CourtListener 10680270

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 4, 2024

S23G1224. VEST MONROE, LLC et al. v. JOHN DOE.

BETHEL, Justice.

When faced with resolving the question of whether class

certification is appropriate, a trial court enjoys broad discretion. See

Carnett’s, Inc. v. Hammond, 279 Ga. 125, 127 (3) (610 SE2d 529)

(2005). OCGA § 9-11-23 guides the court’s exercise of that discretion

and sets forth the requirements a plaintiff must meet in order to

represent a class. Among other requirements, a plaintiff must show

that “[t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class” and

that his own claims are “typical of the claims . . . of the class,”

otherwise known as the commonality and typicality requirements.

See OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (1), (2). In accordance with the broad

discretion afforded the trial court in deciding whether a plaintiff has

met the statutory requirements, an appellate court’s scope of review
is limited to assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion.

See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 274 Ga. 498, 499-500

(1) (556 SE2d 114) (2001). In this case, we are tasked with assessing

whether the Court of Appeals properly applied that deferential

standard of review to the trial court’s denial of class certification.

John Doe, the named plaintiff in this putative class action,

received treatment at Ridgeview Institute – Monroe, a behavioral

health and addiction treatment facility. Following the unauthorized

disclosure of his and other patients’ information by a former

Ridgeview employee, Doe sued Ridgeview’s owners and operators

and its Chief Executive Officer (collectively, “Vest Monroe”), not only

seeking to recover monetary damages caused by the unauthorized

disclosure of his own patient information, but also proposing to seek

relief for a class of other affected patients. 1 The trial court denied

1 Doe alleges eleven different claims: breach of express contract, breach

of implied contract, unjust enrichment, negligence, negligence per se, negligent
misrepresentation, invasion of medical privacy, common law invasion of
privacy, breach of confidentiality/confidential relations, wrongful disclosure of
privileged information, and violation of Georgia’s Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practice Act, OCGA § 10-1-370, et seq.
2
Doe’s motion for class certification, finding that Doe failed to

establish either the required elements of commonality or typicality

under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a). Doe appealed,2 and the Court of Appeals

reversed the trial court’s decision, see Doe v. Vest Monroe, LLC, 368

Ga. App. 572 (890 SE2d 439) (2023), although one member of the

panel dissented, see id. at 579-580 (Brown, J., dissenting). We

granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court abused its

discretion by finding that the putative class lacked commonality and

typicality under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a). For the reasons explained

below, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in

finding a lack of typicality, so we reverse the judgment of the Court

of Appeals. And because a lack of either typicality or commonality

supports the denial of class certification, we do not address

commonality.

2 See OCGA § 9-11-23 (g) (“A court’s order certifying a class or refusing

to certify a class shall be appealable in the same manner as a final order to the
appellate court which would otherwise have jurisdiction over the appeal from
a final order in the action.”).
3
1. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as

follows. The unauthorized disclosure of patient information giving

rise to this case is attributed to the actions of Rhonda Rithmire, a

former employee at Ridgeview. Rithmire became director of plant

operations at Ridgeview in September 2018. As director, Rithmire

was responsible for managing and organizing the facility’s

operations, including housekeeping, maintenance, and

groundskeeping. While Rithmire’s duties did not involve the direct

delivery of healthcare services, aspects of her job required that she

have access to certain patient information. But during her

employment, Rithmire also allegedly accessed and maintained

possession of a significant volume of more sensitive patient

information of various sorts that was unrelated to her job duties.

Rithmire was terminated from her employment at Ridgeview

in June 2019, and soon after, she contacted plaintiff’s counsel of

record in a medical malpractice case pending against Ridgeview and

later provided the attorney with digital copies of documents she

obtained from Ridgeview, as well as paper documents and audio

4
recordings. 3 Rithmire also provided the documents to her personal

attorney. After becoming aware of the disclosure of the patient

information, Ridgeview initiated an investigation and ultimately

discovered that information pertaining to nearly 2,000 patients had

been compromised.

In March 2020, Vest Monroe, LLC, filed suit against Rithmire

in federal court. The district court enjoined Rithmire and her

personal counsel from further dissemination of the Ridgeview

documents and ordered her to delete the material in her possession.

Vest Monroe notified all potentially affected individuals of the

incident.

In November 2020, after receiving notice of the incident, Doe

filed a class action complaint against Vest Monroe, asserting a

number of claims related to the unauthorized disclosure of patient

3 The attorney shared some of those documents with experts he had
retained in his pending case and provided the entirety of the Ridgeview
documents to all counsel of record in that case during the course of discovery.
The attorney also shared some materials with another plaintiff’s attorney in a
separate medical malpractice action against Ridgeview. That attorney’s
actions are not at issue in this appeal.
5
information. Doe moved for class certification in March 2022.4 After

a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that Doe failed

to establish the required elements of commonality and typicality.

Specifically, in finding a lack of commonality, the court noted

the differences in the type of documents disclosed with respect to

members of the proposed class, in that some contained diagnosis and

treatment information, while others did not. With respect to Doe,

the trial court noted that the information released was contained in

discharge summaries and census reports and that no diagnosis or

treatment information was revealed. The court considered that

Rithmire was authorized to access certain of the information as part

of her job duties. But, the trial court reasoned, other information

contained in sensitive clinical files raised a qualitatively different

issue and implicated different questions about whether Vest Monroe

4 Doe sought certification of the following class:

All persons who were adult patients of Ridgeview Institute Monroe
(“RIM”) and whose clinical records containing their protected
health information were improperly disclosed to third parties
without their consent or authorization in the incident described in
the notice posted on RIM’s website (titled “A Notice to Our
Patients”), attached as Exhibit “A” to Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Class Complaint.
6
should have permitted Rithmire to have access to those documents

at all, and, relatedly, Vest Monroe’s liability, if any, for doing so.

Relatedly, and as relevant here, the trial court concluded that Doe’s

claims lacked typicality because some members of the proposed class

had clinical information revealed, while Doe did not.

Doe appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. See Doe, 368

Ga. App. at 575-579 (2). The Court of Appeals rejected the trial

court’s finding on commonality and typicality, concluding with

respect to typicality specifically that Doe’s claims and those of the

putative class arose “from the same alleged events” and were “based

on the same legal theories” was sufficient to satisfy the typicality

requirement. Id. at 579. This appeal followed.

2. Turning first to the question of typicality, we conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding a lack of

typicality and, thus, that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding

otherwise.

7
It is well settled that class actions represent “an exception to

the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the

individual named parties only,” and, “consistent with [their]

exceptional nature,” such actions are permitted “only in the limited

circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23.” Georgia-Pacific

Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner, 295 Ga. 524, 525 (1) (762 SE2d

419) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). “The party seeking

to represent a class bears the burden of proving that class

certification is appropriate” and must meet each of the four

requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) — numerosity, 5 commonality,6

typicality,7 and adequacy of representation8 — in addition to one of

several requirements under OCGA § 9-11-23 (b). Id. at 525 (1). To

meet this burden, the plaintiff must “come forward with evidence to

prove [his] satisfaction of the statutory requirements.” Id. at 526 (1).

5 OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (1) (“The class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable.”).
6 OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2) (“There are questions of law or fact common to

the class.”).
7 OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (3) (“The claims . . . of the representatives are

typical of the claims . . . of the class[.]”).
8 OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (4) (“The representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.”).
8
See also Brown v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 817 F3d 1225,

1233 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he entire point of a burden of proof is that,

if doubt remains about whether the standard is satisfied, the party

with the burden of proof loses. All else being equal, the presumption

is against class certification because class actions are an exception

to our constitutional tradition of individual litigation. The party

seeking class certification has a burden of proof, not a burden of

pleading.” (cleaned up; emphasis in original)).9

Whether the plaintiff has met his burden of proof is a question

committed to the trial court’s “broad discretion,” though the exercise

of that discretion is not unfettered and must comport with the

requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23. Carnett’s, Inc., 279 Ga. at 127. See

also Ratner, 295 Ga. at 526 (1). As we have explained before, a trial

court may certify a class only if, “after a rigorous analysis,” the court

determines “that the statutory requirements have been satisfied.”

9 “As we have previously noted, many provisions of OCGA § 9-11-23 were

SE2d 555) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).

This rigorous analysis of the statutory requirements will
frequently “entail some overlap with the merits of the
plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped. The
class determination generally involves considerations
that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues
comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.”

Id. at 193 (1) (a) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S.

338, 351 (II) (A) (131 SCt 2541, 180 LE2d 374) (2011)). See also

Revizo v. Adams, 455 F3d 1155, 1163 (II) (B) (2) (10th Cir. 2006)

(“Whether a case should be allowed to proceed as a class action

involves intensely practical considerations, most of which are purely

factual or fact-intensive. Each case must be decided on its own facts,

on the basis of practicalities and prudential considerations.”

(citation and punctuation omitted)).

On appeal from the grant or denial of class certification, an

appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Ga. at 499-500

(1) (“On appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to

10
certify a class, the discretion of the trial judge in certifying or

refusing to certify a class action is to be respected in all cases where

not abused.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). And review for

abuse of discretion generally means that a trial court’s conclusions

“will be affirmed so long as they are in conformity with the governing

legal principles, based on correct facts that are relevant to

determining whether any legal requirements are satisfied, and

within the range of possible outcomes in which there could be room

for reasonable and experienced minds to differ.” Premier Pediatric

Providers, LLC v. Kennesaw Pediatrics, P.C., 318 Ga. 350, 354-355

(2) (898 SE2d 481) (2024) (citations and punctuation omitted). “A

trial court abuses its discretion when the exercise of discretion was

infected by a significant legal error or a clear error as to a material

factual finding.” Rockdale Hospital, LLC v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 851

(2) (b) (834 SE2d 77) (2019). See also State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524,

526 (2) (a) (705 SE2d 636) (2011) (when reviewing for abuse of

discretion, “where the trial court has clearly erred in some of its

findings of fact and/or has misapplied the law to some degree, the

11
deference owed the trial court’s ultimate ruling is diminished”

(citation and punctuation omitted)). Critically, the fact that an

appellate court may have reached a different conclusion in deciding

whether to certify a class, had the question been put to that court in

the first instance, “is of no consequence. Abuse of discretion review

allows for a range of choice for the [court], so long as that choice does

not constitute a clear error of judgment.” Hines v. Widnall, 334 F3d

1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Applying that standard

here, we see no basis for concluding that the trial court abused its

discretion in finding that Doe failed to establish the element of

typicality.

The trial court’s order reflects that, overall, it conducted the

rigorous analysis contemplated by OCGA § 9-11-23.10 To begin with,

in its order denying class certification, the trial court recognized the

governing legal principles relevant to the typicality requirement,

explaining that OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (3) supplies the applicable

10 The trial court’s order also reflects that it complied with the statutory

requirement to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of class certification.
See OCGA § 9-11-23 (f) (1).
12
standard for typicality, that typicality requires the class

representative “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury

as the class members,” and that the pertinent inquiry is “whether a

sufficient nexus exists between the claims of the named

representatives and those of the class at large.” The trial court also

recognized that Doe bears the burden of proof in establishing that

class certification is appropriate and must do so by introducing

affirmative evidence.

All of this was a correct statement of the applicable law. As the

United States Supreme Court has explained, “a class representative

must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer

the same injury as the class members.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the

Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147, 156 (II) (102 SCt 2364, 72 LE2d

740) (1982). In other words, there must be “a nexus between the

class representative’s claims or defenses and the common questions

of fact or law which unite the class.” Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise

Lines, Inc., 741 F2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1984).

13
A sufficient nexus is established if the claims or defenses
of the class and the class representative arise from the
same event or pattern or practice and are based on the
same legal theory. Typicality, however, does not require
identical claims or defenses. A factual variation will not
render a class representative’s claim atypical unless the
factual position of the representative markedly differs
from that of the other members of the class.

Id. 11 And, as we have said above, the party seeking to certify the

class has the burden of establishing typicality through affirmative

evidence. See Ratner, 295 Ga. at 525-526 (1).

Second, the trial court did not rely on incorrect facts in

determining that typicality was lacking. Pertinent to its assessment

of typicality, the trial court found that Rithmire “had access to

information that had no relationship to her [job],” including “patient

11 As the Eleventh Circuit has explained,

[i]n many ways, the commonality and typicality requirements of
Rule 23 (a) overlap. Both requirements focus on whether a
sufficient nexus exists between the legal claims of the named class
representatives and those of the individual class members to
warrant class certification. Traditionally, commonality refers to
the group characteristics of the class as a whole and typicality
refers to the individual characteristics of the named plaintiff in
relation to the class.
Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F3d 1266, 1278-1279 (III) (11th Cir.
2000) (citations omitted). This difference in focus creates a “slightly more
exacting screen” with respect to typicality. Newberg and Rubenstein on Class
Actions, § 3:31: Overlap with Commonality (2024).
14
files, many of which contained significant sensitive medical

information, including parts (or even the entire) clinical record of a

patient.” The trial court also found it undisputed that “no diagnosis

or treatment information related to Mr. Doe was revealed” and that

the information about Doe that was improperly disclosed “was

contained entirely on discharge summaries and census reports” and

“included his name, room number, patient number, admit date, age,

sex, marital status, and treating physician.” As to other patients,

however, the trial court found significant differences from Doe in

that “more significant information was revealed, up to and including

peer reviewed medical files and information that was part of a

patient’s clinical record.” Specifically, “527 [patients] had more

information revealed than John Doe, 45 [patients] had highly

sensitive medical information disclosed, including 17 patients for

whom a diagnosis was revealed and 245 for whom a medical

procedure was disclosed.” Doe makes no argument that the trial

court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous; rather, Doe argues

that these differences identified by the trial court do not defeat

15
typicality and that the trial court misapplied the standard because

Doe and the other putative class members were victims of the same

conduct – that is, Vest Monroe’s “careless privacy practices and

inadequate record controls” that resulted in the unauthorized

disclosure of protected health information. Accordingly, the question

is whether, applying the relevant legal principles to the facts found

by the trial court, its determination that typicality was lacking was

“within the range of possible outcomes in which there could be room

for reasonable and experienced minds to differ.” Premier Pediatric

Providers, 318 Ga. at 355 (2). We conclude that it was.

After applying the relevant legal principles to its factual

findings, the trial court concluded that Doe’s claims “do not

represent the claims of all of the proposed class members because

some of [the patients had] clinical information revealed whereas

[Doe] has not” which “leads to factual and legal differences between

the claims in the case.” Though the trial court’s reasoning on the

typicality issue is truncated, we cannot say that its conclusion falls

outside “the range of possible outcomes in which there could be room

16
for reasonable and experienced minds to differ.” Id.

As an initial matter, it appears that Rithmire, as part of her

job responsibilities, was entitled to access some protected health

information, such as discharge summaries or census reports, as was

disclosed with respect to Doe. But as to other kinds of protected but

more sensitive health information, like peer-reviewed medical files

and information that was part of patients’ clinical records —

information that was not disclosed with respect to Doe — the trial

court expressly found that access to such information was not

related to Rithmire’s job duties. And even though all of this

protected health information ultimately was disclosed to outside

individuals following Rithmire’s termination, whether the duty to

keep this information confidential was breached — and, if so, how

and when that duty was breached — as well as the specific claims

arising from any such breach, could reasonably differ among

members of the proposed class and Doe depending on the type of

information disclosed for any given patient. For example, a claim

that Vest Monroe allowed Rithmire to access protected health

17
information contained in sensitive clinical files and, additionally,

that it should not have done so could give rise to different theories

of liability, require different proof, and be subject to different

defenses (among other differences) than a claim that Vest Monroe

should have taken additional measures to protect the type of

information that only tangentially referenced Doe or other class

members and that Rithmire necessarily accessed to fulfill her job

duties — that is, housekeeping schedules, discharge calendars,

patient census reports, and the like. In other words, the qualitative

nature of the injury, and the proof thereof, is materially different; it

is not simply that some of the class members are quantitatively more

injured than Doe and thus would be entitled to more damages. And

because Doe’s injuries are qualitatively different, resolution of his

claims would not necessarily resolve the claims of the class members

belonging to the other group, thus defeating typicality. See Truesdell

v. Thomas, 889 F3d 719, 725-726 (III) (C) (11th Cir. 2018) (holding

that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify

class because the proposed class representative could not adequately

18
establish that his claims were typical of drivers whose personal

information had been accessed by sheriff’s office employee where

employee’s reasons for accessing information could vary for each

putative class member); DWFII Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.

Co., 469 Fed. Appx. 762, 765 (II) (11th Cir. 2012) (no abuse of

discretion in identifying lack of typicality where “each claim would

require the establishment of different facts and would be subject to

different defenses”). See also J.D. v. Azar, 925 F3d 1291, 1322 (2) (b)

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[T]o destroy typicality, a distinction

must differentiate the claims or defenses of the representatives from

those of the class.” (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted));

Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F3d 583, 598 (IV) (C) (3d Cir.

2012) (“Typicality, however, derives its independent legal

significance from its ability to screen out class actions in which the

legal or factual position of the representatives is markedly different

from that of other members of the class even though common issues

of law or fact are present.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

19
In reviewing the trial court’s findings with respect to typicality,

the question before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial

court’s analysis as to typicality fell “within the range of possible

outcomes” permissible on abuse-of-discretion review “in which there

could be room for reasonable and experienced minds to differ.”

Premier Pediatric Providers, 318 Ga. at 355 (2). And because the

trial court’s typicality determination was made in conformity with

the governing legal principles, was not based on incorrect or

irrelevant facts, and was within the reasonable range of possible

outcomes, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by

finding a lack of typicality and denying Doe’s motion for class

certification on that basis. See id. at 354-355 (2). Accordingly, the

Court of Appeals erred in determining that the trial court wrongly

failed to certify the class on the basis of typicality. And because the

trial court acted within its discretion in determining that Doe failed

to meet one of the threshold requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a),

and because Doe’s failure to do so was fatal to his request for class

certification, we need not consider the trial court’s finding as to

20
commonality. See Bowden, 309 Ga. at 193-194 (1) (b); Ratner, 295

Ga. at 527 (1). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

reversed.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Pinson, J.,
disqualified.

319 Ga. 649
FINAL COPY

S23G1224. VEST MONROE, LLC et al. v. DOE.