Striegel v. White et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
NATHAN STRIEGEL 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Case No. 6:24-cv-06069
WARDEN WHITE; MAJOR
OTTS; and LT. JACKSON 	DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) filed June 23, 2024, by the
Honorable Mark E. Ford, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
(ECF No. 7). Plaintiff Nathan Striegel (“Plaintiff”) has objected. (ECF No. 9). The Court finds
the matter ripe for consideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. 	(ECF No. 1). 	The Complaint alleges
that from January 23, 2024, to May 9, 2024, Plaintiff was only allowed access to the yard and
gym “about 5 times.” (ECF No. 1, at 4). Plaintiff alleges that this caused him stress from lack of
fresh air, stress from lack of the ability to move around, and prevented him from getting sun
light. 	(ECF No. 1, at 4). 	Further, Plaintiff alleges that without yard call, tensions between the
prisoners and between the prisoners and staff could lead to “brutal attacks for no reason at all.”
(ECF No. 1, at 6).
On July 23, 2024, Judge Ford filed the instant R&R. 	(ECF No. 7). 	Judge Ford
recommends that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. 	(ECF No. 7, at 4). 	Judge Ford notes that Plaintiff has only alleged a lack of
recreation time in the outdoors or in a gym. 	(ECF No. 7, at 4). 	Judge Ford also notes that
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Plaintiff has provided no additional information such as opportunities to be outside of his cell,
the size of Plaintiff’s cell, or the availability of recreation inside his cell. 	(ECF No. 7, at 3-4).
Additionally, Judge Ford notes that Plaintiff has failed to allege any compensable physical
injuries. (ECF No. 7, at 4).
On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed his objections. (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff argues that the
five (5) times that they were allowed outside they were only given thirty (30) minutes. (ECF No.
9, at 1). 	Plaintiff also argues that he shares a room with thirty-one (31) other inmates in a
barracks only designed for twenty-five (25) inmates and that there is no room “to do anything.”
(ECF No. 9, at 1). 	Plaintiff then states again that the lack of opportunities to be outside have
caused him mental stress. 	(ECF No. 9, at 1). 	Plaintiff also argues that “the timeline to do
anything is unjust do to the fact of being shipped unit to unit the mail is not getting to me in a
timely manner and every time I put in a change of address.” (ECF No. 9, at 2).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Court may designate a magistrate judge to hear pre- and post-trial matters and to
submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition.” Bramlett v.
Wellpath, LLC, No. 6:19-cv-6070, 2020 WL 4748049, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 17, 2020). 	After
reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendations under the appropriate standard of
review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
“[T]he specific standard of review depends, in the first instance, upon whether or not a
party has objected to portions of the report and recommendation.” 	Anderson v. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1015 (N.D. Iowa 2018). 	“The Court
applies a liberal construction when determining whether pro se objections are specific.” Raper v.
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Maxwell, No. 4:21-cv-4067, 2022 WL 1978690, at *1 (W.D. Ark. June 6, 2022) (citation
omitted). 	If the prisoner “files timely and specific objections” to the magistrate’s report and
recommendations, then “the district court makes ‘a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made.’” 	Branch v.
Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 	“When conducting de novo
review, the district court makes its own determinations of disputed issues and does not decide
whether the magistrate’s proposed findings are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1046. Alternatively, if
the Plaintiff does not timely and specifically object to the report and recommendation, the Court
reviews that report and recommendation for clear error. 	See Raper, 2022 WL 1978690, at *2;
see also Thornton v. Walker, No. 4:22-cv-4114, 2023 WL 3063381, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 24,
2023) (applying a clear-error standard where Plaintiff’s objections did not “specifically address
any aspect of [the magistrate judge’s] analysis or reasoning”); Engledow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 20-cv-4, 2021 WL 916925, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 10, 2021) (explaining that de novo review
is appropriate where objections are not “more than . . . conclusory” and are not “accompanied by
legal authority and argument in support” (citations omitted)). 	The Court will review Judge
Ford’s findings de novo.
III. 	DISCUSSION
“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being.” 	Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998). The Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII;
see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978). As it relates to the treatment of prisoners,
the Supreme Court has distinguished between two different types of conduct: (1) conduct that is
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part of the formal punishment imposed for a crime and (2) conduct that does not purport to be
punishment, including the conditions of confinement, medical care, and restoration of control
over inmates. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-303 (1991). As to the latter, the Supreme
Court has taken the position that harsh conditions and rough disciplinary treatment are part of the
price that a convict must pay for his or her offenses against society. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981). 	However, although the Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons, it also does not permit inhumane ones. 	See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994).
The Eighth Amendment also prohibits punishments that deprive inmates of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities. Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996); see
also Hall v. Dalton, 34 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n this circuit, the standards applied to
Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims have been the same.”). 	As is the case
with all Eighth Amendment claims, a prisoner must suffer some actual injury in order to receive
compensation, and the injury must be greater than de minimis. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441,
448 (8th Cir. 2008).
“A prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must prove both an objective and
subjective element.” 	Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004). 	“The defendants’
conduct must objectively rise to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving the plaintiff
of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. The defendants’ conduct must also reflect
a subjective state of mind evincing deliberate indifference to the health or safety of the prisoner.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is established when
the plaintiff shows “the defendant was substantially aware of but disregarded an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Id.
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A constitutional violation exists if Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
exercise needs. See Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992). A “lack of exercise
may be a constitutional violation if one’s muscles are allowed to atrophy or if an inmate’s health
is threatened.” Id. Courts reviewing an inmate’s lack of exercise claim should consider factors
such as: (1) the opportunity to be out of the cell; (2) the availability of recreation within the cell;
(3) the size of the cell; and (4) the duration of confinement. 	Id. 	Lastly, “[c]laims under the
Eighth Amendment require a compensable injury to be greater than de minimis.” 	Irving v.
Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008). 	“While a serious injury is not necessary, some
actual injury is required in order to state an Eighth Amendment violation.” White v. Holmes, 21
F.3d 277, 281 (8th Cir. 1994).
On an initial note, the Court need not reach the duration of Plaintiff’s time without
outdoor yard call because Plaintiff has failed to allege any compensable physical injury, such as
muscle atrophy, or other injury. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury . . .”.). Plaintiff has only alleged that lack of yard call
has caused him stress and that lack of yard call could lead to high tensions among prisoners and
that, in turn, could lead to “brutal attacks for no reason.” 	(ECF No. 7, at 1-2). As Judge Ford
notes in the R&R, Plaintiff has in no way alleged that he has been victim of an attack.
Additionally, nothing in Plaintiff’s objections reveal a compensable physical injury. 	Plaintiff
only repeats that lack of opportunities to be outside the barracks “or available recreation inside
caus[ed] mental stress.” 	(ECF No. 9, at 1). 	These are not physical injuries. 	Thus, the Court
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finds that Plaintiff has failed to show any compensable physical injury as required to state an
Eighth Amendment violation for a conditions of confinement claim.1
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Upon de novo review, the Court hereby adopts the R&R (ECF No. 7) in toto.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and that Plaintiff’s case should be and hereby is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 	Plaintiff is warned that, in the future, this dismissal
may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), and thus the Clerk is directed
to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration. 	Further, the Court
certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal will not be taken
in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 21st day of May, 2025.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge
1Plaintiff also states that “the time line to do any thing is unjust do to the fact of being shipped unit to unit the mail is
not getting to me in a timely manner and every time I put in a change of address.” (ECF No. 9, at 2). To the extent
that Plaintiff is arguing that he did not have enough time to respond to the R&R, the Court notes that Plaintiff did
not request any extensions of time to file. Thus, the Court finds such an argument unpersuasive.
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