Hill v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 30, 2025

S25A0887. HILL v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Hunter Nicholas Hill appeals his convictions for malice murder

and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Justin

McKinney and the non-fatal shooting of Anna Franklin. 1 Hill

1 The crimes occurred on December 4, 2018. On February 21, 2019, a

Fannin County grand jury indicted Hill, Stephan Blake Dickey, Dalton Levi
Manuel, Kevin Jack Chamaty, and Michael Chase Havard for malice murder,
felony murder, criminal attempt to commit malice murder, criminal attempt
to commit armed robbery, five counts of aggravated assault, one count of
aggravated battery, two counts of home invasion in the first degree, and one
count each of burglary in the first degree and violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, OCGA § 16-14-4(c). Hill,
Dickey, and Manuel were also charged with possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, and Chamaty and Havard were charged with the
offense of tampering with evidence. Prior to the indictment, Lakota Ricky Cloer
entered guilty pleas related to his participation in the crimes, and he was not
charged in the indictment. Manuel, Chamaty, and Havard also entered guilty
pleas. Dickey was tried separately from Hill and was convicted of malice
murder and other crimes. Dickey is separately appealing his convictions.
After a jury trial that ended on June 28, 2022, Hill was found guilty on
all counts. On June 30, 2022, Hill was sentenced to serve life in prison for
malice murder, consecutive prison terms of 25 years for attempted murder and
contends that the trial court erred by admitting his custodial

statements, altering a suggested pattern jury instruction, and

admitting an autopsy photograph. For the reasons explained below,

we affirm.

As summarized below, the evidence presented at trial showed

that Hill formulated a plan to rob and murder McKinney and

McKinney’s longtime girlfriend, Franklin, and that Hill led several

of his friends to the victims’ house, where co-indictee Stephan Blake

Dickey shot and killed McKinney, and co-indictee Dalton Levi

Manuel shot and wounded Franklin. Dickey did not testify at Hill’s

trial, but Manuel and three other friends – Lakota Ricky Cloer,

Kevin Jack Chamarty, and Michael Chase Havard – gave detailed

testimony about the plan that Hill devised and their roles in

five years for the firearms count, and concurrent prison terms of 30 years for
attempted armed robbery, 20 years for each home invasion count, and 20 years
for the RICO count. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law,
and the remaining counts were merged into the crimes for which Hill was
sentenced. Hill filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended on
January 12, 2024, and July 16, 2024. The trial court denied Hill’s amended
motion for new trial on August 23, 2024. Hill filed a timely notice of appeal,
and the case was docketed in this Court to the April 2025 term and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
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carrying out that plan, and Manuel testified that he shot Franklin

and saw Dickey shoot McKinney. Franklin testified that Hill was

present during the shooting.

In early December 2018, Hill and five friends, three of whom

were juveniles, discussed his plan to rob and kill McKinney, leave

no witnesses, and split the proceeds. McKinney sold illegal drugs for

“a number of years,” and his customers included Hill and his family

– who lived with McKinney and Franklin for a little while – as well

as Dickey’s father. On the evening of December 3, 2018, Hill and his

five friends met to discuss robbing and killing McKinney and

Franklin, as revenge for McKinney’s supposed sale of “bad drugs” to

Hill’s brother that caused him to overdose and be hospitalized. Hill,

Dickey, and Manuel were 15 years old at the time, and another

friend, Cloer, was 16 years old. The other two friends, Chamaty and

Havard, who were 20 years old, decided not to join the others.

After 11:00 p.m., Cloer drove Hill, Dickey, and Manuel to the

victims’ house while Hill gave directions. During the drive, the group

decided that Dickey would shoot McKinney, Hill would shoot

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Franklin, Manuel would be the lookout, and Cloer would be the

getaway driver. After Cloer dropped off the others, Hill knocked on

the door, told the victims a story about being “kicked out of” a

friend’s truck, and was invited inside the house. Dickey and Manuel

let themselves in through the unlocked door shortly thereafter and

met Hill and the victims in their living room.

After a short visit, McKinney said it was time for Hill, Dickey,

and Manuel to go. While McKinney was dousing a fire in his

woodstove, Dickey shot McKinney in the back of the head with a

.410-caliber shotgun that Dickey had gotten from Hill, causing

McKinney’s death almost instantly. Hill, who was armed with a

.380-caliber pistol, “froze,” and Manuel shot Franklin in the face

with a .25-caliber pistol that he had obtained from Cloer. Manuel

grabbed Hill, and the three perpetrators fled.

In the meantime, Cloer’s vehicle ran out of gas, Chamaty and

Havard brought him some, and the three of them eventually picked

up Hill, Dickey, and Manuel. After being picked up, Hill claimed, “I

blew her head off,” and later that evening, Manuel hid the shotgun

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under his mattress, and Cloer, Chamaty, and Havard threw the .25-

caliber pistol into a nearby lake.

Franklin survived the shooting, called 911 at 12:54 a.m., and

reported that Hill and Dickey were present at the shooting, although

she could not say who fired the shots. Franklin’s injuries were

consistent with injuries caused by projectiles fired from a .25-caliber

pistol. A .25-caliber pistol was recovered from the lake and matched

to .25-caliber shell casings found at the scene. And .410-caliber

cartridge casings found at the scene were matched to the .410-

caliber shotgun found under Manuel’s mattress.

Around lunchtime on December 4, investigators went to Hill

and Dickey’s high school and asked them to go with the investigators

to the sheriff’s office, and they agreed. Dickey confessed to shooting

McKinney with the .410-caliber shotgun. Hill waived his

constitutional rights and was interviewed by GBI Assistant Special

Agent Dustin Hamby for almost two hours. Hill initially denied ever

having been in the victims’ house. Hill later stated that he shot

McKinney and Franklin, and though Hill repeatedly minimized or

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omitted the extent of his friends’ involvement, he subsequently

admitted that he did not shoot McKinney. After Hill stopped the

interview and a different officer was sitting with him, Hill stated,

unprompted: “The reason we did it was because he had sold drugs

to my brother, and he overdosed, and I’d do it again.”

1. Hill contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to suppress his custodial statements on the ground that he did not

voluntarily and knowingly waive his rights pursuant to Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). In support of this contention, Hill

argues that he did not “understand what was going on” because he

was young and inexperienced, had a learning disability, had

difficulty reading, processed information slowly, lacked sleep, and

had used illegal drugs. Hill complains that Agent Hamby impaired

Hill’s understanding by telling him that reading the Miranda rights

did not mean he was under arrest. Hill also argues that he did not

understand the severity of the situation because, even after

confessing, he still asked if he could go home. Finally, Hill argues

that Agent Hamby, who admitted to moving closer to Hill and to

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talking to him in a repetitious way for 20 minutes straight,

“essentially intimidat[ed] Hill.” We conclude that the trial court did

not err in denying Hill’s motion to suppress based on the totality of

the circumstances.

The waiver inquiry has two distinct requirements: first, the

“waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a

free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception,” and, second, it must be “made with a full awareness of

both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences

of the decision to abandon it.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370,

382-83 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]rial courts

are to use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether

a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional

rights.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 429 (2023). That “test requires

trial courts to consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding

a juvenile’s interview with law enforcement officials to determine

whether the State has met its burden of showing” that the juvenile

knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. Id. at

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437. See also id. at 434 (“[P]roper application of a totality-of-the-

circumstances test mandates inquiry into all the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation.” (citation and punctuation omitted));

id. at 429, 434-35 & n.16 (stating that “any prescriptive or fixed list

of factors by its very nature risks undermining a totality-of-the-

circumstances test” and disapproving any language in prior cases

indicating that a specific nine-factor framework to determine

whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda

rights is required or exclusive).

When reviewing whether a defendant knowingly and

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we generally “review a trial

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error

and apply the law de novo.” Sinkfield v. State, 318 Ga. 531, 540

(2024). “We have previously explained that when reviewing a trial

court’s ruling on a suppression issue, an appellate court must

construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the

factual findings and judgment of the trial court.” State v. Franklin,

318 Ga. 39, 39 (2024) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “In

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cases where some or all of the material facts are undisputed, we

properly may take notice of the undisputed facts — even if the trial

court did not — without interfering with the prerogative of the trial

court to resolve disputes of material fact.” State v. Tripp, 320 Ga.

536, 547-48 (2024) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Such

undisputed facts include, among other things, those which

definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence

that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility.

Audio or video evidence may match that description.” Quintanar v.

State, 322 Ga. 61, 65-66 (2025) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). “Finally, we review de novo the application of the facts to

the law — that is, the trial court’s ultimate conclusion whether,

under all the circumstances, the defendant’s statement was

voluntary.” Id. at 66 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The trial court here discussed the evidence with the parties at

some length at the hearing on Hill’s motion to suppress but made

no explicit findings and later denied the motion “[a]fter considering

the totality of circumstances that occurred during Mr. Hill’s

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statement.” The parties have not raised any dispute about the

words or the conduct occurring in the recorded interview or about

any other evidence related to the interview.

Agent Hamby’s testimony at the hearing on the motion to

suppress, together with the audio recording of Hill’s custodial

statement, shows the following. On the day of the shooting, after

arrest warrants were taken out for Hill and Dickey, Agent Hamby

and the GBI case agent went to the high school and told Hill and

Dickey that they would like to speak with them about Justin

McKinney, and Hill and Dickey agreed. Hill rode to the sheriff’s

office with Agent Hamby in a different vehicle from Dickey and was

handcuffed during the drive for security reasons, which was

conveyed to Hill. At the sheriff’s office, Hill was placed in a room

separate from Dickey, and Hill’s handcuffs were removed. Before

beginning the interview, Agent Hamby slowly read Hill his Miranda

rights verbatim from a GBI card, asking Hill whether he understood

each right. Hamby told Hill that the warnings did not mean he was

under arrest, though Hamby testified at the motion hearing that

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Hill was going to be arrested regardless of what he said in the

interview. Hill affirmed that he understood each right as it was read

to him. Agent Hamby informed Hill that he did not have to speak

with Hamby if he did not want to, but Hill agreed to speak with him.

Hill was six days shy of his 16th birthday and in tenth grade

when he was interviewed. An academic document from the ninth

grade showed that Hill had a learning disability that negatively

impacted his academic progress and that he had slower processing

of information and an inability to comprehend grade level text and

vocabulary, making it challenging for Hill to be successful in a

general education setting without help and accommodation.. The

document also showed, however, that Hill increased his score in

English, math, science, and social studies over the previous year,

was “very attentive” in class, participated in class discussions and

completed in-class assignments, had strong skills in math, and tried

to work ahead to make up any missed lessons. 2 During the

2 Another academic document from the third grade was also admitted at

the hearing and showed, among other things, that he was having difficulties

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interview, Hill did not recall the number of his street address or his

social security number, but Agent Hamby stated that many

interviewees he had encountered have had learning disabilities and

similarly that many interviewees did not know their social security

number. Although Hill said that he “smoked weed” at the victims’

house, he did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or

alcohol, or suffering from any mental illness at the time of the

interview. Hill’s father noticed that Hill and Dickey were awake at

2:00 or 2:30 a.m. on the night that the crimes occurred, but Agent

Hamby said that “in no way did [Hill] ever appear to fall asleep or

be tired.” Agent Hamby testified that “the fact that [Hill] was

having an intelligent conversation with me and understood the

questions that I was asking and giving consistent answers with the

questions that I was asking made me believe that obviously he was

coherent and understood fully what was going on.” Hamby did not

have “any kind of worries or doubts as to the cognitive abilities [of

with reading and had made little progress at that point but was “age
appropriate for his grade level.”
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Hill] to actually understand and answer [the] questions.”

Hill never asked to speak with an attorney or a parent at any

point but only inquired whether his father knew he was at the

sheriff’s office. Agent Hamby told Hill that he had tried to contact

Hill’s father but received no response, and Hamby confirmed with

Hill that he had the right contact number. Agent Hamby never

threatened Hill or promised him any benefit for consenting to the

interview. Hill was provided with water, was not denied food or

bathroom access, and had a five-minute break that occurred about

halfway through the interview.

During the interview, Hill appeared to know what happened to

McKinney and understand the severity of the matter. Hill lied about

specific details, even minor ones, and about his friends’ involvement.

Hill changed his story, initially saying that he had never been to

McKinney’s house and did not know what had happened to

McKinney, but later saying that he had helped McKinney move in

one day and that he was at McKinney’s house the previous night.

Hill said he used a .410 shotgun to shoot McKinney but, when

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confronted with Dickey’s confession, agreed that Dickey fired the

fatal shot. Although Hill briefly agreed with the suggestion that

Dickey shot Franklin, Hill otherwise maintained that he shot

Franklin with a .25-caliber weapon and omitted Manuel from his

account. Hill also said that, when Cloer dropped Hill and Dickey off

and later picked them up, Cloer did not know what was happening,

but Hill admitted that Cloer saw the shotgun. When Hill asked

Agent Hamby if he could promise that Cloer would not get in trouble,

Hamby responded that he could not make any promises.

Agent Hamby explained that he used the GBI-recommended

“Reid technique” with Hill. Hamby began the interview by asking

open-ended questions and allowing Hill to provide specific details

before being interrogated on specific points. About halfway through

the interview, Agent Hamby began doing most of the talking for

about 20 minutes, repeatedly trying to rationalize Hill’s behavior. In

the last few minutes of the interview, Hill asked if he could go home

that day, and Agent Hamby told him he could not, although Hamby

did not tell Hill he was formally under arrest during the interview.

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The interview concluded when Hill said he did not want to answer

any more questions.

Contrary to Hill’s specific arguments set forth above, the trial

court did not err by determining that he voluntarily and knowingly

waived his Miranda rights. The audio recording of Hill’s interview

and Agent Hamby’s testimony supports that – despite Hill’s relative

youth and inexperience, lack of sleep and use of marijuana the night

before, and mixed academic reports – his responses were

consistently coherent, and he did not appear to be impaired. See

Clark, 315 Ga. at 430 & n.12 (Whether a juvenile knowingly and

voluntarily waived his rights depends on the totality of the

circumstances and not age alone.); Huffman v. State, 311 Ga. 891,

894 (2021) (holding that the appellant “need not have had

experience with the justice system to understand what was said

during the reading of his Miranda rights”); Griffin v. State, 309 Ga.

860, 868 (2020) (stating, where the appellant contended that “he was

too drunk and sleepy to knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights

prior to his police interview,” that “courts look to the totality of the

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circumstances and consider factors including lucidity, coherency,

manner of speech, and awareness of circumstances” (citation and

punctuation omitted)); Hopwood v. State, 307 Ga. 305, 306 (2019)

(holding that the trial court did not err by admitting the defendant’s

statements to an investigator where the defendant “did not appear

to be intoxicated or otherwise unable to voluntarily waive her

rights,” the record did not show the defendant “suffered from any

mental incapacity at the time she made her statement,” and the

defendant “appeared to understand and voluntarily waive her

rights”); Colton v. State, 296 Ga. 172, 178-179 (2014) (“[T]he fact that

a defendant is of below average intelligence … does not, in and of

itself, warrant the exclusion of the defendant’s inculpatory

statement; there must be additional and sufficient evidence that the

defendant did not have the capacity to understand and knowingly

waive his Miranda rights…. Even though [the appellant’s] academic

records may have reflected a less-than-average intellectual range,

they by no means established that [he] was incapable of

understanding and knowingly waiving his Miranda rights…. There

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was no other evidence offered … to negate the positive showing by

the State that [the appellant] was not impaired by internal or

external factors so as to be unable to understand his rights,

knowingly waive them, and voluntarily make his inculpatory

statement about the fatal encounter.” (citations and quotation

marks omitted)).

The fact that Agent Hamby told Hill that reading the Miranda

rights did not mean he was under arrest did not impair either the

understanding of the Miranda rights that Hill expressed or Agent

Hamby’s assurance that Hill did not have to speak with Hamby. See

Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 401 (2020) (When the interviewing

detective told the appellant that if he wanted to speak with the

detective, he needed to sign a waiver-of-rights “form that ‘basically

just says you’ve been advised of your rights, has no bearing on

anything else,’ that did not diminish the fact that [the appellant]

said that he understood the Miranda warnings that were given to

him orally and understood that he could, but did not have to, speak

with [the detective].”). Although Hill asked if he could go home after

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confessing, he nevertheless showed an understanding that the

situation was serious and that his friends could be in trouble for

their participation in the crimes, and Agent Hamby never indicated

that Hill could avoid negative consequences by confessing, nor did

Hamby otherwise contradict the Miranda warnings. See Williamson

v. State, 305 Ga. 889, 894 (2019) (rejecting the appellant’s argument

that he did not understand the Miranda rights he purportedly

waived where the appellant indicated he understood the potentially

serious negative consequences of inculpatory remarks and where

the interviewing officers urged him to confess but did not make any

affirmative misrepresentations that contradicted the Miranda

warnings). Finally, the mere fact that Agent Hamby admitted that

he moved closer to Hill and talked to him in a repetitious way for 20

minutes, without more, does not show that his Miranda waiver was

the product of “intimidation, coercion, or deception” rather than “a

free and deliberate choice.” See Berghuis, 560 US at 382-383.

Considering all the circumstances here, including Agent Hamby’s

testimony and the audio recording, we conclude that the trial court

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did not err in denying Hill’s motion to suppress.

2. Hill contends that the trial court erred in its charge to the

jury when it added the word “age” to the last sentence of the

suggested pattern jury instruction on sympathy as follows: “In

deciding this case, you should not be influenced by sympathy or

prejudice because of race, creed, color, religion, age, national origin,

sexual preference, local or remote residence, or economic status for

or against either party.” (Emphasis added.) See Suggested Pattern

Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 1.70.11 (4th ed. 2007, updated July

2021). 3 Although Hill objected to this addition at the charge

conference, he did not make any objection after the jury was

charged. Consequently, this enumeration is reviewable for plain

3 The entirety of that pattern jury instruction, entitled “Sympathy,” is as

follows:
Your verdict should be a true verdict based upon your opinion of
the evidence according to the laws given you in this charge. You
are not to show favor or sympathy to one party or the other. It is
your duty to consider the facts objectively without favor, affection,
or sympathy to either party.
In deciding this case, you should not be influenced by sympathy or
prejudice (because of race, creed, color, religion, national origin,
sexual preference, local or remote residence, economic (or
corporate) status) for or against either party.
The trial court charged the first three sentences without change.
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error only. See Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 861 (2023) (“An objection

voiced at the charge conference does not preserve for ordinary

appellate review a party’s objection to the charge as subsequently

given.”). We see no plain error.

To show plain error, Hill “must demonstrate that the

instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious

beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the

proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Clark v. State, 321 Ga. 732, 734

(2025) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “To constitute plain

error, an error in a jury instruction must have been obvious, among

other things.” Id. “For an error to be obvious for purposes of plain

error review, it must be plain under controlling precedent or in view

of the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule.” Sconyers v.

State, 318 Ga. 855, 859 (2024) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

Hill argues that altering the pattern instruction to include

“age” unfairly limited the defense, unnecessarily confused the jury,

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and restricted its open and untrammeled consideration of the case

when Hill did not improperly inject his age into the case or argue

that it was a factor for the jury’s consideration. See Jackson v. State,

311 Ga. 626, 633 (2021). But Hill points to no precedent holding that

it is error to instruct the jury not to be influenced by sympathy or

prejudice because of age. Indeed, the only case Hill cites in support

of his argument mentioned neither the pattern charge nor age;

stated that “[t]he decision over whether to give a cautionary charge

to the jurors, informing them that they should not be influenced by

sympathy or prejudice in reaching a verdict, is a matter generally

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge”; and held that

the trial court did not “abuse[ ] its discretion in declining to give the

cautionary charge Appellant requested.” Id. See also Clark, 321 Ga.

at 734-35 (holding that the appellant’s claim of error in a jury

instruction about the grand jury process “fail[ed] at the second step

of plain-error review” where the appellant pointed to “no precedent

holding that it was error to instruct the trial jury about the grand

jury process or detailing the level of specificity necessary for such an

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instruction”). Accordingly, it was not obvious beyond reasonable

dispute that the trial court erred in its instruction on sympathy, and,

therefore, Hill has failed to show plain error.

3. Hill contends that the trial court abused its discretion when

it admitted into evidence a post-incision photograph from the

autopsy of McKinney. In the photograph, McKinney’s scalp had been

peeled away to reveal a splitting or separation of his skull. Hill

argues that the photograph was gruesome, unnecessary, and

irrelevant to any issue because there was no dispute that Dickey

killed McKinney with a shotgun fired at the back of his head.

According to Hill, because neither the manner nor cause of death

was in dispute, the sole purpose of the photograph was to inflame

the passions of the jury. We conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting the single post-incision autopsy

photograph.

“In general, the admissibility of autopsy photographs is

governed by OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403.” Johns v.

State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (2025), S25A0875, slip op. at 11 (Ga. Aug. 12,

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2025). An autopsy photograph is relevant evidence if it has “any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence,” OCGA § 24-4-401, and a relevant

autopsy photograph is generally admissible as evidence, see OCGA

§ 24-4-402. However, such a photograph “may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403. “In

reviewing the admission of evidence under Rule 403, we look at the

evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its

probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.”

Salvesen v. State, 317 Ga. 314, 317 (2023) (citation and quotation

marks omitted). “Decisions regarding relevance are committed to

the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exclusion of relevant

evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be

used only sparingly.” Albury v. State, 314 Ga. 459, 461 (2022)

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(citation and quotation marks omitted).

“Autopsy photographs may be relevant and probative to show

the nature and location of a victim’s injuries, even if the cause of

death is not disputed.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“The State bore the burden to prove all of the elements of all of the

crimes charged.” Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 295 (2019). “[T]he

State was not required to stipulate to the cause of death and the

circumstances surrounding the murder …. Indeed, a criminal

defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full

evidentiary force of the case as the State chooses to present it.”

Salveson, 317 Ga. at 317 (citation and punctuation omitted).

In this case, the medical examiner explained that the

photograph at issue showed a fracture along the midline of

McKinney’s skull and that the energy coming into the back of his

head from the shotgun pellets caused the skull to break apart. Thus,

the photograph was relevant to show the nature and location of

McKinney’s injuries, which “corroborated the State’s evidence of the

circumstances of the killing.” Moore, 307 Ga. at 295 (citation and

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quotation marks omitted). See also Albury, 314 Ga. at 461.

Moreover, the probative value of the photograph was high, and the

danger of unfair prejudice from its admission was low, given that it

was unlikely that the jury found Hill guilty solely because of the

gruesomeness of this single autopsy photograph. See Salvesen, 317

Ga. at 317 (“[T]he mere fact that the photographs were gruesome

does not, as a general matter, render them inadmissible under Rule

403.”). Given the medical examiner’s testimony, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the autopsy

photograph at issue here. See Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 624

(2020) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting an autopsy photograph that showed “the underside of [the

appellant’s] brain, to illustrate the extent of the bruising,” and was

relevant evidence of the severity of that immediately lethal injury).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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