Nicholas Sharron Edge v. State

FOURTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

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June 15, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A26A0134. EDGE v. THE STATE.

PADGETT, Judge.

After a jury trial, Nicholas Sharron Edge was convicted of sexual contact by an

employee or agent in the first degree and sexual battery against a child under 16 years

of age. Following the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment, Edge appeals his

sexual contact conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that there

was a fatal defect in his indictment. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and

reverse in part.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the

record shows that Edge was a track coach and paraprofessional at Willie J. Williams
Middle School in Colquitt County. M. B. was a 12-year-old student at the school and

was on the track team that Edge coached. On the bus ride back to school from a track

event on March 10, 2022, Edge sat next to M. B. M. B. testified that Edge touched

her “in-between [her] thighs” three times and it made her feel “extremely

uncomfortable.” Edge also asked M. B. why it was “hot down there” and asked her

whether it was “dead down there[.]”Three videos from inside the school bus that

showed Edge resting his hand between M. B.’s legs were played for the jury at trial.

A special agent with the GBI also testified about the bus videos. The GBI special

agent testified that the videos showed Edge sitting in an aisle seat next to M. B.,

rubbing M. B.’s leg, resting his hand in between M. B.’s legs, and placing his hand

underneath her thigh.

M. B. also testified that Edge had previously grabbed her buttocks while on a

practice field and alone with her. On another occasion, Edge invited M. B. to come

over to his house where they could do “grown up things” in his bed. The jury also

heard testimony from G. P., another girl on the track team. G. P. testified that when

she was 12 years old, Edge touched her leg, thigh, and waist and that it made her feel

uncomfortable. A forensic interviewer also testified that M. B. told her that Edge had

touched her buttocks.

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Edge was indicted for child molestation, sexual contact by an employee or

agent in the first degree, sexual battery against a child under 16, and criminal attempt

to commit a felony. After a trial, the jury found Edge guilty of sexual battery against

a child under 16, as a lesser included offense of child molestation, and guilty of sexual

contact by an employee or agent in the first degree. The jury acquitted Edge of the

independent charge of sexual battery against a child under 16, and on the charge of

criminal attempt to commit a felony. Edge then filed a motion in arrest of judgment,

arguing that: (1) the record was devoid of any evidence that he committed sexually

explicit conduct; and (2) the indictment misled the jury to believe that child

molestation was the act of sexually explicit conduct. The trial court denied the

motion, and sentenced Edge to five years on the sexual battery count and twenty

years on the sexual contact count, with the sentences to run concurrently, and with

the first five to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. This appeal

followed.

1. Edge first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction for sexual contact by an employee or agent in the first degree. We agree.

OCGA § 16-6-5.1(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, that

[a]n employee or agent commits the offense of improper sexual contact
by employee or agent in the first degree when such employee or agent
knowingly engages in sexually explicit conduct with another person

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whom such employee or agent knows or reasonably should have known
is contemporaneously:
(1) [e]nrolled as a student at a school of which he or she is an employee
or agent[.]

In turn, OCGA § 16-12-100(a)(4) defines “sexually explicit conduct” as “actual or

simulated: . . . (G) Physical contact in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or

gratification with any person’s unclothed genitals, pubic area, or buttocks or with a

female’s nude breasts.”

Here, Edge was charged with improper sexual contact by an employee or agent

in the first degree under OCGA § 16-6-5.1(b)(1). As we explained in State v.

Crumpton, 369 Ga. App. 403, 406–07(2) (893 SE2d 816) (2023), the phrase “ʻthe

offense of improper sexual contact’ is, as the wording clearly indicates, the name of

the offense itself — not a material element of the offense. This offense is then defined

in the statute by the actual material element of the offense: knowingly engaging in

ʻsexually explicit conduct’ with another.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

There was testimony that Edge cupped his hand and “grabbed [M. B.’s] butt”

at track practice. But there is no evidence in the record that Edge touched M. B.’s

unclothed buttocks necessary to meet the definition of sexually explicit conduct under

OCGA § 16-12-100(a)(4). The State contends that evidence of Edge having touched

M. B.’s thighs meets the definition of “pubic area” under OCGA § 16-12-100(a)(4).

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We reject the State’s argument on this point. The term “thigh” is a commonly and

widely accepted term used to describe the upper leg, and if the legislature intended

to include touching an unclothed thigh or upper leg within the definition of “sexually

explicit conduct,” it could have said so. But it did not.

The State also points to the testimony of the GBI special agent who

investigated the case. The GBI agent testified that although Edge told her that he

rubbed the back of M. B.’s leg, in the agent’s opinion, the bus video showed Edge

“not rubbing the back of her leg, it’s more in the upper area near the vaginal area.”

But, again, the State’s evidence is limited to evidence that Edge touched the upper

area of M. B.’s leg near her pubic area, while not actually touching the pubic area.

Finally, M. B. was clothed while on the bus, and OCGA § 16-12-100(a)(4)(G) requires

that the physical contact be with “any person’s unclothed genitals, pubic area, or

buttocks …” Thus, there is no evidence that Edge committed improper sexual

contact by an employee in the first degree as defined by the statute.

We note that under OCGA § 16-6-5.1(c), “[a] person commits the offense of

improper sexual contact by employee or agent in the second degree when such

employee or agent knowingly engages in sexual contact ...” (emphasis added). And

“sexual contact” is defined as “any contact involving the intimate parts of either

person for the purpose of sexual gratification of either person,” while “intimate

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parts” are defined as “the genital area, groin, inner thighs, buttocks, or breasts of a

person.” OCGA §§ 16-6-5.1(5) (intimate parts), (9) (sexual contact). Thus, while the

evidence that Edge touched M. B.’s inner and upper thigh may have sustained a

conviction for improper sexual contact by an employee or agent in the second degree,

the State did not charge Edge with that offense. In this case, our reversal of the

conviction for sexual contact by an employee or agent in the first degree due to

insufficient evidence raises a procedural double jeopardy bar for that particular crime

and the lesser-included offense of sexual contact by an employee or agent in the

second degree. See Prater v. State, 273 Ga. 477, 481–82(4) (545 SE2d 864) (2001).

2. Because we reverse Edge’s conviction for sexual contact by an employee or

agent in the first degree, we do not address Edge’s argument that his indictment for

that offense was void.

Accordingly, we reverse Edge’s conviction for sexual contact by an employee

or agent in the first degree. We affirm Edge’s conviction and sentence as to Count 1

as he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to that charge.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. McFadden, P. J., and Watkins, J.,

concur.

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