY MIKE LA ROSA GABRIELLA PASSIDOMO
APPEARANCES:
R. WADE LITCHFIELD, Vice President and General Counsel; JOHN T. BURNETT, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel; MARIA J. MONCADA, Senior Attorney, and CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, ESQUIRE, Florida Power & Light Company, 700 Universe Boulevard, Juno Beach, FL 33408
On behalf of Florida Power & Light Company (FPL).
RICHARD GENTRY, Public Counsel; PATRICIA A. CHRISTENSEN, Associate Public Counsel; ANASTACIA PIRRELLO, Associate Public Counsel; and CHARLES REHWINKEL, Deputy Public Counsel; Office of Public Counsel, c/o The Florida Legislature, 111 West Madison Street, Room 812, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400 On behalf of Office of the Public Counsel (OPC).
WILLIAM C. GARNER, ESQUIRE, Law Office of William C. Garner, PLLC, 3425 Bannerman Road, Unit 105, #414, Tallahassee, FL 32312 On behalf of the CLEO Institute Inc. (CLEO).
ROBERT SCHEFFEL WRIGHT and JOHN T. LAVIA, III, ESQUIRES, Gardner, Bist, Bowden, Dee, LaVia, Wright, Perry & Harper, P.A., 1300 Thomaswood Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32308
On behalf of Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. (FAIR).
SCOTT L. KIRK, MAJ, USAF, AF/JAOE-ULFSC, ESQUIRE, 139 Barnes Drive, Suite 1, Tyndall Air Force Base, FL 32403 On behalf of the Federal Executive Agencies (FEA).
JON C. MOYLE, JR. and KAREN PUTNAL, ESQUIRES, Moyle Law Firm, P.A., 118 North Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, FL 32312 On behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG).

Attachment A
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ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI PAGE 2
FLOYD R. SELF, ESQUIRE, Berger Singerman, LLP, 313 North Monroe Street, Suite 301, Tallahassee, FL 32301 and T. SCOTT THOMPSON, ESQUIRE, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., 555 12th Street NW, Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20004 On behalf of Florida Internet & Television Association, Inc. (FIT).
JAMES W. BREW and LAURA WYNN BAKER, ESQUIRES, Stone Mattheis Xenopoulos & Brew, PC, 1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Eighth Floor, West Tower, Washington, D.C. 20007
On behalf of Florida Retail Federation (FRF).
BRADLEY MARSHALL and JORDAN LUEBKEMANN, ESQUIRES, Earthjustice, 111 S. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., Tallahassee, Florida 32301 and CHRISTINA I. REICHERT, ESQUIRE, Earthjustice, 4500 Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 201, Miami, Florida 33137
On behalf of Florida Rising. Inc .. League of United Latin American Citizens of Florida, and Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Inc. (Fla. Rising. LULAC, ECOSWF).
NATHAN A. SKOP, ESQUIRE, 420 NW 50th Boulevard, Gainesville, FL 32607 On behalf of Daniel and Alexandria Larson (Larsons).
GEORGE CAVROS, ESQUIRE, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, 120 E. Oakland Park Blvd., Suite 105, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33334 On behalf of Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE).
KATIE CHILES OTTENWELLER, ESQUIRE, Southeast Director, Vote Solar, 838 Barton Woods Road, Atlanta, GA 30307 On behalf of Vote Solar.
STEPHANIE U. EATON, ESQUIRE, Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, 110 Oakwood Drive, Suite 500, Winston-Salem, NC 27103 On behalf of Walmart Inc. (Walmart).
SUZANNE S. BROWNLESS, SHAW P. STILLER, and BIANCA LHERISSON, ESQUIRES, Florida Public Service Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850
On behalf of the Florida Public Service Commission (Staff).
MARY ANNE HELTON, ESQUIRE, Deputy General Counsel, Florida Public Service Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 0850
Advisor to the Florida Public Service Commission.

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Because it has alleged associational standing on behalf of its members, FAIR must meet the three-prong standing test set forth in Florida Home Builders Association v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 412 So. 2d 351, 353-54 (Fla. 1982), and Farmworker Rights Organization, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 417 So. 2d 753, 754 (Fla. Ist DCA 1982), as more fully discussed below.
FAIR's Evidence and Argument in Support of Standing
FAIR was incorporated on March, 16, 2021, as a Florida not-for-profit membership organization. The specific purposes of FAIR, as set forth in its Articles of Incorporation, include advancing the welfare of residential and business customers of investor-owned electric utilities by advocating against actions that "are likely to result in electric rates being greater than necessary to ensure the provision of safe and reliable electric service."9
After its incorporation, FAIR began to recruit members. At the time the Motion to Intervene was filed, May 4, 2021, 16 persons had either returned a paper membership form or e- mailed a PDF to FAIR. As of June 15, 2021, after the FAIR website had gone live, the number of persons who had completed the membership form had increased to 516. FAIR witness Nancy Watkins, FAIR's Treasurer, verified the June 15, 2021 membership list.10 Four hundred and twenty of those FAIR members (82%) are customers of FPL.
Currently, FAIR does not have membership dues and does not solicit donations. FAIR receives all of its funding from one or more anonymous non-members. The rates paid by FAIR members who are FPL customers will be affected if the petition for an increase in base rates is granted or the settlement agreement is approved. FAIR seeks to prevent these rate actions by participating in this proceeding and opposing the petition and settlement as an association on behalf of its members.
FPL Arguments Against Standing
FPL raises several challenges to FAIR's standing. First, FPL argues that because FAIR has never held an in-person membership meeting and has not spoken to or become personally acquainted with the persons who completed forms online, FAIR failed to prove that the membership forms were submitted by "real" or "flesh and blood" people. FPL further asserts that injury or impact must be demonstrated at the time the intervention request is filed and maintained at all times through the proceeding for a putative intervenor to have standing, and that FAIR failed to prove that it had any members on May 4, 2021, when the Motion to Intervene was filed. FPL next contends that an individual who fills out the membership form does not become a member until admitted by a majority vote of FAIR's Board of Directors. As its final argument on standing, FPL contends that Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
9 Ex. 287 (NHW-2).
10 Three persons who had filled out forms subsequently indicated that they did not wish to be members of FAIR, which reduced the membership number as of June 15th from 516 to 513.

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Commission" outlines factors FAIR must meet to have standing as the “functional equivalent” of
a traditional trade association.

Decision

The first prong of the Florida Home Builders associational standing test requires that an
association demonstrate that a substantial number of its members may be substantially affected
by the Commission's decision in a docket.!?_ Of the total 513 members of FAIR as of June 15,
2021, 420 (82%) are customers of FPL. This is a substantial number of the membership of
FAIR. As customers of FPL, each of these persons will realize an impact to their utility bill as
a result of the decision in this rate case,'’ and is “substantially affected” for purposes of
standing."

FAIR’s membership steadily increased from the time it incorporated through the Summer
of 2021. Because this is a de novo proceeding,!® evidence of FAIR’s growth in membership
subsequent to filing its Motion to Intervene is admissible and may be considered by the
Commission. The statute that governs intervention in this proceeding requires that intervention
be requested more than 20 days prior to the final hearing, but contains no temporal limitation on
associational membership or evidence of membership. Notably, there are examples of statutes
that impose temporal standards on standing requirements for certain administrative proceedings.
For example, Section 403.412(6), F.S., contains timing and membership requirements for
organizational standing in certain environmental permitting proceedings.'’ Yet another statute
imposes temporal limitations on relevant evidence in growth management proceedings.!®

4 432 U.S. 333 (1977).

} Fla. Home Builders, 412 So. 2d at 353-54; Fannworker Rights Org., 417 S80. 2d at 754.

8 See Hillsborough Cty. v. Fla. Rest. Ass'n, Inc., 603 So, 2d 587, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (a “substantial number”
of members for associational standing does not require a set percentage or specific number), ABC Fine Wine &
Spirits v. Dep't of Bus. & Pro. Regul., 323 So. 3d 794, 798 (Fla. lst DCA May 19, 2021} (42% of association’s
members found to be a “substantial number”).

' See Order No. PSC-01-1934-PCC )-EI, issued September 25, 2001, in Docket No. 010949-EI, In re: Rate Increase
by Gulf Power Co. (“The Petitioner's members are ratepayers of Gulf. In this docket, the Commission will set new
retail rates for Gulf. The Petitioner's members must pay whatever rates result from this proceeding, so they have a
substantial interest in this proceeding.”),

1S See Order No, PSC-12-0229-PCC )-EL, issued May 9, 2012, in Docket No. 120015-EI, fn res Petition for Increase
in Rates by Florida Power & Light Co, (FPL customer is substantially affected and has standing to intervene in FPL
rate case).

16 See Section 120.57(1)(k), FS. (All proceedings conducted under this subsection shall be de novo.”).

See Section 403.412(6), F.5. (Any Florida corporation not for profit which has at least 25 current members
residing within the county where the activity 1s proposed, and which was formed for the purpose of the protection of
the environment, fish and wildlife resources, and protection of air and water quality, may initiate a hearing pursuant
tos, 120,569 or s, 120.57, provided that the Florida corporation not for profit was formed at least 1 year prior to the
date of the filing of the application for a permit, license, or authorization that is the subject of the notice of proposed
agency action” (emphasis added)). This subsection was added to the Section 403.412 in 2002 by Section 9, Chapter
2002-161, Laws of Florida. Prior to this amendment and the addition of the italicized timing requirement, an
intervenor could incorporate after filing for intervention and obtain standing as a “citizen” of Florida. See Cape
Cave Corp. v. Dep't of Environmental Reg., 498 So. 2d 1309, 1311 (Fla. lst DCA 1986).

18 See Section 163.3177(1)\(f, F.S. (relevant data in growth management administrative challenges limited to “data
available on that particular subject at the time of adoption of the plan or plan amendment at issue”).

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However, no such requirements apply in this proceeding. Had the Legislature intended such
limitations to apply in proceedings before the Commission, they could have crafted them into
Chapter 120 or 366, F.S. The absence of such limitations leads to the conclusion that the
Legislature intended none! and that the general standing inquiry for intervenors, like other
disputed factual matters, is not restricted to the facts as they existed as some point in time prior
to the final evidentiary hearing. Based on the record evidence, we conclude that FAIR has met
its burden in demonstrating that a substantial number of its members are substantially affected by
our decision in this docket.

The second prong of the Florida Home Builders test requires that the subject matter of
the proceeding be within the association’s general scope of interest and activity.2” The subject
matter of this proceeding is squarely within FAIR’s scope of interest, which includes, inter alia,
“advocating for and providing analyses to the general public concerning State of Florida
governmental policies and regulatory or administrative actions that will lead to retail electric
rates that are as low as possible while ensuring safe and reliable electric service.” Therefore,
FAIR meets the second prong.

The third and final prong of the Florida Home Builders test requires that the association
demonstrate the relief requested is of a type appropriate for it to receive on behalf of tts
members.”! The relief FAIR seeks in this case — lower rates — is appropriate relief for it to obtain
on behalf of its member FPL customers. ‘Therefore, FAIR meets the third prong.

Based on our review of the record under the applicable legal principles set forth above,
we find that FAIR has demonstrated associational standing under Florida Home Builders. FPL’s
arguments against standing fall outside of existing legal requirements for standing. For these
reasons, FPL’s Motion for Summary Final Order is denied.

Jurisdictional Issues

We have been asked whether we have the statutory authority to approve seven regulatory
rate recovery mechanisms found in the 2021 Settlement Agreement. These regulatory
mechanisms are: the Storm Cost Recovery Mechanism (SCRM), the Solar Base Rate Adjustment
(SoBRA); the Asset Optimization Incentive (Asset Incentive); a federal and state corporate
income tax adjustment: a four-year stay-out provision, adjustments to ROE to account for
performance (ROE performance adders); and the Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism

(RSAM).

SCRM, SoBRA, Asset Incentive, Corporate Income Tax Adjustments

In the 2021 Settlement, the SCRM, SoBRA, Asset Incentive, and federal and state
corporate income tax adjustment all contain the following provisions: (1) a description of the

19 See Cason v. Fla. Dept of Memt. Servs., 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006) (“we have pointed to language in other
statutes to show that the Legislature “knows how to’ accomplish what it has omitted in the statute in question”).

0 Fla, Home Builders, 412 So. 2d at 353-54; Farmworker Rights Org., 417 So. 2d at 754.

a 7g

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L.

By ORDER of the Florida Public Service Commission this 2nd day of December, 20

Yi

ADAM J. YEITZMé [AN
Commission ee

Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(850) 413-6770
www.floridapse.com

Copies furnished: A copy of this document is
provided to the parties of record at the time of
issuance and, if applicable, interested persons.

SBr/SS/BL

DISSENT:
Commissioner La Rosa dissents from the Commission decision to grant FAIR’s Motion

to Intervene.

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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Petition by Florida Power & Light Company | Docket No. 20210015-EI
for Base Rate Increase and Rate Unification

WHEREAS, Florida Power & Light Company (“FPL” or the “Company™), Citizens
through the Office of Public Counsel (“OPC”), Florida Retail Federation (“FRF"), Florida
Industrial Power Users Group (“FIPUG”) and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (“SACE”) have
signed this 2021 Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) (unless the context

clearly requires otherwise, the term “Party” or “Parties” means a si

¥ to this Agr it); and

WHEREAS, on December 15, 2016, the Florida Public Service Commission (“FPSC™ or
“Commission”) entered Final Order PSC-16-0560-AS-EI approving a stipulation and settlement
of FPL’s rate case in Docket No. 160021-EI, consolidated with Docket Nos. 160061-EI (Storm
Hardening), 160062-E1 (Depreciation and Dismantlement), and 160088-EI (Incentive Mechanism)

(“2016 Settlement Agr t””), which conti in effect (except for Paragraphs 10 and 11) until

base rates are next reset: and

WHEREAS, on March 12, 2021, FPL, representing the merged and consolidated
operations of FPL and the former Gulf Power Company (“Gulf”), petitioned the Commission for
approval of: (a) base rate increases pursuant to a four-year rate plan; and (b) FPL unified rates for
all customers, including those currently served pursuant to the rates and tariffs on file for Gulf,
subject to a transition rider and credit intended to reflect initial but diminishing cost to serve
differences as the two utility systems are combined and operated as one. As updated, FPL’s four-
year proposal consisted of: (i) an increase in rates and charges sufficient to generate additional
total annual revenues of $1,075 million to be effective January 1, 2022; (ii) a subsequent year

adjustment of $605 million to be effective January 1, 2023 (2023 SYA”), (iii) a Solar Base Rate

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Adjustment (“SoBRA”) mechanism that authorizes FPL to recover costs associated with the

installation and operation of up to an aggregate of 1,788 megawatts (“MW”) of cost-effective solar

generation in 2024 and 2025; (iv) a mechanism to address the possibility that changes to corporate
tax laws might be enacted under the new presidential administration; (v) a reserve surplus
amortization mechanism (“RSAM™), an element in FPL’s last three multi-year rate plans; (vi) a
storm cost recovery mechanism, an element in FPL’s last three multi-year rate plans; and (vii)
authority to accelerate amortization of unprotected excess accumulated deferred income taxes
resulting from the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), and

WHEREAS, the Parties filed voluminous pre-filed testimonies with accompanying
exhibits and responded to extensive discovery; and

WHEREAS, the Parties to this Agreement have undertaken to resolve the issues raised in
Docket No. 20210015-EI so as to maintain a degree of stability and predictability with respect to
FPL’s base rates and charges; and

WHEREAS, the Parties have entered into this Agreement in compromise of positions taken
in accord with their rights and interests under Chapters 350, 366 and 120, Florida Statutes, as
applicable, and as a part of the negotiated exchange of consideration among the Parties to this
Agreement each has agreed to concessions to the others with the expectation that all provisions of
the Agreement will be enforced by the Commission as to all matters addressed herein with respect
to all Parties regardless of whether a court ultimately determines such matters to reflect
Commission policy, upon acceptance of the Agreement as provided herein and upon approval in

the public interest:

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NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the covenants contained herein,
the Parties hereby stipulate and agree:

1. Upon approval by this C ission, this Ag it will become effective on January 1,

2022 (the “Implementation Date”) and continue until the earlier of December 31, 2026 or
when FPL’s base rates are next reset in a general base rate proceeding (the “Term”,
provided, however, that (i)all rates, charges and tariffs authorized pursuant to this
Agreement and such provisions of this Agreement as may be necessary to give effect to
same, shall remain in effect until FPL’s base rates are next reset in a general base rate
proceeding, and (ii) FPL may place interim rates into effect subject to refund pursuant to

Paragraph 14 of this Agi it. The mini term of this Agreement shall be four years,

from the Implementation Date through December 31, 2025 (the “Minimum Term”).

Zz. Except as set forth in this Agreement, the Parties agree that adjustments to rate base, net
operating income and cost of capital set forth in FPL’s Minimum Filing Requirements
(“MFR”) Schedules (with RSAM) B-2, C-1, C-3 and Dla, as revised by Exhibit LF-12,
shall be deemed approved for accounting and regulatory reporting purposes and the
accounting for those adjustments will not be challenged during the Term for purposes of
FPL’s Earnings Surveillance Reports or clause filings.

3. (a) FPL’s authorized rate of return on common equity (“ROE”) shall be a range of
9.7% to 11.7% and shall be used for all purposes. All rates, including those established in
clause proceedings during the Term, shall be set using a 10.6% ROE,

(b) If at any time during the Term, but no more than once during the Term, the average
30-year United States Treasury Bond yield rate for any period of six (6) consecutive

months is at least 50 basis points greater than the yield rate on the date this Agreement is

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filed with the Commission (the “Trigger”), FPL’s authorized ROE shall, after an elective
filing by FPL, be increased by 20 basis points to be within a range of 9.8% to 11.8% with
a mid-point of 10.8% (“Revised Authorized ROE”) from the Trigger Effective Date

defined below for and through the inder of the Mini Term, and for any period in

which the Company’s rates continue in effect after December 31, 2025, and then, until the
Commission issues a final order in a future proceeding changing the Company's rates and
its authorized ROE. Base rates shall not be increased upon implementation of the trigger
mechanism, The Trigger shall be calculated by summing the reported 30-year U.S,
Treasury bond rates for each day over any continuous six-month period, ¢.g., January 1,
2022 through July 1, 2022, or March 17, 2022 through September 17, 2022, for which rates
are reported, and dividing the resulting sum by the number of reporting days in such period.
The effective date of the Revised Authorized ROE (“Trigger Effective Date”) shall be the
first day of the month following the day in which the Trigger is reached. No later than five
business days after the Commission votes to approve this 2021 Agreement, FPL shall
notify the Parties of the 30-year United States Treasury Bond yield rate as of the date this
Agreement is filed with the Commission by filing in this docket proof of the rate with the

Commission Clerk and serving the Parties.

(c) If the Trigger is reached and the Revised Authorized ROE becomes effective,
except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, FPL’s Revised Authorized
ROE range and mid-point shall be used prospectively for all regulatory purposes, including
all rates and applications pursuant to this Agreement, until the Commission issues a final
order in a future general base rate proceeding changing the Company's rates and its

authorized ROE.

Attachment A
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ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI PAGE 28
4. Effective January 1, 2022, unified FPL rates shall apply to all customers throughout the former FPL and Gulf service areas as a result of the consolidation of FPL and Gulf operations and consistent with the consolidated cost of service reflected in FPL's MFRs. Gulf's existing tariffs shall be canceled. The rates and charges applicable to the customers located in the former Gulf service area shall be pursuant to the FPL tariffs as described herein.
(a) Effective on January 1, 2022, FPL shall be authorized to increase its base rates and service charges by an amount that is intended to generate an additional $692 million of annual revenues, based on the projected 2022 test year billing determinants set forth in Schedules E-13c (with RSAM) and E-13d (with RSAM) of FPL's 2022 MFRs filed with the 2021 Rate Petition, and in the respective amounts and manner shown on Exhibit A, attached hereto.
(b) Effective January 1, 2023, FPL shall be authorized to increase its base rates by an amount that is intended to generate an additional $560 million over the Company's then current base rates, based on the projected 2023 test year billing determinants set forth in Schedules E-13c (with RSAM) and E-13d (with RSAM) of FPL's 2023 MFRs filed with the 2021 Rate Petition, and in the respective amounts and manner shown on Exhibit A, attached hereto.
(c) Attached hereto as Exhibit B are tariff sheets for new base rates and service charges that reflect the terms of this Agreement and implement the rate increase described in Paragraph 4(a) above, which tariff sheets shall become effective on January 1, 2022. (d) Attached hereto as Exhibit C are tariff sheets for new base rates and service charges that reflect the terms of this Agreement and implement the additional rate increase
5

Attachment A
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ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI PAGE 29
described in Paragraph 4(b) above, which tariff sheets shall become effective on January 1, 2023.
(e) As part of the negotiated exchange of consideration among the parties to this Agreement, (i) the energy and demand charges for business and commercial rates and the utility-controlled demand rates are adjusted as shown on Exhibits B and C, and (ii) the level of utility-controlled demand credits for customers receiving service pursuant to FPL's Commercial/ Industrial Load Control ("CILC") tariff and the Commercial/Industrial Demand Reduction ("CDR") rider shall each be the same as those currently in effect. FPL shall be entitled to recover the CILC and CDR credits through the energy conservation cost recovery ("ECCR") Clause. The Parties agree that no changes in these credits shall be implemented any earlier than the effective date of new FPL base rates implemented pursuant to a general base rate proceeding, and that such new CILC and CDR credits shall only be implemented prospectively from such effective date. At such time as FPL's base rates are reset in a general base rate proceeding, the CILC and CDR credits shall be reset. (f) The rates set forth in Exhibits B and C are calculated based on a cost of service study that applies (i) the 12 CP and 1/13 methodology for Production Plant, (ii) 12 CP for Transmission Plant and (iii) a negotiated methodology for allocating Distribution Plant, limited by the Commission's traditional gradualism test found in Order No. PSC-09-0283- FOF-EI, pp. 86-87. Under the rates set forth in Exhibits B and C, no rate or revenue class receives (nor shall receive) an increase greater than 1.5 times the system average percentage increase in total and no class receives (nor shall receive) a decrease in rates.

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(g) Base rates and credits applied to customer bills in accordance with this Paragraph

4 shall not be changed during the Minimum Term except as otherwise permitted in this

Agreement.

FPL shall be authorized to apply a transition rider to the bills of customers located in the

former Gulf service area and a corresponding transition credit to the bills of customers

located in FPL’s peninsular service area. The transition rider and credit will step down

ratably and reach zero over five years as set forth in Exhibit B.

The tariff changes shown in Exhibits B and C, including but not limited to those listed

below, shall be implemented:

(1)

(ii)
(iii)

(iv)

{v)

(vi)

(vii)

(viii)

Cancel all existing Gulf tariff sheets and incorporate other ministerial
changes to provide a uniform tariff book; and

Rename the term Customer Charge to Base Charge: and

Implement a Fixed Rate (Flat-1) Tariff once billing system modifications
are complete: and

Increase the threshold between the General Service and the General Service
Demand rate classes from 21 kW to 25 kW; and

Add a maximum demand charge to all commercial and industrial time of
use distribution-level rate schedules; and

Extend the Supplemental Power Services Rider optional pilot through
December 31, 2025; and

Increase the Commercial Industrial Service Rider cap to the greater of

1000 MW or 75 contracts; and

Impl t new E. ic Develor it Rider tariff “Large EDR”; and

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(ix) Close all unmetered lighting rate schedules, except LT-1 to new customers.
Customers currently taking service under unmetered rate schedules will be
grandfathered, and there will be four open tariffs to serve new customers:
LT-1 for company-owned LED, street, outdoor, roadway and general lights;
SL-1M for customer-owned street, roadway and general lights; SL-2M for
traffic signals; and GS-1 for unmetered cable amplifiers and billboard
lights; and

(x) Close Gulf Outdoor Service rate schedule to new customers and
grandfather existing lighting customers under their existing rate schedule.
Remaining customers will be migrated to the applicable FPL tariff, and

(xi) Increase meter tampering fee; and

(xii) Expand the existing field collection charge to include all premise visits;
and

(xiii) Change all service charges including temporary construction service rates
to reflect the cost of performing the service.

te FPL shall be permitted to remove the Regulatory Assessment Fee (“RAF”) from base rates
and include the RAF, on the same line as the Gross Receipts Tax, on customer bills. ‘The

line shall be n 1 “Gross Receipts Tax and Regulatory Assessment Fee” or an

appropriate variation thereof. FPL will not collect the RAF until this change is

lemented on the cust “s bill, FPL, will not back bill for any such uncollected RAFs.

t
8. Clause factors also shall be unified effective January 1, 2022, and shall include unified
true-ups of any then outstanding over- or under- recoveries. In the 2021 clause

proceedi FPL will calculate and file unified clause factors that take effect January 1,

2022, subject to the Commission's approval of the factor calculations. All parties maintain

q

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their full rights in the clause dockets, but shall not oppose unification of the clause factors

or the date of implementation.

9 Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude FPL from requesting the Commission to approve
the recovery of costs that are recoverable through base rates under the nuclear cost recovery
statute, Section 366.93, Florida Statutes, and Commission Rule 26-6.0423, F.A.C. Nothing
in this Agreement prohibits parties from participating without limitation in nuclear cost

recovery proceedings and proceedings related thereto and opposing FPL’s requests.

10. (a) = Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude FPL from petitioning the Commission to
seek recovery of costs associated with amy tropical systems named by the National
Hurricane Center or its successor (Storm Costs) without the application of any form of
earnings test or measure and irrespective of previous or current base rate earnings or the
remaining unamortized Reserve Amount as defined in Paragraph 16, Consistent with the
rate design method set forth in Order No. PSC-06-0464-FOF-EI, the Parties agree that
recovery of storm costs from customers will begin, on an interim basis, sixty days
following the filing of a cost recovery petition and tariff with the Commission and will be
based on a 12-month recovery period ifthe storm costs do not exceed $4.00/1,000 kWh on
monthly residential customer bills. In the event the storm costs exceed that level, any
additional costs in excess of $4.00/1,000 kWh may be recovered in a subsequent year or
years as determined by the Commission. All storm-related costs subject to interim
recovery under this Paragraph 10 shall be calculated and disposed of pursuant to
Commission Rule 25-6.0143, F.A.C., and will be limited to costs resulting from a tropical
system named by the National Hurricane Center or its successor, and additionally will be
limited to the estimate of incremental costs above the level of storm reserve prior to the

storm and to the replenishment of the storm reserve to its then-current level but in no event

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less than $150 million. Replenishment of the storm reserve will be fully funded through
the customer charge as outlined in this paragraph 10. The Parties to this Agreement are not
precluded from participating in any such proceedings and opposing the amount of FPL’s
claimed costs but not the mechanism agreed to herein, provided that it is applied in
accordance with this Agreement.

(b) The Parties agree that the $4.00/1,000 kWh cap in this Paragraph 10 will apply in
aggregate for a calendar year for the purpose of the interim recovery set forth in Paragraph
10(a) above; provided, however, that FPL may petition the Commission to allow FPL to
increase the initial 12 month recovery beyond $4.00/1,000 kWh in the event FPL incurs in
excess of 5800 million of storm recovery costs that qualify for recovery ina given calendar
year, inclusive of the amount needed to replenish the storm reserve to the level described

in Paragraphs 10(a) and 16(¢). All Parties reserve their right to oppose such a petition.

(c) Any proceeding to recover costs associated with any Storm Costs shall not be a
vehicle for a “rate case” type inquiry concerning the expenses, investment, or financial
results of operations of the Company and shall not apply any form of carmings test or
measure or consider previous or current base rate earnings or the remaining unamortized

Reserve Amount as defined in Paragraph 16.

11. Nothing shall preclude the Company from requesting Commission approval for recovery
of costs (a) that are of a type which traditionally, historically and ordinarily would be, have
been, or are presently recovered through cost recovery clauses or surcharges, or (b) that are
incremental costs not currently recovered in base rates which the Legislature or
Commission determines are clause recoverable subsequent to the approval of this

Agreement. It is the intent of the Parties in this Paragraph 11 that FPL not be allowed to

10

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recover through cost recovery cl i in the magnitude of costs of types or

categories (including but not limited to, for example, investment in and maint of

transmission assets except as expressly provided for by Section 366,96, Fla. Stat.) that have
been, and traditionally. historically. and ordinarily would be, recovered through base rates.
It is further the intent of the Parties to recognize that an authorized governmental entity
may impose requirements on FPL involving new or atypical kinds of costs (including but

a |

not [i to, for ple, requir related to cyber security), and concurrently or in

connection with the imposition of such requir ts, the Legislature and/or Commission

may authorize FPL to recover those related costs through a cost recovery clause.

12. (a) FPL projects that for purposes of the cost recovery set forth in this Paragraph, it
will undertake construction of approximately $94 MW of solar generation reasonably
projected to go into service during 2024 and 894 MW of solar generation reasonably
projected to go into service during 2025 or within one year following expiration of the
Minimum Term, with the ability to carry over to 2025 any megawatts that do not enter
service in 2024. For each solar project, which may consist of one or more solar generation
sites as filed by FPL, that is approved by the Commission for cost recovery pursuant to the

process described in this Paragraph, FPL’s base rates will be i d by the i tal

annualized base revenue requirement (excluding any land component that is already
included in base rates as Plant Held for Future Use as shown on Exhibit MV-5) for the first
12 months of operation (the “Annualized Base Revenue Requirement”), but in no event
shall such recovery commence before the entire solar project is in service. Each such Solar
Base Rate Adjustment (“SoBRA”) shall be authorized for solar projects for which FPL

files for Cc ission approval p to this Paragraph during the Minimum Term. The

Commission's approval may occur before or after expiration of the Minimum Term, The

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projects constructed pursuant to this Paragraph must be reasonably scheduled to be placed
into service no later than one year following the expiration of the Minimum Term. The
cost of the components, engineering and construction for any solar project constructed by
FPL pursuant to this Paragraph shall be reasonable and in no event shall the average cost
of all such projects in any filing for Commission approval exceed a value of $1,250 per
kilowatt alternating current (“kW ac”) (“$1,250 KW ac Cap”), less the cost (on a per KW ac
basis) of any land component allocated to such projects when that land is already included
in rate base as Plant Held for Future Use as shown on Exhibit MV-S5 filed in this Docket
(referred to herein as “Adjusted Cap”). The Parties contemplate that FPL does not intend
to use leased land in developing and constructing the projects. However, to the extent that
leased land is used to construct a project, the lease expense will be converted to a capital
cost surrogate in accordance with Commission practice and precedent and will be used to

measure performance against the $1,250 kW ac Cap under this Paragraph.

(b) For solar generation subject to the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act (i.e.
75 MW or greater), FPL will file a petition for need determination pursuant to Chapter 25-
22, F.A.C. [f approved pursuant to the procedures described in this Paragraph and Section
403.519, Fla. Stat., FPL will calculate and submit for Commission confirmation the amount
ofthe SoBR.A for such solar generation using the Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Recovery
Clause docket (“Fuel Docket”) projection filing for the year that solar generation will go
into service.

(c) Solar generation not subject to the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act (i.e.,
fewer than 75 MW) also will be subject to approval by the Commission as follows: (i) FPL.
will file a request for approval of such solar generation at the time of its final true-up filing,

in the Fuel Docket; (ii) all Fuel Docket deadlines and schedules shall apply; (iii) the issues

12

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for determination are limited to the cost effectiveness of each project (i.e., will the project
lower the projected system cumulative present value revenue requirement “CPVRR” as
compared to such CPVRR without the solar project) and the amount of revenue
requirements and appropriate percentage increase in base rates needed to collect the
estimated revenue requirements; and (iv) approval of the solar generation project will be
an issue to be resolved at the regularly scheduled Fuel Docket hearing; provided, however,
that the Commission on its own initiative or upon good cause shown by an intervenor
(which may include any Party to this Agreement or any other entity satisfying the standing
requirements of Florida law) may set FPL’s request for approval of the solar generation
project for a separate hearing to be held in the Fuel Docket before the end of that calendar
year. FPL will calculate and submit for Commission confirmation the amount of the
SoBRA for each such solar project at the time of the projection filing for the year the solar

project will go into service.

(d) FPL may add battery storage to any of the solar projects subject to recovery under
this Paragraph provided that the combined cost of solar plus battery storage (1) for the
project does not exceed $1,250 KWac Cap (or the Adjusted Cap, as applicable under
subparagraph 12(a)), (ii) satisfies the cost-effectiveness condition in this Paragraph, and

(iil) is cost effective compared to solar alone.

(e) For each solar project approved pursuant to this Agreement, the base rate increase
shall be based upon FPL’s billing determinants for the first 12 months following such
project’s commercial in-service date, where such billing determinants are those used in
FPL’s then-most-current Capacity Clause Recovery Clause (“CCR Clause”) filings with

the Commission, including, to the extent necessary, projections of such billing

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determinants into a subsequent calendar year so as to cover the same 12 months as the first

12 months of each such solar project’s operation.

(f) FPL may not receive approval for incremental SOBRA recovery of more than 894
MW of solar projects for a calendar year, provided, however, to the extent that FPL
receives approval for SoBRA recovery in 2024 of less than 894 MW ina year, the surplus
capacity can be carried over for recovery in 2025. For example, if FPL receives approval
for SoBRA recovery in 2024 of 794 MW of solar capacity, it would be entitled to increase
its request for 2025 SoBRA recovery for an additional 100 MW.

(g) Each SoBRA is to be reflected on FPL’s customer bills by increasing base charges
and base non-clause recoverable credits and commercial/industrial demand reduction
credits by an equal percentage contemporaneously. The calculation of the percentage
change in rates is based on the ratio of the jurisdictional Annualized Base Revenue
Requirement and the forecasted retail base revenues from the sales of electricity during the
first twelve months of operation. FPL will begin applying the incremental base rate charges
for each SoBRA to meter readings made on and after the commercial in-service date of
that solar generation site.

(h) — The revenue requirements for each SOBRA will be calculated using the current
authorized midpoint ROE, an incremental capital structure based on investor sources that
is adjusted to reflect the inclusion of applicable tax credits on a normalized basis, and the
depreciation-related accumulated deferred income tax proration adjustment that is required

by Treasury Regulation §1.167(1)-1(h)(6).

(i) If FPL’s actual installed cost for any solar generation site is less than the $1,250

kWac Cap (or the Adjusted Cap on a per site basis for any land already included in rate

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base as Plant Held for Future Use as shown on Exhibit MV-5), the customers and FPL will
share in the beneficial difference with 75% of the difference inuring to the benefit of
customers and 25% serving as an incentive to the Company to seek cost savings. For
example, if the actual installed cost of a solar generation site is $1,150 per kW ac, the cost
to be used for purposes of computing the revenue requirement would be $1,175 per KW ac
[0.25 times ($1.250 - $1,150) + $1,150)}. Any sharing related to a solar generation site
that includes land already included in rate base as Plant Held for Future Use as shown on
Exhibit MV-5 would be based on the Adjusted Cap on a per site basis. Additionally, the
lower installed costs shall be the basis for the full revenue requirements and a one-time
credit will be made through the CCR Clause. In order to determine the amount of this
credit, a revised SoBRA Factor will be computed using the same data and methodology
incorporated in the initial SoBR.A factor. However, in lieu of the capital expenditures on
which the Annualized Base Revenue Requirement was based, the calculation will use
actual installed costs adjusted to reflect the incentive described in this subpart. On a going
forward basis, base rates will be adjusted to reflect the revised SoBRA factor. The
difference between the cumulative base revenues since the implementation of the initial
SoBRA factor and the cumulative base revenues that would have resulted if the revised
SoBRA factor had been in place during the same time period will be credited to customers
through the CCR Clause with interest at the 30-day commercial paper rate as specified in

Rule 25-6.109, FLA.C.

q) Subject to the maximum cost of $1,250 kKWac Cap (or the Adjusted Cap) as set
forth in subparagraph 12(a), in the event that actual capital costs for a solar generation
project are higher than the projection on which the Annualized Base Revenue Requirement

was based, FPL, at its option, may initiate a limited proceeding per Section 366,076, Florida

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Statutes, limited to the issue of whether FPL has met the requirements of Rule 25-
22.082(15), F.A.C. Nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit a Party from participating in
any such limited proceeding for the purpose of challenging whether FPL has met the
requirements of Rule 25-22,082(15) or otherwise acted in accordance with this Agreement,
if the Commission finds that FPL has met the requirements of Rule 25-22.082(15), then
FPL shall increase the SoBRA by the corresponding incremental revenue requirement due
to such additional capital costs, provided, consistent with subparagraph 12(a) above, FPL.
is prohibited from recovering through the SoBRA mechanism for any project any costs
greater than the $1,250 kWac Cap (or the Adjusted Cap as set forth in subparagraph 12(a))
under any circumstances. However, FPL’s election not to seek such an increase in the
SoBRA shall not preclude FPL from booking any incremental costs for surveillance
reporting and all regulatory purposes subject only to a finding of imprudence or
disallowance by the Commission. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude any Party to
this Agreement or any other lawful party with standing from participating, consistent with

the full rights of an intervenor, in any such limited proceeding,

(k) FPL,s base rates applied to customer bills, including the effects of the SoBRAs as
implemented pursuant to this Agreement (i... uniform percent increase for all rate classes
applied to base revenues), shall continue in effect until next reset by the Commission in a

general base rate proceeding.

13. (a) If federal or state permanent tax changes (“Tax Reform”) are effective during the
Term, FPL will quantify the impact of Tax Reform on its Florida Jurisdictional base
revenue requirement as projected in its forecasted earnings surveillance report for the
calendar year that includes the period in which Tax Reform is effective. [f Tax Reform is

enacted effective for any of the tax years 2022 through the Term of this Agreement, the

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impacts of Tax Reform on base revenue requi its will be adjusted for retail customers

within the later of 90 days of when the Tax Reform becomes law or the effective date of
the law but in no instance prior to January 1, 2022, through a prospective adjustment to
base rates upon a thorough review of the effects of the tax reform on base revenue

requi ts. This adjustment shall be accomplished through a uniform percentage

di or i to di d and energy base rate charges for all retail
customer classes. Any effects of tax reform on retail revenue requirements from the

effective date (but no earlier than January 1, 2022) through the date of the base rate

adjustment shall be flowed back to, or collected from, cust through the CCR Clause
on the same basis as used in any base rate adjustment.

(b) Excess and/or Deficient Deferred Taxes created by the Tax Reform shall be
deferred to a regulatory asset or liability, which shall be included in the FPSC-adjusted
capital structure and flowed back to, or collected from, customers over a term consistent

with law. The remaining 2017 TCJA bal of tized unprotected excess deferred

income tax shall not be included in the regulatory asset or liability described in this

Paragraph, but instead will be the subject of Paragraph 26.

‘The flow back or collection shall be accomplished as follows:
0) If the Average Rate Assumption Method used in the TCJA is prescribed,
then the regulatory asset or liability will be flowed back to, or collected from,
customers over the remaining life of the assets associated with the Excess and/or
Deficient Deferred Taxes subject to the provisions related to FPSC adjusted

operating income impacts of Tax Reform noted above.

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(ii) If the Tax Reform law or act is silent on the flow-back or collection period
for parts or all of the Excess and/or Deficient Deferred Taxes. and there are no other
statutes or rules that govern the flow-back or collection period for “unprotected”
amounts, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the following flow-back or
collection period(s) will apply: (1) if the cumulative “unprotected” regulatory
asset/liability balance is less than $500 million, the flow-back/collection period for
the cumulative balance will be five years; or (2) if the cumulative “unprotected”
regulatory asset/liability balance is equal to or greater than $500 million, the flow-

back/collection period for the cumulative balance will be ten years.

(c) “Protected” and “unprotected” Excess and/or Deficient Deferred Taxes will be
flowed back to, or collected from, retail customers within the later of 90 days of when the
Tax Reform becomes law or the effective date of the law but no earlier than January 1.
2022. As subsequent information becomes available. such as FPL’s federal tax return
being filed, any true-ups or adjustments will be evaluated and implemented within 90 days

of that information becoming available.

(d) Ifthe applicable federal or state inconne tax rate for FPL changes more than 90 days
before the effective date of any of the rate increases provided for in Paragraph 4, FPL will
adjust the amount of the base rate increases to reflect the new tax rate before the
implementation of such increase. Any base rate adjustments or changes that are
implemented before the effective date of the applicable federal or state mcome tax rate
change will be adjusted by applying no more than an equal percentage increase or decrease
to each class and pursuant to subpart (a) of this Paragraph.

14. (a) Notwithstanding Paragraph 4 above, if FPL.’s earned return on common equity falls

below the bottom of its authorized range during the Minimum Term on an FPL monthly

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earnings surveillance report stated on an FPSC actual, adjusted basis, FPL may petition the
FPSC to amend its base rates, either as a general rate proceeding under Sections 366.06
and 366.07, Florida Statutes, or as a limited proceeding under Section 366.076, Florida
Statutes. Throughout this Agreement, “FPSC actual, adjusted basis” and “actual adjusted
eared return” shall mean results reflecting all adjustments to FPL.’s books required by the
Commission by rule or order, but excluding pro forma, weather-related adjustments. If
FPL files a petition to initiate a general rate proceeding pursuant to this provision, FPL
may request an interim rate increase pursuant to the provisions of Section 366,071, Florida
Statutes. Nothing in this Agreement shall jpreclude any Party from participating in any
proceeding initiated by FPL to increase base rates pursuant to this Paragraph consistent

with the full rights of an intervenor.

(b) Notwithstanding Paragraph 4 above, if during the Minimum Term of this
Agreement, FPL’s earned return on common, equity exceeds the top of its authorized ROE
range reported in an FPL monthly earnings surveillance report stated on an FPSC actual,
adjusted basis, any Party shall be entitled to petition the Commission for a review of FPL’s
base rates. In any proceeding initiated pursuant to this Paragraph, all parties will have full
rights conferred by law.

(c) Notwithstanding Paragraph 4 above, this Agreement shall terminate upon the
effective date of any final order issued in any such proceeding pursuant to this Paragraph
14 that changes FPL’s base rates.

(d) This Paragraph 14 shall not (i) be construed to bar or limit FPL to any recovery of
costs otherwise contemplated by this Agreement nor, in any proceeding initiated after a

base rate proceeding filed pursuant to this Paragraph, shall any Party be prohibited from

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taking any position or asserting the application of law or any right or defense in litigation
related to FPL’s efforts to recover such costs; (ii) apply to any request to change FPL’s
base rates that would become effective after this Agreement terminates; or (iii) limit any
Party’s rights in proceedings concerning changes to base rates that would become effective
subsequent to the termination of this Agreement to argue that FPL’s authorized ROE range
or any other element used in deriving its revenue requirements or rates should differ from

the range set forth in this Agreement.

15. FPL shall be authorized to establish the regulatory assets identified on Exhibit D attached
to this Agreement. (“Regulatory Assets”). Amortization of the Regulatory Assets shall be
pursuant to Exhibit D and subject to the provisions of Paragraph 16.

16. (a) In Order No, Order PSC-16-0560-AS-EI, the Commission authorized FPL to
amortize the depreciation reserve surplus remaining at the end of 2016 plus up to $1 billion
of theoretical reserve surplus effected by the depreciation agreed upon by the parties. This
resulted in a total reserve amount of $1.25 billion; that amount was later reduced by
$5 million pursuant to the Hurricane Irma settlement, Order No. PSC-2019-0319-8-EI and
further reduced by $5 million pursuant to the Hurricane Dorian settlement, Order No, PSC-
2021-0188-S-EI. FPL projected that it would have $346 million remaining at the end of
2021. The Parties acknowledge that the actual remaining amount may differ from the
projection. The positive difference between the actual remaining amount, if any, and the
$346 million, is the “Carryover Amount.”

(b) The Parties agree that FPL is authorized to apply the altermative depreciation
parameters and resulting rates as set forth in Exhibit KF-3(B). The parties acknowledge
that application of those rates results in a $234.7 million reduction in the 2022 test year

depreciation expense (compared to application of the depreciation rates resulting from

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FPL’s 2021 depreciation study), and the parties agree that FPL’s theoretical depreciation
reserve surplus for purposes of this Agreement shall be $1.45 billion, which is inclusive of
the projected $346 million balance remaining at the end of 2021, (the “Reserve Amount”)

on January 1, 2022.

(@) The Parties agree that until expiration of the Minimum Term of this Agreement or
the extension of one (1) year pursuant to Paragraph 16(g), FPL may amortize the Reserve
Amount by recording credits to depreciation expense and debits to the cost of removal
component of the depreciation reserve, or debits to depreciation expense and credits to the
cost of removal component of the depreciation reserve, with the amounts to be amortized
by the end of 2022 not to exceed a year-end total credit of $200 million and the amounts
to be amortized in each remaining year of the Term left to FPL’s discretion. Additionally,
amortization in each year of the Term is subject to the following conditions: (i) for any
surveillance reports submitted by FPL during the Minimum Term on which its ROE
(measured on an FPSC actual, adjusted basis) would otherwise fall below the bottom of its
authorized range, FPL must amortize at least. the amount of the available Reserve Amount
necessary to maintain in each such 12-month period an ROE at a level that does not fall
below the bottom of its authorized range (measured on an FPSC actual, adjusted basis): (ii)
FPL may not amortize the Reserve Amount in an amount that results in FPL achieving an
ROE that exceeds the top of its authorized range (measured on an FPSC actual, adjusted
basis) in any such 12-month period as measured by surveillance reports submitted by FPL;
and (iii) FPL must debit depreciation expense and credit the depreciation reserve in an
amount to cause FPL to not exceed the top of its authorized ROE range, provided, however,
that if such credit would result in FPL exceeding the Reserve Amount of $1.45 billion, the

provisions of subpart (e) of this Paragraph shall apply.

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(d) The Parties agree that the Carryover Amount as described in subpart (a) of this
Paragraph shall be used as follows: (i) fifty percent of the Carryover Amount would be
applied to credit (decrease) the Regulatory Assets as shown on Exhibit D, page 1 attached
hereto; and (ii) fifty percent of the Carryover Amount would be applied to credit (increase)
the storm reserve as an unfunded amount, on a transitional basis subject to being replaced

on a funded basis after depletion subsequent to a storm event.

(e) If a debit to depreciation expense is required to keep FPL from exceeding a
Regulatory ROE that exceeds the top of its authorized range and such debit would result in
the Reserve Amount exceeding $1.45 billion during any monthly reported period on an
earnings surveillance report: (1) FPL will first record a debit to depreciation expense and a
credit to depreciation reserve such that the Reserve Amount is $1.45 billion; (ii) whatever
debit remains necessary to not exceed the top of its authorized ROE range will be recorded
on the Company’s books such that fifty percent of such debit amount is applied to credit
(decrease) the Regulatory Assets shown on Exhibit D, page 1 and fifty percent is applied
to credit (increase) the storm reserve as an unfunded amount. Any unfunded storm reserve
balance must be depleted prior to using the funded reserve to recover Storm Costs. Nothing
in this Paragraph shall preclude FPL from either expensing Storm Costs in accordance with
Rule 25-6.0143, F.A.C. or exercising its option to seek recovery pursuant to Paragraph 10

of this Agreement for recoverable storm costs pursuant to Rule 25-6.0143, F.A.C.

(D FPL shall not satisfy the requirement of Paragraph 14 that its actual adjusted earned
ROE must fall below the bottom of its authorized range on a monthly surveillance report
before it may initiate a petition to increase base rates during the Minimum Term unless

FPL first uses any of the Reserve Amount that remains available for the purpose of

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increasing its earned ROE to at least the bottom of its authorized range for the period in

question.

(g) FPL shall file an attachment to its monthly earnings surveillance report for
December 2021 that shows the final amount of the “rollover” surplus that remained at the
end of 2021. Thereafter, FPL shall file an attachment to its monthly surveillance report for
each month of each year during the Term that shows the amount of amortization credit or
debit to the Reserve Amount on a monthly basis and year-end total basis for that calendar
year. FPL may not amortize any portion of the Reserve Amount past December 31, 2025
unless it provides notice to the Parties by no later than March 31, 2025 that it does not
intend to seek a general base rate increase to be effective any earlier than January 1, 2027,
in which event the Minimum Term of this Agreement shall be extended by 12 months.
Any amortization of the Reserve Amount after December 31, 2025 shall be in accord with

this Paragraph.

17. The Parties agree that FPL’s 2021 Depreciation Study, filed as Exhibit NWA-1, satisfies
Rule 25-6.0436, F.A.C. and FPL’s obligation to file a depreciation study pursuant to Order
PSC-16-0560-AS-EI. Pursuant to this Agreement, however. FPL is authorized to apply
the depreciation adjustments set forth in Exhibit KF-3(B).

18. The Parties agree that FPL’s 2021 Disrnantlement Study, filed as Exhibit JTK-1
(Corrected), satisfies Rule 25-6.04364, F.A.C. and FPL’s obligation to file a dismantlement
study pursuant to Order PSC 16-0560-AS-EI. The level of FPL’s annual dismantlement

accrual shall be as set forth in Exhibit E.

19. ‘The Parties agree that the provisions of Rules 25-6.0436 and 25-6.04364, F.A.C., pursuant

to which depreciation and dismantlement studies are generally filed at least every four

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years will not apply to FPL until FPL files its next petition to change base rates. The
depreciation rates and dismantlement accrual rates in effect as of the Implementation Date
shall remain in effect until FPL’s base rates are next reset in a general base rate proceeding,
At such time as FPL shall next file a general base rate proceeding, it shall simultaneously
file new depreciation and dismantlement studies and propose to reset depreciation rates
and dismantlement accrual rates in accordance with the results of those studies, The Parties
agree to support consolidation of proceedings, if needed, to reset FPL’s base rates,

depreciation rates and di lement | rates.

20, In Order No, PSC-2020-0084-S-EL, the Commission approved FPL’s SolarTogether Tariff
and Program (“SolarTogether”), a voluntary program that allows participating FPL
customers (“Participants”) to subscribe to a portion of cost-effective solar capacity and
receive a credit for the solar production associated with their subscription. Under
SolarTogether, Participants pay a monthly subscription charge designed to cover the costs
associated with the capacity to which they subscribed, The Commission's Order
authorized FPL to construct 1,490 MW of solar facilities. SolarTogether is fully subscribed
and has a significant waiting list of customers who wish to enroll. The parties agree that
(i) FPL shall be authorized to extend SolarTogether by constructing an additional
1,788 MW of cost-effective solar at its discretion through 2025, such that the total capacity
of SolarTogether will amount to 3,278 MW, (ii) the incremental capacity above the original
1,490 MW shall be allocated 40% to residential and small business customers (45 MW
reserved for low income participants) and 60° to commercial, industrial and governmental
(20° of this capacity is reserved for participants located in the former Gulf territory); and
(iit) the pricing for all participants will be as set forth in First Revised Tariff Sheet $.932-

8.934, included with Exhibit B. The projected benefits of the 3,278 MW of SolarTogether

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shall be allocated 55% of the projected benefits to participants and 45% to the general body

of ratepayers.

21. In Order No. PSC-130023-S-EL the Commission authorized FPL to implement a Pilot
Asset Optimization Program designed to create additional value for customers by FPL
engaging in wholesale power purchases and sales, as well as all forms of asset optimization.
In Order No. PSC-PSC-16-0560-AS-EI, the Commission approved modifications to the
Asset Optimization Program. The Parties agree that FPL is authorized to continue the
Asset Optimization Program as an ongoing program as previously approved in Order No.
PSC-130023-S-EI and Order No. PSC-PSC-16-0560-AS-EI subject to the following

modifications:
(i) FPL may optimize all fuel sources — beyond just natural gas supply and capacity
— when it is reasonable and in the best interests of customers to do so based on
the system requirements, market demand, and market price of the fuel or
capacity at the time;
(ii) FPL may monetize its renewable energy credits;

(ii) The number of annual savings thresholds is reduced from four to three for
reporting purposes. Threshold 1: FPL customers will receive 100% of the
Incentive Mechanism gain up to a threshold of $42.5 million. Threshold 2: FPL
will retain 60% and customers will receive 40% of incremental gains between
$42.5 million and $100 million. Threshold 3: FPL will retain 50% and
customers will receive 50% of incremental gains in excess of $100 million.

(iv) — The per-MWh variable power O&M rate shall be $0.48/MWh.

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22.

(vw) Optimization activities, variable power plant O&M rates, and savings
thresholds shall be considered ‘‘adjustable parameters” such that FPL may
request that the Commission review and adjust these mechanism parameters

every four years in the Fuel Cost Recovery Docket.

Nothing in this Paragraph is intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Commission to

approve cost recovery of investments beyond that authorized by Chapter 366, Fla. Stat.

FPL is authorized to recover the costs associated with the electric vehicle programs listed
below (“EV Programs”). The Parties agree that FPL’s decision to pursue the EV Programs
described below is prudent, and they waive any right to challenge these programs, other
than the reasonableness of amounts actually expended, in any proceeding addressing the
recoverability of these program costs. The cost of the infrastructure of the EV programs,
including the installation and removal costs, would be includable in FPL’s jurisdictional
rate base until recovered from customers. ‘The EV Programs costs described herein are not
incremental to the revenue requirements set forth in Paragraph 4.

(i) £Voilution — a pilot program that supports the growth of electric vehicles. The
primary objective of this pilot program for FPL is to gather data and learnings
ahead of mass EV adoption to better plan for and design possible future EV
investments. The FPL EVolution Pilot focuses on infrastructure build-out
impacts of EV adoption rates, rate structures and demand models, and grid
impacts of fast charging. The total mvestment in the FPL’s EVolution Pilot
Program is forecast to be $30 million through 2022.

(ii) Public Fast Charging Program — a pilot program that expands access to public
fast charging, including access in underserved areas and evacuation routes. The

total investment in the Public Fast Charging Program is forecast to be

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$100 million over the four-year period 2022-2025, the revenue requirements of
which will be partially offset by revenue received under FPL’s UEV tariff
approved in Docket 20200170-EI, which establishes a rate for utility-owned
public EV fast charging stations.

(iii) ~~ Residential EV Charging Services Pilot — a voluntary tariff for residential
customers who desire EV charging service, for a fixed rate, through the
installation of a level 2 EV charger, owned, operated and maintained by FPL.
The subscription utilizes FPL’s filed Time-of-Use (“TOU”) rate and includes

unlimited off-peak charging and flexibility to charge during on-peak periods if

needed, at on-peak TOU rate. FPL will provide full installation and equi it

tl

only installation options pursuant to the Tariff Sheets $.213-8.214 and 9.843-

9.846, included with Exhibit B. The total investment in the Residential EV

Charging Pilot is forecast to be $25 million over the four-year period 2022-
2025.

(iv) Commercial EV Charging Services Pilot — a voluntary tariff for Commercial
customers who desire EV charging services for fleet vehicles through the
installation of Company owned, operated, maintained electric vehicle supply
equipment on a customer's premise. Under the tariff, customer will pay a fixed
monthly charge, established via a formula-based rate to allow for individual

pricing designed to recover all costs and expenses over the life of the

assets and be CPVRR neutral to the general body over applicable term. The
total investment in the Fleet EV Pilot Program is forecast to be $25 million over

the four-year period 2022-2025. The Commercial EV Charging Pilot Tariff is

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attached as Tariff Sheet and associated customer agreement are attached as
Tariff Sheets 8.942-8.943 and 9.833-9.840, included with Exhibit B.

(v) New Technologies and Software — limited pilot initiatives designed to evaluate
emerging EV technologies and enhance service and resiliency for customers, In
addition, FPL will implement sofiware upgrades, including the FPL Evolution
App and systems enhancements, to provide a streamlined customer experience
in support of the EV programs. The total investment in the Technologies and

Software is forecast to be $20 million over the four-year period 2022-2025.

di

(vi) Education and Awareness. FPL will ¢ I 1 its EV prog by

ts that 1 aw and educate customers about the choice to

P

go electric. Such components may include but are not limited to: (a) creating
school curriculums at all levels, from engaging EV awareness and education for
school children to providing training programs, (b) promoting EV and
infrastructure adoption at events such as sustainability conferences, earth days,
home shows, and green markets; (c) establishing automaker/OEM and dealer
partnerships to build EV awareness and drive sales; and (d) providing resources
and tools (i.e., informational webpages and vehicle comparison tools) to inform
consumers of electric vehicle benefits. The total investment in this Education
and Awareness component of FPL*s suite of EV projects is forecast to be $5

million over the four-year period 2022-2025.
23. FPL. shall be authorized to offer a four-year voluntary pilot program pursuant to which
commercial and industrial customers on a metered rate may elect to have FPL install and
maintain a solar facility on their site for a monthly tariff charge (the “Solar Power Facilities

Pilot Program”). Participating customers would select from a variety of options including,

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but not limited to, solar trees, solar canopies and solar benches. Through a fixed monthly
charge over the ten-year term of the customer agreement, all project capttal costs and
expenses will be recovered from program participants, such that the general body of
customers will not be impacted, The Solar Power Facilities Pilot Program tariff sheet and
associated customer agreement are attached as Tariff Sheets 8.939-8.940 and 9.849-9.856
included with Exhibit B. At least 60 days prior to the expiration of the Solar Power
Facilities Pilot Program Tariff, FPL will submit either a petition to the Commission
requesting approval to extend or modify the Tariff or close it to new customers. Regardless
of whether the program continues after four years, customers already participating in the
program will continue to be served under the Solar Power Facilities Pilot Program Tariff.
The Solar Power Facilities Pilot Program costs described herein are not incremental to the
revenue requirements set forth in Paragraph 4.

24, FPL shall be authorized lo implement a Green Hydrogen pilot project that will allow FPL
to evaluate how its combustion turbine units operate with a hydrogen fuel mix and to learn
how a hydrogen fuel production and storage facility can be effectively used on site with
combustion turbine units. The pilot would be deployed at the existing combustion turbine
units at the Okeechobee Clean Energy Center where the Company would build an
approximate 25 MW electrolyzer and a storage facility for the production and on-site
storage of hydrogen, FPL estimates that the pilot project can be put in service in 2023 at
an estimated cost of $65 million. The Parties agree that FPT,’s decision to pursue the Green
Hydrogen pilot program is prudent, and they waive any right to challenge this pilot, other
than the reasonableness of amounts actually expended, in any proceeding addressing the

recoverability of the Green Hydrogen pilot program costs, The Green Hydrogen pilot

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program costs described herein are not incremental to the revenue requirements set forth

in Paragraph 4.

25, FPL shall be allowed to impl t anew residential cust pilot program to test smart
electrical panels (the “Smart Panel Pilot”). Under the Smart Panel Pilot, FPL will install
at no additional cost to pilot participants up to 1,000 Company-owned smart electrical
panels, which enable greater insights regarding and control of in-home electrical loads,
thereby allowing advanced energy management capabilities. The Smart Panel Pilot will
test the feasibility of employing command-and-control load management messaging over
the existing smart meter network as well as determine customer satisfaction. Through this
Pilot, FPL will gather technical, operational and financial feasibility learnings to test its
ability to manage load and to enhance the Company's demand-side management load
control program. A copy of the Smart Panel Pilot Tariff (customer agreement) is attached
as Tariff Sheet 9.806-9.808, included with Exhibit B. The total investment in the
Company's proposed Smart Panel Pilot is forecasted to be up to $6 million from 2022
through 2023, The Parties agree that FPL’s decision to pursue the Smart Panel Pilot
Program is prudent, and they waive any right to challenge this pilot, other than the
reasonableness of amounts actually expended, in any proceeding addressing the
recoverability of the Smart Panel Pilot Program costs. ‘The cost of the equipment associated
with Smart Panel Pilot Program, including the installation and removal costs, would be
includable in FPI.’s jurisdictional rate hase until recovered from customers. The Smart
Panel pilot program costs described herein are not incremental to the revenue requirements

set forth in Paragraph 4.

26. Pursuant to the settlement approved in Order No, PSC-2019-0225-FOF-EL, FPL is

currently amortizing unprotected excess accumulated deferred i laxes gy ited by

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the 2017 TCJA over a 10-year period which began in 2018. FPL is authorized to accelerate
the amortization of the remaining amount of unprotected excess deferred income taxes that
would have been amortized in 2026 and 2027 such that those amounts would instead be
amortized ratably over the period from 2022-2025. This would result in the acceleration
of up to $163 million of unprotected excess accumulated deferred income tax amortization,

or approximately $41 million in each year from 2022-2025.

27. FPL agrees to the termination of 100% of natural gas financial hedging prospectively for
the Minimum Term and any extensions thereof and will make filings to implement such
termination in Docket No. 20210001-EI and subsequent fuel clause proceedings. FPL shall
not be prohibited from filing a petition and proposed risk management plan with the
Commission to address natural gas financial hedging following expiration of the Minimum
Term. The Parties understand and intend that FPL will not enter into any new financial
natural gas hedging contracts after the date on which this Agreement is executed, except
as may be necessary for FPL to remain in compliance to the minimum extent practicable
with the requirements of its currently approved Risk Management Plan.

28. No Party to this Agreement will request, support, or seek to impose a change in the
application of any provision hereof. Except as provided in Paragraph 14, a Party to this
Agreement will neither seek nor support any change in FPL’s base rates or credits applied
to customer bills, including limited, interim or any other rate decreases, that would take
effect prior to expiration of the Minimum Term, except for any such reduction requested
by FPL or as otherwise provided for in this Agreement. No party is prohibited from seeking
interim, limited, or general base rate relief, or a change to credits, to be effective following

latter of the expiration of the Minimum Term or any extensions thereof.

31

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment A
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 93

ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-S-E]
DOCKET NO, 20210015-EI
PAGE 55

29. Nothing in this Agreement will preclude FPL. from filing and the Commission from
approving any new or revised tariff provisions or rate schedules requested by FPL,
provided that such tariff request does not increase any existing base rate component of a
tariff or rate schedule during the Term unless the application of such new or revised tariff,

service or rate schedule is optional to FPL.’s customers.

30. The provisions of this Agreement are contingent on approval of this Agreement in its
entirety by the Commission without modification. The Parties agree that approval of this
Agreement is in the public interest. The Parties further agree that they will support this
Agreement and will not request or support any order, relief, outcome, or result in conflict
with the terms of this Agreement in any administrative or judicial proceeding relating to,
reviewing, or challenging the establishment, approval, adoption, or implementation of this
Agreement or the subject matter hereof. No party will assert in any proceeding before the
Commission or any court that this Agreement or any of the terms in the Agreement shall
have any precedential value, except to enforce the provisions of this Agreement. Approval
ofthis Agreement in its entirety will resolve all matters and issues in Docket No. 20210015-
EI pursuant to and in accordance with Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes. This docket will
be closed effective on the date the Commission Order approving this Agreement is final,
and no Party shall seek appellate review of any order approving this Agreement issued in

this Docket and each Party shall oppose such review.

31. This Agreement is dated as of August 9, 2021. It may be executed in counterpart originals,
and a seanned .pdf copy of an original signature shall be deemed an original. Any person

or entity that executes a signature page to this Agr nt shall b and be d ta

Party with the full range of rights and responsibilities provided hereunder, notwithstanding

that such person or entity is not listed in the first recital above and executes the signature

32

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment A
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 94

ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-S-E]
DOCKET NO, 20210015-EI
PAGE 56

page subsequent to the date of this Agreement, it being expressly understood that the
addition of any such additional Party(ies) shall not disturb or diminish the benefits of this
Agreement to any current Party.

32. All provisions of this Agreement survive the Minimum Term unless expressly stated

herein.

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment A
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 95

ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-8-EI
DOCKET NO, 20210015-EI
PAGE 57

In Witness Whereof, the Parties evidence their p and agi with the

provisions of this Agreement by their signature.

Florida Power & Light Company
700 Universe Boulevard
Juno Beach, FL 33408

em
By: é
Eric E. Silagy

President & CEO

34

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment A
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 96

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 97

ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-8-EI
DOCKET NO, 20210015-EI
PAGE 59

Florida Industrial Power Users Group
Jon C. Moyle, Jr.

Moyle Law Firm

118 North Gadsden Street
Tallahassee FL 32301

36

A, 2o2-\

Attachment A

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment A
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 98

ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-8-EI
DOCKET NO, 20210015-EI
PAGE 60

Florida Retail Federation

James Brew

Stone Law Firm

1025 Thomas Jefferson St., NW
Ste. 800 West

Washington, DC 20007

By:
James Brew

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 99

ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446-8-EI
DOCKET NO, 20210015-EI
PAGE 61

.. Souther Alliance for Clean Energy
Stephen A. Smith
P.O. Box 1842
Knoxville, TN 37901

— =
By: Sais
Stepiien A. Smith

Attachment A

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment B
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI

PAGE 100
FILED 12/9/2021
DOCUMENT NO. 13007-2021
FPSC - COMMISSION CLERK
BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
Power & Light Company. ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI

ISSUED: December 9, 2021

AMENDATORY ORDER

BY THE COMMISSION:

On December 2, 2021, we issued Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI, approving the 2021
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement entered into by Florida Power and Light Company (FPL),
the Office of Public Counsel, and several intervening parties as a full resolution of the issues
raised in this docket with respect to FPL’s petition for rate increase. However, due to scrivener’s
errors, several dates and references in the Order are not correct. Therefore, Order No. PSC-
2021-0446-S-E]I is amended in the following respects:

Page 4, third full paragraph, first sentence:
The 2021 Settlement has a minimum four year term through December 31, 20265.

Page 8, fourth full paragraph, first sentence:

We have been asked whether we have the statutory authority to approve seven regulatory rate

recovery mechanisms-feund in the 2021 Settlement A ereement,

Page 8, last sentence (continued on page 9):

In the 2021 Settlement, the SCRM, SoBRA, Asset Incentive, and federal and state corporate
income tax adjustment all contain the following provisions: (1) a description of the activity
whose costs are sought to be recovered; (2) a method for calculating those costs; (3) a description
of how and when those costs will be recovered, 1.e., an increase in base rates, a surcharge, etc.;
and (4) a “teeup— proceeding in which the final costs for the activity are litigated and
determined.

Page 11, footnote 29, first sentence:

The RSAM concept was first approved as part of the a Settlement Agreement for FPL-s in 20161

Page 14, third full paragraph, third sentence:

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment B
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 101

ORDER NO. PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI Attachment B
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 102

ORDER NO. PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI
DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI
PAGE 3

By ORDER of the Florida Public Service Commission this 9th day of December, 2021.

ADAM J. THITZMAN
Commission Clerk

Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(850) 413-6770
www.floridapsc.com

Copies furnished: A copy of this document is

provided to the parties of record at the time of
issuance and, if applicable, interested persons.

SPS

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