Early Warning Services LLC v. Johnson et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Early Warning Services LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
Warren Vurl Johnson, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-24-01587-PHX-SMB
ORDER
The Court grants Early Warning Services LLC’s (“EWS”) Motion for Leave to File
Excess Pages for Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 391) and thus considers EWS’s
Lodged Proposed Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Warren Johnson (Doc.
392). The Court also considers EWS’s Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant
Brandon O’Loughlin (Doc. 231). The Court rules as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 19, 2026, the Court ordered: “Defendant Warren Vurl Johnson shall
appear in-person before the Honorable Susan M. Brnovich on Wednesday, April 22, 2026,
at 10:00 a.m. (Arizona time) in Courtroom 506, 401 West Washington Street, Phoenix,
Arizona 85003, to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt of this Court’s
December 2024 Order (Doc. 70) and its September 2025 Order (Doc. 243).” (Doc. 372
at 3.) The Court further ordered: “Defendant Warren Vurl must bring ‘all digital electronic
devices and media and all electric mail and storage accounts’ in accordance with the
December 2024 Order (Doc. 70) and the Forensic Imaging Order as discussed in the
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September 2025 Order (Doc. 243) to the April 22 hearing.” (Id.) The Court also stayed
the action until the April 22 hearing, ordering “that no further motions may be filed without
leave of Court.” (Id.)
On April 11, 2026, Johnson, without this Court’s leave, requested the Court to
vacate the April 22 hearing. (Doc. 377.) The Court denied Johnson’s request. (Doc. 378.)
On April 20, Johnson filed a Notice of Non-Appearance on (Doc. 382) in which he stated
he would not be present at the April 22 hearing. Johnson claims he would not appear “due
to travel obligations” and “severe financial hardship.” (Id. at 1–2.) Johnson provided that
he could appear virtually, (id. at 3), but did not indicate that he planned to abide by this
Court’s order to turn over his electronic devices in accordance with the December 2024
and September 2025 Orders.
The Court held the April 22 hearing and Johnson did not appear. (Doc. 383.)
During the hearing, the Court struck Johnson’s Answer (Doc. 58) and noted that this matter
will proceed by default judgment. (Doc. 383.)
II. DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS A SANCTION
The Court may enter default judgment as a sanction for violations of court orders.
See Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Arutyunyan, 93 F.4th 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2024); see
also Curtis v. Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1210 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
(“District courts, however, also have the authority to declare a default as a sanction.”);
Reidhead v. Meyers, 490 F. App’x 884, 885 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2012). Though this is an
extreme sanction—it is appropriate here. Johnson has willfully, and in bad faith, disobeyed
this Court’s orders on multiple occasions.
There are “five factors that a district court must consider before . . . declaring a
default: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need
to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the other party; (4) the public policy
favoring the disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic
sanctions.” Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation
modified). “[I]t is not required that the district court make explicit findings in order to
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show that it has considered these factors.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990
(9th Cir. 1999) (citation modified).
The Court considered these factors and finds that default judgment is appropriate.
This case began over two years ago and has generated over 400 docket entries amounting
to thousands of pages of filings. This case’s expansiveness is due in large part to Johnson’s
behavior. This Court has chronicled Johnson’s troublesome conduct on numerous
occasions. Only a brief survey of the docket is needed to ascertain the nature of Johnson’s
conduct. At bottom, entry of default is appropriate based on Johnson’s longstanding and
willful defiance of this Court’s orders, particular its December 4, 2024 (Doc. 70),
September 24, 2025 (Doc. 243), and March 19, 2026 (Doc. 372) Orders.
The events giving rise to default judgment began on December 4, 2024. At that
time, the Court entered a preliminary injunction, ordering Johnson to:
(1) return all hard copies of documents comprising or containing EWS’s
Confidential Information or Trade Secrets to EWS, without retaining any
physical copies of those documents; (2) preserve, without modification, all
digital electronic copies of documents comprising or containing EWS’s
Confidential Information or Trade Secrets within their position, custody, or
control; and (3) provide access to all digital electronic devices and media and
all electric mail and storage accounts within their possession, custody, or
control—including, without limitation, all computers, laptops, tablets,
external hard drives, other external media and storage devices, smartphones,
personal email accounts, OneDrive, Dropbox, Box, Google Drive and similar
accounts—that may include EWS’s Confidential Information or Trade
Secrets for forensic imaging of those devices and accounts (including all
metadata) by EWS’s forensics vendor.
(Doc. 70 at 16–17.) The Court refers to this order as the “PI Order.” Johnson appealed the
PI Order, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Early Warning Servs., LLC v. Brandon
O’Loughlin, P.A.Z.E. LLC, No. 24-7315, 2025 WL 1895313, at *2 (9th Cir. July 9, 2025).
Johnson then filed a Motion for Clarification (Doc. 198), which the Court denied and
ordered Johnson to “comply with the terms of the injunction no later than Friday, August
15, 2025.” (Doc. 218 at 3). Johnson refused, claiming it would be “legally impossible”
for him to comply with the PI Order. (Doc. 222 at 1.) EWS then filed a Motion to hold
Defendants in Contempt. (Doc. 225.)
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The Court held oral argument on this motion on September 22, 2025, during which,
the Court ordered EWS to propose examination protocols and a list of search terms and
parameters for forensic imaging. (Doc. 239.) As the Court previously explained, “EWS
sent its proposal to Johnson and the Court.” (Doc. 243 at 2.) “The Court continued oral
argument on September 24, 2025 to discuss EWS’s proposals.” (Id.) “During oral
argument, the Court found Johnson in contempt of the PI Order and adopted, and ordered
Johnson’s compliance with, EWS’s proposals (the “Forensic Imaging Order”).” (Id.) “The
Court further ordered that Johnson had forty-eight hours to comply with the Forensic
Imaging Order and imposed a $1,000 per-day fine for each day Johnson did not comply.”
(Id.) The Court then issued an Order explaining its contempt finding. (See id.) At bottom,
Johnson’s non-compliance with the PI Order was—and still is—premised on his mistaken
belief that the preliminary injunction is invalid. (Id. at 3.) As noted, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the preliminary injunction. Additionally, Johnson had the ability to comply with
the PI Order; he simply chose not to. Johnson appealed this Court’s contempt finding,
which is still pending. (Doc. 245.)
In his recent filings, Johnson claims that “default was entered because Johnson—an
indigent pro se litigant residing in Lawrence, Kansas, approximately 1,200 miles from this
Court—was physically and financially unable to appear at a show cause hearing in
Phoenix, Arizona.”1 (Doc. 384 at 2.) Johnson misunderstands the reasons for default and
the purpose of the April 22 hearing. Johnson’s failure to attend the April 22 reason was
one of many examples of his failure to comply with this Court’s orders. Additionally, the
Court was not interested in securing Johnson’s physical presence for its own sake. The
Court mandated an in-person hearing so Johnson could bring the materials subject to the
PI Order. This is the only time the Court has required Johnson to appear in person. The
Court allowed Johnson to appear virtually on every other occasion. Although Johnson
1 Johnson claimed he was unable to appear “due to travel obligations.” (Doc. 382 at 1.)
Johnson provided no additional information about these obligations. Johnson also cited
“severe financial hardship.” (Id.) Johnson did not provide any evidence corroborating this
assertion. Nonetheless, Johnson cited that the $1,000 per-diem fine contributed to his
financial hardship. (Id.) Johnson has not paid this fine and this fine is otherwise the direct
consequence of Johnson’s actions.
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indicated that he would be willing to attend the hearing virtually, he did not express any
indication that he would comply with the PI Order. Undoubtably, Johnson wished to
appear at the April 22 hearing virtually to explain why he would not comply with the PI
Order; Johnson’s filings after the April 22 hearing expressly challenge the propriety of the
PI Order and this Court’s contempt findings.
At this point, it is clear that Johnson will not abide by this Court’s orders. Johnson
has ignored the PI Order for over two years. The Court gave Johnson time to appeal that
order, and even after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the PI Order, Johnson still failed to comply.
The Court then gave Johnson an opportunity to comply before holding him in contempt.
The Court also only held Johnson in contempt on September 24, 2025—approximately
nine months after the Court issued the PI Order. Johnson refused this opportunity and has
thus been in contempt for approximately nine months. Johnson still refused to comply
even facing a $1,000 per diem penalty. The Court then ordered Johnson to attend an Order
to Show Cause Hearing to discuss his contempt and continued failure to comply with the
PI Order. Johnson did not attend that hearing and continued to ignore the PI Order.
Johnson did so even after the Court expressly warned Johnson that it may strike his Answer
and enter default. (Doc. 372 at 2.) At no point has Johnson gave any indication that he
will comply with the PI Order.
Accordingly, the court enters default judgment against Johnson.
III. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JOHNSON)
The Court notes that EWS otherwise lodged a Proposed Motion for Default
Judgment (Doc. 392). Although default judgment is appropriate as a sanction, the Court
otherwise reviewed the Motion and alternatively finds that it presents a sufficient basis
upon which to grant default judgment.
Generally, “[b]efore analyzing the merits of a motion for default judgment, the
Court ‘has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and
the parties.’” Cruz v. N.V. & Sons Builders Inc., No. CV-24-02128-PHX-DJH, 2025 WL
2733269, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2025) (quoting In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir.
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1999)). “The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the
complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes
v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). The Court notes that it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and over Johnson. As to the subject matter,
the Complaint (Doc. 1) asserts claims under federal and state law. The Court has original
jurisdiction over the federal claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court has personal jurisdiction
over Johnson because he lived in Arizona at the beginning of this lawsuit. See Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (“For an individual, the
paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile . . . .”);
see also Steel v. United States, 813 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[O]ne cannot defeat
personal jurisdiction by a move away from the state in which the underlying events took
place.”)
If jurisdiction is established, the Court considers the “Eitel factors”:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s
substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money
at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material
facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong
policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on
the merits.
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). As noted, default judgment is
appropriate as a sanction in this case so the Court will not conduct an exhaustive review of
the Eitel factors. However, the Court notes that it reviewed EWS’s Motion for Default
Judgment and finds that most of these factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment
against Johnson. The Court previously conducted an Eitel analysis in this case when it
entered default judgment against Defendant P.A.Z.E. (Doc. 208.) Much of that analysis
applies with equal force here.
Nonetheless, the Court briefly reviews the Complaint and EWS’s Motion, which
narrows the claims and relief sought against Johnson. The background of this case has
been set forth in the Court’s Order granting EWS’s requested Preliminary Injunction (Doc.
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70). The Court repurposes that summary. “EWS is a financial services technology
company that operates Zelle®, a digital payment network” and PazeSM, a “digital wallet
for ecommerce solutions.” (Doc. 70 at 1–2 (citation modified).) “Johnson worked as
senior intellectual property counsel at EWS between September 2014 and January 2023.”
(Id. at 2.) “Johnson’s primary responsibilities included acquiring, protecting, and
enforcing EWS’s intellectual property rights” and he was “entrusted . . . with confidential
information regarding private, internal business plans, and discussions.” (Id.) Johnson
expressed his intent to resign and the “began sending EWS’s documents from his work
email to his personal email, including a large volume of sensitive and confidential
information and materials.” (Id.) Johnson was fired for these activities. (Id. at 3.)
Johnson sued EWS for wrongful termination and that case was settled. (Id.) In a
corresponding settlement agreement, “Johnson affirmed that he returned all of EWS’s
property, documents, and/or any confidential information in his possession or control and
agreed to maintain the confidentiality of all of EWS’s privileged, trade secret, proprietary
or confidential information.” (Id. (citation modified).) “Johnson also agreed to refrain
from disparaging EWS in any public forum.” (Id.) This suit is predicated on the claim
accusing “Johnson of having engaged in acts that violate the Settlement Agreement,
company policy, and federal and state trade secrets law.” (Id.) In short, EWS alleges that
Johnson leaked “list of domain names EWS planned to acquire” and participated in
“P.A.Z.E., LLC (“P.A.Z.E.”), which EWS describes as a sham gripe website at a domain
name containing EWS’s PAZE mark, with content directed at disparaging EWS and its
business including the Zelle® and PazeSM services.” (Id. (citation modified).)
EWS sued Johnson for: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”) (18 U.S.C. § 1836); (2) misappropriation of trade
secrets under the Arizona Uniform Trade Secrets Act (A.R.S. § 44-401 et seq.); (3) breach
of fiduciary duty; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) declaration of noninfringement of an
unregistered mark under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the Lanham Act, and
Arizona common law (28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); and (6) breach of
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contract. (Doc. 1 at 18–27.) In its Motion for Default Judgment, EWS waives its unjust
competition claim2 and its request for declaration of noninfringement. (Doc. 392
at 12–13.)
The Court has already evaluated the Complaint as to the misappropriation claims
and found that EWS “has shown that it will likely enjoy success on the merits of its trade
secrets misappropriation claims against” Johnson. (Doc. 70 at 12.) EWS only seeks
monetary damages predicated on the misappropriation claims. The Court finds that the
Complaint also states breach of contract and breach of fiduciary claims—both of which are
predicated in large part on the same behavior giving rise to the trade secret
misappropriation claim.
Accordingly, the Court proceeds to discuss damages. “[A]llegations pertaining to
damages are not taken as true when considering a motion for default judgment.” Joe Hand
Promotions Inc. v. La Casa De Las Flores Gourmet Kitchen LLC, No.
CV-24-00991-PHX-MTL, 2025 WL 1580967, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 4, 2025).
“Nonetheless, a district court has wide latitude in determining the amount of damages to
award upon default judgment.” Id. (citation modified).
The Court reviewed EWS’s requested relief and finds that it is reasonable under the
circumstances. In short, EWS’s requests monetary relief in form of Johnson paying any
monetary damages left unsatisfied by P.A.Z.E. in accordance with this Court’s Order
granting default judgment as to P.A.Z.E. (Doc. 208 at 9; Doc. 392-1 at 6.) The Court
already found these damages reasonable as to P.A.Z.E. (Doc. 208 at 9). Given that
Johnson is now liable for the same conduct giving rise to those damages, those damages
are similarly reasonable as to Johnson. EWS also seeks permanent injunctive relief that
functionally mirrors what the Court ordered in the PI Order. (Doc. 392-1 at 5.) Because
EWS has succeeded on the merits, such relief is appropriate. See Williams v. Lobel Fin.
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1105–06 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“The standard for a permanent
2 The Motion provides that EWS waives its claim for “unfair competition” but cites to the
paragraphs in the Complaint relating to unjust enrichment. (Doc. 392 at 13.) Nevertheless,
EWS, in its Proposed Order, confirms it waives its unjust enrichment claim. (Doc. 392-1
at 4.)
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injunction is essentially the same as for a preliminary injunction, except that a litigant must
actually succeed on the merits.”). The Court, in its discretion, denies EWS’s request for
the attorneys’ fees associated with and incurred in connection with the Motion. However,
the Court notes that Johnson is still obligated to pay the previously granted attorneys’ fees
in the amount of $5,000. (Doc. 183.)
In light of this Order, the Court also waives the $1,000 per-diem fine Johnson has
been incurring as a result of this Court’s September 24, 2025 Contempt Order. (Doc. 243.)
That sanction was solely intended to motivate Johnson to comply with the PI Order.
IV. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (O’LOUGHLIN)
The Court now considers EWS Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant
O’Loughlin. (Doc. 231.) O’Loughlin is an acquaintance of Johnson and the Complaint
alleges that O’Loughlin formed P.A.Z.E. (Doc. 70 at 3.) O’Loughlin’s alleged
involvement in this matter was detailed by this Court in the PI Order. (Doc. 70). EWS
asserts the following claims against O’Loughlin: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets
under the DTSA; (2) misappropriation of trade secrets under the Arizona Uniform Trade
Secrets Act; (3) cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(“ACPA”) (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)); (4) unjust enrichment; (5) declaration of
noninfringement of an unregistered mark under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the
Lanham Act, and Arizona common law (28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
O’Loughlin has not made an appearance in this matter since October 31, 2024, when he
filed a responsive brief in connection with his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 45; Doc, 50.) That
Motion was denied on May 12, 2025. (Doc. 141.) The Clerk of Court entered Default on
June 16, 2025. (Doc. 171.)
Default judgment against O’Loughlin is appropriate. An exhaustive analysis is
unnecessary because default judgment is appropriate against O’Loughlin for nearly the
same reasons default judgment was appropriate against P.A.Z.E. and Johnson. In short,
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute for the reasons provided. The
Court has personal jurisdiction over O’Loughlin because he is an Arizona resident. The
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Eitel factors favor default judgment for the same reasons they favor default judgment as to
P.A.Z.E. and Johnson; O’Loughlin and Johnson are alleged to have acted cooperatively in
regard to the misappropriation of trade secrets claims. The only meaningful difference is
there is an ACPA claim asserted against O’Loughlin. However, this claim is not worth
special consideration because EWS does not seek any relief specifically connected to this
claim. Instead, EWS seeks essentially the same relief it seeks as to Johnson. Namely,
EWS seeks: (1) monetary damages premised on the misappropriation claims;
(2) permanent injunctive relief mirroring the PI Order; and (3) certain costs and fees. For
the same reasons as to P.A.Z.E. and Johnson, the Court will grant this relief apart from the
requests for attorneys’ fees and the costs associated with serving O’Loughlin.
V. REMAINING MOTIONS
Even after deciding the default judgment issues as to O’Loughlin and Johnson there
are 26 pending motions which fall into two categories: (1) EWS’s motions to seal
documents filed by Johnson that contained privileged information; and (2) motions filed
by EWS or Johnson that are rendered moot based on this Order. The Court grants the first
category of motions and dismisses the second category of motions as moot.
VI. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED granting default judgment against Defendant Johnson and
O’Loughlin and thus granting Doc. 231, Doc. 391, and Doc. 392.
IT IS THUS ORDERED:
1. Defendants Johnson and O’Loughlin and their agents, employees, attorneys,
successors, assigns, affiliates, and joint venturers, and any person(s) in active
concert or participation with him, or any person(s) acting for, with, by, through or
under them, is permanently enjoined from:
a. directly or indirectly acquiring, possessing, using, disclosing, or
disseminating any of Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets or Plaintiff’s privileged,
confidential, or proprietary information, including but not limited to the
contents of Plaintiff’s intellectual property indices and the Teams Chat; and
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b. registering, acquiring, renewing, maintaining, or using any domain names
containing any of Plaintiff’s trademarks or service marks, including but not
limited to the PAZE mark or confusingly similar versions of it.
2. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Defendants Johnson and O’Loughlin shall
remove from public view all documents containing any of Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets
or privileged or confidential information within Defendants Johnson’s and
O’Loughlin’s possession, custody, or control. Based on the evidence of record, this
Court finds that Defendants Johnson and O’Loughlin have sufficient control of
P.A.Z.E. to cause that entity to remove from public view all documents containing
any of Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets or privileged or confidential information that
P.A.Z.E. has posted online or elsewhere, including archived copies of websites and
social media pages.
3. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Defendant Johnson shall, first, return to
Plaintiff all hard copies and electronic copies of (a) documents that Johnson created
during and within the scope of his employment by EWS and (b) documents that
Johnson downloaded from or uploaded to EWS’s servers (collectively, “EWS’s
Documents”) within Mr. Johnson’s possession, custody, or control, then
permanently delete all electronic copies of EWS’s Documents on all digital
electronic devices and media and all electric mail and storage accounts within Mr.
Johnson’s possession, custody, or control.
4. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Defendant Johnson shall file under seal
with the Court and serve on Plaintiff’s counsel the unredacted contents of each
disclosure to the persons or entities described in Mr. Johnson’s Consolidated
Emergency Motion for Leave to File Motion for Appointment of Neutral Forensic
Examiner and Court Reporter (Doc. 296).
5. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Defendant Johnson shall pay to Plaintiff
the previously granted attorneys’ fees (Doc. 183) associated with the First Motion
for Sanction (Doc. 133) in the amount of $5,000.
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6. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Defendant Johnson shall file with the Court
and serve on Plaintiff’s counsel a written report under oath setting forth in detail the
manner in which he has complied with Paragraphs (5) through (8) of this Order.
Such written report shall not include or describe any of Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets or
privileged or confidential information.
7. If P.A.Z.E. does not satisfy this Court’s judgment against it (Doc. 208) within 30
days of the date of this Order, Defendants Johnson and/or O’Loughlin shall pay to
Plaintiff an award in the amount of $68,850.60 within 60 days of the date of this
Order. Such award shall consist of (i) Plaintiff’s actual damages of $22,950.20 and
(ii) exemplary damages of $45,900.40, owing to Defendants Johnson’s and
O’Loughlin’s acts of willful and malicious misappropriation of Plaintiff’s Trade
Secrets; provided, however, that Plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive a double
recovery of this $68,850.60 award from P.A.Z.E., Johnson, and O’Loughlin.
8. If P.A.Z.E. does not satisfy this Court’s judgment against it (Doc. 208) within 30
days of the date of this Order, Defendants Johnson and O’Loughlin also shall pay
to Plaintiff interest on the foregoing award of $68,850.60 accruing between the date
of this Order and Defendants Johnson’s and O’Loughlin’s payment of that amount
to Plaintiff, with the rate of interest being calculated by reference to the weekly
average one-year constant maturity (nominal) Treasury yield, as published by the
Federal Reserve System.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing the following Motions as moot: Doc.
212; Doc. 241; Doc. 254; Doc. 258; Doc. 272; Doc. 275; Doc. 284; Doc. 287; Doc. 296;
Doc. 299; Doc. 305; Doc. 308; Doc. 329; Doc. 337; Doc. 339; Doc. 384; Doc. 385; Doc.
386; and Doc. 387.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the following Motions: Doc. 345; Doc.
353; Doc. 364; Doc. 367; Doc. 379; Doc. 388; and Doc. 396.
IT IS THUS ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to seal the following: Doc.
308; Doc. 309; Doc. 310; Doc. 316; Doc. 320; Doc. 362; Doc. 366; Doc. 377; Doc. 384;
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and Doc. 385.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED waiving the $1,000 per-diem fine imposed by the
September 24, 2025 Contempt Order (Doc. 243). Johnson is released from any obligation
to pay this fine.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to accordingly enter
judgment in favor of EWS and close this case. The Court retains jurisdiction of this matter
for the purpose of making any further orders necessary or proper for the enforcement of
this Order and Judgment and the punishment of any violations thereof.
Dated this 16th day of June, 2026.
Case 2:24-cv-01587-SMB Document 404 Filed 06/17/26 Page 13 of 13