McCoy v. State

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In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0648
Kim McCoy
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Bartow County
No. SUCR2018002361

Decided: June 16, 2026

ELLINGTON, Justice.
Appellant Kim McCoy challenges her convictions for felony
murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting of her
ex-husband, James “Sam” McCoy. 1 McCoy’s sole claim of error is

1 The crimes occurred on February 21, 2018. A Bartow County grand
jury indicted McCoy on October 17, 2018, for felony murder (Count 1);
voluntary manslaughter (Count 2); aggravated assault (Count 3); possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, with said felony being the felony
murder indicted in Count 1 (Count 4); possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, with said felony being the voluntary manslaughter
indicted in Count 2 (Count 5); and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, with said felony being the aggravated assault indicted
in Count 3 (Count 6). At the conclusion of a jury trial that started on October
21, 2019, the jury found McCoy guilty of felony murder (Count 1) and not guilty
of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter; not guilty of voluntary
manslaughter (Count 2); guilty of aggravated assault (Count 3), but not guilty
of its lesser included offense, reckless conduct; guilty of two of the counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 4 and 6); and
not guilty of the third count of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (Count 5). On November 19, 2019, the trial court sentenced McCoy
that the trial court erred in denying her pre-trial immunity
motion. Because the record supports the trial court’s ruling, we
affirm.
Prior to trial, McCoy filed a motion for immunity from
prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2, arguing that she
responded in a reasonable manner to what she perceived to be a
real and imminent threat of her ex-husband committing a sexual
or physical assault upon her. The trial court held a hearing on the
motion, and McCoy testified to the following.
McCoy and Sam were together for almost 20 years. They
were married for ten years, from 2004 to 2014, were then divorced
for nine months, and were married again for about two and a half
years, from June 2015 until their divorce on January 31, 2018, 21
days before the shooting. They continued to live together after the
second divorce, but they had had discussions about Sam’s intent
to evict McCoy. A week before the shooting, Sam filed a demand
for possession saying that McCoy needed to remove herself from
the house or an action for eviction would be filed against her on
February 19, 2018, but McCoy had never seen that filing prior to
the immunity hearing. McCoy believed that she had “lifetime
rights” in Sam’s house and told him that she would not be leaving
because “it was our house,” and that, if he wanted her to leave, he

to life in prison for felony murder (Count 1) and merged the aggravated assault
charge (Count 3) into the felony murder charge. The court then imposed five
years in prison for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
conviction (Count 4), to be served consecutively to Count 1, and merged the
other possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony charge (Count
6) into the first possession of a firearm charge (Count 4).
McCoy timely filed a motion for new trial on November 21, 2019, which
she amended through new counsel on May 15, 2025. The trial court denied the
amended motion for new trial on August 27, 2025. McCoy filed a timely notice
of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the April 2026 term.

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would need to go through the court system to have her removed.
During their marriages, McCoy’s entire “life was home and
work,” as she would prepare Sam’s breakfast, leave for work,
return home from work to fix Sam’s lunch, and handle the house
chores every day. While at work at either a burger restaurant or
the local gas station, Sam required that she call to check in with
him every hour or two, and he instructed that, when she
interacted with male customers, she was to limit physical contact
while handing customers their change. In addition to controlling
her everyday actions, Sam also isolated McCoy. McCoy was “not
allowed to have any friends,” but had one person in her life whom
she considered a friend, Donna Weaver, the owner of the burger
restaurant, whom she met through Sam. Although McCoy had
her own vehicle, Sam would not let her visit her family in North
Carolina.
In the beginning of their relationship, there was no
physical abuse or sexual abuse. But in 2005 or 2006, when Sam
started to attend church and McCoy refused to go with him, the
physical abuse — including grabbing, pushing and shoving —
began. Sam was concerned about his image and the optics of
McCoy not attending church with him. The abuse eventually
escalated to Sam forcing McCoy to have sex, but McCoy believed
it was her “duty” to oblige. In the weeks before the shooting,
McCoy at times “refused” to have sex, and Sam would “force
himself on [her]” and caused bruising in her inner thighs. But
Sam often told McCoy that “a husband can’t rape a wife.” The
physical abuse happened once or twice a week. The last physical
abuse occurred about a week before Sam’s death, when Sam
pushed McCoy, and he made sexual advances in the two to three
days before his death. McCoy would retreat from the fights to her
bedroom, so Sam removed the locks from her bedroom door and

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“turned them around” to prevent her from locking him out. McCoy
never reported Sam’s physical abuse to police or to her friend
because she believed those things were private and she was
helping protect Sam’s good public image.
Two weeks after their second divorce was finalized, on
February 14, 2018, McCoy and Sam got into an argument because
Sam inquired about purchasing McCoy’s vehicle from her, which
McCoy refused. She ultimately called 911 that day because Sam
had taken her car and gone to church. A week later, McCoy was
sitting on her bed when Sam came to the doorway of her bedroom,
“yelling and screaming at [her],” about McCoy’s refusal to sell
Sam her car. As Sam began to enter the room, McCoy told him to
leave her alone, and when he refused to listen and continued to
approach, McCoy pulled out her gun from underneath her pillow
and set it on the bed next to her. Sam asked, “So, you’re going to
pull a gun on me?” and kept stepping forward. McCoy told Sam
that she was not going to argue and that Sam was not going to
put his hands on her that day, and Sam replied, “Yes, I will. I will
do what I want to when I want to, to whomever I want to. This is
my house.” McCoy interpreted this to mean that he was “going to
be physical,” and she “knew he was going to hurt [her],” but she
just did not “know how bad it was going to be.”
McCoy testified, “[T]he next thing I know he was laying on
my feet,” as she had shot Sam from a close distance. As Sam was
lying there, McCoy first called her brother and then called her
friend Weaver before calling 911. McCoy told the 911 operator
that she had just shot her ex-husband and that he was trying to
have her evicted following their divorce.
McCoy also testified that on the night of the shooting she
told an investigator the following. Prior to the shooting, Sam and
McCoy had not shared a bed in about a year but had been getting

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along well. After they divorced, Sam began telling her that she
would need to move out, and McCoy disagreed and told him she
would only leave if he had her removed. Sam had problems with
her refusal to go to church with him, her smoking, and her alcohol
consumption, and on the day of the shooting, she had consumed
one beer.
At the pretrial immunity hearing, McCoy presented one
other witness, Dr. Jamie Dickson, a licensed psychologist who
was qualified as an expert in the field of trauma and domestic
violence and who testified to the following. Dr. Dickson testified
that she interviewed and evaluated McCoy following Sam’s death
and that she administered three psychological tests to McCoy.
McCoy’s responses and performance showed that she experienced
problematic – but not clinically significant – levels of depression
and its associated symptoms and problems with “intrusive
ideation of past traumatic experiences” (i.e., reliving those
experiences), as well as clinically significant levels of
disassociation (i.e., “split[ting] off” one’s consciousness from the
traumatic event). Dr. Dickson explained that Battered Woman
Syndrome (“BWS”) is not a mental health disorder on its own but
that it does mirror the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”). BWS can result in disassociation, interpersonal
difficulties, difficulties in sexual function, difficulties with body
image, physical health complaints, changes in thinking and mood
– including cognitive confusion, attention difficulties, depression,
and feelings of hopelessness and helplessness. BWS also
manifests in learned helplessness, where an individual learns her
responses are ineffective and gives up fighting back or reduces
efforts to change her situation because she has learned that her
behaviors would not help change the situation.
Dr. Dickson also testified that there are three levels or

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stages in the cycle of violence identified with BWS. Level one is
the tension building phase, prior to a battery incident, when “the
battered woman feels the tension and is perhaps on guard
anticipating what might happen.” Level two is the actual
battering incident itself. And level three is either contrition
and/or lack of tension, where the abuser may apologize for his
behavior and promise not to do it again. Throughout their
interviews, McCoy told Dr. Dickson several things that were
indicative of these phases. Regarding the level one tension
building phase, McCoy said that she was always thinking about
what she could do to make things better to prevent Sam from
getting angry or violent, that she had sleeping difficulties and
feelings of depression or hypervigilance, but when Sam was in a
better mood, she felt at ease. McCoy also reported level two acute
battering phase incidents where Sam was pushing, pulling, and
grabbing her. And she described signs of the level three contrition
phase because she would explain how Sam could be a very loving
and good person.
Dr. Dickson further testified that there were other
important factors that she took into consideration in her analysis,
including that in McCoy’s first marriage prior to her marriages to
Sam, she experienced physical and sexual abuse by her husband,
yet did not leave the relationship until that husband put a gun in
her mouth; that she was physically abused by her mother and
sexually abused as a child; and that she was raised in a home
where she was taught to believe that the woman should be
obedient to her husband and that “once you’re married … you
have to stay married.” Dr. Dickson explained that many of those
factors are relevant in how learned helplessness may have
developed for McCoy. Dr. Dickson also highlighted that the abuse
in her relationship with Sam did not start immediately but,
rather, grew eventually out of Sam’s controlling or isolating

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behaviors. Based upon these factors and symptoms, Dr. Dickson
diagnosed McCoy with PTSD, which she said mirrors the criteria
under BWS.
On cross-examination, Dr. Dickson acknowledged that, in
addition to PTSD, McCoy was diagnosed with Major Depressive
Disorder and Unspecified Alcohol-Related Disorder. She also
acknowledged that changes in thinking and moods can be
associated with alcohol disorders and that alcohol use can impact
a person’s sleep and physical health. Further, Dr. Dickson
testified that she did not believe McCoy’s close friend Weaver was
aware of any physical abuse in McCoy’s relationship with Sam
but that Weaver reported that McCoy was basically “a functioning
alcoholic.” Further, although McCoy reported the sexual abuse
that she faced from her first husband and in her childhood to Dr.
Dickson, Dr. Dickson testified that McCoy never reported any
prior sexual abuse by Sam to her. Dr. Dickson further testified
that McCoy had told her that Sam had been mad for the entire
week leading up to the shooting because McCoy refused to sell
him her car and told him that he could not drive it to church. She
testified that McCoy reporting her car as stolen could be
characterized as an effort to fight back, which could conflict with
the learned helplessness component. Finally, Dr. Dickson
testified that, after McCoy recounted the details of the shooting
to Dr. Dickson, McCoy told Dr. Dickson: “That’s what I figured I
was going to do if he ever came at me again and wouldn’t stop. I
was going to stop him from getting to me. I didn’t mean to kill
him.” McCoy also made this statement during her own testimony.
After the evidence at the immunity hearing was presented,
the trial court opined that the testimony presented seemed more
like evidence at trial for the affirmative defense of self-defense as
opposed to grounds for a pretrial motion for immunity. The

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parties acknowledged that immunity is a pretrial decision that
needs to be made first even if some of the evidence presented
before trial could later be used as an affirmative defense at trial.
The court found that the evidence reflected an affirmative defense
of justification or of battered person’s syndrome that McCoy could
present at trial but that it did not carry her burden to “qualify”
for a grant of immunity based on the testimony presented at the
hearing, the language of OCGA § 16-3-24.2, and the requirement
that the defendant carry the burden by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The case proceeded to trial the following year. McCoy again
testified as she had at the pretrial immunity hearing that she shot
Sam because he was physically, sexually, and verbally abusive for
their entire marriage; that Sam was enraged on the day of the
shooting because McCoy would not sell him her car; and that he
had a “look in his eyes” that made her know he was about to beat
her and that the beating might end with “sexual connotations.”
On appeal, McCoy argues that the trial court erred in
denying her pretrial motion for immunity because, on the day of
the shooting, she was not engaged in any behaviors that may have
negated her claim of justification under OCGA § 16-3-21(b)(1) –
(3), 2 but, rather, she was acting in self-defense after Sam entered

2 OCGA § 16-3-21(b) provides:
A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances
specified in subsection (a) of this Code section if he:
(1) Initially provokes the use of force against himself with
the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily
harm upon the assailant;
(2) Is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after
the commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(3) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by

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her room, started the argument, was “acting aggressively” and
not leaving, insinuated that he would hurt her if he wanted
because it was his house, and had previously physically and
sexually abused her. We conclude that the trial court did not err
in denying the motion.
A person generally “is justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm ... if he or
she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent
death or great bodily injury to himself or herself or a third person
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” OCGA § 16-3-
21(a). With some exceptions not relevant here, “[a] person who
uses threats or force in accordance with OCGA § 16-3-21 … shall
be immune from criminal prosecution.” OCGA § 16-3-24.2. To
prevail on a motion for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, a
defendant must “establish [her] justification defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441,
444 (2013).
“As the trial court’s ruling on a motion for immunity under
OCGA § 16-3-24.2 must be based solely on the evidence presented
at the pretrial hearing on the motion,” our review of McCoy’s
argument is limited to that evidence as well. Ellison v. State, 313
Ga. 107, 108 (2022). “In reviewing the denial of a motion for
pretrial immunity, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling and accept the trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility determinations if there is any
evidence to support them.” Id. at 110. “And in the absence of
explicit factual and credibility findings by the trial court, we

agreement unless he withdraws from the encounter and
effectively communicates to such other person his intent to
do so and the other, notwithstanding, continues or
threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.

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presume implicit findings were made supporting the trial court’s
decision.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 430, 432–33 (2019). See also
State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 129 (2020) (“A trial court is free
to consider a defendant’s testimony when deciding a motion for
immunity from prosecution and to make credibility
determinations and factual findings based on all of the evidence
before it — findings that this Court will accept so long as they are
supported by any evidence.”).
In denying McCoy’s motion for immunity, the trial court
did not make explicit factual or credibility findings during its oral
ruling but did state that it weighed the testimony presented by
the parties and found that the testimony did not support the grant
of the motion. Here, reviewing the evidence from the pretrial
immunity hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, we determine that the trial court was authorized to find
that McCoy did not meet her burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that she was justified in using
deadly force under OCGA § 16-3-21. The only eyewitness
testimony that the defense presented about what transpired
between McCoy and Sam when Sam entered the bedroom was
McCoy’s own testimony. The defense also presented testimony
from Dr. Dickson regarding her interviews and assessments of
McCoy. But the evidence at the hearing supported conflicting
theories of potential explanations of McCoy’s conduct. Prior to the
shooting, McCoy was aware of Sam’s desire to have her move out
of their shared house following the second divorce. McCoy
testified that she still loved her ex-husband, that she did not want
a divorce, and that she did not want to leave their house. And
when McCoy called 911 following the shooting, she told the
operator that, after their divorce, Sam was trying to have her
evicted but that she refused. Further, Dr. Dickson also testified
that McCoy insinuated to her that McCoy had previously

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considered using deadly force against Sam when McCoy told Dr.
Dickson that she did “what [she] figured [she] was going to do if
he ever came at [her] again and wouldn’t stop.”
Here, as the trier of fact at the immunity hearing, the trial
court did not have to credit McCoy’s testimony about the events
leading up to the shooting. And although the trial court did not
explicitly state that it was not crediting McCoy’s testimony, the
court explained that the evidence did not qualify her for immunity
from prosecution but, rather, was more in line with an affirmative
defense that she could present at trial, and we presume, under
the circumstances here, that the court made implicit findings
supporting its ruling. See Davis, 306 Ga. at 432–33. At the
hearing, the defense presented evidence, and the State elicited
evidence in its cross-examination of the witnesses, and when
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the
evidence supported the trial court’s implicit decision not to credit
McCoy’s testimony and finding that she had not carried her
burden. See Ellison, 313 Ga. at 110. See also Hornbuckle v. State,
300 Ga. 750, 753 (2017) (holding that the trial court was
authorized to conclude that defendant’s actions were motivated
by aggression or anger rather than self-defense where physical
evidence, the defendant’s 911 statements, and defendant’s
testimony on cross examination provided conflicting explanations
for what happened). See also Benson v. State, __ Ga. __ (2026),
S26A0425, slip op. at 15-16 (May 19, 2026) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that critical portions
of defendant’s testimony were not credible, that defendant acted
out of anger rather than fear, and that he had not shown that he
was justified by a preponderance of the evidence).
On appeal, McCoy does not allege any legal error in the
denial of her immunity motion but, rather, restates what she

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alleged in her motion for pretrial immunity: that McCoy faced
abuse at the hands of her ex-husband and acted in self-defense of
what she anticipated he might do. But McCoy’s disagreement
with the trial court’s implicit fact-finding and credibility
determination does not persuade us that the trial court erred in
its conclusions. Instead, the court was authorized to reject
McCoy’s self-serving testimony, to implicitly conclude that a
reasonable person would not believe deadly force was necessary
here, and to find that, under the circumstances presented in this
case, McCoy could not establish her justification defense under
OCGA § 16-3-21 by a preponderance of the evidence so as to
entitle her to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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