Derossett v. Kijakazi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
T. D.,1
Plaintiff,
vs.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00225 RRB
ORDER REMANDING FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
(Docket 16)
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, 	T.D. 	(hereinafter 	“Claimant”), 	filed 	an 	application 	for
Supplemental Security 	Income benefits on 	September 23, 2019, alleging disability
beginning August 18, 2018. The ALJ denied his claim on August 12, 2021.2 Claimant has
exhausted his administrative remedies and seeks relief from this Court.3 He argues that the
determination by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) that he is not disabled, within
the meaning of the Social Security Act (“the Act”),4 is not supported by substantial
1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the
recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. See Memorandum, Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf.
2 See Tr. 17–27.
3 Dockets 1, 16.
4 42 U.S.C. § 423; 42 U.S.C. § 1381.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 1 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 2
evidence and that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed legal errors. Claimant
seeks a reversal of the decision by the SSA and a remand for further proceedings.5
The Commissioner of the SSA (“Commissioner”) filed an answer to the
Complaint and an answering brief in opposition. Claimant has replied. For the reasons set
forth 	below, 	Claimant’s 	Motion 	for 	Remand 	at 	Docket 16 	is 	GRANTED, 	the
Commissioner’s final decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the SSA
for further proceedings.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Disability is defined in the Act as:
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.6
The Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to individuals who have contributed
to the social security program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability.7
Specifically:
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only
if his . . . impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area
in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For
purposes 	of 	the 	preceding sentence 	(with 	respect 	to 	any
5 Claimant does not request a remand for calculation of benefits.
6 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
7 42 U.S.C. § 423(a).
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 2 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 3
individual), “work which exists in the national economy”
means work which exists in significant numbers either in the
region where such individual lives or in several regions of the
country.8
The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining
disability within the meaning of the Act,9 relevant portions of which are addressed below.
A claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four in order to make a prima
facie showing of disability.10 	If a claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of
proof then shifts to the agency at step five.11
A decision by the Commissioner to deny disability benefits will not be
overturned unless it either is not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal
error.12 	“Substantial evidence” has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”13 Such evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla,” but also “less than a
preponderance.”14 	In making its determination, the Court considers the evidence in its
entirety, weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s
conclusion.15 	If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
8 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
9 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
10 Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1096 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,
1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
11 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1096 n.1.
12 Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Gonzalez v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990)).
13 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
14 Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975).
15 Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 3 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 4
ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.16 Courts “review only the reasons provided by the ALJ
and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.”17 If an ALJ commits
legal error, courts will uphold the decision if it is harmless.18 An error is harmless if it is
“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.”19
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Background
This is Claimant’s second application for SSI benefits, the first having been
denied on August 21, 2018.20 	At the first hearing, on August 7, 2018, the ALJ took
testimony from Claimant, as well as non-examining psychiatrist, Dr. Cheryl Buechner, and
vocational expert (“VE”) Daniel Labrosse.21 	Claimant testified that he lived with his
mother. 	He took Clonazepam, Effexor, and Klonopin, the latter being effective to keep
anxiety “right at the doorstep,” with side effects of feeling intoxicated, but “it keeps me out
of the ER.” 	He reported that he has “had anxiety my whole life but I could control it. 	I
could do jobs and tasks and I could be having anxiety attack in my head and no one even
know.” He testified that as he has gotten older it has been harder to manage, despite several
years of outpatient treatment to learn exercises to manage, and he has been unable to
identify any specific trigger for his panic attacks.22 	ALJ Paul Hebda concluded that
16 Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452–53 (9th Cir. 1984).
17 Garrison, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).
18 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012).
19 Id. (citation omitted).
20 Tr. 103.
21 Tr. 33.
22 Tr. 41–49.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 4 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 5
Claimant had not been under a disability from June 7, 2005, through the date of his
decision.23
Claimant’s 	second 	application 	September 	23, 	2019, 	alleged 	disability
starting on August 18, 2018.24 	The second hearing was held on July 15, 2021, where
Claimant again testified, and the ALJ took testimony from Vocational Expert Mitchell
Schmidt.25 In 2021, Claimant testified that his conditions had worsened. He described a
“roller coaster” of symptoms cycling through depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and the
desire to flee. In order to take enough medication to manage the symptoms, he would be
“a zombie.” He sees a therapist once a week, and every three months he sees a provider
for medication management. His provider has told him that his medication is “as good as
it’s going to get” for managing anxiety. 	He had an unsuccessful volunteer position as a
“greeter” at Hope Community Resources,26 and described being fired from a pizza place
for having a panic attack. He avoids the grocery store because he had a panic attack there.27
ALJ Mark Baker denied benefits on August 12, 2021, and this appeal
followed.28 Claimant alleges that the ALJ erred in denying benefits, for a second time, by
failing to fully account for his “severe mental impairments” at Step 2 and in determining
23 Tr. 103.
24 Tr. 17.
25 Tr. 55.
26 “Hope Community Resources, Inc., is a non-profit disabilities service provider based in
Anchorage, Alaska . . . [which] provides services and supports to people of all ages and abilities who
experience an intellectual or developmental disability, traumatic brain injury, or mental health
challenges.” www.hopealaska.org/welcome (last visited November 22, 2023).
27 Tr. 69–70.
28 Tr. 27.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 5 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 6
his residual functional capacity.29 At all times relevant to the current ALJ’s adjudication,
Claimant was “closely approaching advanced age” (age 50–54), with a marginal education
and no past relevant work.30
There is no dispute that Claimant does not suffer from any significant
physical limitations. 	Rather, he alleges disability based on various mental disorders,
including 	panic 	disorder; 	generalized 	anxiety 	disorder; 	and 	major 	depressive
disorder. Claimant argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence
and that the ALJ committed legal errors in denying him benefits. Specifically, he contends
that “the ALJ did not reasonably support his findings with a logical connection between
the evidence and his analysis of the State Agency administrative findings and Plaintiff’s
testimony . . . by relying on highly selective references to the record to do so, and by failing
to account for all the limitations set forth therein.”31
B. 	2021 ALJ Decision
(1) 	Five step analysis
The ALJ concluded that: 	Step 1, Claimant had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since his alleged onset date; Step 2, Claimant suffered from severe
impairments, including panic disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; and major
depressive disorder;32 and Step 3, Claimant’s severe impairments did not meet any
medical listings.
29 Docket 16 at 1.
30 Tr. 25; 59–60.
31 Docket 16 at 11.
32 The ALJ further found bipolar disorder to be non-medically determinable, and Claimant’s
history of obesity, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia to be nonsevere impairments.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 6 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 7
Before proceeding to Step 4, a claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) is assessed. 	RFC is the most someone can do despite their mental and physical
limitations.33 In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must base findings on “all of the
relevant medical and other evidence,” including a claimant’s testimony regarding the
limitations imposed by his impairments.34 This RFC assessment is used at both Step Four
and Step Five.35 In evaluating his RFC, the ALJ concluded that Claimant had the capacity
to perform “a full range of work at all exertional levels but with . . . nonexertional
limitations,” as follows:
[T]he claimant is able to concentrate in the workplace for two
hours before requiring a break; limited to perform simple,
routine tasks; can occasionally interact with supervisors, co-
workers, 	and 	the 	general 	public; 	can 	frequently 	respond
appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; requires a
low 	stress 	work 	environment, 	defined 	as 	requiring 	only
occasional independent decision-making or use of work related
judgement, and no responsibility for the safety of others; no
fast paced production quotas, but rather goal-oriented work;
and no tandem work (solo work only).36
At Step 4, Claimant had no past relevant work. At Step 5 the burden of proof
shifts to the Commissioner.37 	With the assistance of a vocational expert, the ALJ
concluded that Claimant was able to perform work in the national economy, such as Battery
Stacker, Floor Waxer, and Hand Packager.38
33 Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1),
416.945(a)(1).
34 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3).
35 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
36 Tr. 21.
37 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1096 n.1.
38 Tr. 88–89.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 7 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 8
(2) 	Listed impairments
The 	ALJ’s 	analysis 	included 	a 	detailed 	discussion 	of 	listings 	12.04
(Depressive, bipolar and related disorders) and 12.06 (Anxiety and obsessive-compulsive
disorders), and whether the “paragraph B” criteria were satisfied. 	“To satisfy the
‘paragraph B’ criteria, the mental impairments must result in one extreme limitation or
two marked limitations in any of four areas of functioning.39 An extreme limitation is the
inability to function independently, appropriately, or effectively, and on a sustained basis.
A marked limitation is a seriously limited ability to function independently, appropriately,
or effectively, and on a sustained basis.”40
In 2018, non-examining psychiatric expert, Dr. Cheryl Buechner, performed
a record review and testified telephonically at the hearing at the request of the ALJ. She
identified the “primary medically determinable impairment” as “either panic attacks, panic
disorder with agoraphobia or generalized anxiety with panic features,” falling under listing
12.06.41 She opined that Claimant did not meet the listing, rating his limitations as “mild”
to “moderate,” with only one area suggesting “marked episodes when attempting to interact
with the public.”42 The ALJ did not take testimony from a psychiatric expert at the 2021
hearing.
The ALJ concluded that Claimant’s underlying mental impairments could
reasonably be expected to produce his pain or other symptoms, and turned his analysis to
39 The four areas are “[u]nderstand, remember, or apply information; interact with others;
concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(a)(3).
40 Tr. 20.
41 Tr. 38.
42 Tr. 39.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 8 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 9
“evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to
determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s work-related activities.”43 The ALJ
concluded that Claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of his symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record.44
The ALJ found that Claimant had mild limitations in understanding,
remembering, or applying information, and in his ability to adapt or manage himself. The
ALJ also found moderate limitations in Claimant's ability to concentrate, persist, or
maintain pace, and in interacting with others. The ALJ found it significant that Claimant
could “handle self-care and personal hygiene, spend time with his children, and get along
with caregivers,” while maintaining “appropriate grooming and hygiene” and having “no
problems with temper control.” Accordingly, because Claimant’s mental impairments do
not cause at least two “marked” limitations or one “extreme” limitation, the “paragraph B”
criteria were not satisfied.45
In support of his conclusion that Claimant’s statements were not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence, the ALJ cited a May 2019 new patient evaluation
wherein the provider noted:
adequate/appropriate 	appearance 	and 	grooming,
good/appropriate eye contact, normal psychomotor activity,
cooperative attitude, normal speech, “good” mood, euthymic
affect, linear/goal directed thought process, normal thought
content with no suicidal/homicidal thoughts and no delusions,
43 Tr. 22.
44 Tr. 22.
45 Tr. 20.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 9 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 10
normal perception with no hallucinations, normal cognition
with full orientation, intact remote memory, normal fund of
knowledge, and fair insight and judgment.46
The ALJ cited similar chart notes dated September, October, and November 2019, as well
as February, June, September, and December 2020, finding that Claimant “continued to be
cooperative and attentive in follow up visits . . . through June 2021.”47
The ALJ was unpersuaded by the opinions of consultative examiner Daniel
Gonzales, Ph.D., who performed a mental status examination at the request of the Alaska
State Disability Determination Services in January 2018. Dr. Gonzales noted that Claimant
last worked full time in 2013 as a dishwasher and pizza deliverer, but “stopped after two
weeks of employment due to low productivity and poor job performance due to panic
episodes.”48 Dr. Gonzales found Claimant to be “forthright” in his self-presentation, and
opined that Claimant’s ability to interact with peers, supervisors, and the general public
was “grossly impaired,” his ability to maintain concentration and focus on simple or
detailed repetitive work was “markedly impaired,” and his ability to concentrate on
multiple tasks was also “markedly impaired.”49 But the ALJ found that Dr. Gonzales did
not provide specific support for the conclusions and found them “grossly inconsistent with
the numerous mental status evaluations discussed above, which were continuously largely
46 Tr. 22 citing Tr. 601–07
47 Tr. 22–24.
48 Tr. 312.
49 Tr. 314.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 10 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 11
within normal limits.”50 Moreover, Dr. Gonzales had performed his evaluation within the
previously adjudicated period.51
In contrast, the ALJ found the opinions of the State agency psychiatric
consultants “generally persuasive.” 	Both opined Claimant had 	mild to moderate
limitations in the Paragraph B requirements.52 The ALJ found these opinions “consistent
with the overall treatment records, including numerous mental status evaluations largely
within normal limits.” However, the ALJ found “the consultants’ specific opinion that the
claimant is moderately limited in completing a normal workday/week is not consistent with
the overall record.”53
C. 	Analysis
A decision of the Commissioner to deny benefits will not be overturned
unless it either is not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.
“Substantial evidence” is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 	Having carefully reviewed the administrative record,
including extensive medical records, the Court concludes, based upon the record as a
whole, that the ALJ’s decision denying disability benefits to Claimant was not supported
by substantial evidence for the following reasons.
First, “the Social Security Act does not require that claimants be utterly
incapacitated to be eligible for benefits, . . . and many home activities are not easily
50 Tr. 24.
51 Tr. 25.
52 Tr. 128, 115–16.
53 Tr. 25.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 11 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 12
transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the workplace, where it
might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication.”54 	Claimant describes the
ALJ’s summary of the medical records as a “highly selective analysis,” and a “gross
mischaracterization of the record, which details a long history of treatment-resistant panic,
depression, insomnia, and generalized anxiety.”55 Claimant notes that it is well-settled that
variable presentation of symptoms, such as “good and bad days,” are “practically a
hallmark feature of mental impairments, and an ALJ plainly errs when he selectively culls
the record for normal exam findings in a mental impairment case where the record also
demonstrates significant mental impairment.”56 Claimant cites back to his opening brief,
identifying medical records showing: 	off task due to lack of focus;57 frequent panic
attacks;58 excessive sleeping;59 medication side effects;60 increased depression symptoms
and difficulty coping with tangential thought process;61 mGAF score of 43.5, “which shows
some serious symptoms or impairment in functioning”;62 and insomnia, guarded attitude,
54 Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d at 603.
55 Docket 16 at 17.
56 Docket 19 at 4–5 (citing Janet M. v. Comm’r SSA, No. 6:21-cv-00725-AR, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 230400, at *10 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2022) (citing Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th
Cir. 2001)) (“That a person who suffers from severe panic attacks, anxiety, and depression make some
improvement does not mean that the person’s impairments no longer seriously affect her ability to
function in a workplace.”).
57 Docket 19 at n.4 (citing Tr. 113–16; 127–33; 224–30; 327; 601; 622; 754; 771; 854; 945;
955). 58 Id. (citing Tr. 68–84; 227; 230; 331; 328; 601–08; 625; 659; 663).
59 Id. (citing Tr. 83–84; 331; 601; 648; 657; 771; 808; 828; 855; 955).
60 Id. (citing Tr. 659; 663 (if he does not take his anxiety medication, he will have a panic
attack, but when he does, he is tired and sleepy)).
61 Id. (citing Tr. 624).
62 Id. (citing Tr. 637).
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 12 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 13
restricted affect, circumstantial thought processes.63 	The Court agrees that Claimant’s
medical history is significantly downplayed in the ALJ’s written opinion.
Second, the Court notes that the ALJ disregarded vocational expert testimony
that did not align with his conclusions. 	In both 2018 and 2021, the vocational experts
testified that there was unskilled work in the national economy for an individual of
Claimant’s age, education, and past work experience, with no physical limitations, but who
would be limited to: 	simple and routine and repetitive tasks; only occasional interaction
with coworkers, supervisors, or the public; and no tandem tasks or a high production rate.64
But the 2018 VE opined that if that same individual “would not be able to sustain sufficient
persistence or pace to do even routine tasks on a regular and continuing basis for eight
hours a day,” that it would “pretty much eliminate” any jobs.65 And in 2021, a different
VE concluded that if an individual was off-task 15 percent of a typical workday, such an
individual would not be employable.66 The ALJ did not discuss the VE opinions that being
off-task or absent would preclude employment, despite treatment records indicating
Claimant’s diagnoses of moderate to severe Major Depressive Disorder Recurring,
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and PTSD,67 and Claimant’s testimony regarding daily
panic attacks.
This Court also finds that the ALJ has not adequately supported his
conclusion at Step 3 that Claimant does not meet the Paragraph B criteria of a listed
63 Id. (citing Tr. 756–59).
64 Tr. 51, 88–89.
65 Tr. 52.
66 Tr. 88–90.
67 Tr. 315–457.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 13 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 14
impairment. 	The ALJ found that Claimant had mild limitations in understanding,
remembering, or applying information, and in his ability to adapt or manage himself, and
moderate limitations in his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, and in
interacting with others. 	The ALJ did not acknowledge the 2018 testimony of the non-
examining medical expert who opined that Claimant had “marked” difficulty interacting
with others.68 Nor did the ALJ call a psychological expert to testify at the 2021 hearing.
And although the ALJ dismissed examining physician Dr. Gonzalez’s opinions of “gross”
or “marked” impairments as outdated,69 the ALJ did nothing to develop the record to
update this opinion. 	Additionally, although the ALJ found the opinions of the non-
examining state agency psychiatric consultants “generally persuasive” and “consistent with
the overall treatment records,” he then found their opinions that Claimant was “moderately
limited in completing a normal workday/week,” were “not consistent with the overall
record.”70
Dr. Gonzalez and the state agency psychiatric consultants were all neutral
physicians appointed by the state, and the ALJ’s dismissal of their opinions, in whole or in
part, because they did not align with the ALJ’s cherry-picked summary of the record does
not constitute “substantial evidence.” Having dismissed most of the opinions that would
support a disability finding, the ALJ then discounted Claimant’s testimony as unsupported
by the record. 	But a review of Claimant’s treating physician’s treatment notes reveals
68 Tr. 39.
69 Tr. 314.
70 Tr. 25.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 14 of 15

T. D. v. Kijakazi 	Case No. 3:22-cv-00225-RRB
Order Remanding for Further Proceedings 	Page 15
diagnoses, 	prescribed 	treatments, 	medications, 	and 	clinical 	findings 	of 	significant
psychiatric diagnoses. Moreover, no physician indicated concerns of malingering. Even
the neutral examining physician, Dr. Gonzalez, found Claimant “forthright.”71
In making the determination that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence, this Court considered the evidence in its entirety, weighing both the
evidence that supported and that which detracted from the ALJ’s conclusion.72 The Court
finds that the ALJ’s conclusions that Claimant does not meet a listed impairment, and that
he could perform work for eight hours per day without being off task, are not supported by
substantial evidence for the reasons discussed in this order. Such error was not harmless.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimant’s
motion at Docket 16 is GRANTED and this matter is REMANDED for further
proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of December, 2023, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Ralph R. Beistline
RALPH R. BEISTLINE
Senior United States District Judge
71 Tr. 314.
72 Jones, 760 F.2d at 995.
Case 3:22-cv-00225-RRB Document 20 Filed 12/06/23 Page 15 of 15