USA v. Holyfield et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TYRONE HAMPTON,
Defendant.
3:22-CR-000084-02-JMK-MMS
FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION ON
MOTION TO SUPPRESS [DKT. 80,
107, 110, 122]
I. 	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR PRO SE DEFENDANT
You have asked this Court to suppress evidence from the search warrants at issue.
You were allowed to file one amended motion since you are filing motions without an
attorney. You filed several motions that are the essentially the same, so the four pending
motions will be considered together. This Court is recommending that your motions be
denied because you did not have a connection or property right to apartment #4 or the
packages. You need to show that first that you have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area searched to challenge the government’s search warrants. This Court understands
that you are making a good-faith effort, so your Franks arguments were still considered.
This Court commends your well-thought-out arguments that were presented in a clear
fashion. A Franks challenge has a high standard though, and your arguments did not meet
the standard. The United Parcel Service (“UPS”) policy did exist, and this Court is satisfied
that it did exist because the government introduced an exhibit which establishes that there
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was such a policy. You are right that the date was incorrect and that one of the law
enforcement officials was incorrectly identified. These two incorrect statements were not
done on purpose or in a very careless way. Honest mistakes are inevitable. 	This Court
looked at the entire situation, viewed the mistakes as minor, and would not have affected
the overall probable cause analysis.
You have two weeks to object to this Report and Recommendation. You have five
(5) pages to explain 	what you think is 	specifically 	wrong about this Report and
Recommendation. It can be an objection to the facts or the legal analysis. You can ask the
District Court for more time to file the objection (Local Rule 47.1 “Pretrial Motions to
Continue Deadlines or Proceedings.”). If you object, the government can respond. The
District Court then considers your objections (if you file them) and will agree or disagree
with you, and then rule on your motion. This information is included in the last page, so
please make sure to carefully read it.
This Court, in good-faith, did not reject your many motions that abused the
docketing system. The District Court may receive more evidence, but it can also reject any
further filings that relate to the pending motions. This is for your information.
This is just a summary. The actual Report and Recommendation is below.
II. 	MOTION PRESENTED
The operative indictment, filed in January 2023, charges Tyrone Hampton with one
count of conspiring to distribute and possess controlled substances,1 two counts of
1 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(B)
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attempting to possess and distribute controlled substances,2 and one count of conspiring in
a money laundering scheme.3 Hampton moves, pro se, to suppress the evidence from the
search warrant on two bases: (1) the affidavit intentionally or recklessly omitted several
pieces of material information and that, had that information been included, the affidavit
would not have supported probable cause; and (2) the affidavit intentionally or recklessly
made a material misstatement. See generally Dkt. 80, Dkt. 107, Dkt. 110. The government
responds that (1) Hampton lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the targeted
apartment or in the second package; and (2) Hampton’s motion nonetheless fails on the
merits because there were no material misstatements or omissions in the affidavit. See
generally Dkt. 114.
Mindful of Hampton’s pro se status—this Court allowed Hampton to file an
amended motion. Dkt. 80; Dkt. 101; Dkt. 107; Dkt. 110; Dkt. 122.
This 	Court 	hereby 	issues 	its 	Final 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	regarding
Hampton’s Motions to Suppress. For the reasons below, Hampton’s request for a Franks
hearing is DENIED because he failed to make a substantial preliminary showing of
material omissions or misstatements in the search warrant that were intentional or reckless
in nature. Hampton’s Motions to Suppress should therefore be DENIED. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B).
//
//
2 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(B)
3 18 U.S.C. § 841(B)
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III. 	FACTUAL HISTORY
The following facts are drawn from party briefs and from law enforcement reports.
Dkt. 80; Dkt. 107; Dkt. 110; Dkt. 114.
On April 26, 2022, a United Parcel Service worker failed to deliver a package to a
multi-resident building. Dkt. 114-2 at 7; Dkt. 114-3 at 6. The delivery failed because the
package did not specify an apartment number and the driver “was unable to find anyone
who recognized the name of the recipient and noted all the seams of the package were
taped. Id.; Id. The package returned to the UPS office, was deemed suspicious, and was
opened “per their company policy and identified what they believed were controlled
substances in the box.” Id.; Id.
On April 27, law enforcement officials verified that a substantial amount of
controlled substances were in the package. Id.; Id. Tiffany Thompson, now known to be
the intended receiver, inquired into the delivery status of the package. Id.; Id. Thompson,
had in the weeks before, been the subject of a landlord complaint, “regarding people
trespassing in the parking lot and [] wanting to evict the tenant of apartment 4, Jasmine
Larionoff.” Id. The landlord believed that controlled substances were being trafficked from
apartment #4 because of the numerous non-residents that visited that apartment. Id. Law
enforcement 	then 	contacted 	the 	landlord, 	received 	verification 	of 	the 	landlord’s
observations, and pointed out his interactions with a suspicious vehicle. Id. The driver, now
known to be Tyrone Hampton, offered to purchase the building and “that he would pay for
Jasmine’s rent” to avoid being evicted. Id. After speaking with the landlord, law
enforcement observed Hampton “sitting on the door step of Apt. 4.” [sic]. A separate law
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enforcement report, notably, mentioned that “Tyrone Hampton of California, [] had
recently been residing at” apartment #4 of the building. Dkt. 114-6 at 1. Law enforcement
then executed the search warrant and arrested Hampton. Dkt. 114-2 at 7; Dkt. 114 at 3-4.
A second package, addressed to the same residential building, was flagged on April
28. Dkt. 114-3 at 5. Law enforcement investigated and concluded that there was no match
between the recipient’s name and records of the building tenants. Id. More controlled
substances were found inside the package. Id.
IV. 	LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment provides the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A criminal defendant must, however, show that “his
own Fourth Amendment rights [were] infringed.” Byrd v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1518,
1526 (2018) (citation cleaned up). As relevant here, “in some circumstances a person may
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else.” Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir.
2015); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1991).
Here, nothing in the record indicates that Hampton had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in apartment #4. Hampton, does not address, let alone provide evidence that he
slept overnight in apartment #4, that he had an apartment key, or that he stored possessions
there. Any of these factors, alone or together, could have arguably created a right to exclude
people from the home. To the contrary—the record indicates that the landlord twice
confirmed that the only tenant was Jasmine Larionoff, and that Hampton was aware of
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Larionoff’s possessory rights when he offered to pay for her past due rent. Even if
Hampton’s presence on the doorsteps of apartment #4 can be construed as a visitor license,
expectation of privacy does not necessarily turn on mere presence; it is a showing of trust
from the tenant to the guest that symbolizes a reasonable expectation of privacy. See
Carter, 525 U.S. at 90. Indeed, Hampton’s motions emphasize the drug use history of prior
tenants to possibly indicate that he was not the intended recipient or that he did not have
an expectation of privacy in apartment #4. Regarding the second package, this Court notes
that it was intended for apartment #2, that Hampton’s name was omitted as the recipient,
and Hampton has not explicitly claimed an expectation of privacy.
On these facts, Hampton cannot challenge the searches and seizures from the two
packages; and even if this Court were to review the merits of the motion, Hampton’s
arguments would fare no better.
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment “provides that a Warrant may be
issued only upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. “A search warrant is supported by probable cause if the issuing judge finds
that, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him” indicate that a “fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
United States. v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). The duty of a reviewing
Court “is to simply ensure that the” issuing Judge “had a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 214. The issuing Judge’s finding of
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probable cause is accorded substantial deference, and the affidavit enjoys a “presumption
of validity. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). Despite this presumption, there
are some circumstances where a defendant may challenge the truthfulness of factual
statements in the affidavit, and therefore undermine the warrant’s validity, and along with
it, the search and seizure. Id. at 156. The relevant circumstance here is when the affiant
intentionally or recklessly made misleading statements or omissions. United States v.
Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017). The determinative inquiry is whether
probable cause remains after casting aside erroneous information and correcting material
omissions. Perkins, 850 F.3d at 1119 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th
Cir. 2014)) (internal quotations omitted).
To begin, this Court dispenses with Hampton’s omission or misstatement regarding
UPS policy. The affidavit did not omit that UPS had such a policy because, as Hampton
points out, it was included in the probable cause section. Neither was it a misleading
statement to mention the UPS company policy. The government has provided evidence
that the policy exists, and that the policy is clear and unambiguous: “UPS reserves the right
to open and inspect any package tendered to it for transportation.” Dkt. 114-1 at 1. Both
packages were tendered, or in other words, paid by an individual for the transportation
services of UPS. This Court hastens to add that Hampton is correct that the affidavits may
have mistaken the date of the first package inspection and the name of one of the
investigating officers. The government, however, has the prevailing view. On this record,
the two mistakes resulted from nothing more than negligence or innocent mistake. The
thrust of law enforcement records is substantially similar to the truth, save for the incorrect
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date and correct officer. Indeed, the affidavit and law enforcement reports both describe
the UPS delivery attempts, the suspicious packages, UPS package inspections, law
enforcement investigations into the packages and residents (or not) of the targeted building.
Even if this Court were to accept Hampton’s claims the statements were misleading or
recklessly omitted, the statements would not be material to the determination of probable
cause, given the resounding evidence accumulated and described in the affidavits.
All told, Hampton does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in apartment
#4 or the packages, and even on the merits, the affidavits did not mislead or omit material
statements pertinent to the probable cause determination.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Hampton’s Motions to Suppress should be
DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
DATED this 21st day of March, 2023, at Anchorage, Alaska.
s/ Matthew M. Scoble
CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to D. Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a), a party seeking to object to this proposed finding
and recommendation shall file written objections with the Clerk of Court no later than the
CLOSE OF BUSINESS on April 4, 2023. Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s findings
of fact may be treated as a procedural default and waiver of the right to contest those
findings on appeal. Miranda v. Anchondo, et al., 684 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth
Circuit concludes that a district court is not required to consider evidence introduced for
the first time in a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s recommendation. United States
v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000). Objections and responses shall not exceed five
(5) pages in length, and shall not merely reargue positions presented in motion papers.
Rather, 	objections 	and 	responses 	shall 	specifically 	designate 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations objected to, the basis of the objection, and the points and authorities in
support. Response(s) to the objections shall be filed on or before the CLOSE OF
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BUSINESS on April 11, 2023. The parties shall otherwise comply with provisions of D.
Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a). Reports and recommendations are not appealable orders. Any
notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the
District Court’s judgment. See Hilliard v. Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986).
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