USA v. Hoover et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
United States of America v. Terrick Louis Hoover
Case No. 3:08-cr-00123-TMB-SAO
By: 	THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. BURGESS
PROCEEDINGS: 	ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
The matter comes before the Court on the Final Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of the
United States Magistrate Judge, which recommends the Court grant Defendant Terrick Louis
Hoover’s Motion to Dismiss Petition to Revoke Supervised Release (the “Motion”).1 The United
States filed an objection to the R&R.2 After a de novo determination of the R&R,3 and for the
reasons discussed below, the Court ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS the R&R at Docket 355 WITH
MODIFICATION.
A. Motion to Dismiss
On August 27, 2009, Hoover pleaded guilty to two counts: (1) Drug Trafficking Conspiracy4 and
(2) Felon in Possession of a Firearm.5 Hoover was sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment with
five years of supervised release.6 On March 16, 2022, United States Probation and Pretrial Services
(“USPO”) filed a Petition to Revoke Supervised Release (the “Petition”) for Hoover, alleging two
violations of his supervised release conditions based on state charges of Driving Under the
Influence.7 After Hoover’s initial appearance on the Petition on March 31, 2022, the Court
requested periodic status reports.8 The parties have since filed two status reports, both indicating
that Hoover has not committed any further violations.9 On November 3, 2022, Hoover pleaded
1 Dkt. 350 (Motion); Dkt. 355 (R&R).
2 Dkt. 356 (Government Objection).
3 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“Within fourteen days after being served with a copy [of the magistrate
judge’s R&R], any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and
recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”).
4 21 U.S.C. § 846, (b)(1)(B).
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2); Dkt. 123 (Plea Agreement); Dkt. 133 (Minute Entry); Dkt.
134 (Judgment).
6 Dkt. 134.
7 Dkt. 322 (Petition); Alaska State Superior Court Case 3AN-22-01890CR.
8 Dkt. 337 (Minute Entry).
9 Dkt. 345 (Status Report); Dkt. 348 (Status Report).
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guilty to the underlying state charges and was sentenced to 25 days’ incarceration and a $3,000
fine.10
Hoover moves to dismiss the Petition based on his seven months of compliance with supervised
release.11 Since March 31, 2022, Hoover “has complied with Soberlink and provided all negative
breath tests.”12 In addition, “[h]e has completed an outpatient treatment program and remained
employed.”13 Hoover notes that he has 18 months remaining on supervised release, with his term
set to expire on May 26, 2024.14 Hoover also contends that the Court is “not required to revoke
supervision on a grade C violation” and because USPO is “recommending a dismissal of the
[Petition] . . . the Court should defer to [USPO’s] wisdom on how best to supervise [Hoover].”15
USPO recommends the Court dismiss the Petition based on Hoover’s encouraging conduct since
the March 2022 violations.16 If the case were to go to final disposition, USPO is not seeking
additional terms of imprisonment or conditions of supervised release, or even an extension of
supervision.17
The United States (“the Government”) opposes the Motion.18 The Government initially took the
position that USPO did not need the “United States Attorney’s Office’s permission to dismiss the
petition,” but argued that Court should not dismiss the Petition due to Hoover’s “extensive history
of failing to follow court-imposed conditions.”19 However, citing the unpublished Ninth Circuit
case United States v. Chavez-Tello,20 the Government contends in a supplemental filing that the
Court may not dismiss the Petition because “the District Court does not have the legal authority to
dismiss a petition absent a violation of the defendant’s due process rights.”21
B. Final Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court grant the Motion and dismiss the Petition at Docket
322, determining that: (1) “the District Judge has the authority to grant dismissal of the Petition to
Revoke Supervision as requested in the defense[’s] motion”; and (2) dismissal is appropriate
because Hoover “has made significant strides in his treatment and personal conduct.”22
10 Dkt. 350 at 2 (Hoover’s remand date was set for January 3, 2023).
11 Dkt. 350.
12 Id. at 1.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 2.
15 Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3).
16 Dkt. 354 (Minute Entry); see also Dkt. 355 at 2.
17 Dkt. 355 at 2.
18 Dkt. 351 (Opposition); Dkt. 353 (Supplemental Authority).
19 Dkt. 351 at 1.
20 United States v. Chavez-Tello, 510 F.App’x 506, 507 (9th Cir. 2013).
21 Dkt. 353 at 1.
22 See generally Dkt. 355.
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First, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Chavez-Tello is inapplicable because its procedural facts
are distinct from Hoover’s circumstances. The R&R finds that “the defense’s motion to dismiss in
Chavez-Tello appears to have been raised after adjudication of the allegations and conclusion of
the revocation proceedings.”23 Explaining that the “procedural posture of [Hoover’s] case is
significant considering application of the rules outlined in 18 USC § 3583 and FRCP 32.1,” the
Magistrate Judge concludes that “the District Court has the authority to dismiss . . . a [revocation]
petition prior to court having entered findings on the petition.”24
Second, the Magistrate Judge finds that, although Hoover “has previously violated his release
conditions and has a serious criminal history, he has made significant strides in his treatment and
personal conduct.”25 Further, the continuation of Hoover’s supervision over the next eighteen
months provides sufficient time to address the issues raised in the Petition.26 For these reasons, the
Magistrate Judge recommends the Petition be dismissed without prejudice.27
C. Objections
The Government objects to the R&R on the basis that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding a
material distinction between the procedural facts of Chavez-Tello and those in this case.28 The
Government argues that “Chavez-Tello was in the exact same procedural posture as Hoover. That
is, he attempted to have his petition dismissed before he entered admissions.”29 The Government
argues that because there is no “material and compelling difference” between the two cases, the
Court should deny the Motion and set the case for disposition.30
D. Discussion
Having conducted a de novo review of the R&R, the Government’s objection, and relevant
portions of the record, the Court concludes that it would be inappropriate to deny the Motion. As
a result, the Court ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS the R&R WITH MODIFICATION, on three
bases: (1) Chavez-Tello is not binding; (2) USPO recommends dismissal of the Petition; and (3)
the compelling interests of judicial economy.
First, because Chavez-Tello is an unpublished disposition, it is not precedent that the Court must
follow.31 Second, Chavez-Tello filed a motion to dismiss based on amendments to the United
23 Dkt. 355 at 3; Chavez-Tello, 510 F.App’x at 508 (“Moreover, the district court already had the
statutory authority to remedy any injustice by declining to revoke his supervised release term after
weighing the statutory factors. See § 3583(e).”
24 Dkt. 355 at 3.
25 Id.
26 Dkt. 355 at 3–4.
27 Dkt. 356.
28 Id. at 2.
29 Dkt. 356 (citing United States v. Chavez-Tello, 3:10-CR-2463 S.D. Cal., Docket Numbers 37,
43, 44, and 46).
30 Id. at 2.
31 See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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States Sentencing Guideline § 5D1.1(c), which the district court denied because these amendments
“were not retroactive and . . . Chavez-Tello was sentenced before they took effect.”32 As such, the
district court “found that it had no authority to dismiss the proceedings.”33
The Ninth Circuit held that the “district court correctly determined that it did not have legal
authority to dismiss the revocation proceedings under these circumstances.”34 First, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) did not “give the [district] court the discretionary
authority to simply dismiss revocation proceedings at any time as Chavez-Tello urges.”35 Second,
the court held that a “district court’s inherent powers to dismiss a prosecution are typically limited
to situations where a defendant’s rights have been violated or where the integrity of judicial
proceedings has otherwise been compromised,” which was not the case as “Chavez-Tello [had]
not alleged any prosecutorial misconduct or other violations of his rights.”36
Under these principles, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “the district court already had the
statutory authority to remedy any injustice by declining to revoke [a defendant’s] supervised
release term after weighing the applicable statutory factors.”37 “Given the availability of this
‘lesser remedial action . . . the district court lacked the authority to dismiss revocation proceedings
pursuant to its supervisory powers under these circumstances.”38
As a threshold matter, the Court agrees with the Government that Chavez-Tello and Hoover appear
to share a similar procedural posture; both defendants sought to dismiss their petitions to revoke
supervised release after their initial appearances but before a disposition hearing.39 Nevertheless,
this procedural similarity does not foreclose the Court’s ability to distinguish Chavez-Tello’s case
from Hoover’s.
For example, Chavez-Tello unilaterally moved for dismissal, which the district court denied
because his motion lacked legal justification; the Chavez-Tello record does not reflect that USPO
supported Chavez-Tello’s motion to dismiss. In contrast, Hoover moves to dismiss the Petition
with USPO’s full support and based upon his compliance with his release terms.40 USPO’s
recommendation 	that 	the 	Court 	dismiss 	the 	Petition, 	corroborating 	Hoover’s 	position,
distinguishes this case from the circumstances in Chavez-Tello.
32 Chavez-Tello, 510 F.App’x at 507.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
35 Id.
36 Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 4 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A court may dismiss an
indictment under its supervisory powers only when the defendant suffers substantial prejudice and
where no lesser remedial action is available.”)).
37 Id. at 508.
38 Id.
39 E.g., Dkt. 356 (citing United States v. Chavez-Tello, 3:10-CR-2463 S.D. Cal., Docket No. 37,
43, 44, and 46).
40 E.g., Dkt. 350 at 2; Dkt. 354; see also Dkt. 355 at 2.
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Third, the interests of judicial economy would be best served by granting the Motion. After
reviewing the relevant briefing and the record, the Court concludes that Hoover’s supervised
release should not be revoked or altered at this time. Because Hoover has complied with his
supervised release conditions since March 2022 and USPO also recommends the Petition’s
dismissal, the Court declines the Government’s suggestion that it must deny the Motion only to
later leave Hoover’s supervised release terms unaltered at a future disposition hearing. The Court
therefore ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the R&R WITH MODIFICATION in accordance with the
rationale set forth in this Order.
E. Conclusion
The Court concludes that the Government’s objection does not merit rejection of the R&R and
ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the R&R WITH MODIFICATION in accordance with this Order’s
foregoing reasoning. Consequently, the Motion at Docket 350 is GRANTED.
Entered at the direction of the Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, United States District Judge.
DATE: January 13, 2023.
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