Denby et al v. Casa Grande, City of et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs James Denby and Elizabeth Torres’s Motion
for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case. (Doc. 335). Defendants Engstrom,
Robinson, Lapre, Gragg, and Skedel filed a Response (Doc. 337), and Plaintiffs filed a
Reply. (Doc. 338). Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider its Order dismissing this matter as
a sanction for Plaintiffs’ conduct. (Doc. 335). In that Order (Doc. 329), the Court found
that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith when they were less-than-candid with the Court about
Plaintiff Torres’s residence in a memory care facility and her ability to participate in her
own case, including testifying at trial. (See id.). The Court imposed sanctions based on its
inherent authority and determined that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction. (Id. at
23–25).
In the Motion for Reconsideration, “Plaintiffs’ counsel request the opportunity to
clear their names in open court.” (Doc. 335 at 5 n.2, 14). The Court finds that oral argument
would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, and the pending motion is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v.
James W. Denby, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
City of Casa Grande, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. CV-17-00119-PHX-SPL
ORDER
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 1 of 10

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court now rules as follows.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Reconsideration is disfavored and “appropriate only in rare circumstances.” Defs.
of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Motions for
reconsideration are “not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their
original briefs,” nor should such motions “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has
already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582
(D. Ariz. 2003); see also LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) (“The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for
reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts
or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable
diligence.”). A motion for reconsideration may be brought based on “matters that the
movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court.” Id.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs identify seven reasons that the Court’s decision should be reconsidered:
(1) it dismisses Denby’s independent claims without adequate
nexus to any alleged misconduct; (2) even if sanctions were
warranted, and they are not, the Court failed to consider any
alternative as required by Ninth Circuit law; (3) it contravenes
Rule 17(c)’s mandate to protect, not punish, incompetent
parties; (4) it sanctions counsel for conduct that Arizona’s
ethical rules required; (5) it imposes the most extreme measure
available on an expedited timeline with no prior warning; (6)
the Thompson factors, properly analyzed, do not support
dismissal of this Section 1983 civil rights action; and (7) the
Court resolved material factual disputes which include disputes
that Defendants themselves asked to resolve through an
evidentiary hearing without permitting live testimony or cross
examination.
(Doc. 335 at 2). The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
A. Dismissal of Plaintiff Denby’s Claims as a Sanction
First, the Court will address what Plaintiffs argue is the “most fundamental error in
the Court’s Order”—the dismissal of Plaintiff Denby’s claims. (Doc. 335 at 6). Plaintiffs
argue that Plaintiff Denby had independent standing, Plaintiff Torres’s testimony was not
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 2 of 10

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
necessary to prove his claims, and that the alleged misconduct only relates to Plaintiff
Torres’s claims. (Id. at 6–8). In the April 24, 2026 Order, the Court found that Plaintiff
Denby and Plaintiffs’ counsel knew or should have known that Plaintiff Torres was not
competent to participate in the case. (Doc. 329 at 17). Specifically, Plaintiffs averred that
Plaintiff Denby communicated regularly with Plaintiff Torres and “consistently reported
to counsel that Torres had capacity.” (Id.). The Court considered Plaintiff Denby’s conduct
in determining whether Plaintiffs acted with an improper purpose (id. at 19–20) and issued
sanctions accordingly.
In addition, the Court already considered Plaintiffs’ arguments that Plaintiff
Denby’s claims are independent from those of Plaintiff Torres. (Id. at 20). The Court has
previously acknowledged that Plaintiff Denby had sufficiently alleged standing,
independent of his sister, to assert Fourth Amendment claims. (Doc. 275 at 9–10).
However, he still sought to add Plaintiff Torres to the litigation to streamline the issues for
trial and claim damages to the real property, which he did not own at the time of the
incident. (See Doc. 249). For those reasons, the Court found in its Order that “the deception
is closely related to the merits of the case,” and dismissed both Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. at
24). Even despite Plaintiff Denby’s standing to bring claims without Plaintiff Torres, he
still failed to inform the Court of Plaintiff Torres’s mental capacity. The Court will not
grant reconsideration on this basis.
B. Alternative Sanctions and Thompson Factors Analysis
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Court failed to consider alternative sanctions and
misapplied the Thompson factors. The Court explicitly considered the availability of less
drastic sanctions in consideration of the five factors outlined in Thompson v. Housing Auth.
of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1986). (Doc. 329 at 25). The Court discussed the
possibility of denying only Plaintiff Torres’s claims and awarding fees but determined that
the lesser sanction would not be adequate. (Id.). In addition, the Court explained the
challenges of proceeding with litigation, including trial, in light of the credibility issues
that arose. (Id. at 25–26). Thus, the Court considered meaningful alternatives to dismissal
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 3 of 10

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
in its Order. Plaintiffs also assert that the fourth Thompson factor disfavors dismissal in §
1983 actions. (Doc. 335 at 10). The Order addressed that the fourth factor weighs against
dismissal, but this does not change the outcome nor provide a reason to reconsider the
Order. (Doc. 329 at 24). The Court weighed all the Thompson factors in its Order and will
not grant reconsideration on this basis.
C. FRCP 17 and Ethical Rules
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the Order contravenes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(c) and sanctions counsel for complying with ethical obligations under the Arizona Rules
of Professional Conduct, specifically, Ethical Rules 1.14 and 1.6. (Doc. 335 at 10–19).
Plaintiffs contend that the Court should have granted Plaintiffs’ motion to appoint a
representative for Plaintiff Torres instead of dismissing her claims.1 (Id. at 12). This
argument does not account for the fact that Plaintiffs did not raise the issue of Plaintiff
Torres’s competency and did not request appointment of a representative until prompted
to do so by the Court, one week before trial. (Doc. 323). Indeed, the requirements of Rule
17 do not alter the Court’s finding that Plaintiff Denby and Plaintiffs’ counsel acted in bad
faith by failing to investigate Plaintiff Torres’s mental state or communicate with Plaintiff
Torres.
At the same time as Plaintiffs argue that the Court should have appointed a
representative, they also appear to argue that, despite being declared incompetent to testify
by her treating medical provider, Plaintiff Torres could have “take[n] the stand and
answer[ed] questions.” (Doc. 335 at 15). Further, in Declarations attached to the instant
Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs’ counsel Mr. Woods declares: “It was and continues
to be my belief and opinion that despite the opinion of the nurse practitioner, Ms. Torres is
1 Plaintiffs also state that the “Court’s finding that Ms. Torres is an ‘unrepresented
party’ is gross error.” (Doc. 335 at 5, n.2). Plaintiffs counsel appears to argue that this is
untrue because she is represented by counsel. (Id.). The Court’s April 24, 2026 Order
described that after Plaintiffs conceded Plaintiff Torres lacked capacity to testify at trial,
she remained a party but was “unrepresented in the action within the meaning of Rule
17(c).” (Doc. 329 at 12). Plaintiffs also assert that Plaintiff Torres is not represented under
Rule 17, and the Court should have granted their Motion.
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 4 of 10

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
capable of testifying.” (Doc. 335-1 at 14, ¶ 16). In addition, Mr. Mills declares: “When Ms.
Torres’ nurse practitioner issued a written opinion that Ms. Torres is not competent to
testify, it didn’t change anything other than to establish that perhaps Ms. Torres should not
testify.” (Id. at 18, ¶ 15). Mr. Mills continues to declare that it “was and continues to be my
belief and opinion that if Ms. Torres is capable of testifying, great. If not, it would not
adversely affect Plaintiffs’ ability to prove their claims.”2 (Id. at 19, ¶ 16). This is a new
argument. Plaintiffs contradict their previous statement to the Court that Plaintiff Torres is
incompetent and their own request to vacate the competency hearing. (See Doc. 316).3
They also flatly contradict other arguments made in this Motion.
As to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s ethical duties, the Court agrees with Defendants that
“[w]hether sanctions implicate counsel’s compliance with ethical duties is not relevant to
Rule 59(e) relief.” (Doc. 337 at 16). The Court does not find that compliance Ethical Rules
1.14 or 1.6 explain the conduct at issue here. Ethical Rule 1.14 governs a lawyer’s duty to
a client with “diminished capacity” and states that the lawyer shall “maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship” as much as possible, “treat the client with attention and
respect,” and “maintain communication with the client, even if the client has a legal
representative or other involved third parties.” E.R. 1.14. Ethical Rule 1.6 requires
confidentiality with client information. Neither of these Rules required Plaintiffs’ counsel
to disregard or conceal Plaintiff Torres’s ability to prosecute her claims. In fact, Plaintiffs’
arguments regarding their ethical duties underscore the Court’s concerns that Plaintiffs’
counsel never consulted with Plaintiff Torres, or even her daughters, prior to re-adding her
back to the case. By all accounts, “February 2026, six months after moving to re-add
2 Counsel’s nonchalance regarding a plaintiff’s ability to testify in her own case is
surprising.
3 In the Motion to Vacate Competency Hearing, Plaintiffs wrote that “in addition to
the supporting medical evidence, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Plaintiff Denby, Torres’ daughter
with the power of attorney, and most importantly, Torres’ current treating medical
professionals, are all in agreement. Plaintiff Torres is no longer competent to testify in this
matter. Therefore, the purpose of the Competency Hearing is moot, and it should be vacated
accordingly.” (Doc. 316 at 2).
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 5 of 10

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff Torres to the case, is the only time that Plaintiffs assert that counsel has actually
met or spoken with her.” (Doc. 329 at 18).
Next, Plaintiffs argue that “the Court’s finding that Ms. Torres was incompetent for
years is directly contrary to law and medicine.” (Doc. 335 at 19).4 Again, this argument
overlooks that Plaintiffs themselves informed the Court of their belief that Plaintiff Torres
“is not competent to testify at trial.” (Doc. 316 at 1). On April 15, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a
Motion to Vacate Competency Hearing, stating that “based on recent medical records and
a letter from Torres’ treating physician, Plaintiffs concede that Ms. Torres is not competent
to testify a trial. Therefore a Hearing to determine her competency is no longer needed.”
(Id.). In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs provide information about dementia’s impact on
competency, but these are new arguments that were not raised prior to the Court’s Order.
Similarly, Plaintiffs now provide the Court with records of two cognitive examinations
showing only mild cognitive impairments and reflecting that Plaintiff Torres was “only
three points short” of scoring within normal limits. (Doc. 335 at 4; Doc. 335-1 at 1–11).
Defendants provided the Court with excerpts of Plaintiff Torres’s medical records along
with the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions. (Doc. 321). In response, Plaintiffs
chose not to provide the Court with any medical evidence, despite the records being in their
possession. (Docs. 325, 323). Thus, the Court cannot grant reconsideration now based on
information that could have been submitted earlier and was not.
D. Due Process Concerns
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that the expedited briefing schedule and failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing violated due process, and that they were prejudiced by the case being
assigned to a different Judge between October 28, 2025 (Doc. 258) and December 12, 2025
(Doc. 271). Plaintiff argues that the expedited briefing schedule on the Motion to Dismiss
4 The Court reviewed the medical evidence not to make a specific finding regarding
Plaintiff Torres’s competency at any given time (the parties had already come to an
agreement that Plaintiff Torres was not competent to testify) but to illuminate what
information Plaintiffs could have or should have known about Plaintiff Torres’s medical
condition.
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 6 of 10

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
and Motion for Sanctions deprived them of due process because they were only afforded
one day to respond to the Motion. (Doc. 335 at 23–24). Indeed, Defendants filed the Motion
to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions on April 21, 2026, Plaintiffs had until 5:00 P.M. on
April 22, 2026 to file a Response, and Defendants had until noon on April 23, 2026 to
reply. (Docs. 321, 322). The Court appreciates the time and resources that were necessary
to resolve this dispute shortly before the scheduled trial, which was set to begin on April
28, 2026. However, Plaintiffs did not object to the briefing schedule or request an
extension. (See Doc. 325). Thus, this argument is not appropriate for a Motion for
Reconsideration.
Nor did Plaintiffs request an evidentiary hearing or oral argument. (See id.).
Plaintiffs highlight three factual disputes that they assert should not have been resolved
without oral argument. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Court credited Defendants’
investigator’s account of Ms. Suzanne Jackson’s statement over Plaintiffs’ assertion that
counsel met with Ms. Torres in person in February 2026 to develop responses to discovery
requests. (Doc. 335 at 25 (citing Doc. 329 at 18:11–15). Defendants’ investigator reported
that sometime around December 2025, Ms. Jackson told Plaintiffs’ attorneys that Plaintiff
Torres was in a memory care facility. (Id.). But the fact that Ms. Jackson’s first contact
with Plaintiffs’ counsel after Plaintiff Torres was re-added into the case was in December
2025, and she informed them of Plaintiff Torres’s residence, does not contradict Plaintiffs’
counsel’s assertion that they met in person with Plaintiff Torres in February 2026.
Moreover, Plaintiffs submitted a Declaration from Ms. Jackson along with their Motion to
Vacate Competency Hearing wherein she avows that she did not “talk to [Plaintiff Torres’s]
attorneys prior to adding her back to the lawsuit[.]” (Doc. 316-2 at 3). There was no factual
dispute before the Court on this issue warranting an evidentiary hearing.
Second, Plaintiffs assert that the Court should have held a hearing to determine
whether counsel should have known about Plaintiff Torres’s competency issues at the time
of Plaintiff Denby’s July 31, 2025 visit to the memory care facility or upon requesting and
receiving the treating medical provider’s March 30, 2026 letter stating that Plaintiff Torres
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 7 of 10

8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
was incompetent. (Doc. 335 at 26). This is not a factual dispute, nor can the issue before
the Court be boiled down to a specific date on which Plaintiffs’ counsel should have known
about her incompetency. The Court’s Order cited undisputed medical records showing that
Plaintiff moved into a memory care facility on December 19, 2024, and continued to reside
in a locked down memory care unit through 2025 and 2026. (Doc. 329 at 8–9). Plaintiffs
had the opportunity at any point during their representation of Plaintiff Torres to investigate
her mental status and inform the Court of concerns about her ability to prosecute her case.
Instead, as is detailed in the Court’s Order (Doc. 329), Plaintiffs repeatedly averred that
Plaintiff Torres was able to testify, until Defendants suggested that she may lack
competency. (Id. at 10–12).
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that there should have been an evidentiary hearing to
address the authenticity of Nurse Practitioner Calucer’s letter stating that Plaintiff Torres
lacks capacity to participate in Court proceedings. (Doc. 335 at 26). But Plaintiffs were the
ones who submitted this letter to the Court in support of their Motion to vacate the
competency hearing. (Doc. 316 at 1–2; Doc. 316-1). The Court will not grant a Motion for
reconsideration based on this new argument and attempt to recharacterize the evidence that
Plaintiffs themselves submitted to the Court.
In the briefing on the Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs did
not present the Court with contradicting facts in the record warranting an evidentiary
hearing. Nor did they request such a hearing. Instead, in their Response, Plaintiffs chose
not to provide the Court with additional medical records, visitation records, declarations of
counsel or the plaintiffs, or other information about Plaintiff Torres’s status beyond the
assertion that they had no concerns about Plaintiff Torres. Even more telling, Plaintiffs did
not aver that counsel consulted with Plaintiff Torres about her re-addition to this action or
spoke with her at any time except for the meeting in February 2026. Because Plaintiffs’
Response did not contradict the record created by Defendants, the Court did not hold an
evidentiary hearing. In addition, Plaintiffs do not explain how the reassignment of this case
to the Honorable Michael T. Liburdi created prejudice. (Doc. 335 at 24–25). Plaintiffs note
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 8 of 10

9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
that Judge Liburdi reset the trial date from March 17, 2026 to April 28, 2026 and that the
period of reassignment also coincided with the “the Torres competency issue” and “rapidly
approaching deadlines.” (Id. at 25). There is no apparent connection between the judicial
reassignment and the issues here. (See Doc. 300).
E. Prior Findings and Attorney-Client Relationship
Finally, the Court will address two additional overarching arguments raised by
Plaintiffs. The first is that the Court’s prior findings in this action negate a finding of bad
faith related to Plaintiff Torres’s competency now. (Doc. 335 at 18–19). Plaintiff identifies
several of the Court’s past Orders in this matter as examples. Plaintiff cites the Court’s
Order granting Plaintiff Denby’s Motion to Amend the Complaint and re-add Elizabeth
Torres to the action. (Id. at 18). In that Order, the Court found there was no evidence of
bad faith, the re-addition of Plaintiff Torres did not reflect a lack of diligence, and her re-
addition to the action would not prejudice Defendants. (Id. (citing Doc. 255)). Plaintiffs
assert that the Court is now dealing with the same set of facts and Plaintiffs’ conduct was
the same, except for the discovery of her condition. (Id.). That is not true. At the time
Plaintiff Torres was re-added to the case, there was no information before the Court about
her competency or lack thereof, either due to counsel’s failure to communicate with her
directly and investigate or the failure to communicate such facts to the Court. Plaintiffs
also point to the Court’s Order denying Defendants Motion to Dismiss, in which the Court
held that Plaintiff Denby had adequately alleged Fourth Amendment standing and Plaintiff
Torres’s claims related back to the original Complaint. (Id. at 19 (citing Doc. 275)). These
Orders have not been “abandoned” as Plaintiffs suggest. But it is unfortunate that after
being given every opportunity to pursue their claims, Plaintiffs conduct resulted in the
dismissal of this matter.
Plaintiffs also assert that “the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims is a gross
overreach and interference with the attorney-client relationship. Notably the Court has not
inquired whether Mr. Jellison communicated personally with each of the individual
defendants before he began representing them or, for that matter, whether any of them had
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 9 of 10

10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
any say in who would represent them.” (Doc. 335 at 23). But counsels’ communication
with Plaintiff was not an issue until serious questions arose about her ability to prosecute
and participate in her own case arose, and Plaintiffs conceded that she was unable to do so.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court will deny the request to reconsider its April 24, 2026 Order. The
Court has considered each of the arguments raised by Plaintiffs, but there are no grounds
to reconsider the Order issuing sanctions and dismissing this action.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing
Case (Doc. 335) is denied.
Dated this 15th day of July, 2026.
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 341 Filed 07/16/26 Page 10 of 10