McBee v. Battle et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 4:24-cv-04118-SOH
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS TEXARKANA DIVISION
TATYANA LASHELLE MCBEE
PLAINTIFF
V.
Civil No. 4:24-cv-04118-SOH-SGS
CORWIN BATTLE; JOHN RHONE; INVESTIGATOR BLAKE EUDY; LARRY MARION; BRYAN CHESSIR; and AARON BRASEL1
DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Tatyana Lashelle McBee, currently an inmate of the Arkansas Division of Corrections - McPherson Unit in Newport, Arkansas, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her original Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") on November 3, 2024, in the Eastern District of Arkansas. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). Plaintiff then filed an Addendum to her Complaint on November 6, 2024. (ECF No. 3). The Eastern District Court transferred the case to this Court on December 2, 2024. (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff
1 The Court notes Plaintiff did not name Tom Cooper or Jessica Gunter in her Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 22). Accordingly, the Clerk properly terminated these two Defendants from the docket sheet at the filing of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
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AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

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was granted IFP status by this Court on December 19, 2024. 	(ECF No. 8).
On January 15, 2025, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation screening Plaintiff’s
original Complaint pursuant to Section 1915A(a). 	(ECF No. 11). 	In this Report, the Court2
recommended all of Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 	Id. 	Upon filing of this Report and Recommendation, the referral to the
Magistrate Judge was terminated.
On February 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend her original Complaint. 	(ECF No.
12). 	The Court denied this Motion on February 18, 2025. 	(ECF No. 13).
On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff objected to the Court’s Report and Recommendation
screening her original Complaint. 	(ECF No. 14).
On September 16, 2025, the Court declined to adopt the January 15, 2025 Report and
Recommendation. 	Instead, Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to amend her Complaint. 	(ECF
No. 16). 	The case was then referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for screening of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
On October 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint. 	(ECF No. 22). 	In this
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names Special Agents from the Arkansas State Police: Corwin
Battle, John Rhone, Police Detective Larry Marion, and Investigator Blake Eudy as Defendants.
She also names former prosecutor and current Circuit Judge Bryan Chessir and prosecuting
attorney Aaron Brasel as Defendants. 	(ECF No. 22, p. 1). 	Plaintiff claims these Defendants
2 This case was originally directly assigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge Barry A. Bryant. 	(ECF No.
6). 	Upon filing of the first Report and Recommendation this referral was terminated, and the case
was reassigned to U.S. District Judge Susan O. Hickey. 	(ECF No. 11). 	When Judge Hickey
declined to adopt the first Report and Recommendation, the case was referred to U.S. Magistrate
Judge Spencer Singleton on September 16, 2025 for screening of the instant Amended Complaint.
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violated her Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and violated Article 2 Section
10 and 15 of the Arkansas State Constitution. 	Id. 	Plaintiff specifically claims in her Amended
Complaint:
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3.) Before interrogating me; Special Agents State Police Corwin Battle, John Rhone, Police Detective Larry Marion, and Investigator Blake Eudy seized and searched items unreasonably. Any search warrant was issued without probable cause, and in violation of not only my Constitutional Rights and Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Items requested to be searched according to what was filed on the court docket (View document #2-0 pg. 27) were seized and transported to Howard County without warrant, nor probable cause. The search warrant and warrant was issued improperly and unlawfully executed.
4.) On or about September 2022, I received my Motion of Discovery. After reviewing the documents I noticed a invalid arrest warrant (View document #2-0 pg. 15). Special Agent John Rhone of the Arkansas State Police swore by affidavit (incompletely) that an arrest warrant was obtained August 16, 2016. However, no such arrest warrant existed, nor was issued by any court clerk (Review documentation #2-0 pg. 23 and 27).
5.) Former Prosecuting Attorney Bryan Chessir and former Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Aaron Brasel tried and prosecuted this case after knowing the unlawful acts committed by Special Agent(s), Arkansas Police John Rhone, Corwin Battle, Detective Larry Marion, and Blake Eudy. On or about November 2016 former Prosecuting Attorney Bryan Chessir and former Deputy Prosecutor Aaron Brasel sent the Public Defender Gregory Vardaman my discovery. On or about May 17, 2017 former Prosecuting Attorney Bryan Chessir and former Deputy Prosecutor Aaron Brasel sent then Public Defender LaTonya Laird Austin my discovery with the exact same contents that I reviewed noticing the unlawful, unconstitutional acts ofthe named Arkansas officials.
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(ECF No. 22, pp. 2-3).
For relief Plaintiff requests $500,000 in punitive damages and $300,000 dollars in
compensatory damages along with a formal apology from the Defendants. 	Plaintiff alleges all
her claims against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. 	(ECF No. 22, p. 3).3
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court must dismiss a complaint, or
any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or it is
undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer v.
3 The Court notes it did not consider Plaintiff’s exhibits attached to her Complaint. 	Exhibits may
only be submitted to the Court when attached to: (1) a motion for summary judgment or response
to such motion; (2) a motion for a restraining order or response to such motion; (3) a motion to
compel or a response to a motion to compel; (4) a motion for sanctions; (5) at a hearing or trial; or
(6) as directed by the Court. 	United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas
Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Guide, https://www.arwd.uscourts.gov/prisoner-1983-litigation
(last visited November 30, 2025).
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Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants acted under
color of state law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009
(8th Cir. 1999). 	Furthermore, the deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not
suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under Section 1983. 	Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). 	Lastly, Defendants
must have been personally involved and caused the violation alleged. 	“Liability under section
1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. 	To
establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of
personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.”
Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442
F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). 	Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed for failure to state a
claim if it appears beyond a doubt the Plaintiff’s complaint can prove no set of facts to support
the plaintiff’s purported cause of action. 	See Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d
736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege
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specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes it interprets Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to assert
the following claims against each Defendant: (1) unlawful stop, detention, and arrest, on August
16, 2016, against Defendants Battle, Rhone, Marion, and Eudy; (2) unreasonable search and
seizure of “items” during the interrogation following the August 16, 2016 arrest by Defendants
Battle, Rhone, Marion, and Eudy; and (3) malicious prosecution in November 2016 and on May
17, 2017, by Defendants Brasel and Chessir. 	(ECF No. 22).
A. Statute of Limitations
First, all of Plaintiff’s claims are time barred. 	Section 1983 does not contain its own
statute of limitation. 	Instead, causes of action under Section 1983 are governed by “the most
appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations.” 	Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985).
In Arkansas, this is the three-year personal injury statute of limitations, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-
105(3). 	See Mountain Home Flight Serv., Inc. v. Baxter Cty., Ark., 758 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.
2014).
The Court must next determine when this applicable statute of limitations began running.
While state law provides the statute of limitations, federal law applies in determining when a cause
of action accrues. 	Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). 	Generally, a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. 	Id.; see also Rassier v.
Sanner, 996 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 2021) (“accrual occurs when the plaintiff can file suit and
obtain relief”).
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The actions or inactions complained of by Plaintiff, as listed in her Amended Complaint,
occurred in August 2016 (her arrest and the relevant search and seizures), November 2016, and
May 2017 (the alleged malicious prosecutions). 	The Court notes, however, Plaintiff also refers
to her arrest occurring in “August 16, 2025.” 	(ECF No. 22, pp. 1-2). 	Plaintiff also asserts in her
Amended Complaint she was arrested on August 16, 2016, in “Tulsa,” and her prosecution from
this arrest occurred during 2016 and 2017 in Arkansas. 	(ECF No. 22, pp. 1-3). 	Lastly, the
Arkansas State Criminal Court records indicate an arrest warrant from Howard County, Arkansas
was served on Plaintiff on August 19, 2016. 	State v. Tatyana McBee, Criminal Case Number,
31AW-16-3, 	https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/31AW-16-3 	(last 	visited 	November 	30,
2025). 	The criminal case resulting from this arrest commenced on September 12, 2016, and
Plaintiff entered a negotiated plea of guilty on April 17, 2018. 	State v. Tatyana McBee, Criminal
Case 	No. 	31CR-16-120, 	https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/31CR-16-120 	(last 	visited
November 30, 2025). 	This is the only criminal case involving Plaintiff listed in the criminal
records of Howard County, Arkansas for Plaintiff.
While the Court takes note of the inconsistencies in dates offered by Plaintiff, considering
any dates alleged by Plaintiff or the dates listed in Plaintiff’s Arkansas criminal court docket,
Plaintiff’s statute of limitations has long expired. 	Plaintiff filed this case on December 2, 2024,
over eight years from the date of her arrest and any search and seizures related to that arrest and
over six years since her prosecution and conviction—April 17, 2018. 	Accordingly, all of
Plaintiff’s claims alleged in her Amended Complaint should be dismissed as time barred.4
4 The Court notes Judge Bryant did not address the statute of limitations issue in the first Report
and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s original Complaint as all of Plaintiff’s claims failed for other
reasons.5 Plaintiff states in her Amended Complaint she received disclosure of discovery in her
criminal case in “September 2022.” 	(ECF No. 22, p. 2). 	Plaintiff did not assert in her Amended
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B. Heck v. Humphrey
Even if Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim was not time barred, it would be barred by Heck.
Plaintiff may not recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment because
such claims are barred unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 	Plaintiff has produced no evidence or
allegations in her Complaint to meet the Heck requirements.
Heck does, however, have exceptions for illegal search and seizure claims:
a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search
may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's
still-outstanding conviction. 	Because of doctrines like independent
source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such
a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that
the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful. 	In order to recover
compensatory damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove
not only that the search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual,
compensable injury, which, we hold today, does not encompass the
“injury” of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has
been overturned).
Id. at 487, n. 7. 	The Eighth Circuit has interpreted this footnote to create a general exception from
Heck for Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims. 	See e.g. Moore v. Sims,
200 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 2000) (when Plaintiff was convicted of drug possession, his § 1983 claim
Complaint this was the first instance she learned of any purported prosecutorial conduct, but giving
Plaintiff a liberal construction of her Amended Complaint, the Court could consider this an
argument for tolling her statute of limitations on the malicious prosecution claims and unlawful
arrest claims. 	However, such an interpretation would be futile as Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Chessir and Brasel fail based on immunity and her unlawful arrest claim against all
the officer Defendants fails based on Heck as explained herein.
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that the drugs were “planted” by officers was barred by Heck, but his claim that his initial stop and
detention at a detoxification center were without probable cause could proceed); Simmons v.
O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Because harmless error analysis is applicable to the
admission at trial of coerced confessions, judgment in favor of Simmons on this § 1983 action will
not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction.”).
Here, however, as explained above, Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure claims
accrued in August of 2016 and are thus, time barred.
C. Immunities
Next, Defendants Chessir and Brasel are immune from Plaintiff’s suit. 	The Supreme
Court established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under
Section 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” 	Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). 	This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 	Id. at 430. 	Furthermore, immunity is not defeated
by “[a]llegations of unethical conduct and improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial
functions.” 	Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). 	“[A] prosecutor is
immune from suit even if he knowingly presented false, misleading, or perjured testimony . . . or
withheld or suppressed exculpatory evidence.” 	Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th
Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, even if Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Chessir and Brasel were not
time barred, the claims would still fail as a matter of law because of Defendants Chessir and
Brasel’s immunity from suit.5
5 Plaintiff states in her Amended Complaint she received disclosure of discovery in her criminal
case in “September 2022.” 	(ECF No. 22, p. 2). 	Plaintiff did not assert in her Amended
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D. Official Capacity
Similarly, if Plaintiff’s official capacity claims were not time barred, they must fail as a
matter of law as the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 	The Eleventh Amendment
bars claims for damages by private parties against a state. 	See e.g., Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cty.
Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Fryberger v. Univ. of Ark., 889 F.3d 471, 473
(8th Cir. 2018) (Eleventh Amendment establishes that “an unconsenting State is immune from
suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state”). 	An
official capacity claim against government officials is the equivalent of a claim against the entity
itself. 	Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits against state officials in their official capacity
. . . should be treated as suits against the State”). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
asserted against all the Arkansas State Police Defendants and both prosecuting attorneys6 are
essentially claims against the State of Arkansas and barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
E. State Claims
As all of Plaintiff’s federal Section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law, the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims under the Arkansas
Constitution. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th
Cir. 2004) (when all federal claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to consider
Complaint this was the first instance she learned of any purported prosecutorial conduct, but giving
Plaintiff a liberal construction of her Amended Complaint, the Court could consider this an
argument for tolling her statute of limitations on the malicious prosecution claims and unlawful
arrest claims. 	However, such an interpretation would be futile as Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Chessir and Brasel fail based on immunity and her unlawful arrest claim against all
the officer Defendants fails based on Heck as explained herein.
6 In Arkansas prosecuting attorneys are officers of the state. 	Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 20.
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under pendent jurisdiction doctrine will weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims). 	Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s state-law claims be dismissed
without prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended the case be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Referral Status: Referral should be terminated.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 2nd day of December 2025.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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