USA v. Holloway et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
United States of America v. Lamont Moore
Case No. 3:15-cr-00101-TMB-2
By: 	THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. BURGESS
PROCEEDINGS: 	ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
The matter 	comes 	before the Court 	on 	Defendant 	Lamont 	Moore’s 	pro 	se Motion 	for
Compassionate Release at Docket 893 and subsequent Motion for Compassionate Release at
Docket 903 (together, the “Motion”). Moore asks for compassionate release on the basis that he is
the only available caregiver for his terminally ill wife.1 The U.S. Probation Officer (“USPO”)
recommends against a sentence reduction but finds that Moore’s release plan is appropriate in the
event he is released.2 The Government opposes the Motion.3 For the reasons discussed below, the
Motion is GRANTED.
A. Background
On November 18, 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Moore for a drug conspiracy, among other
charges.4 Moore subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled
Substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B).5 On December 19,
2016, the Court sentenced Moore to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of
supervised release.6 During his federal case, the State of Alaska simultaneously prosecuted Moore
for First Degree Assault.7 Moore pleaded guilty to the state assault charge and, on January 4, 2017,
was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.8 On December 3, 2019, the Court issued an Amended
Judgment clarifying that Moore’s federal sentence would run concurrently with his state sentence.9
On February 26, 2019, after serving approximately five years of his state sentence, Moore was
paroled by the State of Alaska.10 Moore states his early release was due to his extraordinary work
1 Dkts. 893; 903 (Motions). Moore also filed a Reply, which the Court accepted. Dkts. 916 (Reply);
918 (Text Order).
2 Dkts. 898 (USPO Memorandum); 921 at 3 (Amended USPO Memorandum) (stating “defendant’s
release plan appears appropriate”).
3 Dkt. 914 (Response).
4 Dkt. 2 (Indictment).
5 Dkts. 326 (Plea Agreement); 383 (Change of Plea Minute Entry).
6 Dkts. 531 (Sentencing Minute Entry); 538 (Judgment).
7 State of Alaska v. Lamont Moore, Case No. 3AN-15-04428CR (filed on May 19, 2015).
8 Dkt. 753 at 1 (Order Granting Motion to Alter Judgment).
9 Dkt. 757 at 2 (Amended Judgment); see also Dkt. 753 at 3.
10 Dkt. 914-3 at 2 (Sentence Monitoring Computation Data).
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in prison and with other prisoners.11 Moore was moved to federal custody and is currently serving
the remainder of his federal sentence at Federal Correctional Institution Sheridan (“FCI
Sheridan”).12 Moore is scheduled to be released on June 26, 2025.13
B. Motion for Compassionate Release
Moore seeks compassionate release on the basis that his wife of over 15 years, Allison Moore, is
dying with no one to care for her.14 Moore asserts that his wife suffers from acute alcoholic
cirrhosis, among other illnesses.15 She “needs a liver transplant,” but doctors predict her liver “will
almost certainly fail before the six-month period passes that is required to determine if she is even
eligible for a transplant.”16 Thus, Moore says, Allison may well have less than six months to live.17
In the meantime, she is in significant pain, is unable to take pain medication because of her liver,
and is unable to care for herself.18 And while she has a nurse “who comes by a couple of times a
week,” Allison needs more frequent care.19 Allison’s mother was assisting with her care but was
forced to leave Alaska “to return to her job.”20 Likewise, Moore’s children are unable to care for
their mother, leaving Moore as his wife’s only potential caregiver.21 Moore implores the Court to
allow him to fill that role. He states that his “wife has stood by [him] thru [sic] all [his] ups and
downs of life” and he would like “the chance to do the same for her.”22 Upon release, Moore plans
to live with his wife.23
The Government opposes the Motion, arguing primarily that (1) Moore failed to exhaust his
administrative 	remedies 	because 	he 	requested 	home 	confinement 	from 	the 	Warden, 	not
compassionate release; 24 (2) Moore “has not alleged that he is the only available caregiver” for
his wife as he “admits” that she has a nurse who comes by a “‘couple of times a week’”;25
11 Dkt. 903 at 4.
12 Dkt. 898 at 1.
13 Id.
14 Dkts. 893 at 1; 903 at 1. Moore makes other arguments in support of his release, including that
the COVID-19 pandemic, when considered along with his wife’s illness, creates “extraordinary
and compelling” circumstances. See Dkt. 903 at 8–10. Because the Court finds Moore’s wife’s
illness is sufficient, it need not and will not reach Moore’s additional arguments.
15 Dkts 893 at 1; 893-1 at 1 (Allison Moore’s Medical Records).
16 Dkts. 903 at 6; 904 at ¶ 5 (Williams Decl.) (recounting defense counsel’s conversation with
Allison Moore). Allison “did not have the ability to write or sign” her own declaration. Dkt. 903
at 6.
17 Dkts. 893 at 1, 903 at 6.
18 See Dkt. 904 at ¶¶ 4, 6, 11.
19 Dkts. 903 at 6; 904 at ¶¶ 4–11.
20 Dkt. 904 at ¶ 4.
21 Id. at ¶ 11.
22 Id. at 6 (Exhibit 2 to William’s Decl.).
23 Dkt. 920 (Proposed Release Plan).
24 Dkt. 914 at 4–5.
25 Id. at 8–9.
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(3) Moore’s claims about his wife’s condition are “dubious”;26 (4) even if Moore’s wife is dying,
her illness is “not an appropriate reason for shortening his sentence given the existence of
administrative furloughs”;27 and (5) Moore cannot be safely released because he has a substantial
criminal record and “was convicted of drug conspiracy based on gang-furthering activities.”28
In Reply, Moore notes that even if his initial request for home confinement does not satisfy the
exhaustion requirement, he made an additional request to the Warden for compassionate release
on or about August 10, 2021, at the direction of his counsel.29 Moore also asserts he is likely
ineligible for furlough.30
C. Legal Standard
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, a defendant may move
the district court for a sentence reduction after exhausting their administrative remedies.31 The
court may grant the motion if, after considering the applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), it finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction[.]”32 For
guidance, the court may look to the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement on compassionate
release found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.33 That policy statement provides that “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” exist if the defendant would be the only available caregiver for an
incapacitated spouse.34 However, the policy statement is “not binding” on courts evaluating
motions filed by defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).35
D. Discussion
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Moore exhausted his administrative remedies as is
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Court agrees with the Government that Moore’s April
request for home confinement does not satisfy the statutory requirement. However, Moore asserts
that he submitted an additional request for compassionate release to the Warden at FCI Sheridan
on or about August 10, 2021, as is reflected in a contemporaneous email to his counsel.36 Courts
26 Id. at 9, 11.
27 Id. at 2, 10.
28 Id. at 11–12. The Government also responds to Moore’s COVID-19-related arguments by noting
that Moore is vaccinated and, thus, protected from severe illness. Id. at 2. As noted above, the
Court finds Moore’s wife’s illness sufficient and will not reach the impact of COVID-19 in this
case.
29 Dkt. 916 at 1.
30 Id. at 1–2.
31 See Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018).
32 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
33 United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The Sentencing Commission’s
statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district court’s discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A)
motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.”).
34 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C)(ii).
35 Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802.
36 Dkt. 916 at 1, 3.
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have accepted such assertions where the court has no reason to assume bad faith on the part of the
defendant or their counsel.37 The Court has no reason to assume that Moore or his counsel have
acted in bad faith here. Thirty days have passed since Moore’s request, and the Warden has not
granted relief.38 Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that it may consider the merits of Moore’s
Motion.
Proceeding to the merits, the Court finds that Moore has demonstrated “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” to justify his release. Moore is the only available caregiver for his
incapacitated wife who urgently needs his help.39 The Court agrees with the Sentencing
Commission that such circumstances are “extraordinary and compelling.”40 Allison should not
suffer alone, and Moore should not be kept from caring for his wife of over 15 years during what
might be the final moments of her life.
Further, the Court is satisfied that Moore’s Motion, including Allison’s medical records and
defense counsel’s sworn declaration, establish the urgency of the situation.41 The Government
disagrees, arguing that Moore’s claims are “suspect.”42 In doing so, the Government selectively
cites to portions of Allison’s medical records and suggests they demonstrate that Moore and his
counsel are exaggerating Allison’s medical condition.43 The Government also claims Moore’s
assertion that Allison has had a breathing tube is incompatible with his attorney’s report that he
spoke with Allison, saying, “The defendant told [the USPO] that his wife had a breathing tube,
leading [the USPO] to surmise she may be unable to speak, but his attorney spoke to her.”44 The
Government has offered no evidence showing the selected portions of Allison’s medical records
37 See United States v. Levario, No. 2:12-CR-00399-JAM-1, 2020 WL 3256918, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
June 16, 2020) (accepting as true defendant’s representation that he requested compassionate
release from the Warden where the Court had no reason to assume bad faith on the part of
defendant or counsel); United States v. Leigh Ann Massengill, Case No. 3:17-cr-00091-02-TMB,
(closed April 11, 2019) (Dkt. 146) (same).
38 See United States v. Garcia, No. CR 13-00884 HG-01, 2020 WL 3547933, at *3 (D. Haw.
June 30, 2020) (rejecting argument that the court could not consider defendant’s compassionate
release motion filed within 30 days of requesting release from the warden where 30 days had since
lapsed).
39 The Government asserts that Moore is not, in fact, Allison’s “only available caregiver” under
the Sentencing Commission’s guiding policy statement because he “admits” Allison is visited on
occasion by a nurse. Dkt. 914 at 9. That argument fails. Moore’s filings make clear that Allison
needs more frequent care than what her nurse offers and that Moore is the only available caregiver
to provide Allison the care she requires. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
40 See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C); see also United States v. Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.
Mass. 2019) (finding defendant’s role as only potential caregiver for his ailing mother was an
“extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release); United States v. Walker, No.
1:11 CR 270, 2019 WL 5268752, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2019) (granting release for defendant
to assist in caring for his terminally ill mother).
41 See generally Dkts. 893-1; 904.
42 Dkt. 914 at 9.
43 Id.
44 Id. (emphasis in original).
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are irreconcilable with Moore’s claim that Allison was given six months to live without a liver
transplant. Absent such evidence, the Court will take Moore and his counsel at their word.45
Similarly, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that Moore’s claims are incompatible with
his attorney’s declaration. The fact that the USPO “surmise[d]”46 Allison was unable to “readily
communicate”47 with the USPO does not compel the Court to conclude Allison could not have
spoken to her husband’s attorney. Moore’s attorney has put his professional credibility at stake by
submitting a sworn declaration attesting to his conversation with Allison in which she explained
the seriousness of her prognosis.48 This evidence is sufficient under the circumstances.
In addition, while the Government claims emergency furlough would be a more appropriate form
of relief, it offers no authority for the proposition that the existence of an emergency furlough
program precludes the Court from granting compassionate release. Thus, the Court will not deny
compassionate release on that basis.
The Court also finds that the relevant § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence reduction here.
Moore has spent over six years in custody and has made strong efforts to rehabilitate. While in
prison, Moore “has taken classes on anger management and conflict resolution, helped suicidal
inmates, worked as a mental health counselor, and helped build the Restorative Justice Initiative
at the Spring Creek Correctional Center.”49 Moore’s probation officer wrote about Moore’s time
at the Spring Creek Correctional Center that “[i]f [someone] was in crisis, security staff would call
Mr. Moore over to help deescalate the person. He was asked to move into the [mental health] unit
after a while and lived in the mental health unit for over 150 days” where he was “pretty much on
call for [anyone] in the unit that was in crisis.”50 Moore also says he is a “changed man,” pointing
to his significant work helping his peers in prison and noting, “I’ve taken steps to better myself
and in the process I’ve helped others along the way.” The Court is inclined to agree and finds that
Moore is no longer a danger to the community such that his release should be denied. Thus, while
drug conspiracy is a serious crime, Moore’s characteristics and the time he has already served
satisfy the sentencing goals in this case.
The Government relies only on Moore’s criminal history to argue that he cannot be safely
released.51 This argument ignores the substantial work Moore has done while incarcerated to better
45 The USPO also concludes that Moore’s filing “did not fully verify the urgency of the information
contained in his motion.” Dkts. 898 at 3; 921 at 3. However, when the USPO spoke with Allison,
she confirmed she is “on the waiting list for a liver transplant, she has congestive heart failure, and
she has pneumonia of the brain.” Dkt. 921 at 2. In addition, Allison was unable to give the USPO
a virtual walkthrough of her home because of her “physical condition and limited mobility.” Id.
46 Dkt. 914 at 9.
47 Dkt. 898 at 2.
48 See generally Dkt. 904.
49 Dkt. 903 at 3.
50 Dkt. 904 at 4 (Exhibit 1 to Williams Decl.).
51 Dkts. 898 at 2–3; 914 at 11–12.
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himself and his community.52 Acknowledging the seriousness of Moore’s criminal history, the
Court finds his demonstrated rehabilitation efforts, coupled with his wife’s urgent need for his
care, outweigh Moore’s criminal record. In addition, Moore will be subject to supervised release,
which mitigates concerns that Moore will pose a danger to his community upon release.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Motion at Dockets 893 and 903 is GRANTED
with the following conditions:
1. 	The Court will issue an Amended Judgment. Moore’s term of imprisonment shall be
reduced to time served. He shall be released on October 5, 2021, or as soon as possible
pursuant to BOP COVID-19 protocols; and
2. 	Moore shall be subject to all the standard and special conditions of supervised release
imposed in his original judgment. He shall also abide by local, state, and federal public
health mandates.
Entered at the direction of the Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, United States District Judge.
DATE: September 30, 2021.
52 See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011) “[E]vidence of post[-]sentencing
rehabilitation may be highly relevant to several of the § 3553(a) factors that Congress has expressly
instructed district courts to consider at sentencing.”).
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