Urovak v. Houser

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
TIMOTHY UROVAK,
Petitioner,
v.
EARL HOUSER,
Respondent.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00184-SLG
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On August 15, 2022, Petitioner Timothy Urovak, a self-represented prisoner,
filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.1 On August
23, Mr. Urovak filed a civil cover sheet and a signed and dated signature page for
his 	Petition.2 	On 	September 	20, 	2022, 	Mr. 	Urovak 	filed 	additional 	related
documents that included additional briefing and exhibits on international treaties
involving Alaska territory.3
Mr. Urovak seeks federal habeas relief based on a challenge to the State
of Alaska’s criminal jurisdiction in his pending state criminal proceeding.4 	Mr.
Urovak alleges that as an Alaskan Native and member of a federally recognized
1 Docket 1.
2 Dockets 2–3.
3 Docket 4.
4 Docket 1 at 1.
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tribe, only a tribal court or federal court have jurisdiction to prosecute him.5 	Mr.
Urovak also alleges that his public defender will not make motions on his behalf
and is denying him access to discovery.6 Mr. Urovak is “trying to confront systemic
racism, 	and 	discrimination, 	and 	facial 	classification, 	and 	lastly 	hate 	crimes
committed against Alaskan Natives by the State of Alaska Court System.”7 	For
relief, he requests to be released from custody.8
The Court takes judicial notice of Mr. Urovak’s pending criminal cases,
where he is a pretrial detainee in State of Alaska v. Timothy Urovak, Case No.
3PA-21-00494CR and charged with a Probation/Parole Violation in State of Alaska
v. George Urovak, Jr. (a/k/a Timothy Urovak, a/k/a George T. Urovak), Case No.
4BE-03-00762CR.9
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides federal courts with general habeas corpus
jurisdiction.10 	A petitioner may properly challenge pretrial detention under 28
5 Docket 1 at 1.
6 Docket 1 at 2.
7 Docket 1 at 3–4.
8 Docket 1 at 4.
9 Judicial notice is the “court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a
party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court’s power to accept such a fact.”
Judicial Notice, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Materials from a proceeding in another tribunal
are appropriate for judicial notice.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
10 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
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U.S.C. § 2241.11 A court must “promptly examine” a habeas petition.12 “If it plainly
appears 	from 	the 	motion, 	any 	attached 	exhibits, 	and 	the 	record 	of 	prior
proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss
the motion.”13
DISCUSSION
A writ of habeas corpus allows an individual to test the legality of being
detained or held in custody by the government.14 	The writ is “a vital ‘instrument
for the protection of individual liberty’ against government power.”15 	Under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, this Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”16
28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper avenue for a state prisoner who seeks to challenge
his state custody when there is no state judgment, such as here, where Mr. Urovak
is challenging his pretrial detention.17
Upon screening, it plainly appears that Mr. Urovak is not entitled to habeas
relief pursuant to § 2241 because the doctrine of Younger abstention compels the
11 See Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 885-88 (9th Cir. 2004).
12 Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
13 Id.
14 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473–74.
15 Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 743 (2008)).
16 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
17 Stow, 389 F.3d at 886 (“By contrast, the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241 is
available for challenges by a state prisoner who is not in custody pursuant to a state court
judgment—for example, a defendant in pre-trial detention or awaiting extradition.”) (quoting
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Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over his current petition. 	Younger
abstention, first announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris,18
requires that “[w]hen there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal
courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.”19 	Younger abstention
applies when the following four requirements are met:
(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding
implicates 	important 	state 	interests; 	(3) 	there 	is 	an 	adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges;
and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect
of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding.20
If a case satisfies these four factors, a federal court must abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over it unless there is “a showing of bad faith, harassment, or some
other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.”21
The Ninth Circuit has recognized an “irreparable harm” exception to Younger
abstention that applies “under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of
irreparable loss is both great and immediate.”22 	Under the irreparable harm
exception, Younger abstention
does not “require[] a district court to abstain from hearing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of pretrial detention
White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004)).
18 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
19 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013).
20 Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898,
901–02 (9th Cir. 2019)).
21 Id. (quoting Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018)).
22 Id. (quoting World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082
(9th Cir. 1987)).
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in state court” where (1) the procedure challenged in the petition is
distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution and the challenge
would not interfere with the prosecution, or (2) full vindication of the
petitioner’s pretrial rights requires intervention before trial.23
The Ninth Circuit has applied this exception to a pretrial detainee’s “colorable claim
that a state prosecution [would] violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,”24 to “a
challenge to pretrial detention on the basis of a stale and scientifically invalid
probable cause determination,”25 to “a pretrial detainee’s claim that he had been
incarcerated for over six months without a constitutionally adequate bail hearing,”26
and to a pretrial detainee’s challenge of “forcible administration of antipsychotic
medications.”27 	But the Ninth Circuit has not applied this exception to pre-
conviction habeas petitions that “seek[] to vindicate a petitioner’s speedy trial
affirmative defense.”28 Nor, as far as the Court’s research has discovered, has the
Ninth Circuit ever applied the exception to a pretrial habeas petition challenging a
state court’s criminal jurisdiction.
Mr. Urovak’s petition satisfies the four Younger abstention requirements.
First, Mr. Urovak’s pending criminal case is an ongoing state proceeding. Second,
23 Page, 932 F.3d at 903 (alteration in original) (quoting Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 764).
24 Bean, 986 F.3d at 1133–34 (quoting Dominguez v. Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1131 n.5 (9th Cir.
2018)).
25 Id. at 1134 (citing Page, 932 F.3d at 904).
26 Id. (citing Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 766–67).
27 Id. at 1134–36.
28 Id. at 1134 (citing Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 2012); Carden v. Montana, 626
F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in his pending case, Mr. Urovak has
been charged with Assault in the Second Degree, a Class B Felony; three counts
of Assault in the Third Degree, Class C Felonies; Assault in the Fourth Degree, a
Class A Misdemeanor; and Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, a Class A
Misdemeanor.29 	The State of Alaska has an important interest in prosecuting
violent crimes and enforcing sex offender registration requirements.30 	Third, Mr.
Urovak has an adequate opportunity to raise his jurisdictional challenge in the
pending state case. 	Mr. Urovak has identified no procedural bars that might
prevent him from raising his arguments in the state proceeding.31 	Fourth, Mr.
Urovak’s petition seeks his immediate release in the ongoing proceedings.32 	If
granted, such relief would “ha[ve] the practical effect of enjoining” the state’s
proceedings.33 	Thus, Mr. Urovak’s petition meets the four requirements for
Younger abstention.
Beyond the Younger abstention doctrine, which controls in this case, the
Court will briefly address the prevailing intersection of state, tribal, and federal
29 State v. Urovak, Case No. 3PA-21-00494CR, Party Charge Information.
30 Cf. Bean, 986 F.3d at 1133 (“[T]he state has an important interest in prosecuting a murder
case . . . .”).
31 See Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.
1999) (explaining that satisfying the “adequate opportunity” prong of Younger “requires only the
absence of ‘procedural bars’ to raising a federal claim in the state proceedings”).
32 Docket 1 at 4.
33 Bean, 986 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Page, 932 F.3d at 902).
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jurisdiction in criminal matters. Alaska is subject to Public Law 280.34 With Public
Law 280, Congress expressly granted six states, including Alaska, concurrent
state jurisdiction with tribes over criminal matters within: “all Indian country within
the State, except that on Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian community may
exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians in the same manner in
which such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in Indian country over
which State jurisdiction has not been extended.”35 As the Ninth Circuit has made
clear, “Public Law 280 was designed not to supplant tribal institutions, but to
supplement them.”36 Mr. Urovak appears to argue that as a tribal member he may
not be prosecuted by the State of Alaska under state law no matter where the
offense occurred.37 	This argument has been raised and rejected by the Alaska
Court of Appeals, which held that the State’s criminal laws fully apply to Alaskan
Natives under Public Law 280.38 Moreover the Alaska Court of Appeals has also
clarified that the “legislature has authorized the superior court to exercise original
jurisdiction in all criminal matters, and this jurisdiction extends to the whole of
Alaska.”39
34 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (Pub. L. 280, codified).
35 Id.
36 Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State of Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
37 See Docket 1.
38 Harrison v. State, 784 P.2d 681, 682–83 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
39 Bourdon v. State, 370 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting Defendant’s argument
that as a Native Alaskan sovereign citizen the Superior Court of Alaska lacked jurisdiction over
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In support 	of his argument, Mr. 	Urovak provides 	a newspaper 	article
discussing the United States Supreme Court decision McGirt v. Oklahoma.40
However, McGirt is inapposite. 	In McGirt, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the state court conviction of an member of the Seminole Nation, who
committed 	three 	serious 	sexual 	crimes 	on 	reservation 	land 	against 	a 	tribal
member.41 	The core of that case addressed whether McGirt’s crimes were
committed on reservation land, and therefore, subject to the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153, which grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction for major
felony crimes committed by “any Indian who commits” certain offenses “against
the person or property of another Indian or any other person” in “Indian country.”42
However most recently, the United States Supreme Court held that “Indian country
within a State’s territory is part of a State, not separate from a State. Therefore, a
State has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian country unless state
jurisdiction is preempted.”43 	The Court notes that Mr. Urovak’s alleged offense
took place in Willow, Alaska.44 	Mr. Urovak does not allege that he committed his
alleged offense on tribal lands where jurisdiction is preempted, nor against another
his criminal offense).
40 Docket 1-1 at 1–3.
41 McGirt v. Okla., 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459–60 (2020).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
43 Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486, 2504 (2022).
44 State v. Urovak, Case No. 3PA-21-00494CR, Party Charge Information.
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tribal member or Alaskan Native.45 	Further, Mr. Urovak does not raise any legal
grounds that would grant either exclusive tribal or federal jurisdiction as to his
alleged crimes.46
Lastly, to the extent that Mr. Urovak raises disagreements with his state
court-appointed counsel and systemic racism or discrimination within the state
court system, these allegations lie outside the bounds of habeas jurisdiction. 	A
federal court lacks jurisdiction over claims of constitutional violations that are not
within the “core of habeas corpus.”47 	The core of habeas corpus is relief that
“terminates custody, accelerates the future date of release from custody, [or]
reduces the level of custody.”48 	His disagreements with counsel may be raised
within Mr. Urovak’s state court proceeding or with the Alaska Bar Association.
Challenges regarding discrimination are likely best presented as a civil rights
action. 	Neither of these allegations are within the core of habeas corpus as they
do not seek relief that could terminate Mr. Urovak’s custody.
Mr. 	Urovak’s 	petition 	presents 	no 	other 	grounds 	that 	might 	justify 	an
exception to Younger abstention, or another avenue to habeas relief. 	Therefore,
the Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over his petition.
45 See generally Docket 1.
46 See Docket 1.
47 Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
48 Id. at 929–30 (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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CONCLUSION
In summary, Mr. Urovak’s petition satisfies the requirements for applying
Younger abstention. Because Mr. Urovak has not alleged or established bad faith,
harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances that might justify an exception
to abstention, the Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over his current
petition. 	Mr. Urovak has therefore not presented viable grounds for a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and his petition must be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. The Petition at Docket 1 is DISMISSED.
2. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a Final Judgment in this case.
4. A Certificate of Appealability shall not issue.49
DATED this 4th day of October, 2022, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
49 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(d), 2253(c)(2). See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(certificate of appealability may be granted only if applicant made a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” i.e., a showing that “reasonable jurists could debate
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further” (internal quotations
and citations omitted)).
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