CourtListener 10845995

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 17, 2026

S26A0168. BODIE v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

In July 2022, Alexandra Bodie was convicted of malice murder

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony related

to the shooting death of Brandy Brummett. She appeals her

convictions, arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on accident and

that the trial court committed plain error by not giving an

instruction on accident. Because she has failed to show that her

counsel was deficient and because the lack of an accident instruction

likely did not affect the outcome of her case, we affirm her

convictions.1

1 Brummett was killed in May 2019.
In August 2019, a DeKalb County
grand jury indicted Bodie for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated
1. At around 5:30 p.m. on May 11, 2019, Bodie shot and killed

Brummett on stairs leading to a parking lot in a commercial area.2

After being identified by a police officer as the woman seen in a

surveillance video running from the area after the shooting and

being identified as the shooter in a photo lineup by an eyewitness to

the shooting, Bodie was arrested. She was interviewed by a police

detective twice. In her first interview, she denied being involved in

the shooting, first saying that she was not in the area and then

admitting that she was in the area “selling dope” but saying that she

ran when she heard the gunshot. In her second interview, however,

she admitted that she was involved in the shooting, giving the

assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At a
jury trial in July 2022, the jury found Bodie guilty on all counts. Bodie was
sentenced to serve life in prison for malice murder and a consecutive five years
in prison for the firearm count. The remaining counts were merged or vacated
by operation of law. Bodie timely filed a motion for new trial in July 2022 and
amended it with new counsel in October 2024. After an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied Bodie’s motion in July 2025. Bodie filed a timely notice
of appeal. The appeal was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December
2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2 We describe the trial evidence “in some detail rather than only in the

light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts” because this case involves a question
of whether an assumed trial court error caused harm, as discussed in Division
3 below. Wood v. State, 316 Ga. 811, 812 n.2 (2023).
2
following account. 3

Bodie had known Brummett for many years. Brummett took

Bodie “up under her wing” when Bodie began selling drugs “on the

street.” Eventually, Bodie “started doing her own thing,”

“branch[ing] out” from Brummett. Shortly before the shooting,

Bodie heard that Brummett was “trying to set [Bodie] up” because

Brummett “hate[d] on people who try to come up,” like Bodie, and

Brummett was defensive of her “territory.” The “word on the street”

was that Brummett “had to get” Bodie. About a week before the

shooting, Bodie and a friend were attacked by a man with a crowbar.

The next day, Bodie learned that Brummett had “set [her] up” for

this attack. After this incident, Bodie began carrying a gun. Bodie

had this gun in her waistband when she saw Brummett on the stairs

of the parking lot on May 11. Brummett approached Bodie and

“came in to give her a hug.” Bodie pushed her, saying, “get the f**k

off of me.” Brummett pushed Bodie back, and Bodie pushed

3 The detective who interviewed Bodie testified about the interview at

trial, and a recording of the interview was played for the jury.
3
Brummett again. Bodie then realized that Brummett knew Bodie

had a gun, and she thought, “so at this point, it’s either you or me …

either you go for it or I’m going for it.” So Bodie grabbed the gun

and although she had put the safety on “as always,” somehow “the

safety went off,” and the gun “went off.” Bodie did not know how the

gun fired, speculating, “I guess my finger slipped.” Bodie did not

mean to shoot Brummet, but explained, “at this point it’s either me

or you. You were reaching for it, I’m reaching for it.” The gun fired

one shot, and Bodie “just ran.” As she was running, she “threw” the

gun away. That night, she slept in the bushes in a nearby park.

An eyewitness to the shooting testified that he saw Bodie

sitting on the stairs of the parking lot around 10:00 a.m. on the

morning of the shooting, and she told him that she “was going to

beat” Brummett. When Brummett arrived later that day, she

“c[a]me[] up … to hug [Bodie].” Bodie said, “F**k you, b**ch,” and

shot Brummett. Then Bodie “ran.” 4

4 On cross-examination, the witness admitted that he had not told police

investigators about Bodie’s threat to “beat” Brummett and that he told

4
Additionally, evidence was presented that there was tension

between Bodie and Brummett related to the February 2019 murder

of Erica Cruz, who was a mutual acquaintance. Bodie told the

detective in her interview that shortly after Cruz was killed,

Brummett admitted to Bodie that Brummett had “everything” to do

with Cruz’s death but “another dude [was] going down for it.” A

detective working on the Cruz case testified at Bodie’s trial that he

had spoken to Brummett about Cruz’s murder and Brummett “was

willing to pass along” information about the murder. On May 8,

three days before Brummett’s shooting, Bodie posted on Facebook a

picture and headline from an article about the man charged with

Cruz’s murder. Above the picture, Bodie wrote, “Brandy brummett

had everything to do with it fk u pookie.”5

The medical examiner who performed Brummett’s autopsy

testified that Brummett died from a single gunshot wound to the

investigators he heard Bodie say, “Don’t touch me, mother**king b**ch,”
rather than “F**k you, b**ch.”

5 Bodie said in her interview that “Pookie” was Brummett’s nickname.

5
chest. She also noted that Brummett had “a bunch of scratches and

bruises on the back” of her right hand, which could have been from

her falling after she was shot but also could have been caused by a

fight immediately before the shooting.

At trial, Bodie’s counsel argued that Bodie shot Brummett in

self-defense, asserting that Bodie knew that “a hit had been put out

on her,” was “in fear” because of the attack against her the week

before, and was “physically engaged” by Brummett immediately

before the shooting. Counsel pointed to the injuries on Brummett’s

hand as evidence that she fought Bodie before the shooting and

emphasized Bodie’s statement that “it was either me or her.” The

jury was instructed on self-defense.

2. Bodie contends that her counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on accident. See

OCGA § 16-2-2 (“A person shall not be found guilty of any crime

committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears

there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal

negligence.”). To establish this claim, Bodie must show that her trial

6
counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance resulted in prejudice. See Fox v. State, 321 Ga. 411,

414–15 (2025) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687

(1984)). To show deficient performance, Bodie must demonstrate

that “counsel performed counsel’s duties in an objectively

unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances and in the

light of prevailing professional norms.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). “[D]ecisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form

the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such

a course.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). If Bodie fails to establish

one part of the Strickland test, we need not examine the other part.

Id.

Bodie has failed to show that her counsel’s performance was

deficient. In light of the evidence presented at trial—including

Bodie’s statements that the “word on the street” was that Brummett

“had to get” Bodie and that Bodie grabbed the gun from her

waistband because once Brummett knew about the gun, it was

7
“either you or me”—it was not objectively unreasonable for counsel

to make the strategic decision to focus on arguing that Bodie acted

in self-defense and forgo requesting an accident instruction, which

would have presented a defense that was inconsistent with a self-

defense theory. See Fox, 321 Ga. at 415 (holding that where the

evidence “supported trial counsel’s choice to pursue a self-defense

strategy,” “[c]ounsel’s decision not to request an accident charge,

which he believed would have undermined the all-or-nothing

justification defense, was not patently unreasonable”). See also

McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 867 (2019) (Nahmias, P.J.,

concurring) (“[A] decision by defense counsel to forgo the option of

presenting an inconsistent alternative defense and instead to focus

on the defense or defenses that he reasonably believes to be the

strongest under all the circumstances will usually not constitute

deficient performance under Strickland.”). Thus, Bodie’s claim of

ineffective assistance fails.

3. Bodie also argues that the trial court erred by failing to give

an instruction on accident. Because counsel did not request an

8
instruction on accident, this claim is reviewed for plain error only.

See OCGA § 17-8-58. To demonstrate plain error, Bodie must show

(1) an error that was not affirmatively waived, (2) that the
error was clear and obvious, and (3) that the error affected
her substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means
she must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the
trial court proceedings. If she makes such a showing, we
would have discretion to remedy the error, but only if the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.

Fox, 321 Ga. at 416 (cleaned up). “If one prong of the plain error test

is not satisfied, we need not address the other prongs of the test.”

Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Even assuming the trial court clearly erred by not instructing

the jury on accident, Bodie has not shown that this assumed error

affected the outcome of the proceedings. As discussed above, self-

defense, rather than accident, was the focus of Bodie’s defense at

trial. The evidence Bodie now argues supported an accident

instruction—Bodie’s self-serving statements that she was not sure

how the safety came off or how the gun fired—came from a single

interview, in which Bodie also said that she grabbed the gun because

9
it was “either you or me.” 6 And there was other strong evidence that

Bodie intended to shoot Brummett, including Bodie’s statement that

she believed Brummett was “trying to set [her] up” over a territory

dispute, Bodie’s Facebook post three days before the shooting saying

“fk u pookie” related to Cruz’s murder, the eye witness’s testimony

that Bodie said she was going to “beat” Brummett on the morning of

the shooting, and the fact that Bodie fled and threw the gun away

immediately after the shooting. Thus, Bodie has failed to show that

the lack of accident instruction likely affected the outcome of her

trial. See Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 688 (2023) (holding that

the failure to give an accident instruction was harmless under plain

error where the appellant’s “primary theory at trial” was not

accident but that someone else caused the injuries and although the

6 Moreover, even if the jury believed Bodie’s statement that she did not

know how the gun fired, the jury also could have concluded—based on Bodie’s
statement and the evidence that Brummett was shot in the chest—that after
Bodie grabbed the gun, she pointed it at Brummett, which would constitute
criminal negligence and preclude an accident defense. See Mills v. State, 287
Ga. 828, 832 (2010) (holding that the appellant’s actions of “climb[ing] into bed
with the victim and her two-year-old son holding a loaded handgun with his
finger on the trigger” and “point[ing] the gun at the victim’s head” “shows a
degree of culpability that constitutes criminal negligence,” not accident).
10
appellant offered an accident theory “as a possible explanation” for

the victim’s injuries when he testified at trial, testimony from

medical experts was inconsistent with the accident theory). See also

McClure, 306 Ga. at 867 (Nahmias, P.J., concurring) (noting that a

trial court’s “fail[ure] to give an instruction on an alternative defense

that is supported by only the slightest evidence and that is

inconsistent with the defendant’s own account of the events or with

the main defense theory presented at trial … almost certainly will

not amount to plain error”).

4. Lastly, Bodie argues that the cumulative effect of the errors

enumerated in her brief requires her convictions to be reversed.

“Under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (2020), we must consider

collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along

with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.”

Blocker v. State, 316 Ga. 568, 583 (2023). However, in our analysis

above, we assumed only one error—that the trial court erred by

failing to give a jury instruction on accident—and we held that trial

counsel did not perform deficiently. Thus, Bodie has failed to show

11
more than one trial court error or instance of deficient performance

by counsel, so “there are no errors to aggregate,” and this claim fails.

Madera v. State, 318 Ga. 593, 600 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

12
PETERSON, Chief Justice, concurring.

I join the decision of the Court in full. I write separately to

make one additional point. The Court holds that Bodie has failed to

show plain error from the trial court’s failure to charge on accident,

because Bodie has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood

the outcome would have been different if the trial court gave such a

charge. I agree.

But it also seems to me that the failure to charge an

unrequested affirmative defense that conflicts with the defense’s

strategic focus can almost never be plain and obvious error, even if

evidence existed to support that defense. The weight of federal

authority holds that there is no error at all in failing to give an

unrequested instruction on an affirmative defense. See Musacchio

v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 248 (2016) (“When a defendant fails

to press [a non-jurisdictional affirmative] defense, the defense does

not become part of the case,” the government does not otherwise

have the burden of disproving it, and thus “there is no error for an

appellate court to correct — and certainly no plain error.”); United

13
States v. Sago, 74 F4th 1152, 1160 n.6 (10th Cir. 2023) (noting that

“[o]f the circuits to have considered a claim regarding an

unrequested affirmative-defense instruction, most hold there is no

error,” and collecting cases). See also State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33

(2011) (adopting federal plain error standard in analyzing

unpreserved jury instruction claims). And, although it’s not clear to

me whether we’ve ever decided that question ourselves, we have at

least flagged the issue for future decision. See Walker v. State, 301

Ga. 482, 486 n.2 (2017) (“Because Appellant's defense of habitation

claim fails under [plain error], we need not decide in this case

whether we should follow Musacchio to hold categorically that a

defendant cannot establish plain error in regard to a claim based on

a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense that the defendant never

put at issue at trial.”). Given that we appear to have left this

question unanswered since acknowledging its existence in Walker,

it seems to me unlikely that failure to give an unrequested

affirmative-defense instruction could constitute clear and obvious

error under existing precedent.