Padgett v. State

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 24, 2025

S25A0719. PADGETT v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant John Padgett was convicted of malice murder in

connection with the strangling death of his former girlfriend,

Wynesha Medley. 1 In this appeal, Padgett contends that his trial

counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in three

respects. As explained below, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at Padgett’s trial showed the

following. Padgett and Medley dated for several months during

1Medley’s body was found on January 24, 2017. In April 2017, a
Chatham County grand jury indicted Padgett for malice murder, felony
murder, and aggravated assault. At a jury trial from May 17 to 20, 2021, the
jury found him guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Padgett to serve
life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, and the
remaining counts were vacated or merged. Padgett filed a timely motion for
new trial, which he later amended through new counsel. After an evidentiary
hearing in September 2024, the trial court denied the motion in December
2024. Padgett filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this
Court’s April 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2016. After Medley ended the relationship in November 2016,

Padgett repeatedly sent Medley “aggressive” text messages, which

caused her to change her phone number. In early January 2017, he

arrived at Medley’s apartment and “bang[ed] on her door, crying”

and “asking her to let him in and get back together.” Around 2:30

a.m. on January 23, 2017, Medley awoke and noticed that there was

no electrical power in her apartment. Later that day, a maintenance

worker at Medley’s apartment complex discovered that a switch on

an exterior breaker panel had been moved to the “off position,” such

that only the power to Medley’s apartment was turned off, while the

breakers that controlled the power to the other apartments were still

“on.” Medley called the police, reported that she believed Padgett

had turned off her power, and inquired about obtaining a protective

order.

When Medley did not arrive at work the next day, January 24,

2017, a co-worker called the police and requested a welfare check.

An investigator who responded to Medley’s apartment that

afternoon found her “cold,” dead body lying on the floor, with a pair

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of black “leggings” around her neck. The medical examiner who

performed Medley’s autopsy determined that her death was caused

by strangulation; the medical examiner also noted abrasions on

Medley’s forehead and left eye.2 Later forensic testing on fingernail

clippings from Medley’s right hand revealed the presence of

Padgett’s DNA.3

Investigators interviewed Padgett the next day, January 25,

2017; the interview was video-recorded and played for the jury at

trial. During the interview, Padgett claimed that he had not been

to Medley’s apartment since December 2016, and he denied ever

2 The medical examiner was not asked about Medley’s time of death. The

State’s theory was that Medley was killed on the night of January 23. In
support of that theory, the State presented testimony from a neighbor of
Medley’s who said that she head “a scream” at the apartment complex around
9:00 p.m. that night.

3 The forensic biologist who performed the testing testified that she also

tested the pair of leggings and fingernail clippings from Medley’s left hand.
On cross-examination, she stated that the leggings contained DNA from
Medley and a “second partial [DNA] profile” that “could not have been
contributed by . . . Padgett.” In addition, the forensic biologist’s report, which
was admitted into evidence, said that the DNA obtained from the fingernail
clippings from Medley’s left hand “contained the profiles of two individuals”
and that “[t]he second partial profile” “could not have been contributed by . . .
Padgett.”
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“threatening her.” He also said that on the evening of January 22,

he went to work and then home; he claimed that after he left work

on the evening of January 23, he visited his grandmother’s

boyfriend, drove around for a while, and then went home. However,

a mapping application on Padgett’s cell phone showed that the

phone traveled to Medley’s apartment around 11:30 p.m. on January

22, and cell-site location information (“CSLI”) showed that the

phone was in the area of Medley’s apartment at 12:15 a.m. on

January 23, shortly before Medley noticed that her power was out.

In addition, a friend of Padgett’s testified that Padgett, who had a

car of his own, borrowed the friend’s car around 10:00 p.m. on

January 22, returning it about two hours later. Padgett, who was

wearing “all black,” said that he was going to see a woman and

“didn’t want someone to see [Padgett’s] car in the [woman’s]

neighborhood.” CSLI also showed that Padgett’s cell phone was near

Medley’s apartment from around 7:20 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. on

January 23, the night before her body was found. And another

friend of Padgett’s testified that Padgett borrowed his truck around

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7:00 p.m. that night and returned it around 10:00 p.m. Moreover,

the investigators who interviewed Padgett on January 25 observed

that he had several scratches on his hand and arm.

Padgett testified and told the following story. On the night of

January 22, 2017, Medley came to his home and falsely claimed that

she was pregnant. They argued, and as they “tussle[d],” their heads

collided, such that Medley was hit on the left side of her head. And

on the evening of January 23, Padgett borrowed his friend’s truck to

move a lawnmower; he then encountered a woman he knew. She

was having “car trouble,” so he took her car to his grandmother’s

boyfriend, who often worked on cars. He then returned the car to

the woman, returned the truck to his friend, and went home. On

cross-examination, Padgett claimed that his DNA likely was

deposited on the fingernail clippings taken from Medley’s right hand

when they “tussle[d]” on January 22. He also said that the evidence

showed that his cell phone was at Medley’s apartment on January

22 and near the apartment on January 23 because the phone was

connected to a tablet that he left inside the apartment in December

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2016.

2. Padgett contends that his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects. To prevail

on these claims, Padgett must establish that counsel’s performance

was constitutionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a

result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt

2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Washington v. State, 320 Ga. 839, 851

(912 SE2d 600) (2025). To prove deficient performance, Padgett

must show that counsel “‘performed at trial in an objectively

unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light

of prevailing professional norms.’” Washington, 320 Ga. at 851

(citation omitted). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-691. And to

prove prejudice, Padgett must establish a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial

would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

Washington, 320 Ga. at 851. We need not address both parts of the

Strickland test if Padgett makes an insufficient showing on one. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Washington, 320 Ga. at 851.

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(a) Padgett claims that trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance because during closing argument, he failed to

assert that certain DNA evidence suggested that Padgett was not

guilty. As discussed above, a forensic biologist testified at trial that

fingernail clippings taken from Medley’s right hand contained

Padgett’s DNA; fingernail clippings from Medley’s left hand

contained a partial DNA profile that was not contributed by Padgett;

and the leggings used to strangle Medley also contained a partial

profile that was not contributed by Padgett. Padgett contends that

trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue in closing

that the fingernail clippings from Medley’s left hand contained

another person’s DNA—not Padgett’s—and that this evidence

indicated that someone other than Padgett killed her. Because trial

counsel’s decision not to make this argument was reasonably

strategic, Padgett has not established that counsel was deficient.

The argument Padgett says his trial counsel should have made

would not have been particularly persuasive. In this respect, an

argument that the presence of an unknown person’s DNA on

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Medley’s left hand (without any other evidence) proved that the

unknown person killed her would have called the jury’s attention to

the State’s parallel argument that the presence of Padgett’s DNA on

Medley’s right hand showed that Padgett killed her. Trial counsel

strategically attempted to downplay the incriminating DNA

evidence from Medley’s right hand and instead emphasized the DNA

evidence found on the leggings, which was not attributed to Padgett.

To that end, counsel asserted that Padgett’s DNA could have been

deposited on Medley’s right hand long before she was killed, which

was consistent with Padgett’s testimony that his DNA likely was

found on Medley because they “tussle[d]” at his home two days

before her body was discovered. Counsel then argued to the jury

that it was “really interesting” that “the actual instrument used to

kill” Medley (that is, the leggings) contained an unknown person’s

DNA—not Padgett’s—and argued that this evidence raised

“tremendous reasonable doubt.”

Under these circumstances, trial counsel’s decision not to

emphasize the DNA evidence from Medley’s left fingernails was

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objectively reasonable. Thus, Padgett has not shown that counsel

performed deficiently, and this claim fails. See Walker v. State, 311

Ga. 719, 726 (859 SE2d 25) (2021) (explaining that “‘decisions

regarding trial tactics and strategy constitute deficient performance

only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have followed such a course’”) (citation omitted);

Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 298 (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (explaining

that a closing argument is “‘to be judged in the context in which it is

made’”; it is not patently unreasonable for defense counsel to base

the defense on the defendant’s account; and defense counsel is

permitted “‘wide latitude’” in closing argument and “‘is not

ineffective simply because another attorney might have used

different language or placed a different emphasis on the evidence’”)

(citations omitted).

(b) Padgett also contends that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance because he failed to investigate and present

evidence related to an investigator’s report that, Padgett alleges,

would have shown that another man (who had also dated Medley)

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“had seen . . . Medley” on the night before her body was found.

Padgett asserts that the jury might have inferred from this evidence

that the other man “could have been a potential suspect” in Medley’s

murder. Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently in

this respect, Padgett’s claim fails because he has not met his burden

of establishing prejudice.

At the motion for new trial hearing, Padgett failed to introduce

any evidence demonstrating what the man who dated Medley or the

investigator who made the report would have said, had they been

called to testify at trial. Padgett did not call those witnesses or

present a legally acceptable substitute for their testimony, nor did

he present any other evidence at the hearing to support this claim.

Thus, Padgett has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that

the outcome of his trial would have been different if counsel had

investigated and presented evidence related to the report. As a

result, this claim of ineffective assistance fails. See, e.g., Sturkey v.

State, 319 Ga. 156, 162-163 (902 SE2d 607) (2024) (assuming that

the appellant’s trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to call

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a witness who, the appellant claimed, would have testified that

other people had motives to kill the victim and concluding that the

appellant failed to establish prejudice, because he did not

demonstrate what the uncalled witness’s testimony would have

shown by introducing “testimony from the uncalled witness or a

legally recognized substitute for that testimony”); Speziali v. State,

301 Ga. 290, 295 (800 SE2d 525) (2017) (concluding that the

appellant had not shown Strickland prejudice from his counsel’s

alleged failure to interview additional witnesses because the

appellant “offered no evidence on this issue at the motion for new

trial hearing”).

(c) At trial, the State presented other-acts evidence pursuant

to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) showing that Padgett had attacked another

former girlfriend after she ended their relationship. During closing

argument, the prosecutor referenced the other-acts evidence and

asserted that Padgett was “the type of man” to strangle Medley

“because he’s done it before”; “he’s the type of man to resort to

violence when he has been rejected by a woman that he wants.”

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Padgett claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

by failing to object to these statements on the ground that the

prosecutor improperly argued that the other-acts evidence showed

Padgett’s propensity for violence. Assuming, without deciding, that

counsel performed deficiently by not objecting, Padgett’s claim fails

because he has not shown prejudice.

The prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements were brief, and

the trial court instructed the jury before the other-acts evidence was

introduced and again during the final charge that the evidence was

admitted for the limited purpose of showing Padgett’s intent and

motive, the jury could consider the evidence “only in so far as it may

relate to those issues and not for any other purpose,” and the jury

was not permitted to “infer from such evidence that [Padgett] is of a

character that would commit such crimes.” 4 The trial court also told

the jury that it was bound to follow the court’s instructions and that

closing arguments are not evidence. Moreover, the evidence of

4 Padgett does not challenge the admission of the other-acts evidence or

the trial court’s limiting instructions about the evidence.
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Padgett’s guilt was compelling. CSLI showed that Padgett’s phone

was near Medley’s apartment shortly before her power was cut off

and again on the night before her body was found; he borrowed his

friends’ vehicles on those nights, indicating that he did not want his

own car to be seen; his DNA was found under Medley’s fingernails;

he lied during his interview with investigators about his

whereabouts near the time of the crimes; and during his testimony,

he provided a different (but still implausible) account.

Because Padgett has not established a reasonable probability

that the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable to him

if trial counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s statements, this

claim of ineffective assistance, like the others, fails. See, e.g.,

Washington, 320 Ga. at 857 (holding that the appellant did not

demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the prosecutor’s closing argument that misstated the law

regarding the burden of proof because the appellant had not shown

prejudice, as the evidence of his guilt was strong and the trial court

“charged the jury on the burden of proof, the court’s duty to instruct

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the jury on the law, the jury’s duty to follow the court’s instructions,

and the fact that closing arguments were not evidence”); Clark v.

State, 307 Ga. 537, 544-545 (837 SE2d 265) (2019) (rejecting the

appellant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument that

misstated the law regarding the presumption of innocence because

the trial court twice correctly instructed the jury on that point and

“[t]he jury was presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions”).

(d) Finally, Padgett argues that trial counsel’s alleged errors

caused him prejudice when considered collectively. See Schofield v.

Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 n.1 (642 SE2d 56) (2007), overruled on

other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (838 SE2d 808) (2020).

Even considering the effect of the two instances of deficient

performance that we assumed in Divisions 2 (b) and (c) above—

counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence related to the

investigator’s report and counsel’s failure to object to the

prosecutor’s statements during closing argument—Padgett has not

shown prejudice sufficient to order a new trial. As discussed above,

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Padgett introduced no evidence at the motion for new trial hearing

to support his claim about the investigator’s report, so he has shown

no prejudice from counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and present

such evidence. And the prosecutor’s statements were brief; the trial

court twice correctly instructed the jury regarding how it should

consider the other-acts evidence; and the evidence of Padgett’s guilt

was compelling. Thus, Padgett has not shown a reasonable

probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different

in the absence of these alleged deficiencies. See, e.g., Troutman v.

State, 320 Ga. 489, 501 (910 SE2d 173) (2024) (rejecting the

appellant’s claim of cumulative prejudice from trial counsel’s

assumed deficiency in failing to raise a “more robust theory of

defense” and from counsel’s deficient performance in failing to object

to the prosecutor’s closing argument that mischaracterized the

burden of proof, because the appellant presented no evidence at the

motion for new trial hearing to support his claim about the theory of

defense, such that he had shown “no prejudice” as to that claim, and

the evidence of his guilt was strong) (emphasis in original).

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Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, and Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

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