Preston v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0122
Keyondre Preston
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Newton County
No. 2021CR6892

Decided: June 2, 2026

LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Keyondre Preston appeals his convictions for
malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of
Shelvis Hillman. 1 On appeal, Preston argues that (1) the evidence

1 Hillman was killed on April 3, 2019. On June 7, 2019, a Newton
County grand jury indicted Preston, and on July 23, 2021, a grand jury re-
indicted Preston for the following counts: malice murder (Count 1); felony
murder predicated on armed robbery (Count 2); felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault (Count 3); armed robbery (Counts 4–6); aggravated assault
(Counts 7–9); burglary in the first degree (Counts 10 and 11); and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 12–14). Preston was
tried from October 18 to 21, 2021, and the jury found Preston guilty on all
counts except Count 2. The trial court sentenced Preston to life without the
possibility of parole on Count 1; life in prison on each of Counts 4–6, to run
concurrently; twenty years to run concurrent on Count 10; and five years to
run consecutive on each of Counts 12–14. The remaining counts merged or
were vacated by operation of law. Preston filed a timely motion for new trial,
which he later amended on September 2, 2023. The trial court denied the
motion on October 30, 2024. Preston filed a timely notice of appeal, and his
case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
was constitutionally insufficient to support the verdicts; (2) the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting other-act evidence
of two prior incidents; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing his
request to charge the jury on justification and related concepts.
For the reasons set forth below, Preston’s arguments fail.
Accordingly, we affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that, during the
evening hours of April 3, 2019, Preston shot and killed Hillman
at the home of his uncle, Charlie Hillman. Preston then robbed
Hillman, Charlie, and Curtis Kimbrough, Charlie’s roommate.
Earlier that same day, Preston, who also went by “Peanut,”
accompanied David Catlett to the home of Hillman’s father,
Stanley Hillman, who was friends with Catlett. When Preston
and Catlett arrived at Stanley’s house, Stanley’s fiancée told them
that Stanley was not home, but the two men came inside the
house anyway. 2 Stanley’s dog was in the house and began barking
at them. Preston pulled a gun and shot at the dog but missed.
Stanley’s fiancée then “threw them outside,” called Stanley, and
told Stanley to come home because somebody just shot at his dog.
After receiving this call, Stanley returned home, and
Hillman and Charlie accompanied him. When the three men
arrived, they saw Preston and Catlett waiting outside the house. 3
Stanley and Hillman began arguing with Catlett and Preston, 4
and Preston told Hillman, “[Y]a’ll don’t know who the f**k y’all
f***ing with.” Preston and Catlett left and walked to Catlett’s

2 Stanley’s fiancée testified that she knew Catlett but did not know the
person who was with Catlett.
3 Charlie and Stanley testified that, although they knew Catlett well,
they had never seen Preston before.
4 Charlie testified that he did not participate in the conversation in the
yard.

2
grandfather’s house, where they saw Preston’s uncle, Deandre
Arnold, and Catlett’s cousin, Jamarcus Latimore. Preston told
Arnold that “somebody just tried him,” which, according to
Catlett, meant he “felt disrespected.”
Around 8:00 p.m. that night, Arnold picked up his wife,
Letonya Arnold, from work in her van, and Preston, Catlett, and
Latimore were with him. When Letonya got into the van, she
heard Preston say that he shot at Stanley’s dog. Letonya also
noticed that Preston and Arnold both had a gun “on [their] hips,”
and the men appeared “inebriated,” “sluggish,” and “on a
substance.” The group then drove to Stanley’s house because
Arnold, who was friends with Stanley, wanted to talk to Stanley
about Preston shooting at his dog. When they arrived, Stanley’s
fiancée told them that Stanley was at Charlie’s house, so the
group drove over there. When the group arrived at Charlie’s
house, Letonya remained in the van, but everyone else went to
the back door of the house, which led into the kitchen.
Charlie testified that he and Hillman had been talking in
the kitchen, and Charlie left briefly to go to the restroom. When
Charlie came out of the restroom, he saw Arnold standing there,
holding a gun by his side. Charlie told Arnold that he did not allow
guns in the house, and Arnold left the house. According to
Charlie, after Arnold left the house, “the shooter” 5 came into the
kitchen and “shot [Hillman] point-blank.” 6 Charlie testified that,
prior to the shooting, the shooter “[d]idn’t say no word. Didn’t say
nothing.” Charlie further testified that, as Hillman fell to the floor

5 Charlie testified that, although he did not know the name of the
shooter, the shooter was the same person he had seen in Stanley’s yard with
Catlett earlier that afternoon.
6 Hillman was later transported to the hospital, where he died from a
gunshot wound to the torso.

3
“holding his stomach,” he saw a gun in Hillman’s hand, but
Charlie had not seen Hillman with a gun before this moment.
Catlett—who was not in the kitchen and was instead outside of
the house near the back door at the time—testified that Preston
and Hillman were arguing right before the shooting, and Catlett
heard Hillman say, “I got a gun, too.”
Letonya testified that, while she was sitting in the van with
the windows open, 7 she heard Preston say, “[G]ive me what you
got,” followed by a gunshot. After hearing the gunshot, Letonya
exited the van and went to the back door of the house, where she
saw Hillman bleeding on the kitchen floor. Letonya also saw
Preston standing in the kitchen holding a gun, and she heard
Arnold ask Preston why he shot Hillman.
Kimbrough testified that, prior to the shooting, he was
listening to music in the living room when he heard “something
like a pop,” then he walked to the kitchen, where he saw Hillman
lying on the floor and Charlie on his knees with his hands locked
behind his head. Kimbrough felt something cold on his neck and
realized that a gun was being pointed at him by a man he had
never seen before. Catlett testified that, around this time, he went
to the kitchen, where he heard Preston tell Charlie and
Kimbrough to “give him their stuff,” and saw Charlie and
Kimbrough “getting on the ground” and emptying their pockets,
which included a cell phone, keys, and cash, and throw them on
the floor. Preston then grabbed items off the floor, 8 picked up
Hillman’s gun, went through Hillman’s pockets, and left the
house.

7 Letonya also testified that, around this time, the back door to
Charlie’s house was open.
8 Kimbrough testified that both Arnold and the person he did not know
grabbed items off the floor.

4
After the shooting, Preston, Arnold, Letonya, Catlett, and
Latimore returned to the van. Letonya testified that, when
Preston got into the van, she saw Preston holding “the gun, a book
bag, and another gun in his hand and some keys.” After Arnold
returned to the van, he told Letonya that Preston shot Hillman
and took his gun. Someone told Letonya “to drive,” and the group
left. When the group dropped off Catlett and Latimore, Preston
told Catlett, “Better not snitch” and “Don’t say nothing.” Letonya
then drove to a gas station, where Preston exited the van. When
Preston left, he took the two guns with him but left the stolen
keys behind.
When officers responded to the scene, they recovered a
9mm cartridge casing near the back door, 9 as well as keys and a
small amount of change on the floor. Later that same night,
Covington Police Department Detective Julie English went to
Stanley’s house to investigate the shooting incident involving
Stanley’s dog, and she found a 9mm cartridge casing on the floor
near the front door. Subsequent testing revealed that the
cartridge casing found in Stanley’s home and the cartridge casing
found in Charlie’s home were both fired from the same gun.
On April 4, the day after the shooting, Letonya and Arnold
turned themselves in to law enforcement and were arrested for
murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault. 10 Detective
English testified that Arnold was intoxicated, shouting, and
“raising cane, going on saying he didn’t do s**t, it was his nephew
Keyondre that shot the man.” After hearing this, Detective

9 The medical examiner who conducted Hillman’s autopsy recovered
one 9mm bullet from Hillman’s body, but the weapon that fired the bullet was
never recovered.
10 Letonya and Arnold were both granted immunity for their testimony
at Preston’s trial.

5
English looked up Arnold’s Facebook page, where she saw “a
Keyondre as a friend on [F]acebook.” When she did so, Arnold
looked and said, “That’s him, that’s him,” and pointed at Preston’s
Facebook page.
In Letonya’s initial interview that night, she indicated that
she did not know the shooter, but in a subsequent interview, she
identified the shooter as “Peanut,” saying that “she has known
Peanut, the shooter, ever since he was a child.” Officers later
executed a search warrant for Letonya’s van and recovered two
sets of keys. One set had a Chevrolet key and a heart-shaped
keychain that said “Shelvis & Patrice,” and the other had two
Mercedes key fobs, which officers later learned belonged to
Charlie.
On April 5, investigators created a photo lineup that
included a picture of Preston and showed it separately to Arnold,
Letonya, and Catlett, who all identified Preston as the shooter.
On April 20, Detective English received a tip that Preston was at
a hotel in Cordele, and officers apprehended him at that hotel.
Detective English testified that, at the time of Preston’s arrest,
his head was clean-shaven, but during previous interviews with
witnesses, Preston was described as having “twists in his hair.”
During the arrest, officers seized a black shoulder bag and a .40
caliber pistol 11 from the bathroom in Preston’s hotel room.
1. Preston contends that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions for
malice murder, armed robbery, and burglary under the standard
set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979). For the

11 The firearms examiner testified that this pistol did not fire the bullet
that killed Hillman, nor did it eject the cartridge casings that were found at
Stanley’s and Charlie’s houses.

6
reasons explained below, this claim fails.
When evaluating a challenge to the constitutional
sufficiency of the evidence, “we view the evidence presented in the
light most favorable to the verdicts to determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” See Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 101 (2024)
(citing Jackson, 443 US at 319). “The jury’s verdicts will be upheld
as long as some competent evidence, even if contradicted,
supports each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.”
Copeland v. State, 316 Ga. 452, 455 (2023). And, “[w]e defer to the
jury’s resolution of any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of
witnesses, and the drawing of reasonable inferences from the
facts.” Hooks v. State, 318 Ga. 850, 852 (2024).
Here, when properly viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdicts, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
Preston guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. As to the
malice murder count, 12 Preston primarily argues that the
evidence presented about Hillman’s shooting was “highly
conflicting,” “many of the witnesses had reasons for adjusting
their testimony,” and he was “an easy person to blame for the
shooting even if he had not been responsible.” But, as we have
often said, “it is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the
evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the
resolution of such conflicts adversely to the defendant does not
render the evidence insufficient.” Stroud v. State, 318 Ga. 744,
750 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). See also OCGA § 24-14-8

12 Under OCGA § 16-5-1(a), “[a] person commits the offense of murder
when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied,
causes the death of another human being.” And we have held that “[t]he malice
necessary to establish malice murder may be formed in an instant, as long as
it is present at the time of the killing.” Pinkins v. State, 319 Ga. 595, 601 (2024)
(quotation marks omitted).

7
(“The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to
establish a fact.”). And, here, despite any conflicting testimony
among the witnesses, the evidence established that, on the day of
the shooting, Preston had a confrontation with Hillman, in which
Preston told Hillman, “[Y]a’ll don’t know who the f**k y’all f***ing
with.” After that confrontation, Preston told Arnold that
“somebody just tried him,” meaning that he felt disrespected.
Later that night, when the group went to Charlie’s house, Preston
was armed with a gun, and after Hillman’s shooting—which
Charlie testified was at “point-blank”—Letonya saw Preston
holding a gun in the kitchen and heard Arnold ask Preston why
he shot Hillman. In speaking to Letonya and Detective English
after the shooting, Arnold confirmed that Preston shot Hillman.
The firearms examiner also determined that a cartridge casing
found inside Stanley’s house, where Preston shot at Stanley’s dog,
and a cartridge casing found in Charlie’s house, where Hillman
was shot, were both fired from the same gun. Given this evidence,
the jury was authorized to find Preston guilty of malice murder.
See Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 850 (2024) (holding that the
evidence was sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction for
malice murder where, among other things, a witness “found
[a]ppellant standing with a gun over [the victim’s] dead body”
immediately after hearing a gunshot).
Likewise, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
Preston guilty of armed robbery. 13 On appeal, Preston argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for armed
robbery because the testimony was conflicting as to his

13 Under OCGA § 16-8-41(a), “[a] person commits the offense of armed
robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another
from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive
weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such
weapon.”

8
“involvement in taking items from [Hillman], [Kimbrough], and
Charlie,” but this argument fails because, as noted above, any
conflicts in the evidence are for the jury to resolve. See Stroud,
318 Ga. at 750. And, here, the evidence showed that Preston was
armed with a gun when he went to Charlie’s house, and after
Preston and the group went inside Charlie’s house, Letonya
overheard Preston say, “[G]ive me what you got,” before hearing
a gunshot. After the shooting, Letonya saw Preston holding a gun.
Additionally, Catlett saw Preston take Hillman’s gun; he saw
Charlie and Kimbrough “getting on the ground” and pulling stuff
out of their pockets; and he heard Preston tell them to “give him
their stuff.” When the group returned to the van, Arnold told
Letonya that Preston took Hillman’s gun, and Letonya saw
Preston holding “the gun, a book bag, and another gun in his hand
and some keys.” Finally, when law enforcement searched
Letonya’s van, they found Charlie’s car keys and a set of keys with
a “Shelvis & Patrice” keychain. We conclude that this evidence
was constitutionally sufficient to enable the jury to find Preston
guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Dillard
v. State, 321 Ga. 171, 174–75 (2025) (holding that evidence was
sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions for armed robbery
where it showed that the appellant pointed his gun at two victims,
demanded their possessions, and took a backpack).
The evidence was also sufficient for a reasonable jury to
convict Preston for first-degree burglary. 14 For the burglary count
at issue, Preston was convicted for entering or remaining within
Charlie’s home with the intent to commit aggravated assault. On
appeal, Preston argues that there was no evidence that he

14 Under OCGA § 16-7-1(b), “[a] person commits the offense of burglary
in the first degree when, without authority and with the intent to commit a
felony or theft therein, he or she enters or remains within an occupied,
unoccupied, or vacant dwelling house of another.”

9
“entered or remained in [Charlie’s] home unlawfully or without
authority.” 15 But we have said that, where a defendant enters a
victim’s home and subsequently assaults and attempts to rob the
victim, the evidence would support a burglary conviction for
remaining in the home without authority. See Bell v. State, 287
Ga. 670, 673 (2010) (“The evidence that, once inside the
apartment, [appellant] assaulted [the victim] and sought to rob
him would support a conviction for ‘remain[ing]’ in the dwelling
without authority.”) Here, contrary to Preston’s argument, the
evidence showed that Charlie and Kimbrough did not know
Preston, and there was no evidence that Preston was invited to
Charlie’s house before going there. Additionally, Charlie testified
that, after Arnold left the house, Preston came inside, and Charlie
did not say that Preston was accompanied by any people Charlie
knew. Preston then shot Hillman—Charlie’s nephew—“point-
blank,” and he robbed Charlie, Hillman, and Kimbrough, after
holding a gun to Kimbrough’s neck and forcing Charlie and
Kimbrough to get on the ground. Based on this evidence, the jury
could have reasonably concluded that Preston did not have
authority to enter or remain within Charlie’s home, and that he
did so with the intent to commit aggravated assault. Thus, the
evidence was sufficient to support Preston’s conviction for first-
degree burglary. See Gines v. State, S25A1305, slip op. at 7–9 (Ga.
Mar. 12, 2026) (2026 WL 696353) (holding that the evidence was
sufficient “for the jury to make the reasonable inference that the
[a]ppellants remained in [the victim’s] home without authority”

15 Preston makes this argument for both burglary counts (Counts 10
and 11). However, because Count 11 was vacated, his arguments relating to
the sufficiency of that count are moot and will not be addressed. See Anderson
v. State, 299 Ga. 193, 196 n.4 (2016) (concluding that, where a count is vacated
for sentencing purposes, the defendant is not convicted on that count, and a
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support that count is moot).

10
and, thus, was sufficient to support the appellant’s burglary
conviction where it showed that, once he and the other appellants
were inside the victim’s home, they robbed and shot the victim).
Accordingly, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdicts, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to authorize a
rational jury to find Preston guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
all the crimes for which he was convicted. See Dillard, 321 Ga. at
174–75.
2. Preston also argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting other-act evidence under OCGA § 24-4-
404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”). For the reasons that follow, we conclude
that, because the other-act evidence was admissible under Rule
404(b) to prove intent, the trial court did not clearly abuse its
discretion in admitting this evidence for that limited purpose. See
Hall v. State, 322 Ga. 378, 382 (2025) (“A trial court’s decision to
admit evidence under Rule 404(b) will be disturbed only if it
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence that
Preston committed two prior crimes in 2018 (the “2018
incidents”). The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion
and ruled that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of
proving intent. At trial, Ilyas Numan testified that, on May 25,
2018, he went to a convenience store near his apartment complex,
where he saw a man—later determined to be Preston 16—who had

16 After the incident, Numan met with DeKalb County Police
Department Detective Jerad Wheeler and watched the convenience store’s
surveillance video. After watching the video, Numan identified the man who
robbed him, and surveillance video screenshots of Numan and Preston in the

11
a “little -- eye -- eye thing” on his face. Prior to this encounter,
Numan had never seen Preston before. After leaving the store,
Numan eventually went home, where he saw Preston near the
front gate of his apartment complex. Numan rolled down his
window, Preston “gave [Numan] some herb,” Numan gave
Preston money, and then Preston pulled out a gun. Preston said,
“Don’t do anything stupid,” and made Numan empty his pockets.
Numan then put the car in park and ran from the car. As he was
running, Numan heard gunshots, and Preston drove the car
away.
Additionally, Stefan Ellington testified that, on the
morning of June 11, 2018, he was working as a Lyft driver.
Ellington was sitting in his car when he felt a gun pressed against
his head. The person holding the gun—later determined to be
Preston 17—told Ellington not to move and to put his hands up,
and another man, who was with Preston, got into Ellington’s
passenger seat. Preston told the man to take Ellington’s keys and
wallet from his pocket, which he did. Ellington was then told to
get out of the car and not to move. After Ellington got out of the
car, Preston started to get in the driver’s seat. As Preston was

convenience store were shown to the jury. At the conclusion of his testimony,
Numan identified Preston in the courtroom as the person who robbed him.
Additionally, Detective Wheeler testified that, after reviewing the surveillance
video with Numan, he made still-shot photos of the suspect and distributed the
photos to other detectives in his unit. Several detectives recognized the suspect
as Preston.
17 After the incident, Ellington met with law enforcement and viewed
a photo lineup, which included six males who all had a face piercing, and he
identified Preston as the person who held the gun to his head and fired the
gunshots. Additionally, DeKalb County Police Department Detective Antwon
Winston testified that Ellington picked Preston, whom Detective Winston
knew as “Peanut,” from the photo lineup.

12
getting in the car, he took the gun off Ellington, and when he did
so, Ellington ran away. Ellington then heard someone yell, “Hey,”
followed by the sound of one or two gunshots.
Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith,” but such evidence
may be admissible for other purposes, including to prove intent.
See OCGA § 24-4-404(b). See also Henderson v. State, 318 Ga.
752, 754–55 (2024) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, but it does
prohibit the introduction of other acts evidence when it is offered
for the sole purpose of showing a defendant’s bad character or
propensity to commit a crime.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Therefore, a party offering Rule 404(b) evidence must show:
(1) that the evidence is relevant to an issue in the
case other than the defendant’s character; (2) that
the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice;
and (3) that there is sufficient proof for a jury to find
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the other act.

Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 84 (2020). On appeal, Preston does not
dispute that there was sufficient proof for a jury to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that he committed the 2018
incidents, so we address only the first and second parts of this
test. See Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2020).
As to the first part, “we look to OCGA § 24-4-401, which
defines relevant evidence as evidence that has any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” Rooks v. State, 317 Ga. 743,

13
756 (2023) (cleaned up). Here, because Preston entered a plea of
not guilty and did not take affirmative steps to remove intent as
an issue, he made intent a material issue in this case. See Mitchell
v. State, 317 Ga. 107, 111 (2023) (“[A] defendant who enters a not
guilty plea makes intent a material issue, and the State may
prove intent by qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence absent
affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an issue.”
(cleaned up)).
Because intent was at issue, the relevance of the 2018
incidents was satisfied as it required the same state of mind as
some of the crimes with which Preston was charged in this case.
As noted above, Preston was charged in this case with armed
robbery, felony murder predicated on armed robbery, aggravated
assault, and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault,
among other crimes. “And we may consider whether the other acts
were relevant to the issue of intent on any of these offenses.”
Greene v. State, 316 Ga. 584, 598 (2023) (quotation marks
omitted). Because the charged offenses of armed robbery and
aggravated assault involved a similar intent to the 2018 incidents
involving Numan and Ellington—which could have constituted
aggravated assaults and armed robberies—the 2018 incidents
were relevant to prove Preston’s intent in the charged crimes. See
id. See also Mitchell, 317 Ga. at 111 (“Because intent was at issue,
the relevance of the [prior] robbery was satisfied because it
required the same state of mind (intent to rob) as some of the
crimes—felony murder predicated on armed robbery and armed
robbery—that [appellant] was charged with here.”). As such,
because the 2018 incidents were relevant to an issue other than
Preston’s character, the first part of our Rule 404(b) test has been
met. See Henderson, 318 Ga. at 755 (concluding that the first part
of the Rule 404(b) test is satisfied “[w]here the intent required for
the charged offenses and other acts is the same, and intent is at

14
issue”).
Having concluded that the 2018 incidents were relevant to
prove intent, we now turn to the second part of the Rule 404(b)
test, which is governed by OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). See
Rooks, 317 Ga. at 757.
Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant
evidence where its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. In
other words, other acts evidence should be excluded
if it constitutes matter of scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake
of its prejudicial effect. Factors to be considered in
determining the probative value of other act
evidence offered to prove intent include its overall
similarity to the charged crime, its temporal
remoteness, and the prosecutorial need for it.

Hood, 309 Ga. at 500–01 (citations and punctuation omitted).
When evaluating overall similarity, we must also consider any
differences between the other acts and the charged crimes. See
Mitchell, 317 Ga. at 111. And, “when other act evidence is
introduced to prove intent, a lesser degree of similarity between
the charged crime and the extrinsic evidence is required than
when it is used to prove identity.” Greene, 316 Ga. at 600 (cleaned
up).
First, the charged crimes in this case and the 2018
incidents had many similarities. In all three incidents, Preston
robbed the victims at gunpoint, took items from the victims’

15
pockets, and fired his gun at the victims to either threaten or
shoot them. Additionally, in the 2018 incidents, neither Ellington
nor Numan knew Preston, and in the present case, at least two of
the victims—Charlie and Kimbrough—testified that, prior to the
day of the incident, they had never seen Preston before, and he
was a stranger to them. 18 Kimbrough, in particular, had never
seen Preston prior to Preston holding a gun to his neck and telling
him to empty his pockets. 19 On the other hand, there were also
differences between the 2018 incidents and the crimes charged in
this case. For example, in the 2018 incidents, Preston stole the
victims’ cars, whereas during the charged crimes, he did not steal
any vehicles, but only two sets of car keys. Additionally, in the
2018 incident involving Ellington, Preston did not interact with
Ellington prior to robbing him, but in this case, Preston
encountered Charlie and Hillman at Stanley’s house earlier in the
day before robbing them at Charlie’s house later that night. But
these differences are not substantial. Although Preston did not
steal a vehicle during the subject incident, he used a gun to rob
Hillman, Charlie, and Kimbrough—similar to the prior incidents
involving Numan and Ellington—and he stole the victims’ car
keys. Moreover, while Preston encountered Hillman and Charlie
at Stanley’s house earlier in the day of the charged crimes,
Charlie testified that he did not actually interact or participate in
any conversation with Preston, making Preston’s later encounter
with Charlie at Charlie’s house similar to Preston’s encounter
with Numan, whom he also likely saw at a convenience store prior

18 The record does not demonstrate whether Hillman knew Preston
before the day of the shooting.
19 As noted above, because Kimbrough did not know Preston, he did
not identify Preston as the person who robbed him, and he was not asked at
trial whether Preston was the person who robbed him. However, the testimony
from Catlett, Charlie, and Letonya indicated that Preston was the person who
robbed Kimbrough.

16
to robbing Numan.
Because the circumstances surrounding the 2018 incidents
were sufficiently similar to the charged crimes, the evidence of
the 2018 incidents—and Preston’s intent in carrying them out—
were probative of his intent here. See generally Greene, 316 Ga.
at 600–01. And the differences between the 2018 incidents and
the charged crimes were “not so significant that it was an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to conclude that the similarities
gave the evidence” of the 2018 incidents “substantial probative
value.” Rooks, 317 Ga. at 758. See also Mitchell, 317 Ga. at 111
(concluding that any slight differences between the prior acts and
the charged offenses were “not so significant such that it would
have been an abuse of discretion to conclude that the similarities
gave the other-acts evidence substantial probative value”).
Additionally, the “significant probative value” of the 2018
incidents was not “diminished by its temporal remoteness,”
Rooks, 317 Ga. at 758, as the 2018 incidents both happened
within one year of the charged crimes. See Mitchell, 317 Ga. at
112 (concluding that the probative value of the other-act evidence
“was not diminished by temporal remoteness, as the events were
separated by only two years”).
Finally, the prosecutorial need for the other-act evidence
was fairly significant. When the State sought to admit the 2018
incidents before trial, it argued that it needed the evidence to
rebut a potential self-defense argument. Although Preston did not
testify at trial, the record shows that, during Preston’s cross-
examination of witnesses, he pursued alternative defenses: (1)
that he was not the perpetrator of the charged crimes or was not
present when the crimes occurred; and (2) if he was present, that
he acted in self-defense. Regarding his alleged absence during the
charged crimes, Preston’s counsel asked Preston’s family

17
members and one of the Rule 404(b) witnesses whether Preston
had a piercing on his face, and asked investigators of the charged
crimes whether any of the witnesses to the incident mentioned a
distinctive feature on the shooter’s face. As to self-defense,
Preston’s counsel asked witnesses whether Hillman owned a gun,
carried a gun, and had a concealed carry license 20; whether
Hillman was drinking on the day of the incident; and whether
people feared Hillman.
Because Preston pursued alternative defenses at trial, the
State needed the evidence of the 2018 incidents to prove that
Preston was both present at the scene of the incident and that he
committed the charged crimes with the requisite intent. See
generally Henderson, 318 Ga. at 757 (concluding that the
prosecutorial need for other-act evidence was significant where
the defendant argued that he “blacked out” during the charged
crimes, and, alternatively, that he was provoked by the victim,
because “the State needed evidence from which the jury could
infer that his acts were intentional rather than defensive or
committed while ‘blacked out’ or ‘in a trance’”); Rooks, 317 Ga. at
758 (concluding that the prosecutorial need for other-act evidence
was higher where the defendant’s defense to the charged crimes
was that he was merely present at the scene when someone else
shot and killed the victim). Further, there were conflicts in the
evidence that the State needed to overcome. Namely, Charlie
testified that Arnold was the person who robbed him, despite
telling investigators in pretrial interviews that it was Preston.
Given this conflict in the evidence and the alternative defenses

20 Charlie testified that Hillman had a concealed carry permit, and
investigators later found a concealed carry permit inside Hillman’s wallet.
Additionally, Arnold testified that he had seen Hillman with a gun prior to the
day of the incident, and Kimbrough testified that Hillman sometimes carried
a gun.

18
pursued by Preston through cross-examination at trial, the
probative value of the 2018 incidents was strengthened by the
State’s need for the evidence to prove intent. See generally
Henderson, 318 Ga. at 757; Rooks, 317 Ga. at 758.
Taking all of this into account—the similarities between
the 2018 incidents and the charged crimes, the close proximity
between them, and the prosecutorial need for this evidence—the
2018 incidents provided significant probative value. And,
although evidence that Preston had committed these prior
incidents was “prejudicial, the evidence was not a matter of scant
or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake
of its prejudicial effect.” Rooks, 317 Ga. at 759 (quotation marks
omitted). Further, “in a criminal trial, inculpatory evidence is
inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits
exclusion.” Henderson, 318 Ga. at 757 (quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, here, any prejudice was diminished by the trial court’s
limiting instruction, 21 which it gave to the jury prior to the

21 The limiting instruction included the following:

In order to prove its case in these counts that you’re hearing
about, the State must show intent. To do so, the State has -- is
going to offer evidence of other acts allegedly committed by the
accused. You’re permitted to consider that evidence only
insofar as it may relate to that issue and not for any other
purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that the
defendant is of a character that would commit such crimes. The
evidence may be considered only to the extent that it may show
the element that the State is required to prove in the crimes
charged in the case now on trial. Such evidence, if any, may not
be considered by you for any other purpose. The defendant is
on trial for the offenses charged in this bill of indictment only
and not for any other acts, even though such acts may

19
admission of any testimony related to the 2018 incidents and
again during the jury charge before deliberations. See id.
(concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that the probative value of other-acts evidence was not
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice, and noting that
“[t]his is particularly true given that the trial court instructed the
jury … that this evidence was to be considered only for the limited
purposes for which it was admitted”). Although this evidence was
prejudicial, Preston has not demonstrated that any unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that Preston has
failed to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of the 2018 incidents at trial. See Mitchell,
317 Ga. at 110 (holding that, where the defendant was charged
with malice murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and
other crimes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting other-act evidence of a prior armed robbery for the
purpose of showing intent).
3. Preston contends that the trial court erred by refusing
his request to charge the jury on justification and related

incidentally be criminal. Before you may consider any of the
alleged acts for the limited purpose stated, you must first
determine whether it is more likely than not the accused
committed the other alleged acts. If so, you must then
determine whether the act shed any light on the elements of
the offenses or issues for which the act was admitted in the
crimes charged in the indictment in this trial. Remember to
keep in mind the limited use and the prohibited use of this
evidence by other acts of the defendant. And, by giving this
instruction, the Court in no way suggests to you that the
defendant has or has not committed any other acts, nor
whether such acts, if committed, prove anything. This is solely
a matter for your consideration.

20
concepts, 22 arguing that a justification charge was warranted
because the evidence showed that Hillman was known to carry a
gun, was heard saying that he had a gun on the night of the
shooting, and was seen holding a gun after Preston shot him,
which “could have permitted a jury to determine that Preston shot
[Hillman] in self-defense.” Assuming without deciding that the
trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on justification,
this claim nevertheless fails because any such error was
harmless.
“Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to authorize
the giving of a jury charge is a question of law.” Gray v. State, 319
Ga. 72, 75 (2024) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). “To
authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight
evidence supporting the theory of the charge, but the failure to
give a requested charge which is authorized by the evidence can
be harmless error.” Rana v. State, 320 Ga. 66, 71 (2024) (quotation
marks omitted). “The test for determining whether a
nonconstitutional instructional error was harmless is whether it
is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”
Gray, 319 Ga. at 75 (quotation marks omitted). Here, we need not
decide if the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on
justification, as it is “highly probable” that any such instruction
“would not have changed the outcome of the trial.” Rana, 320 Ga.

22 In addressing Preston’s requested charges on justification during
the charge conference, the trial court stated that there was no evidence of an
aggressive act by Hillman and that Hillman’s possession of a gun, which he
had a permit for, was not a crime. The trial court also noted that a witness
heard Hillman say, “‘I’ve got a gun, too,’ which implie[d] that [Preston] had
already drawn his gun and was pointing it at [Hillman].” The trial court
further observed that the evidence included an eyewitness to the shooting,
Charlie, who “never said that [Hillman] was the one that pulled the gun on
[Preston].” The trial court thus declined to give Preston’s requested charges on
justification, and Preston’s counsel objected to the trial court’s ruling.

21
at 71 (quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the evidence presented against Preston was
strong. That evidence included Letonya’s testimony that Preston
had a gun on him when the group went to Charlie’s house on the
night of the shooting, and that she heard Preston say, “[G]ive me
what you got,” prior to hearing a gunshot. The evidence also
included Charlie’s testimony that “the shooter 23 came and shot
[Hillman] point-blank.” Additionally, Letonya testified that she
went to the back door after hearing the gunshot, where she saw
Preston holding a gun and heard Arnold ask Preston why he shot
Hillman. And Catlett testified that, after the shooting, he saw
Preston take Hillman’s gun, saw Charlie and Kimbrough “getting
on the ground” and pulling stuff out of their pockets, and heard
Preston tell them to “give him their stuff.” The evidence also
showed that, after the shooting, Letonya saw Preston holding “the
gun, a book bag, and another gun in his hand and some keys,” and
Preston told Catlett, “Better not snitch” and “Don’t say nothing.”
Further, in speaking to Letonya and Detective English after the
shooting, Arnold said that Preston shot Hillman. Finally, the
firearms examiner determined that a cartridge casing found
inside Stanley’s house, where Preston shot at Stanley’s dog, and
a cartridge casing found in Charlie’s house, where Hillman was
shot, were both fired from the same gun.
Given the strong evidence of Preston’s guilt, any evidence
supporting a jury charge on justification and related concepts—to
the extent that such evidence exists—was weak at best. As noted
above, Preston argues that the jury could have determined that
Preston shot Hillman in self-defense because the evidence showed
that Hillman was known to carry a gun and was heard saying

23 As noted above, Charlie testified that the shooter was the same
person he had seen in Stanley’s yard with Catlett earlier that afternoon.

22
that he had a gun prior to Preston shooting him. But there was
no evidence showing that Preston ever saw Hillman with a gun
prior to shooting him, that Hillman threatened Preston with a
gun, or that Preston believed he had to shoot Hillman to defend
himself. At most, the evidence showed that Catlett—who was
outside of the house and did not witness the shooting—heard
Hillman said, “I got a gun, too,” which, as the trial court noted,
“implie[d] that [Preston] had already drawn his gun and was
pointing it at [Hillman].” Additionally, although Charlie—the
only eyewitness to the shooting—testified that he saw Hillman
holding a gun after Hillman was shot, he said that he did not see
Hillman with a gun prior to this moment, and the evidence did
not show that Hillman reached for a gun prior to being shot by
Preston.
Therefore, it is highly probable that any error in failing to
give the requested instructions did not contribute to the verdict.
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 310 Ga. 886, 889–90 (2021) (holding it
was highly probable that the jury’s verdict was unaffected by any
error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on justification
because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was strong and any
evidence supporting the charge “was meager at best”); Calmer v.
State, 309 Ga. 368, 372–73 (2020) (assuming without deciding
that evidence that unidentified armed men (who turned out to be
law enforcement officers) bursting into the defendant’s home
provided the slight evidence necessary to support the requested
charge on self-defense, but holding that the trial court’s failure to
give that charge was harmless because “any weak inference that
[the defendant] acted” in self-defense was “wholly undercut by
other evidence to the contrary”). Accordingly, this enumeration
fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.

23