MCMULLIN v. THE STATE

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0723
DeQuivon Hykeim McMullin
v.
The State
On Appeal from the Superior Court of Spalding County
No. 22R368C
Decided: October 14, 2026
ELLINGTON, Justice.
DeQuivon McMullin, Isaac Reid, and Kinesa Harvey were
jointly tried for murder and other crimes in connection with the
shooting death of Wildarius Draggs, and McMullin was convicted
of 	felony 	murder. 1 	On 	appeal, 	McMullin 	contends 	that 	the
1 The crimes occurred on March 15, 2022. On June 8, 2022, a Spalding
County grand jury returned an indictment charging McMullin, Reid, Cameron
Barkley, and Harvey, individually and as parties to the crimes, with malice
murder (Count 1); felony murder (Counts 2 and 4); aggravated battery (Count
3); aggravated assault (Counts 5-6, for assaulting both Draggs and Rayshon
Goodrum); and violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act
(Counts 7-9). Barkley testified against his co-defendants at trial in the hope of
obtaining leniency from the State. At the conclusion of a jury trial that began
on September 18, 2023, the jury found McMullin guilty of felony murder
predicated on aggravated battery and aggravated battery (Counts 2 and 3) and
not guilty of the remaining counts. Reid was found not guilty of Count 8 but
guilty of the remaining counts, and we have affirmed his convictions. See Reid
v. State, 322 Ga. 858 (2025). Harvey was found not guilty on all counts. On
September 25, 2023, the trial court sentenced McMullin to life in prison with
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

2
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the
State failed to corroborate the testimony of Cameron Barkley, his
accomplice; that the evidence was insufficient because it was
entirely circumstantial and failed to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis save that of guilt; that the trial court improperly
commented on the evidence; and that the trial court committed
plain error in permitting the testimony of a GBI Special Agent.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. In Reid v. State, 322 Ga. 858, 859–61 (2025), in which we
affirmed the convictions of one of McMullin’s co-defendants, we
set forth the facts of this case as follows:
The 	evidence 	presented 	at 	trial 	included 	a
surveillance 	video 	from 	a 	local 	school 	building,
which showed that, at approximately 5:19 p.m. on
March 15, 2022, Rayshon Goodrum arrived at 1001
Lake Avenue in Griffin, Georgia, where Draggs lived
with 	his 	aunt, 	Monica 	Fambro. 	After 	Goodrum
arrived at Fambro’s house, he and Draggs sat on the
front porch of the home. Fambro’s home was located
on the corner of North 16th Street and Lake Avenue,
with the front porch facing Lake Avenue and one
side of the house facing North 16th Street, and the
neighborhood 	is 	part 	of 	“Lit 	Block,” 	an 	area
controlled by the Bloods Rollin’ 20s gang, also known
the possibility of parole for felony murder; the aggravated battery count was
merged for sentencing purposes. McMullin filed a timely motion for new trial
on October 13, 2023, which he amended with new appellate counsel on August
30 and October 7, 2024, and on March 17, 2025. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied the amended motion for new trial on July 17, 2025. McMullin filed
a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the April
2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

3
as the “Zoo Krew.”
The 	surveillance 	video 	showed 	that, 	at
approximately 5:29 p.m., about ten minutes after
Goodrum arrived at Fambro’s house, a white Ford
Fusion, which belonged to DeQuivon McMullin’s
mother, drove down North 16th Street toward its
intersection 	with 	Lake 	Avenue. 	With 	the 	front
passenger 	window 	down, 	the 	car 	“slow 	rolled”
through 	the 	intersection 	and 	“slowly 	passed”
Fambro’s house in front of the porch where Draggs
and Goodrum were sitting. The car was driven by
Kinesa Harvey, and Reid (Harvey’s brother) was in
the 	front 	passenger 	seat, 	while 	McMullin 	and
Cameron Barkley were in the rear passenger seat.
Barkley testified that he, Reid, and McMullin were
members of the Zoo Krew, but Harvey was not.
During the car ride, Reid showed a gold Glock 19
handgun to Barkley and McMullin. The surveillance
video shows that, at 5:44 p.m., the Ford Fusion was
again driving north on North 16th Street toward its
intersection with Lake Avenue, but stopped in front
of a house on North 16th Street that was several
houses before the intersection. Three people exited
the car at that house. Barkley testified that he, Reid,
and McMullin were the three who exited the car, and
a law enforcement official also identified the three
people from surveillance video as Reid, McMullin,
and Barkley. The house on North 16th Street was a
popular 	spot 	for 	neighborhood 	teenagers 	to 	buy
snacks after school and for gang members to gather.

4
A path ran from the backyard of the house on North
16th Street to 1010 Lake Avenue, which was down
the block and on the opposite side of the street from
Fambro's house. Reid, McMullin, and Barkley stood
on the front porch of the house on North 16th Street
for about a minute before moving to the side of the
house 	toward 	the 	path, 	at 	which 	point 	they
disappeared 	from 	the 	video camera’s 	view
toward the backyard. Barkley testified that once
they were on the path behind the house, Reid offered
the gun to both Barkley and McMullin. When both
refused to take it, Reid continued down the path
alone, 	and 	Barkley 	saw 	Reid 	fire 	shots 	toward
Draggs and Goodrum from 1010 Lake Avenue. Reid
was gone about thirty seconds, and the group ran
after the shooting. At 5:53 p.m., Reid, McMullin, and
Barkley reappeared on camera at the house on
North 16th Street and then walked away together,
heading south on North 16th Street away from Lake
Avenue. 	The 	surveillance 	camera 	at 	the 	school
building did not capture any part of the shooting.
Barkley 	testified 	that 	he, 	Reid, 	and 	McMullin
thought that there was an “opp,” a member of an
opposing gang, on the porch of the house and that
was the reason Reid fired shots at the porch. Law
enforcement officials found six shell casings along
the side of the house at 1010 Lake Avenue, but
because no handgun was ever located, the casings
were not sent for any kind of forensic testing. The
State, 	however, 	did 	introduce 	into 	evidence 	a

5
photograph of members of the Zoo Krew holding a
gold gun, and Barkley testified that members of the
gang shared guns and that the gold gun in the
photograph was the gun that Reid had on the day of
the crimes.
At 5:50 p.m., shortly before the shooting, Fambro
arrived home from work. She walked by Draggs and
Goodrum on the porch, “came in the house, went
towards the kitchen, and then ... just heard six
shots”; Draggs and Goodrum then ran inside. Draggs
stated “I’ve been hit,” and Goodrum hid in Fambro’s
pantry. Fambro called 911 at 5:54 p.m. and police
officers began arriving on the scene a few minutes
later. Draggs told the first officer who arrived that
he had been shot by a stray bullet and did not see
who 	shot 	him. 	Draggs 	later 	died 	from 	a 	single
gunshot wound that penetrated both of his lungs
and his heart.
A law enforcement officer testified that he thought
that the shooting occurred at 5:52 p.m., as, according
to his review of the surveillance footage, a bird,
which had not reacted to cars driving by Fambro’s
house, flew away from her house at that time.
However, 	when 	asked 	on 	cross 	whether 	it 	was
possible that the bird just decided that it was going
to fly away at that time and that the shooting
occurred after the bird flew away, the officer said
that was “plausible.”
In an interview with law enforcement officials on the
day 	of 	the 	crimes, 	Reid 	admitted 	that 	he 	was

6
dropped off at the house on North 16th Street on the
day of the crimes. He also said that he heard the
gunshots 	and 	thought 	that 	someone 	might 	be
shooting at him. The evidence at trial also showed
that on March 17, Reid sent Harvey a screen shot of
a newspaper article about the shooting of Draggs.
The State’s gang expert testified that he knew that
Goodrum lived in an area of Griffin known to be
“Crip territory” and that he saw Goodrum there
“constantly.” He could not, however, “say that he is
a Crip.” The expert was not familiar with Draggs
and did not know whether he had any kind of gang
affiliation. The expert explained that the Zoo Krew
referred to a member of a rival gang as an “opp, short
for opposition.” Under Zoo Krew rules, “no Crips
[are] allowed on their turf,” and if a Zoo Krew
member 	saw 	a 	Crip 	in 	his 	territory, 	the
member “would have to act upon that.” Moreover, a
Zoo Krew member could gain respect and rank in the
gang by committing acts of violence against rival
gang members. Further, failure to assault a rival
gang member found in Zoo Krew territory could
result in discipline from gang leadership. The expert
added 	that 	based 	on 	his 	investigation 	of 	Reid,
McMullin, and Barkley, including the language and
hand signs they used in social media posts and the
clothes they wore, they were members of the Zoo
Krew.
In 	addition 	to 	the 	foregoing 	evidence, 	Lakeisha 	McMullin,
McMullin’s mother, testified that McMullin lived with her at the
time of the crimes and that she lived close to North 16th Street.

7
When asked by the prosecutor whether she had told a law
enforcement officer that she had dropped McMullin, Reid, and
Barkley off near the house on North 16th Street on the day of the
crimes, Lakeisha said that she could not remember. On cross-
examination by McMullin, Lakeisha testified that she got home
from work around 5:15 p.m. to 5:25 p.m. on the day of the crimes
and that McMullin was home when she arrived. She added that
he took a shower around 5:25 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. and then lay down
in his room. She looked at her Facebook account around 5:55 p.m.
and saw a posting that there had been a shooting on 16th Street.
She testified that McMullin was home at that time.
Vickie 	Harvey, 	McMullin’s 	grandmother, 	lived 	with
Lakeisha and McMullin. She testified on direct examination by
the prosecutor that she got home that day around 3:30 to 4:00
p.m. and that McMullin was there, talking on the phone. She
heard Lakeisha come home around 5:15 p.m. Vickie dozed off and
later heard Reid arrive at the house to see McMullin. When asked
if she remembered telling the prosecutor before trial that Reid,
McMullin, and Kinesa Harvey left her house in a Ford Fusion
around 5:00 p.m., Vickie denied doing so. On cross-examination
by McMullin, Vickie reiterated that Lakeisha got home from work
that day around 5:15 to 5:20 p.m. and that McMullin was home
at that time. Once Lakeisha got home, McMullin took a shower
and lay down. Vickie testified that McMullin got up when Reid
came over to the house and that it had to be around 6:00 to 7:00
p.m. by that time.
An assistant district attorney, who was present when the
lead prosecutor spoke with Vickie about her testimony a few days
before trial, testified that Vickie told them that McMullin, Reid,
and Kinesa Harvey left the house in the Ford Fusion around 5:00
p.m. and that Kinesa was driving the vehicle.

8
In a statement to investigators on the night of the crimes,
McMullin admitted that he had been to the house on North 16th
Street that day.
2. McMullin contends that the testimony of Barkley, an
accomplice, was not sufficiently corroborated, as required by
OCGA § 24-14-8. We disagree.
Under OCGA § 24-14-8, the testimony of an accomplice is
not sufficient to establish a fact in felony cases, unless the
accomplice’s 	testimony 	is 	corroborated 	“by 	other 	evidence
implicating the defendant.” McGarity v. State, 308 Ga. 417, 420
(2020). Corroborating 	evidence 	“must 	be independent 	of 	the
accomplice’s testimony and must directly connect the defendant
to the crime or lead to the inference of guilt.” Reid, 322 Ga. at 863
(cleaned up). “The corroborating evidence need only be slight and
can be entirely circumstantial,” “need not be of itself sufficient to
warrant a conviction of the crime charged,” and need not “match
the testimony of the accomplice in every detail.” Bowdery v. State,
321 Ga. 890, 896 (2025) (cleaned up).
Here, 	there 	was 	evidence 	from 	a 	number 	of 	sources
providing at least slight corroborating evidence of Barkley’s
testimony identifying McMullin as a participant in the crimes. To
begin, surveillance video showed that, at approximately 5:29
p.m., a Ford Fusion drove slowly in front of the porch on which
the victims were sitting, and that, at approximately 5:44 p.m., the
car stopped in front of the house on North 16th Street. In addition,
Reid, 	McMullin, 	and 	Barkley 	were 	identified 	from 	the
surveillance footage as the three people who were dropped off
from the Ford Fusion at the house on North 16th Street a few
minutes 	before 	the 	shooting. 	That 	same 	surveillance 	video
showed that, after being dropped off, the three then walked
behind the house, where there was a path that led to the location

9
from which the shots were fired, and that they reemerged by the
house on North 16th Street shortly after the shooting. Moreover,
photographic evidence showed that members of the Zoo Krew had
a gold gun, and the State’s “gang expert testified, independently
of Barkley, that Reid, Barkley, and McMullin were members of
the Zoo Krew and that the gang encouraged retaliation against
members of other gangs who were in its territory.” Reid, 322 Ga.
at 864. Additionally, McMullin’s grandmother told the prosecutor
that McMullin, Reid, and Harvey left McMullin’s house around
5:00 p.m. in the Ford Fusion on the day of the crimes, with Kinesa
driving the vehicle. Considered together, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to corroborate Barkley’s testimony and
thus satisfied the requirements of OCGA § 24-14-8. See Reid, 322
Ga. 	at 	864 	(concluding 	that 	the 	evidence 	was 	sufficient 	to
corroborate Barkley’s testimony in Reid’s appeal based on most of
these 	same 	considerations); 	Bowdery, 	321 	Ga. 	at 	896–97
(concluding 	that 	an 	accomplice’s 	testimony 	was 	sufficiently
corroborated by, among other things, evidence that the defendant
and his accomplice were in the same gang and that there was a
gang-related motive for the shooting); Washington v. State, 320
Ga. 839, 845 (2025) (concluding that surveillance video that
showed the movements of the defendant to which the accomplice
had 	testified 	adequately 	corroborated 	the 	accomplice’s
testimony).
3. McMullin contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support 	his 	convictions 	under 	OCGA 	§ 	24-14-6. 	Under 	that
statute, “a conviction that rests only on circumstantial evidence
cannot stand unless the evidence ‘excludes every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.’” Lee v. State, 322
Ga. 44, 56 (2025) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6; punctuation omitted).
“But if there is any direct evidence presented by the State, the
circumstantial evidence statute does not apply in a sufficiency

10
analysis.” Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 492 (2024) (quotation
marks 	omitted). 	Here, 	the 	evidence 	was 	not 	entirely
circumstantial, 	as 	Barkley’s 	eyewitness 	testimony 	about
McMullin’s participation in the crimes was direct evidence of
guilt. See Rouse v. State, 322 Ga. 328, 334 (2025) (holding that
the testimony of an eyewitness whom we assumed to be an
accomplice constituted direct evidence of guilt, making OCGA §
24-14-6 inapplicable); Pindling v. State, 321 Ga. 231, 239 (2025)
(holding that the defendant’s conviction was not based entirely on
circumstantial 	evidence, 	as 	the 	eyewitness 	testimony 	of 	an
accomplice constituted direct evidence of guilt); Bradley v. State,
318 Ga. 142, 144 (2024) (“Eyewitness testimony based on the
witness’s 	firsthand 	observations 	of 	the 	crime 	is 	direct, 	not
circumstantial, evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)). Because
there was direct evidence of McMullin’s guilt, his argument under
OCGA § 24-14-6 fails.
4. 	McMullin 	contends 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	improperly
commented on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1)
(“It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case,
to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether
a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the
accused.”). McMullin, however, has not shown that the trial court
improperly commented on the evidence.
During Reid’s cross-examination of Barkley, Reid asked
Barkley 	if 	he 	had 	told 	the 	District 	Attorney 	in 	a 	pre-trial
interview that Reid showed him “a gun in the car.” Barkley said
that he had. Reid then asked whether Barkley had testified on
direct examination that Reid had showed him the gun “on the
path.” Barkley answered that he had not. Reid’s counsel then
said, “You just testified to that not 20 minutes ago.” The trial
court asked Barkley whether Reid had “show[ed] [him] the gun in

11
the car.” Barkley answered, yes. The trial court then asked, “And
did he show you the gun on the path?” Barkley answered that he
had. Speaking to Reid’s counsel, the court said, “I think he just
explained that he saw the gun in the car and on the path.”
McMullin did not make any objection to the court’s statement, but
he now argues that it was an improper comment on the evidence.
Because McMullin did not raise this claim below, we review
it only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-57(b) (“[F]ailure to make
a timely objection to an alleged violation of [OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1)]
shall preclude appellate review, unless such violation constitutes
plain error which affects substantive rights of the parties.”). To
show plain error, McMullin must demonstrate that the alleged
error 	“was 	not 	affirmatively 	waived, 	was 	clear 	and 	obvious
beyond reasonable dispute, affected his substantial rights, and
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Tedder v. State, 320 Ga. 29, 38 (2024)
(quotation marks omitted).
Here, McMullin has failed to carry his burden to show plain
error. It is not clear and obvious that the trial court’s statement
violated OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1), as the trial court merely repeated,
without elaboration, Barkley’s testimony that Reid showed him
the gun in the car and on the path. In repeating that testimony,
the trial court did not obviously express an opinion about whether
a fact at issue had or had not been proved. The court thus did not
plainly err in making the comment. See Weems v. State, 318 Ga.
98, 105 (2024) (holding that a trial court’s “statement did not
obviously violate OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1) because the trial court did
not appear to express or intimate an opinion about the evidence
or whether a fact at issue was proven,” but “[i]nstead, … simply
repeated the witness’s testimony nearly verbatim”).
5. McMullin contends that the trial court committed plain

12
error when it qualified a GBI agent as an expert on criminal street
gangs and when it failed to exclude certain parts of the agent’s
testimony on the ground it was speculative or irrelevant or on the
ground that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its
probative value. We conclude that McMullin has failed to show
plain error.
At trial, Special Agent Colt Tolen of the GBI testified that
he was assigned to the GBI Gang Task Force. He added that he
had been a gang investigator since 2015, had taken 295 hours of
training about criminal street gangs, and had become certified to
instruct other law enforcement officers regarding criminal street
gangs. Agent Tolen testified that he had investigated over 200
gang members and that his job consists of “investigating criminal
street gangs,” interviewing gang members “on a constant basis,
reviewing social media records, cell phone extractions, and just
steadily staying on top of criminal street gangs and ongoing
trends.” 	He added that the cell phones of gang members often
contain valuable information about gang rules and clothing and
that he had been qualified as an expert 11 times in cases involving
criminal street gangs. Finally, Agent Tolen added that he was
familiar with the history of the Zoo Krew and its leadership and
had read its “Book of Knowledge,” which sets forth the gang’s
rules. The trial court qualified Agent Tolen as an expert on
criminal street gangs, and McMullin did not object. Similarly,
when Agent Tolen testified about social media messages sent
between McMullin and Reid and others, McMullin voiced no
objection.
Because McMullin did not object to Agent Tolen’s expert
qualifications or testimony at trial, we review his claims only for
plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d). McMullin first complains
that the trial court clearly erred in qualifying Agent Tolen as an

13
expert on criminal street gangs, arguing that the State failed to
lay the foundation for his testimony pursuant to OCGA § 24-7-
702(b) (setting forth the standards that govern the admissibility
of expert testimony). But McMullin does nothing more than cite
the statute; he does not cite any record evidence relating to Agent
Tolen’s gang expertise, cite to any case law, or make any legal
argument as to why the record evidence demonstrates that the
State failed to lay a proper foundation for Agent Tolen’s testimony
under OCGA § 24-7-702(b). Thus, McMullin has not carried his
burden to show that the trial court obviously erred in failing to
exclude 	Agent 	Tolen’s 	testimony 	under 	§ 	24-7-702(b). 	See
Mansfield v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A1122, slip op. at 8-9
(Ga. Aug. 13, 2026) (holding that the appellant failed to carry his
burden to show plain error by failing to identify specific evidence
that should not have been admitted under a rule of evidence and
by failing to provide meaningful argument); Calhoun v. State, 324
Ga. 683, 693 (2026) (holding that where the appellant failed to
cite to any record evidence or make meaningful legal argument,
he failed to carry his burden to show error, explaining that, “as a
general matter, a legal argument in support of a claim of error on
appeal involves the presentation of reasoning based on the law
and the specific facts of the case aimed at persuading a court that
the claim of error has merit” (cleaned up)).
McMullin also claims that the trial court plainly erred by
failing to exclude Agent Tolen’s testimony for various reasons. He
contends that some of the messages were exchanged weeks before
the shooting and thus lacked probative value as to the shooting;
that much of Agent Tolen’s interpretation of the gang lingo in the
messages was “speculative”; and that some of the messages were
not relevant because it was not clear whom McMullin was talking
to. He also argues that Agent Tolen’s testimony was prejudicial
because 	the 	trial 	court 	relied 	on 	it 	in 	finding 	that 	all 	the

14
defendants shared a common intent to shoot Goodrum for gang-
related purposes. But McMullin does not cite any authority to
support that Agent Tolen’s testimony should have been excluded
for any of the reasons he claims. To show clear and obvious error
on 	plain-error 	review, 	the 	appellant 	“must 	identify 	on-point
controlling authority or the unequivocally clear words of a statute
or rule that plainly establishes that the trial court erred.” Adams
v. State, 322 Ga. 155, 162 (2025) (quotation marks omitted).
McMullin has not cited any authority at all, let alone authority
that “plainly establishes that the trial court erred,” id., so he has
not carried his burden to show clear and obvious error. See
Sanders v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0682, slip op. at 11 (Ga.
Aug. 13, 2026) (holding that because the defendant failed “to
identify on-point controlling authority” 	that plainly established
that the trial court erred, he failed to carry his burden to show
plain error (quotation marks omitted)); Kerns v. State, 323 Ga.
510, 523 (2026) (holding that the defendant’s claim of plain error
failed 	because 	he 	identified 	no 	controlling 	authority 	that
established that the trial court plainly erred). So this claim of
plain error fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.