CourtListener 10680316

Gesamter Gesetzestext

319 Ga. 215
FINAL COPY

S24A0101. FORD v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

William Jordan Ford appeals his convictions related to the

shooting death of Travron Gill.1 On appeal, Ford argues that the

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for malice

murder and armed robbery. He also argues that the trial court erred

in allowing a forensic witness to testify about aspects of a blood test

that the witness did not perform and that the court should have

1 Gill was killed on August 4, 2017. In December 2017, a Fulton County

grand jury indicted Ford for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony
murder (Counts 2-4, predicated on armed robbery, aggravated assault, and
possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer), armed robbery (Count
5), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 6), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 7), and possession of a firearm by a
first offender probationer (Count 8). At a March 2019 trial, the jury found Ford
guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Ford to life in prison without the
possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive life sentence on Count 5, a five-
year term on Count 7 consecutive to Count 5, and a five-year term on Count 8
consecutive to Count 7. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by
operation of law. Ford filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
amended. The trial court denied Ford’s motion for new trial in June 2023, and
he timely appealed. His appeal was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in
December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
granted him a mistrial because the forensic witness was not timely

disclosed as a witness. Ford also argues that the trial court erred in

admitting certain exhibits into evidence because they were not

properly authenticated. We conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to support Ford’s convictions, the trial court did not err in

allowing the forensic witness to testify or in denying Ford’s mistrial

motion, and any error in admitting the exhibits was harmless.

Therefore, we affirm.

The trial evidence showed the following. Travron Gill (also

known as Travion Gill) operated a “trap house,” from which he sold

large quantities of high-grade marijuana.2 On August 4, 2017, Ford

reached out to Wilbert “Ola” Stephenson, a friend of Gill’s who also

sold drugs. Ford went to Stephenson’s workplace driving a Ford

Fusion and told Stephenson that he wanted to buy a pound of

marijuana and that he had a firearm for sale. Stephenson was not

2 Because this case turns on an assessment of whether an error was

harmless, we lay out the evidence as reasonable jurors would have viewed it
rather than in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts. See Moore v. State,
315 Ga. 263, 264 (1) n.2 (882 SE2d 227) (2022).
2
interested in the firearm and did not have marijuana to sell, but he

directed Ford to Gill. Stephenson reached out to Gill to let him know

a “white boy” was on his way to the trap house.

Around that time, Makeith Riggins was renovating a house

located across the street from the trap house. Riggins testified that

he encountered a white male later identified as Ford. Ford pulled

into the driveway of the house Riggins was working on, got out of

his car, and was “looking kind of crazy.” Ford said he was looking for

an “ounce.” Riggins said that Ford did not look like a “weed smoker,

he looked like he wanted something else.” Riggins knew Gill sold

only marijuana, so he directed Ford to a different location. Ford left,

but Riggins saw Ford driving up and down the road a few more

times.

Ford contacted Stephenson, saying he could not find the trap

house, and Stephenson sent Ford a picture of the house around 6:20

p.m. Ford confirmed with Stephenson that he had arrived at the

house. Stephenson and Gill were on the phone at the time, and Gill

told Stephenson that Stephenson’s “buddy” was there. Stephenson

3
heard Gill “fixing up the bags” before he hung up.

Riggins saw Ford back his car onto the driveway of the trap

house and enter it, and Riggins heard a gunshot while Ford was

inside. About five minutes later, Riggins saw Ford exit the house,

throw a black bag into the trunk of his car, and drive away quickly.

The house Riggins had been renovating that day had security

cameras. He obtained the surveillance video and provided it to the

police. The recording, which was played for the jury, showed Ford

talking to Riggins, backing into the trap house driveway at 6:23

p.m., and leaving the house at 6:28 p.m.

Stephenson subsequently tried to call Gill and became worried

when he could not reach him. Stephenson then tried to contact Ford,

calling him, sending him text messages, and reaching out on

Instagram. At a certain point, Stephenson’s calls to Ford would not

go through and he was blocked on Ford’s Instagram.

The next day, Gill’s girlfriend, Brittani Tarver, went to the trap

house because he had not responded to any of her messages. When

she found Gill in the house, unresponsive, she called 911. Police

4
responded and found Gill lying on the kitchen floor with a gunshot

wound to his head. Police also saw blood on an interior doorknob, a

cartridge casing next to Gill’s leg, and a bullet in the crevice between

the stove and a kitchen cabinet. Police collected the casing and bullet

for evidence. Police also found marijuana and a digital scale in the

kitchen. Police also recovered more than $900 in cash from Gill.

Gill was pronounced dead at the scene and his body was

transported to a medical examiner, who performed an autopsy that

same day. The medical examiner determined that Gill died from a

gunshot wound to the head and testified that the fatal gunshot

entered behind Gill’s left ear and exited to the right of his eyebrow.

The medical examiner also testified that the condition of Gill’s body

was consistent with Gill having been shot between 6:15 p.m. and

6:30 p.m. the day before.

Based on their investigations, police questioned Stephenson,

who told them about his interactions with Ford and provided a

picture of Ford. Police confirmed Ford’s identity and learned that he

had a 2016 grey Ford Fusion registered in his name. Ford was on

5
first-offender probation at the time.

Police went to Ford’s workplace to execute an arrest warrant.

When approached by police, Ford attempted to flee. Ford was

ultimately arrested, and the clothing and shoes he was wearing at

the time were submitted for testing by the GBI. The testing of Ford’s

jeans revealed the presence of gunshot residue, and one of his

sneakers had blood on it that matched Gill’s DNA. Police later

searched Ford’s car and found a 9mm Beretta under the driver’s

seat. Police also found a bag of marijuana next to a black bag in the

trunk. A forensic analysis revealed that the recovered gun fired the

spent casing found next to Gill’s body and the bullet recovered next

to the stove in the kitchen.

1. Ford argues that under the standard set forth in Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for malice

murder and armed robbery. We disagree.

When evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and inquire

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whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “Under

this review, we must put aside any questions about conflicting

evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence,

leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of

fact.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 853 (1) (a) (823 SE2d 325) (2019)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

The evidence described above was plainly sufficient to support

Ford’s murder conviction. There was testimony that Ford went to

Gill’s house to purchase marijuana, Gill confirmed to Stephenson

that Ford had arrived, and Riggins saw Ford enter Gill’s house and

heard a gunshot shortly thereafter. Surveillance video footage

played for the jury confirmed Ford’s presence at Gill’s house at the

time of the shooting. Forensic evidence showed that the gun

recovered from Ford’s vehicle was the murder weapon and that one

of his sneakers had blood on it that matched Gill’s DNA. Ford’s

conduct following the shooting also showed a consciousness of guilt.

Ford had been in frequent contact with Stephenson until he arrived

7
at Gill’s house but subsequently did not respond to Stephenson’s

messages and blocked him on social media. He also attempted to flee

when police approached him. See Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 89 (3)

(868 SE2d 205) (2022) (an accused’s flight, resistance to arrest,

concealment, and other related conduct “is admissible as evidence of

consciousness of guilt for the charged offense, and thus of guilt itself”

(citations and punctuation omitted)). This evidence far exceeds the

threshold for sufficiency under Jackson.

Ford argues that he countered the State’s evidence that he shot

Gill with malice, because there was money left behind at the scene

of the crime. But as we have stated before, “[i]t is for a jury to

determine from all the facts and circumstances whether a killing is

intentional and malicious.” Benton v. State, 305 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (a)

(824 SE2d 322) (2019). Because the evidence showed that Gill was

shot in the head while Ford was in the house and that Ford left the

scene without rendering aid, the jury was authorized to conclude

that Ford was guilty of the crime of malice murder. See, e.g., Benton,

305 Ga. at 244 (1) (a) (evidence sufficient to support finding of malice

8
murder where, among other things, appellant left the victim after

shooting him); Moran v. State, 302 Ga. 162, 163 (1) (b) (805 SE2d

856) (2017) (jury authorized to find evidence of malice where, among

other things, the defendant shot the victim in the back of the head).

Ford argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

armed robbery conviction solely because the State did not prove he

took anything from Gill when cash and other items of value were

found at Gill’s house following the shooting, and the State could not

prove that the marijuana found in his trunk was taken from Gill.

His argument fails.

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Ford at

least took marijuana. The evidence clearly established that Ford

was attempting to acquire marijuana, and he went to Gill’s house

for that purpose. Stephenson said that when Gill confirmed Ford’s

arrival, it sounded like Gill was “fixing up the bags.” The evidence

shows that after Gill was shot in the kitchen, which contained

marijuana and a digital scale, Ford left Gill’s house with a black bag

and placed it in his trunk. When Ford was later arrested, marijuana

9
was found in the trunk of Ford’s vehicle and located next to a black

bag. Although there is no specific evidence that the marijuana found

in Ford’s vehicle was similar to the marijuana that Gill sold, a jury

could infer from the circumstances, especially Ford leaving Gill’s

residence with a black bag, that Ford at least took marijuana from

Gill. Accordingly, Ford’s argument to the contrary fails. See

Thornton v. State, 312 Ga. 224, 227-228 (1) (862 SE2d 113) (2021)

(rejecting argument that there was no evidence showing when or

how the defendant obtained the victim’s property because the

defendant had a knife when he encountered the victim and jury

could conclude from evidence whether he obtained property by

armed robbery); Waller v. State, 311 Ga. 517, 522-523 (2) (a) (858

SE2d 683) (2021) (based on evidence presented, the jury was

authorized to make the reasonable inference that the defendant took

the victim’s property).

2. Ford next argues that the trial court erred in allowing

forensic technician Angela McCray to testify about a “blood stain

card” that was later used to compare Gill’s blood against that

10
collected from Ford’s sneaker. McCray testified that she was present

for the autopsy and personally drew Gill’s blood and placed blood

droplets on the blood stain card. Ford argues that McCray’s

testimony was based on hearsay testimony, pointing to her response

to questioning about how she knew she had some personal

involvement with the blood stain card. The prosecutor asked

McCray, “How do you know that you had any connection with the

autopsy regarding [the blood stain card]?” McCray responded, “Well,

I know because I was able to look over the case before I came here,

and I saw that I was the assigned technician on that case, meaning

that I assisted the pathologist with the autopsy on that case.”

Ford’s hearsay claim is meritless. “Hearsay” is defined as “a

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at

the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (c). But McCray did not testify

about something someone else told her; instead, she testified about

what she personally did. See OCGA § 24-6-602 (a witness’s own

testimony may prove that she has personal knowledge of the matter

11
at issue); see also Brown v. State, 314 Ga. 193, 200 (3) (875 SE2d

784) (2022) (witnesses’ knowledge of shooting was not based on

hearsay where they were present at crime scene and described their

observations of shooting); Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 478 (3) (b) (819

SE2d 468) (2018) (reviewing case law that a witness can testify only

as to that of which the witness has personal knowledge and that

relaying information told to the testifying witness constitutes

inadmissible hearsay).

Ford also claims that McCray’s testimony constituted

“surrogate testimony” under Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.

647 (131 SCt 2705, 180 LE2d 610) (2011). There, the United States

Supreme Court held that testimony about a lab test by a witness

who did not perform or observe the test reported in the certification

violates the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. But McCray

testified that she personally drew the blood and placed it on the

blood stain card, and McCray provided no testimony about the

results of any tests run on that blood stain card. Therefore, Ford’s

Bullcoming claim fails.

12
3. Ford alternatively argues that the court should have granted

his request for a mistrial because McCray was not identified on any

of the State’s witness lists or in discovery. We disagree.

A trial court has broad discretion as to whether to grant a

mistrial, and we will not disturb a court’s decision not to grant one

unless there is a showing that a mistrial was essential to preserve a

party’s right to a fair trial. See Jordan v. State, 305 Ga. 12, 15 (2)

(823 SE2d 336) (2019); Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833-834 (3) (792

SE2d 342) (2016). A trial court has the discretion to fashion an

appropriate remedy for a violation of the discovery statutes,

including whether to grant a mistrial. See OCGA § 17-16-6; Tubbs

v. State, 276 Ga. 751, 753-754 (3) (583 SE2d 853) (2003). Ford fails

to show that a mistrial was necessary to preserve his right to a fair

trial.

On the fourth day of his trial, the State notified Ford just after

lunch that it intended to call McCray in order to establish the chain

of custody for the blood stain card. McCray was not the next witness

to be called. Ford moved for a mistrial because he was not provided

13
McCray’s name prior to trial, but he made no request for a

continuance or any other remedy for the purported discovery

violation. The trial court denied his mistrial motion without

explanation.

Ford argues that the court should have granted him a mistrial

because he was not prepared to cross-examine McCray, as he did not

even know of her existence before trial. But McCray’s testimony was

very brief, limited only to her description of having collected blood

from Gill and placing it on the blood stain card. Ford makes no

showing of how advance notice of McCray’s testimony would have

made any difference with respect to his cross-examination of her. He

also argues that, due to the lack of notice, he was unable to

investigate the collection of the blood stain card prior to trial. He

makes no claim, however, that he was unaware that blood was

collected from Gill, placed on a blood stain card, or tested. In other

words, he has not shown how McCray’s omission from witness lists

precluded him from investigating the blood stain card, nor has he

shown how additional time would have helped his defense. Ford’s

14
arguments about how he was harmed by the omission of McCray’s

name from the State’s witness list are purely speculative and are

insufficient to show that the denial of a mistrial motion was an

abuse of discretion. See Platt v. State, 319 Ga. 1, 9 (2) (i) (901 SE2d

114) (2024) (rejecting claim that the trial court erred in denying

motion for mistrial based on State’s failure to disclose the existence

of a recording of a statement by the defendant, because the

defendant did not show how an earlier disclosure would have

benefitted him, and his suggestion that he would have cross-

examined witnesses differently if he was aware of the recording was

“vague and unsupported”).

4. Ford argues that the trial court erred in admitting into

evidence exhibits containing cell-phone data extracted from four cell

phones. Ford argues that the exhibits were not properly

authenticated. But any error in admitting the exhibits was

harmless.

At trial, Detective Mark Taylor testified that he was

responsible for downloading or extracting data from mobile devices.

15
The State tendered into evidence State’s Exhibits 90 through 93, and

Detective Taylor identified the exhibits as thumb drives containing

data extracted from certain cell phones, and the labels on the thumb

drives corresponded to the owner of the cell phone. The thumb drives

were labeled “Ford Dump,” “Vic Dump,” “Ola Stephenson,” and

“Tarver.”

Ford objected based on lack of foundation and failure to

establish a chain of custody because “[w]e do not have the phones to

know which actual phones were dumped.” Detective Taylor testified

that he reviewed the exhibits, and they contained the data extracted

from the devices. He testified that he received the actual phones

from the lead detective and took photographs of the phones,

including the identification numbers for each. The court admitted

the exhibits, overruling Ford’s objections based on hearsay and

chain of custody grounds.

On appeal, Ford argues that the State failed to authenticate

Exhibits 90 through 93 properly because Detective Taylor had no

personal knowledge about the ownership of the cell phones and his

16
knowledge was based on hearsay information gained from the lead

detective. But regardless of whether Exhibits 90 through 93 were

properly authenticated, any error in their admission was harmless.

“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is

whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the

verdict.” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 478 (3) (c) (citation and punctuation

omitted). The State bears the burden of showing harmlessness.

Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 708 (2) (a) (808 SE2d 671) (2017).

Any error here was harmless because the evidence of guilt was

overwhelming. The surveillance video shows Ford inside Gill’s house

between 6:23 p.m. and 6:28 p.m. on the day of Gill’s death, and the

medical examiner testified that the condition of Gill’s body was

consistent with a time of death between 6:15 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.

Riggins said that after he saw Ford go inside Gill’s house, he heard

a gunshot and then saw Ford leave. When Ford was arrested, the

murder weapon was found in his car, and one of his shoes had blood

on it that had the presence of Gill’s DNA.

Ford argues that the data contained in Exhibits 90 through 93

17
were critical to the State’s case because it corroborated important

aspects of Stephenson’s testimony, including that Ford went to Gill’s

house shortly before 6:30 p.m. on the day of Gill’s death and that

Stephenson sent Ford a text message containing a picture of Gill’s

house when Ford was lost. Ford argues that the State needed to

corroborate Stephenson’s testimony because he was arguably an

accomplice based on conspiring with Ford to arrange a drug

transaction with Gill.

But even if this were true, other evidence corroborated

Stephenson’s testimony: surveillance video footage showed that

Ford arrived at Gill’s house around 6:23 p.m. and Riggins testified

that Ford was driving around looking for drugs. Therefore, the

exhibits were not critical to the State’s case. Under these

circumstances, it is highly probable that any error in admitting the

exhibits did not contribute to the verdicts.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

18
Decided June 11, 2024.

Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Farmer.

Lucile M. Ruiz, for appellant.

Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong, Ruth M.

Pawlak, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill,

Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Chelsea S.

Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 11, 2024

S24A0101. FORD v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

William Jordan Ford appeals his convictions related to the

shooting death of Travron Gill. 1 On appeal, Jordan argues that the

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for malice

murder and armed robbery. He also argues that the trial court erred

1 Gill was killed on August 4, 2017. In December 2017, a Fulton County

grand jury indicted Ford for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony
murder (Counts 2-4, predicated on armed robbery, aggravated assault, and
possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer), armed robbery (Count
5), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 6), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 7), and possession of a firearm by a
first offender probationer (Count 8). At a March 2019 trial, the jury found Ford
guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Ford to life in prison without the
possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive life sentence on Count 5, a five-
year term on Count 7 consecutive to Count 5, and a five-year term on Count 8
consecutive to Count 7. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by
operation of law. Ford filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
amended. The trial court denied Ford’s motion for new trial in June 2023, and
he timely appealed. His appeal was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in
December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
in allowing a forensic witness to testify about aspects of a blood test

that the witness did not perform and that the court should have

granted him a mistrial because the forensic witness was not timely

disclosed as a witness. Ford also argues that the trial court erred in

admitting certain exhibits into evidence because they were not

properly authenticated. We conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to support Ford’s convictions, the trial court did not err in

allowing the forensic witness to testify or in denying Ford’s mistrial

motion, and any error in admitting the exhibits was harmless.

Therefore, we affirm.

The trial evidence showed the following. Travron Gill (also

known as Travion Gill) operated a “trap house,” from which he sold

large quantities of high-grade marijuana. 2 On August 4, 2017, Ford

reached out to Wilbert “Ola” Stephenson, a friend of Gill’s who also

sold drugs. Ford went to Stephenson’s workplace driving a Ford

2 Because this case turns on an assessment of whether an error was

harmless, we lay out the evidence as reasonable jurors would have viewed it
rather than in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts. See Moore v. State,
315 Ga. 263, 264 (1) n.2 (882 SE2d 227) (2022).
2
Fusion and told Stephenson that he wanted to buy a pound of

marijuana and that he had a firearm for sale. Stephenson was not

interested in the firearm and did not have marijuana to sell, but he