CourtListener 10679996

Gesamter Gesetzestext

317 Ga. 676
FINAL COPY

S23A0846. COOPER v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

In September 2021, a jury found Kiresa Cooper guilty of malice

murder, feticide, and other related crimes in connection with the

shooting death of Auriel Briana Callaway, who was pregnant at the

time she died.1 On appeal, Cooper asserts: (1) that the evidence was

1 Callaway and her unborn child were killed on July 22, 2019, and on

October 22, 2019, an Athens-Clarke County grand jury indicted Cooper for
malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon (Count 2), three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon (Counts 3, 5, and 6), feticide (Count 4), and four counts of possession
of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 7-10). Following a trial
from September 13 through 17, 2021, a jury found Cooper guilty of malice
murder, felony murder, one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
feticide, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime; the jury found her not guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court
sentenced Cooper to two consecutive sentences of life in prison for malice
murder and feticide, plus two consecutive sentences of five years in prison for
her possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime convictions; the
felony murder count was vacated by operation of law and the aggravated
assault count for which Cooper was found guilty was merged for sentencing
purposes.
Cooper timely filed a motion for new trial on September 30, 2021, which
was amended by new counsel on July 29 and again on October 3, 2022.
Following a hearing on November 2, 2022, the trial court denied Cooper’s
insufficient to support her malice murder conviction; and (2) that

her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object

to 20 portions of the lead detective’s testimony on various grounds,

such as inadmissible hearsay, confrontation violations, improper

opinion and speculation, and failure to properly authenticate

evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the

evidence at trial showed that on the afternoon of July 22, 2019, a

group of teenage girls were fighting at the apartment complex where

Callaway lived. Police arrived and broke up the fight, but after the

police left, people exited their apartments, forming a crowd that

spread out around the apartment complex. At least two distinct

groups of people formed; one of which included Cooper and some of

her family members, and the other which included Callaway and

members of another family named Calhoun. Certain people within

each group, including Cooper but not including Callaway, began

motion for new trial on March 1, 2023. Cooper filed a timely notice of appeal
on March 23, 2023, and the case was docketed to the August 2023 term and
thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
yelling and threatening each other. Finally, gunfire rang out, and

as people scattered, Callaway was struck once in the torso by a 9mm

bullet, causing her death and that of her unborn child.

Multiple eyewitnesses who were among the people at the

apartment complex on the night of the shooting testified at trial.

Felicia Calhoun testified that she arrived at the apartment complex

after the initial fighting but before the shooting because she received

a call informing her that one of her daughters was involved in the

fight. As Calhoun stood outside with her daughters and others,

including Callaway, a group of people came from one of the

apartment buildings “yelling and cussing.” That group included

Cooper, who shouted “I’ll shoot all of y’all,” “I will kill all you

b***hes,” and “I’ll shoot everybody,” as she walked toward them.

Calhoun testified that she then saw Cooper begin shooting and that

Cooper was “aiming at us.”

According to Brittny Mason, she came to the apartment

complex to visit her cousin that day, and when she arrived, the police

were still there and “[e]verybody was rowdy,” but the police left a

3
short time after she arrived. After the police left, “everybody went

outside,” including Cooper, who was holding a handgun and saying

she “didn’t come to fight,” she “came to shoot.” Mason and others

told Cooper to put the gun away, but, according to Mason, “[s]he told

us that she grown, don’t tell her what to f**king do.” Cooper also

said, “Y’all got guns, then we got guns, too.” Mason testified that

she made a phone call, and while she was on the phone, she heard

gunshots and then, again, saw Cooper holding the gun, though she

did not see her shooting. Mason also acknowledged at trial,

however, that she previously told investigators that she saw Cooper

fire her gun, though she did not see where Cooper was aiming.

According to Mason’s trial testimony, she heard multiple shots but

did not see who fired first or where the shots came from.

Ivy Dunn, who resided at the apartment complex, testified that

on the day of the shooting, she witnessed some earlier fights between

“the Cooper girls and some more people.” After the fights, Dunn saw

Cooper and members of her family come back outside, and Cooper

told the other crowd of people who were also gathered outside,

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“When I shoot, I’m going to aim. Ain’t nobody fixing to f**k with my

family members,” before she “stood in the middle of the road and she

started shooting . . . towards up the crowd – where the other crowd

was.” Dunn testified that she “seen it plain as day” and that “the

first shot came from Ms. Cooper.” Dunn did not witness anyone

threaten Cooper before she began shooting.

Another witness, Jocelyn Wheeler, who was visiting Callaway,

was with Callaway when she was shot. Wheeler testified that once

the shooting began, “[i]t just went haywire,” and they began to flee

but Callaway fell, and “I felt like they was trying to kill all of us that

was over there,” so Wheeler pulled out her own gun and “fired back

at where I seen sparks was coming from,” where she saw a girl with

“red hair, red braids or something.”2 According to Wheeler, other

people started firing as well, and she believed that as many as 100

shots were fired.

Another resident, Shandra Goolsby, testified that before the

2 Photographs extracted from Cooper’s phone that were admitted into
evidence showed Cooper with red-colored braids days before the shooting.
5
shooting, she saw Cooper standing outside with members of her

family, yelling and holding a gun. Goolsby heard gunfire which she

believed was pointed into the air to clear the crowd of people who

were gathering outside, and she then heard another person,

Jasmine Taylor, whom Goolsby did not believe was holding any gun,

shout, “Y’all b***hes shooting in the air. We’re aiming.” Goolsby

was not sure what, if anything, Cooper may have yelled. At that

point, gunfire began erupting. Although Goolsby saw Cooper

“walking back and forth with her gun,” she did not see Cooper

aiming the gun. Seconds after the shooting, however, Goolsby saw

Cooper coming around the side of Goolsby’s building, holding her

gun, and Cooper appeared to have “a smirk on her face.” Goolsby

came outside as the police were there collecting evidence, and when

she returned to her apartment, Cooper was there and told her that

she fired her gun between two buildings. Approximately 30 minutes

later, Callaway’s sister arrived at Goolsby’s apartment, at which

time, Cooper claimed that she did not fire her gun, despite being

challenged with her earlier statement that she had, but Cooper kept

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saying, “I didn’t kill your sister. I didn’t kill your sister.”

Callaway was transported to the hospital, where she and her

unborn child were pronounced dead. Callaway’s autopsy showed

that her cause of death was a single gunshot through the chest. The

9mm bullet that killed her was retrieved from her body.

Based on multiple witness statements during law

enforcement’s investigation of the shooting, police obtained and

executed a search warrant for Cooper’s apartment, where they

recovered a KelTec gun box with documents bearing Cooper’s name

and the serial number of a KelTec 9mm handgun. Cooper’s mother,

Barbara Patman, also consented to a search of her vehicle, which

Cooper also used and where police recovered a backpack containing

ammunition of various different calibers, including 9mm, and a

magazine, though no evidence was introduced at trial tying any of

these items specifically to Cooper’s gun or to the bullet that killed

Callaway. Investigators also recovered over 80 spent shell casings

from the scene, including 9mm casings. Based on the information

they had gathered, investigators obtained an arrest warrant for

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Cooper, and she was arrested two days later in Smyrna and

transported to the Athens-Clarke County Jail. After Cooper’s

arrest, Patman came to the jail with Cooper’s loaded 9mm KelTec

gun “to get her name cleared.”3 According to Patman, Cooper told

her that on the day of the shooting, she came out to protect her

cousins who were involved in the initial fighting, and Cooper

admitted to her that she fired shots but denied shooting Callaway.

A forensic firearms examiner testified that he performed

analysis on Cooper’s gun and the bullet recovered from Callaway’s

body, as well as some of the shell casings recovered from the crime

scene, and that it was his expert opinion that the bullet and some of

the shell casings were fired from Cooper’s gun. Another law

enforcement officer testified that she was able to extract information

from Cooper’s cell phone, which was given to the lead investigator,

Athens-Clarke County Police Detective Scott Black.

3 It was stipulated at trial that Cooper owned the 9mm KelTec handgun.

No evidence was introduced at trial tying the ammunition that was in the gun
when it was turned over by Patman to the bullet recovered from Callaway’s
body.
8
Detective Black testified as one of the State’s final witnesses

before it rested. Detective Black explained, as part of his initial

summary of the investigation, that after police had conducted

several interviews, “[t]he name Kiresa Cooper kept being brought

up more and more,” and “[s]everal witnesses actually identified Ms.

Cooper out of a lineup as seeing her. Several witnesses stated that

they saw her with a gun,” and “[t]here were witnesses who stated

that they saw her shoot the gun in the direction of [Callaway].”

Detective Black explained that some of these witnesses had already

testified at trial and that “there was just a plethora of evidence that

just kind of kept pointing [to] Kiresa Cooper which gave us probable

cause to believe that she was in fact the person responsible for this.”

Describing the findings of the investigation in more detail,

Detective Black recounted that the events had started with the

earlier fighting between groups of girls at the apartment complex,

whom he referred to as the “Calhoun group,” who had gathered in

the parking area toward “the top of the complex” near building 160,

and “the Cooper group.” Detective Black explained that based on

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law enforcement’s investigation, the initial shot came from the area

where the Calhoun group was gathered and was a shot in the air,

“likely a crowd-clearing shot or a warning shot,” but that it

prompted Cooper to start yelling, “So you b***hes got guns. We got

guns, too. When I shoot, I aim.” A “short volley of fire” then rang

out, and it was during that volley of shots that Callaway was struck

and killed. Detective Black further explained that based on the shell

casings recovered from the scene, it appeared that multiple shots

were fired from the area where the Calhoun group was gathered but

that the lack of property damage to any building, window, or vehicle,

made it appear that those shots had been fired in the air. Detective

Black also noted that there were not any witnesses who said that

someone was shooting at Cooper or that Callaway ever possessed a

gun.

A portion of the initial fighting was recorded by Mason and

provided to law enforcement. That recording was played for the jury

during Detective Black’s direct examination. According to Detective

Black, the video showed Cooper with “very long kind of reddish or

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burgundy braids that kind of made her a little easier to find in the

crowd,” and she appeared to be “apparently fine with the fight . . .

allow[ing the girls] to fight and . . . trying to just make sure no one

else jumped in.” Detective Black also testified about photographs

extracted from Cooper’s phone, showing that she had long, red-

colored braids in the days before the shooting; these photographs

were also shown to the jury. By the time Cooper was arrested two

days after the shooting, she had altered her appearance and no

longer had long red braids. Detective Black also testified regarding

text messages that were recovered from Cooper’s phone.

Screenshots of the text messages were introduced into evidence.

Detective Black noted that those messages indicated that Cooper

was afraid of being arrested after the shooting and that she denied

being the one who shot Callaway, but when asked, Detective Black

testified that he saw nothing in any of her texts after the shooting

“expressing any kind of sadness” about it.

Cooper called two witnesses in her defense, Cassandra Smith

and Saquia Davenport, and Cooper testified in her own defense.

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Smith testified that she was at the apartment complex on the night

of the shooting and standing near Callaway with the group of people

that was gathered near building 160. Smith recalled that she first

heard two shots come from the area near building 160, followed by

“a shot or two [ ] from the other direction,” which was the time when

Callaway was shot, “and then a couple of seconds later, a lot of shots

came . . . [from] all directions.” Davenport, who is Cooper’s cousin,

testified that her daughters were also involved in the earlier fighting

and that she and Cooper went to break up the fight. When police

also arrived to break up the fight, Cooper asked them to stay because

there were “a lot of people at the top [of the hill near building 160]

yelling down at us,” but the police left. According to Davenport, after

the police left, the first shots came from the top of the hill near

building 160, and she then saw Cooper firing.

Cooper testified that after learning of the initial fighting, she

arrived to separate Davenport’s children from the “Calhoun kids.”

Cooper said that after police arrived and broke up the fight, she “was

begging them to stay in the neighborhood because I knew if they

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leave, it was going to get worser [sic],” but the police left anyway.

After the police left, the Calhoun sisters came back out holding bats

and yelling at Davenport’s daughter, saying “Y’all b***hes need to

come on. We’ll show y’all how to fight,” and Davenport’s daughters

yelled back, “Oh, y’all b***hes got guns. We got guns, too, and if

y’all aim, we know how to aim, too.” Cooper admitted that she had

her gun but denied yelling at anyone. Cooper testified that the

initial two shots came from near building 160, but she could not tell

what direction they were going, and that several shots then started

“going off at the same time.” Cooper said she was scared of being

shot, and she admitted firing her gun two or three times, but said

that she fired toward the river and never aimed at anyone. She

testified that she knew she did not kill anyone due to the direction

in which she fired her gun. She maintained that she was trying to

protect herself and her family.

1. Cooper contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support her malice murder conviction. We disagree.

When this Court evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence, “the

13
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781,

61 LE2d 560) (1979) (emphasis omitted). In this case, multiple

eyewitnesses testified that Cooper brandished her gun while yelling

belligerent threats toward the group of people where Callaway was

located. Both Calhoun and Dunn testified that they observed

Cooper aiming toward that group as she shot. Dunn further testified

that Cooper fired the first shots. Moreover, Goolsby testified that

immediately after the shooting, she saw Cooper holding her gun and

smirking. And this was all in addition to Cooper’s own admission

that she fired her gun during the incident and the ballistics evidence

confirming that the bullet that killed Callaway, as well as shell

casings recovered from the crime scene, were fired from Cooper’s

gun.

This evidence was more than constitutionally sufficient for a

rational jury to find Cooper guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

14
malice murder. And this remains true despite Cooper’s arguments

that the evidence of who fired first and who said what was

inconsistent; that she only fired out of fear and not toward any

people; and that the firearm examiner testified that he was not

permitted to use the terminology “reasonable scientific certainty,” in

opining that the shell casings and fatal bullet were fired from

Cooper’s gun, because it is well established that it is for the jury who

heard that evidence to determine the credibility of the witnesses and

to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, as well as

whether to accept or reject a defendant’s version of events. See

Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 151 (1) (886 SE2d 818) (2023); see

also McIntyre v. State, 312 Ga. 531, 531 (1) (863 SE2d 166) (2021)

(“This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in

testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to

the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight

and credibility of the evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.

2. Cooper also contends that her trial counsel rendered

15
ineffective assistance by failing to object to multiple portions of

Detective Black’s testimony. We are not persuaded.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

Cooper must show both that her counsel’s performance was deficient

and that such deficiency prejudiced her defense. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong, Cooper must demonstrate

that her counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable

way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Bacon v. State, 316 Ga. 234, 239 (3) (887 SE2d

263) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). In doing so, Cooper

must overcome “[a] strong presumption . . . that trial counsel’s

performance was reasonable and that counsel’s decisions and

choices at trial fell within the broad range of professional conduct as

assessed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under

the specific circumstances of the case.” Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted). To establish prejudice, Cooper “must prove that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for [her] trial counsel’s deficiency,

16
the result of the trial would have been different.” Bates v. State, 313

Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022). And if Cooper fails to make a

sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong,

we need not address the other prong. See Washington v. State, 313

Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022).

In all, Cooper lists the following 20 portions of Detective

Black’s testimony, which she asserts—without further argument or

citation to any case law—were objectionable because they

constituted inadmissible hearsay that served to bolster his

investigation and that violated her confrontation rights;4 because

they constituted improper speculation or opinion, including opinion

on the ultimate legal issue in the case; or because they were not

based on Detective Black’s personal knowledge:

1) Detective Black’s preface of his description of the police

investigation that “[a] lot of times it’s not uncommon for folks

involved in situations like this to not want to be involved or

4 Cooper does not indicate in her brief whether she is referring to her

right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution,
the comparable right under the Georgia Constitution, or both.
17
want to be witnesses or go to court. In certain areas of the

county that is kind of even more difficult.”

2) Detective Black’s response in the negative when asked by the

prosecutor if it was “surprising” to him that some witnesses did

not want to be involved and that so many shell casings were

discovered.

3) Detective Black’s testimony that during witness interviews,

Cooper’s name came up “more and more”; that “[s]everal

witnesses stated that they saw [Cooper] with a gun”; that

witnesses “stated that they saw her shoot the gun in the

direction of [Callaway]”; and that “[t]here was just a plethora

of evidence . . . pointing [to Cooper].”

4) Detective Black’s testimony that Cooper was “in the wind . . . .

She seemed to have kind of disappeared or fled the area most

likely.”

5) Detective Black’s description, in response to a question from

the prosecutor about evidence that was “significant,” of the gun

box and backpack with ammunition that were found during the

18
searches for which he was not present.

6) Detective Black’s testimony that unnamed witnesses had said

they saw Cooper in possession of a gun “while shooting.”

7) Detective Black’s response, when asked by the prosecutor, that

he had taken the legal defenses of justification and self-defense

into consideration during the investigation.

8) Detective Black’s description of the groups involved as the

“Calhoun group” and the “Cooper group.”

9) Detective Black’s testimony that he did not think Callaway was

a part of either group.

10) Detective Black repeating Goolsby’s testimony that the initial

gunfire sounded like a warning shot, which was not

uncommon.

11) Detective Black’s testimony that none of the investigation

indicated that anybody was firing at Cooper or that Callaway

ever possessed a gun.

12) Detective Black’s testimony about the alleged “crowd-clearing

shot” that “most people were describing as likely that they just

19
know it’s in the air, and it’s kind of trying to get rid of the

crowd.”

13) Detective Black’s testimony that “witnesses and the general

investigation shows [Cooper] then starts yelling . . . ‘you

b***hes got guns. We got guns, too . . . When I shoot, I aim,’

which seems to be a reference to ‘Well, I’m not shooting

warning shots.’”

14) Detective Black being used by the State to lay the foundation

to introduce into evidence the video of the fighting, taken and

provided by Mason, that supposedly sparked the ensuing

events, despite his lack of personal knowledge to authenticate

that evidence.

15) Detective Black’s testimony while discussing the video and

selected screenshots for the jury that they depicted Cooper,

whom he could identify based on her hair color and witnesses’

description of the shooter as having red braids.

16) Detective Black’s testimony that nowhere in Cooper’s text

messages did she express any sadness for Callaway.

20
17) Detective Black’s testimony on cross-examination that the

video appeared to show Cooper encouraging the other girls to

fight.

18) Detective Black being used by the State to lay the foundation

to introduce into evidence the magazine and ammunition taken

from Cooper’s gun, despite his lack of personal knowledge to

authenticate that evidence.

19) Detective Black’s testimony that shooting into a crowd that

included children was neither reasonable nor justified.

20) Detective Black’s testimony that Callaway was “completely

innocent [and] one of the few true victims” he had encountered

in his career and that “[y]ou can’t just shoot into a crowd . . .

and expect to be able to do that with impunity.”

As an initial matter, many of these portions of Detective

Black’s testimony simply did not violate Georgia’s rules of evidence.

As for alleged deficiency numbers 1 and 16 (failure to object to

testimony that some people were resistant to talking to police about

crimes they had witnessed and that none of Cooper’s texts expressed

21
sadness for Callaway), this was not impermissible opinion

testimony, as Cooper argues, but rather, was no more than

straightforward factual testimony regarding matters within

Detective Black’s personal knowledge, which is admissible. See

OCGA § 24-6-602; see also Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 385 (4)

(858 SE2d 8) (2021).

As for alleged deficiency numbers 2, 5, and 17 (failure to object

to Detective Black’s responses that it did not surprise him that so

many shell casings were recovered or that some people were

resistant to talking to the police; his responses concerning what

evidence he found significant; and the cross-examination exchange

in which he testified that the fight video appeared to show Cooper

encouraging the girls to fight), Detective Black’s testimony was

permissible as non-expert opinion testimony that was “[r]ationally

based on the perception of the witness” and “[n]ot based on scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Code

Section 24-7-702 [expert testimony and qualifications].” OCGA § 24-

7-701 (a) (1), (3); see also Harris v. State, 309 Ga. 599, 604-05 (2) (a)

22
(847 SE2d 563) (2020).

And as for alleged deficiency number 14 (failure to object to

Detective Black’s authentication of the fight video recorded by

Mason), the rules of evidence do not provide that a video recording

can be authenticated solely by the person who recorded it or who

was an eyewitness to the events depicted therein. It appears that

Detective Black properly authenticated the video by testifying that

he responded to the apartment complex as part of his investigation,

where he personally observed the location and spoke with multiple

eyewitnesses of the day’s events; that he recognized the video as the

recording supplied by Mason—who was also available and testified

at trial—during his investigation; that he had personally reviewed

the video; that it showed part of the fighting that occurred at the

apartment complex, as he recognized some of the persons depicted

in the video, including Cooper, as well as the location it depicted;

and that he had not altered the video.5 See OCGA § 24-9-901 (a)-(b)

5 In addition, because Mason was available to authenticate the video, it

was a reasonable strategy to refrain from objecting on grounds that could have

23
(1), (4) (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a

condition precedent to admissibility shall be satisfied by evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims[, which includes, for example,] [t]estimony of a

witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be; [or]

[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other

distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with

circumstances”); see also United States v. Broomfield, 591 F. App’x

847, 851-52 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2014) (video recording that

government did not make of defendant in possession of firearm was

amply authenticated where government’s evidence “identified the

individual in the video as [defendant], established where and

approximately when the video was recorded, and then identified the

specific rifle and ammunition depicted in the video”). Objections to

been easily cured. See Washington, 313 Ga. at 774 (3) (b) (holding that
defendant failed to show that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to
video recording on the ground that it was not properly authenticated by lead
detective and district attorney investigator because “refraining from objecting
to foundational matters that can be readily cured,” including by another
witness who is able to do so, “is not an unreasonable strategy”) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
24
these portions of Detective Black’s testimony (numbers 1, 2, 5, 14,

16, and 17), therefore, would have been meritless, and “the failure

to make a meritless objection is not deficient performance.” Smith

v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 367 (5) (b) (882 SE2d 289) (2022).

As to several of Cooper’s other claims of ineffectiveness for

failure to object, even if those objections would not have been

meritless, Cooper has not shown that counsel’s failures to object to

those portions were objectively unreasonable. These include

counsel’s failure to object to Detective Black’s testimony concerning

alleged deficiency numbers 3, 6, 8, 10-13, and 15 (referring to other

witnesses’ statements about the shooting) because that testimony

was cumulative of other properly admitted trial court testimony and

evidence. Cooper has not offered any evidence to overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the broad

range of professional conduct and therefore has not carried her

burden of showing that counsel’s failure to object to that cumulative

evidence was objectively unreasonable, especially since such

objections may draw more attention to inculpatory testimony. See

25
Sawyer v. State, 308 Ga. 375, 384 (2) (b) (839 SE2d 582) (2020) (trial

counsel not deficient in failing to object to cumulative testimony);

Koonce v. State, 305 Ga. 671, 676 (2) (d) (827 SE2d 633) (2019) (“Trial

counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the cumulative

testimony of [the lead detective] on these matters [regarding the

results of her investigation].”); see also Snipes v. State, 309 Ga. 785,

794 (3) (b) (iv) (848 SE2d 417) (2020) (allegedly objectionable

testimony was “largely cumulative of other admissible testimony

. . . and therefore [defendant] has failed to show that trial counsel

was deficient in failing to object to this testimony or that a

reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would

have been different if the objection had been made”).

As for alleged deficiency numbers 9 and 20 (failure to object to

Detective Black’s testimony that Callaway was an innocent

bystander who was not a part of either group), trial counsel testified

at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, “I don’t think that is something

that would have been looked favorably upon by the jury if I had

objected to the victim being characterized as innocent.” This

26
rationale was not objectively unreasonable, and “trial counsel’s

strategic or tactical decisions,” including whether to object to

testimony, “generally will not form the basis of an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim unless they are so patently unreasonable

that no competent attorney would have made [them] under the

circumstances at the time.” Davis v. State, 311 Ga. 225, 231 (3) (857

SE2d 207) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly,

Cooper has not carried her burden of demonstrating that her trial

counsel acted deficiently in not objecting to Detective Black’s

testimony as to numbers 1-3, 5, 6, 8-17, or 20.

That leaves Cooper’s claims that her trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to object to Detective Black’s

testimony that Cooper identifies in numbers 4 (that Cooper had

probably fled); 7 (that he had considered justification defenses); 18

(authentication of a magazine and ammunition that came from

Cooper’s gun); and 19 (that shooting into a crowd with children was

not reasonable or justified). Pretermitting whether this testimony

was objectionable and whether any failure to object to this testimony

27
was deficient, Cooper has not established that she was prejudiced by

those deficiencies—even considering their cumulative effect, see

Ingram v. State, 316 Ga. 196, 208 (2) (887 SE2d 269) (2023). The

jury was well aware that Detective Black was not an eyewitness to

the crimes upon which he was commenting, such that Cooper’s

remaining claims of ineffectiveness for failing to object to these

portions of his testimony go to more tangential issues versus the

substantial evidence of her guilt that the jury had already heard.

That evidence included multiple eyewitnesses to the crimes who

testified to Cooper’s belligerence and intentionality in firing into the

crowd of people, as well as the ballistics evidence that tied Cooper’s

gun directly to the bullet that killed Callaway and to shell casings

recovered from the crime scene, unlike the ammunition

authenticated by Detective Black, which was not directly linked to

the shooting. We cannot say Cooper has carried her burden of

establishing a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to

object to the remaining portions of Detective Black’s testimony, the

result of her trial would have been different. See id. (cumulative

28
effect of multiple assumed deficiencies on the part of trial counsel

did not actually prejudice defendant where there was substantial

evidence of his guilt and he failed to show that absent counsel’s

alleged deficiencies, there was a reasonable probability of a different

outcome); Bates, 313 Ga. at 68-69 (2) (d) (assuming without deciding

that counsel was deficient in failing to object to a witness’s testimony

on the ultimate issue of the case, defendant failed to carry his

burden to show prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of his

guilt). Accordingly, this enumeration of error also fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided November 7, 2023.

Murder. Clarke Superior Court. Before Judge Haggard.

John W. Donnelly, for appellant.

Deborah Gonzalez, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula

K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric C. Peters,

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 7, 2023

S23A0846. COOPER v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

In September 2021, a jury found Kiresa Cooper guilty of malice

murder, feticide, and other related crimes in connection with the

shooting death of Auriel Briana Callaway, who was pregnant at the

time she died. 1 On appeal, Cooper asserts: (1) that the evidence was

1 Callaway and her unborn child were killed on July 22, 2019, and on

October 22, 2019, an Athens-Clarke County grand jury indicted Cooper for
malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon (Count 2), three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon (Counts 3, 5, and 6), feticide (Count 4), and four counts of possession
of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 7-10). Following a trial
from September 13 through 17, 2021, a jury found Cooper guilty of malice
murder, felony murder, one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
feticide, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime; the jury found her not guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court
sentenced Cooper to two consecutive sentences of life in prison for malice
murder and feticide, plus two consecutive sentences of five years in prison for
her possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime convictions; the
felony murder count was vacated by operation of law and the aggravated
assault count for which Cooper was found guilty was merged for sentencing
purposes.
insufficient to support her malice murder conviction; and (2) that

her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object

to twenty portions of the lead detective’s testimony on various

grounds, such as inadmissible hearsay, confrontation violations,

improper opinion and speculation, and failure to properly

authenticate evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.