USA v. Shanholtzer

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW WILSON MOI,
a/k/a “Matt Matt”
Defendant.
Case No. 3:19-cr-00112-TMB-SAO-2
ORDER ON DEFENDANT MOI AND
GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
(DKTS. 460, 463, & 494)
Before the Court are three separate motions in limine—two filed by Defendant Matthew
Wilson Moi and one filed by the Government.1 Moi’s first Motion in Limine (“Moi’s First
Motion”) seeks to preclude the Government from eliciting testimony regarding Moi’s 2004
Washington murder charges, which are described in State v. Moi, 2011 WL 6825264 (Wash. App.
2011).2 The Government does not take a position on Moi’s First Motion, but states it “does not
intend to present evidence that the defendant murdered another victim in Washington in 2004.”3
Moi’s second Motion in Limine (“Moi’s Second Motion”) seeks to preclude the Government from
eliciting (1) evidence of an alleged plot to kill CS-1; (2) general testimony regarding Moi’s firearm
possession; and (3) evidence Moi devised a plan to murder Myrick Elliott in September 2019.4
The Government opposes Moi’s Second Motion and argues the evidence is relevant and
1 Dkt. 463 (Moi’s First Motion in Limine); Dkt. 460 (Government’s Motions in Limine); Dkt. 494
(Moi’s Second Motion in Limine).
2 Dkt. 463.
3 Dkt. 474 (Government’s Response to Moi’s First Motion in Limine) at 1.
4 Dkt. 494.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 1 of 18

2
admissible.5 In its own motion in limine (“Government’s Motions”), the Government seeks to limit
the scope and nature of the admission of Jordan Shanholtzer’s and Kyle Dwiggins’s prior criminal
convictions.6 Moi opposes the Government’s Motions and offers notice of his intent to use the
convictions identified by the Government pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b)(2).7
For the following reasons, Moi’s First Motion at Docket 463 is GRANTED; Moi’s Second
Motion at Docket 494 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and the Government’s
Motions at Docket 460 are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 18, 2019, the Government filed an Indictment charging Moi and four others
with drug conspiracy.8 On September 15, 2020, a grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment
naming one additional co-defendant and charging defendants with Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(Count 1), Drug Conspiracy (Count 2), Money Laundering Conspiracy (Count 3), Using A Firearm
to Commit Murder in Furtherance Of Drug Trafficking Crime (Count 4), and Killing in
Furtherance of Continuing Criminal Enterprise (Count 5).9 Moi is charged with Counts 2
through 5.10 The case was declared complex in November 2020.11 Since then, charges against
5 Dkt. 505 (Government’s Opposition to Moi’s Second Motion in Limine).
6 Dkt. 460.
7 Dkt. 479 (Moi’s Response to Government Motions in Limine).
8 Dkt. 12 (Indictment).
9 Dkt. 189 (First Superseding Indictment).
10 Id.
11 Dkt. 237 (Minute Entry).
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 2 of 18

3
Moi’s co-defendants have been resolved, and Moi remains the sole defendant in this case. Trial is
set to begin on February 22, 2022.12
II. 	FACTS
The Government alleges that Moi conspired to distribute illicit drugs in Alaska.13
According to the Government, several packages intended for Moi were intercepted by law
enforcement, including one in April 2019 that was sent to Navarrow Andrews’s address. The
Government asserts that despite repeated attempts, Moi was unable to retrieve the package from
Andrews.14 Believing that Andrews had stolen the package, the Government alleges, Moi killed
Andrews.15
The Government asserts despite leaving Alaska following Andrews’s death, Moi remained
an active participant in the criminal enterprise.16 In September 2019, law enforcement intercepted
a second shipment, this time of heroin intended for CS-117 in Wasilla, Alaska.18 CS-1 permitted
law enforcement agents to monitor his communications with individuals he purported to be Moi
and Jordan Shanholtzer as they directed CS-1 how to distribute the heroin.19 According to the
12 Dkt. 516 (Order re: Moi’s Fifth Motion to Continue Trial) at 1.
13 See Dkt. 189.
14 Id. at 5.
15 See id.; Dkt. 505 at 1–2.
16 Dkt. 189 at 6.
17 In their briefing, both parties refer to the unnamed individual as CS-1.
18 Dkt. 189 at 6.
19 Dkt. 494 at 4.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 3 of 18

4
Government, CS-1 was instructed to deliver some of the heroin to Elliott.20 After monitoring the
delivery of heroin to Elliott, agents briefly apprehended Elliott and seized the heroin.21 The
disappearance of the heroin aroused suspicion and allegedly led Shanholtzer to believe that Elliott
had lied about the whereabouts of the heroin and had actually stolen it.22 The parties dispute
whether a plan developed to address the missing heroin.23 But before any alleged plan was carried
out, Moi was arrested in Los Angeles, California.24
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion in limine is a procedural device to obtain an early and preliminary ruling on the
admissibility of evidence.”25 Motions in limine are appropriate when the “mere mention of
evidence during trial would be highly prejudicial.”26 Motions in limine “should not be used to
resolve factual issues or weigh evidence.”27
20 Id.
21 Id. at 5.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Dkt. 505 at 2.
25 Barnard v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:03-cv-01524-RCJ-LRL, 2011 WL 221710, at
*1 (D. Nev. Jan. 21. 2011); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-01-658-TUC-
RCJ, 2009 WL 2971755, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2009).
26 	Barnard, 2011 WL 221710, at *1 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1109 (9th ed. 2009));
Research Corp., 2009 WL 2971755, at *1 (similar).
27 Barnard, 2011 WL 221710, at *1 (citations omitted); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Quad City Testing Lab.,
Inc., No. CV-07-170-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL 4534406, at *1 (D. Mont. Oct. 28, 2010) (citations
omitted); Research Corp., 2009 WL 2971755, at *1 (citations omitted).
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 4 of 18

5
A party seeking to exclude evidence through a motion in limine must satisfy a “high
standard” 	and 	show 	the evidence is 	inadmissible on 	all 	potential 	grounds.28 Otherwise,
“evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and
potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.”29 A court’s rulings on motions in limine
are provisional and may be reconsidered during the course of trial.30 A denial of a motion in limine
merely means that the court is unable to determine whether the evidence should be excluded
outside of the context of trial.31
A. Rules 403 and 404
As a general rule, Federal Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of
a person’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts are inadmissible “to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”32 “The rule
is designed to avoid a danger that the jury will punish the defendant for offenses other than those
charged.”33 However, because such evidence may be highly relevant, Rule 404(b)(2) provides that
evidence of a person’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts “may be admissible for another purpose, such
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
28 Barnard, 2011 WL 221710, at *1 (citations omitted); BNSF, 2010 WL 4534406, at *1 (citations
omitted); Research Corp., 2009 WL 2971755, at *1 (citations omitted).
29 Barnard, 2011 WL 221710, at *1 (citations omitted); BNSF, 2010 WL 4534406, at *1 (citations
omitted); Research Corp., 2009 WL 2971755, at *1 (citations omitted).
30 Barnard, 2011 WL 221710, at *2 (citing, inter alia, Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758
n.3 (2000)); Research Corp., 2009 WL 2971755, at *2 (same).
31 Barnard, 2011 WL 221710, at *2; BNSF, 2010 WL 4534406, at *; Research Corp., 2009 WL
2971755, at *2.
32 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see also United States v. Charley, 1 F.4th 637, 645 (9th Cir. 2021).
33 Charley, 1 F.4th at 647.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 5 of 18

6
or lack of accident.”34 To introduce evidence under Rule 404(b), the Government must prove that
the proposed evidence satisfies four requirements:
(1) the evidence tends to prove a material point (materiality); (2) the other act is not
too remote in time (recency); (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that
defendant committed the other act (sufficiency); and (4) … the act is similar to the
offense charged (similarity).35
But even under this circumstance, “[t]he use of such evidence must be narrowly circumscribed and
limited.”36
If the Court finds these requirements are met, it must then determine, under Rule 403,
whether the “probative value [of the evidence] is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”37
B. Rule 609
Separately, Rule 609 “provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked during
cross-examination by establishing that he has been convicted of a crime.”38 Two factors dictate
the standard the Court applies to determine whether to permit the use of a prior conviction for
impeachment purposes: (1) the age and nature of the conviction, and (2) whether the witness is the
defendant.39 Where a party seeks to impeach a defendant with a prior conviction punishable by
34 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
35 Charley, 1 F.4th at 647.
36 Id. (quoting United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1982)).
37 Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2005).
38 United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984).
39 Fed. R. Evid. 609.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 6 of 18

7
death or imprisonment for more than one year, the conviction must be admitted “if the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.”40 But where the witness
is not the defendant, use of the prior conviction for impeachment is subject to Rule 403.41 The
parties may use any crime involving a “dishonest act or false statement” to impeach a witness.42
The Ninth Circuit provides “five factors that a district court should consider in balancing the
probative value of evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions against that evidence’s prejudicial
effect . . .
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the point in time of the
conviction and the witness’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the
past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of defendant’s testimony;
and (5) the centrality of defendant’s credibility.43
Courts also consider how much time has elapsed before permitting a party to use a prior
criminal conviction to impeach a witness.44 Where “more than ten years have passed since the
witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later,” evidence of a witness’s
conviction is admissible only if:
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to
use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.45
40 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1).
41 Id.
42 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).
43 United States v. Hursh, 217 F.3d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Browne, 829
F.2d 760, 762–63 (9th Cir. 1987)).
44 Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).
45 Id.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 7 of 18

8
Finally, “absent exceptional circumstances, evidence of a prior conviction admitted for
impeachment purposes may not include collateral details and circumstances attendant upon the
conviction.”46 “Generally, ‘only the prior conviction, its general nature, and punishment of felony
range [are] fair game for testing the defendant’s credibility.’”47
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. Moi’s 2004 Washington Murder Charges
Moi argues that the introduction of any evidence related to the murder charges he faced in
Washington State in State v. Moi, 2011 WL 6825264 (Wash. App. 2011), which were later
overturned in In re Moi, 360 P.3d 811, 812 (Wash. 2015), are not relevant to this case and “any
hypothetical relevance is outweighed by the prejudicial impact evidence of these allegations.”48
The Government responds that it “does not intend to present evidence that the defendant murdered
another victim in Washington in 2004.”49 For the Government to use this prior criminal conviction
to impeach Moi, the Court would need to find that “the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect,”50 or to introduce the conviction as evidence for a permitted purpose, the
parties would need to identify a permitted use.51 Here, the Government has done neither.
Therefore, because the Court finds the introduction of State v. Moi, 2011 WL 6825264 (Wash.
46 United States v. Osazuwa, 564 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1036 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotations removed).
47 Id. (quoting United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1480 (10th Cir. 1996)).
48 Dkt. 463 at 1.
49 Dkt. 474 at 1.
50 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B).
51 Fed. R. Evid. 404.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 8 of 18

9
App. 2011), is likely to be prejudicial and yield unknown probative value, the Court grants Moi’s
First Motion.
B. Plot to Kill CS-1
In Moi’s Second Motion, Moi argues that under Rules 403 and 404 the Court should
exclude evidence that a “supposed ‘hitman’” was hired to kill CS-1 in October 2020.52 Moi asserts
the introduction of such a plot would be highly prejudicial and bears no probative value because
the Government has not charged the “supposed ‘hitman’”53 or identified any evidence linking Moi
to any such plot.54 The Government objects and argues that it should be permitted to introduce
evidence of a plot to kill CS-1 in order to explain the basis for payments the Drug Enforcement
Agency (“DEA”) made to CS-1.55 The Government says it intends to introduce evidence of the
plot only if Moi introduces evidence about payments made to CS-1 by the DEA. The Government
also states that it “does not oppose a limiting instruction explaining that the payments are not
evidence that the threats were real, or that they came from Moi.”56
The Court acknowledges that without proper limitation, evidence of a plot to kill CS-1
could be highly prejudicial to Moi given the serious nature of the allegation and the risk a jury may
mistakenly infer that Moi was involved in the plot. However, at this time, the risk of mistake
appears low because neither party has identified evidence that links Moi to the plot. Moreover, the
Government has identified a specific, probative purpose for introducing the evidence—to explain
52 Dkt. 494 at 3.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Dkt. 505 at 3–4.
56 Id. at 4.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 9 of 18

10
why DEA paid the witness. Therefore, the Court finds that the danger of unfair prejudice to Moi
is not likely to substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. If, however, such
evidence were to be introduced at trial, the Court finds that a limiting instruction would be
appropriate to further mitigate any potential prejudice to Moi. But because questions remain
related to the foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice of the evidence related to a plot to kill
CS-1, the Court concludes it would be inappropriate to make a determination on the admissibility
of such evidence through a motion in limine. For these reasons and because of the conditional
nature of the proposed evidence related to a plot to kill CS-1, at this time, the Court denies Moi’s
request to preclude the introduction of evidence related to the plot. Furthermore, the Government
must make a proper application to the Court if it intends to introduce evidence of a plot to kill
CS-1.
C. Moi’s Firearm Possession
In Moi’s Second Motion, he also argues that under Rules 403 and 404, the Government
should 	be 	precluded 	from 	eliciting 	testimony 	regarding 	Moi’s 	prior 	firearm 	possession.
Specifically, Moi cites Isaiah Roderick’s testimony regarding his knowledge of Moi’s past firearm
possession, including that Moi had a “Draco with a ‘big drum’” and “a handgun, possibly an ‘XD’
of unknown caliber.”57 Moi argues that Roderick’s testimony would be unfairly prejudicial
because it does not definitively prove Moi possessed a Glock 10 mm, which is believed to have
been used to shoot Andrews, and because Roderick did not specify when he witnessed Moi in
possession of firearms. Moi argues that “such evidence risks unfair prejudice to Mr. Moi making
57 Dkt. 494 at 4.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 10 of 18

11
it likely that the jury might use this evidence to convict Mr. Moi on improper grounds by drawing
negative propensity inferences from his past, unrelated, weapon possession.”58
The Government objects and states that it intends to call witnesses at trial who will testify
that Moi owned and carried firearms. The Government argues that because the killing of Andrews
was committed with a firearm, Moi’s access to firearms is relevant to show his ability to commit
the charged offense.59 The Government also argues that possession of a firearm alone is not
stigmatized in Alaska and is therefore unlikely to prejudice Moi.60
The Court generally agrees with the Government that under Rules 403 and 404, evidence
that Moi possessed firearms in the presence of an alleged co-conspirator is relevant to show
opportunity and that, in Alaska, possession of a firearm alone is not so prejudicial that the risk of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value. Here, the Government
must show that Moi had access to a firearm to prevail in at least one of the charges. In two of the
other counts, access to firearms may be relevant evidence.61 Whether Moi possessed a Glock 10
mm or other firearms at particular times can be challenged by Moi at trial. Furthermore, firearm
58 Id.
59 Dkt. 505 at 4.
60 Id.
61 See United States v. Street, 548 F.3d 618, 625 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Firearms are routinely allowed
into evidence as ‘tools of the trade’ in drug trafficking cases.”); see also United States v. Taylor,
767 F. Supp. 2d 428, 438 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2010) (“The Court finds that Rosario’s prior gun
possession is . . . admissible to demonstrate [the Defendant’s] ability to access such a weapon.”).
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 11 of 18

12
possession alone is “only slightly prejudicial, if at all.”62 For these reasons, the Court declines to
preclude the introduction of evidence regarding Moi’s firearm use or possession at this time.
D. Plan to Murder Elliott
Finally, in Moi’s Second Motion, he argues that under Rules 403 and 404 the Government
should be precluded from eliciting evidence that Moi planned to murder Elliott. Moi identifies
several audio recordings between CS-1 and individuals purported to be Shanholtzer and Moi,
which he states show “it is far from definite that such a plan was ever made.”63 Moi argues in the
alternative that if a plan to murder Elliott actually existed, “this plan has little relevance to a non-
propensity purpose.”64 Moi further argues that this evidence would be “cumulative,” “marginally
probative,” and more prejudicial than other evidence that could be presented to show Moi’s
participation in an alleged drug distribution conspiracy, including cellphone, travel, and bank
records and the testimony of alleged co-conspirators.65 Moi argues that based on this type of
evidence “a jury would be likely to use this evidence to draw negative propensity inferences
against Moi—e.g., that, because he planned to murder Elliott, he is a murderer and likely murdered
Andrews.” The Government objects and argues that statements by Moi after the heroin shipment
was intercepted are relevant and should be admitted to show Moi’s direct involvement in the
criminal enterprise. The Government also argues that the recordings show Moi’s intent to engage
in “violent retaliation against a former accomplice whom he believed to have stolen a large amount
62 United States v. Collins, 604 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 2010); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008) (Americans may lawfully possess and use firearms, and have a constitutional right
to do so).
63 Dkt. 494 at 5–6.
64 Id. at 6.
65 Id. at 7.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 12 of 18

13
of narcotics,” which is particularly relevant because Moi has allegedly admitted to killing
Andrews, but “did so accidentally.”66
Rule 404 permits the admission of crimes, wrongs, or acts that would otherwise be
inadmissible to show intent.67 To introduce evidence under Rule 404(b), the Government must
show materiality, recency, sufficiency, and similarity.68 Because the Government argues that the
recordings and evidence of Moi’s alleged plan to kill Elliott show intent, the Court considers the
materiality, recency, sufficiency, and similarity of the proposed evidence. The alleged plot to kill
Elliott is not dissimilar from the charges Moi faces for allegedly killing Andrews in furtherance of
a drug conspiracy—both plots were allegedly devised for the purpose of retaliating against a
person who was believed to have stolen a drug delivery from the enterprise. Further the killing of
Andrews and the alleged plot to kill Elliott occurred only months apart. However, at this time, Moi
has not represented that he unintentionally killed Andrews. Absent evidence creating doubt about
whether Moi’s actions were intentional, evidence of a plot to kill Elliott, that is unrelated to the
killing of Andrews and cumulative of Moi’s participation in an alleged conspiracy, is likely to be
highly prejudicial to Moi and is unlikely to yield probative evidence. The Court therefore grants
Moi’s motion at this time with the caveat that the probative value of evidence of a similar plot may
change if questions arise related to Moi’s intent related to the death of Andrews.
66 Dkt. 505 at 7.
67 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
68 Charley, 1 F.4th at 647.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 13 of 18

14
E. Shanholtzer’s Prior Criminal Convictions
In the Government’s Motions, the Government seeks to limit the nature and scope of the
admission of Shanholtzer’s prior criminal convictions at trial. The Government has identified the
following prior criminal convictions for Shanholtzer:
• 	3AN-05-10414, Misconduct Involving Controlled Substances in the Fourth Degree, State
of Alaska, conviction date of January 5, 2007.
• 	3:07-cr-00090-JWS, Drug Distribution, United States District Court, District of Alaska,
conviction date of December 18, 2008.
• 	3AN-07-5025, Resisting Arrest, Attempted Escape, Assault in the Fourth Degree, and
Failure to Appear, State of Alaska, conviction date of March 26, 2009.
• 	3AN-07-461, Assault in the Third Degree, State of Alaska, conviction date of April 10,
2009.
• 	3AN-16-2065, Operating Under the Influence, State of Alaska, conviction date of
March 31, 2016.69
The Government argues that Shanholtzer’s convictions in 3AN-16-2065 and 3AN-07-5025
are inadmissible under Rule 609 for impeachment purposes as they are convictions for crimes
punishable by less than one year imprisonment.70 Moi does not present any argument to the
contrary. The Court finds 3AN-16-2065 and 3AN-07-5025 are inadmissible under Rule 609.
The Government argues that Shanholtzer’s conviction in 3AN-05-10414 is inadmissible
under Rule 609 for impeachment purposes because he was convicted on January 5, 2007, and
sentenced to only six months of imprisonment, therefore his conviction and release from
confinement were more than 10 years prior.71 Moi does not present any argument to the contrary.
The Court finds 3AN-05-10414 is inadmissible under Rule 609.
69 Dkt. 460 at 2.
70 Id. at 3.
71 Id.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 14 of 18

15
The Government concedes that Shanholtzer’s convictions in 3:07-cr-00090-JWS and
3AN-07-461 may be admissible, but argues that the Court should preclude Moi from eliciting
evidence regarding the convictions because “[h]is prior convictions have little relevance into his
character 	for 	untruthfulness,”72 and 	would 	likely 	be 	used 	in 	a 	prejudicial 	manner.73 In
3:07-cr-00090-JWS, 	Shanholtzer 	was 	convicted 	for 	a 	drug 	distribution 	crime,74 	and 	in
3AN-07-461, Shanholtzer was convicted of assault.75 The Government further stated that it
“expects Mr. Shanholtzer to testify at trial that he was an active drug trafficker in Anchorage,
Alaska during the course of the charged conspiracy.”76 Moi does not present an argument that the
probative value of these convictions substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect under Rule
609 or identify a permitted use of the convictions under Rule 404. Absent a specific argument for
their admission, at this time, the Court finds Shanholtzer’s convictions in 3:07-cr-00090-JWS and
3AN-07-461 inadmissible under Rule 609.
F. Dwiggins’s Prior Criminal Convictions
The Government also seeks to limit the nature and scope of the admission of Dwiggins’s
prior criminal convictions. The Government has identified the following prior criminal convictions
for Dwiggins:
• 	3AN-06-5695, Theft in the First and Second Degree, State of Alaska, conviction date of
January 22, 2007.
• 	3AN-07-8137, Theft in the Second Degree, State of Alaska, conviction date of January 22,
2008.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id. at 3.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 3–4.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 15 of 18

16
• 	3AN-11-13579, Scheme to Defraud, State of Alaska, conviction date of August 30, 2013.
The Government argues that Dwiggins’s convictions in 3AN-06-5695 and 3AN-07-8137
are inadmissible as they are more than 10 years old.77 Moi opposes the Government’s Motions.
Moi does not specifically address Dwiggins’s theft conviction in 3AN-07-8137. The
conviction date was January 22, 2008, more than 10 years ago. Without argument “supported by
specific facts and circumstances” for how this theft conviction’s probative value substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect in this trial, the Court finds evidence of Dwiggins’s conviction in
3AN-07-8137 inadmissible at the trial at this time.78
Moi argues the convictions in 3AN-06-5695 may be introduced because (1) the conviction
is not 10 years old within the meaning of Rule 609, but (2) even if the conviction is over 10 years
old, “the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect of
admission,” and it is, therefore, admissible under the rule.79 Moi argues that 3AN-06-5695 is less
than 10 years old within the meaning of Rule 609 because “Dwiggins was incarcerated for parole
and probation violations—for committing a new crime of dishonesty, the Scheme to Defraud
alleged in 3AN-11-13579—as recently as 2016, which brings his release on the offense well within
the 10-year window contemplated by Rule 609.”80 Moi relies on United States v. McClintock as
support for this argument.81 In McClintock, the court found that “reconfinement pursuant to parole
revocation is ‘confinement imposed for’ [the original] conviction” where the “violation involved
77 Id. at 5.
78 Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).
79 Dkt. 479 at 2.
80 Id.
81 748 F.2d 1278 (1984).
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 16 of 18

17
a substantive probation condition and closely parallels the initial, fraudulent activity.” Here,
Dwiggins was initially incarcerated in 3AN-06-5695 for theft and later incarcerated for “parole
and 	probation 	violations” 	after 	he 	was 	convicted 	of 	a 	Scheme 	to 	Defraud 	alleged 	in
3AN-11-13579.82 It is not clear from the parties’ briefing whether Dwiggins’s commission of
subsequent crime violated a substantive condition of his parole or probation terms. Further, based
on the parties’ briefing, it is also not clear whether the initial theft and later scheme to defraud
were related in any way. For these reasons, the Court cannot conclude that these circumstances
mirror the “narrow variant” addressed by the Ninth Circuit in McClintock and finds that if Moi
wishes to impeach Dwiggins using 3AN-06-5695, he needs to show that the probative value of the
conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 609(b).83 Moi has not
made such a showing. However, Dwiggins’s conviction in 3AN-11-13579 for a scheme to defraud
is a crime of dishonesty and admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2).84
G. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
• 	GRANTS Moi’s Motion in Limine Re Alleged Prior Misconduct at Docket 463;
• 	GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE Moi’s
Second Motion in Limine at Docket 494 is, specifically the Court:
- 	DENIES Moi’s request to preclude the introduction of evidence related to
a plot to kill CS-1;
- 	DENIES Moi’s request to preclude the introduction of evidence related to
Moi’s past firearm possession; and
82 Dkt. 479 at 2.
83 Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).
84 AS 11.46.600.
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 17 of 18

18
- 	GRANTS Moi’s request to preclude the introduction of evidence related to
a plot to kill Elliott; and
• 	GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE the
Government’s Motions in Limine at Docket 460, specifically the Court:
- 	GRANTS the Government’s request to preclude the use of Shanholtzer’s
prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes in the following cases:
(1)3AN-05-10414, (2) 3:07-cr-00090-JWS, (3) 3AN-07-5025, (4) 3AN-07-
461, and (5) 3AN-16-2065; and
- 	GRANTS the Government’s request to preclude the use of Dwiggins’s
prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes in the following cases:
(1) 3AN-06-5695 and (2) 3AN-07-8137; and
- 	DENIES the Government’s request to preclude the use of Dwiggins’s prior
criminal conviction in case number 3AN-11-13579.
These rulings on the motions in limine are provisional and may be reconsidered during trial.
Finally, nothing in this Order relieves the parties of any requirements to make proper application
to the Court before seeking to admit evidence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 10th day of February, 2022.
/s/
TIMOTHY M. BURGESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Timothy M. Burgess
Case 3:19-cr-00112-JMK-SAO Document 543 Filed 02/10/22 Page 18 of 18