Rodriguez v. Tempe, City of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jasmine Rodriguez,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Tempe, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-01488-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Jasmine Rodriguez alleges a Tempe police officer, defendant Benjamin
Trotter, used excessive force against her while arresting a third party. (Doc. 15.) She brings
three claims: excessive force against Officer Trotter, municipal liability against defendant
City of Tempe (“Tempe”) and negligence against both defendants. Tempe moved to
dismiss the municipal liability claim against it. (Doc. 17.) Its motion is granted with leave
to amend.
I. Factual Allegations
At around 2:00 a.m. on May 5, 2024, Jasmine Rodriquez was leaving a bar in Tempe
when she stopped in front of a movie theater ticket booth. (Doc. 15 at 3.) A man, later
identified as non-party Trequan Whirl, walked up to Rodriguez while three Tempe police
officers approached him and attempted to arrest him. (Doc. 15 at 4.) In the commotion,
Rodriguez alleges the officers gave her no explanation, no warning, and no instruction to
move in a certain direction. (Doc. 15 at 4.) Instead, she “was caught between the three
officers,” with one reaching for Whirl from her left and another approaching from her right.
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(Doc. 15 at 4.) Officer Trotter then “grabbed her from behind and pulled her out of the
situation” and forcibly detained her. (Doc. 15 at 4.) While holding her and still without
giving her instructions or commands, he “slammed her face into the ticket booth.” (Doc.
15 at 4.) Rodriguez briefly lost consciousness and suffered a fractured nose, two cracked
front teeth, bruised and split lips, and facial bruises and abrasions. (Doc. 15 at 4.)
Rodriguez filed this suit against Officer Trotter and Tempe. She alleged a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 excessive force claim against Officer Trotter and a negligence claim against Officer
Trotter and Tempe. Rodriguez’s other claim is a § 1983 municipal liability claim based on
Tempe failing to implement policies and procedures to ensure officers’ fitness for duty and
adequately investigate excessive force allegations; failing to adequately train or supervise
employees regarding officer conduct with citizens; “and/or [] fail[ing] to implement
mandatory training” regarding use of force. (Doc. 15 at 7.) Despite Tempe knowing
inadequate policies and procedures would result in excessive force violations (Doc. 15 at
6-7), she alleges Tempe “made deliberate and conscious decisions to create inadequate
policies and procedures” and to ratify widespread unconstitutional practices and customs
(Doc. 15 at 7.) Officer Trotter and Tempe answered the excessive force and negligence
claims, but Tempe moved to dismiss the municipal liability claim.
II. Legal Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal citations omitted)). This is not a “probability requirement,” but a requirement that
the factual allegations show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
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III. Analysis
“A municipality may not be sued under § 1983 solely because an injury was inflicted
by its employees or agents.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978) (no respondeat superior liability when municipality employs tortfeasor). But a
municipality may be held liable for constitutional violations in some specific
circumstances. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. In general, a plaintiff may pursue three theories
in alleging a Monell claim: (1) the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflict[ed] the injury”; (2) a municipality failed to train employees in a
manner so inadequate that the “policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need”; or (3) “an official with final policy-making
authority” was the tortfeasor or ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional action. Rodriguez
v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2018) (simplified); see also Gordon
v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973-34 (9th Cir. 2021). Rodriguez does not specify which
Monell theory she is attempting to invoke but she uses language that matches the first two.
(Doc. 15 at 6-8.)
Rodriguez’s first Monell theory requires she allege facts describing a policy or a
“persistent and widespread custom” and facts suggesting that policy or custom caused her
injury. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs’ allegations of dozens
of relevant incidents did not sufficiently establish custom). Rodriguez does not allege
sufficient facts supporting this theory. In fact, the complaint does not allege any facts about
a particular policy or custom, instead conclusorily reciting the Monell standard. (See Doc.
15 at 6 (“Tempe deliberately and consciously adopted unconstitutional policies and/or
encouraged, tolerated, or ratified unconstitutional widespread Tempe Police Department
practices and customs”).) The complaint does not make clear which policies are at issue,
let alone why they might be unconstitutional. Rodriguez has not stated a Monell claim
under the policy or custom theory.
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Rodriguez’s second theory of Monell liability based on inadequate training requires
she allege facts showing city decisionmakers were on notice of “particular omission[s] in
their training program” that would cause employees to violate citizens’ rights, yet chose to
retain that program. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). “A pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate
deliberate indifference” in training. Id. at 62 (citation omitted); see also Rodriguez, 891
F.3d at 803 (requiring evidence of widespread practice or repeated constitutional
violations). When a plaintiff lists prior incidents of relevant conduct or examples of policy
or training failures, those examples must be detailed enough for a court to determine the
incidents are sufficiently similar to the one at issue. See Ames v. City of Tempe, No. CV-
20-02102-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 5578868, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 29, 2021); Connick, 593
U.S. at 61. Again Rodriguez does not allege sufficient facts supporting this theory.
The complaint does not provide any facts regarding a pattern of similar excessive
force violations by Tempe officers or even any facts regarding officers’ training. (Doc. 15.)
For this theory too, the complaint includes only conclusory recitations of the Monell
standard. (See Doc. 15 at 6 (“Tempe either failed to train or inadequately trained Officer
Trotter regarding encounters with persons of interest, including, but not limited to the
appropriate use of force, proper procedures for detention and takedowns, interactions with
persons of interest, and minimizing unnecessary injury to citizens.”) As Tempe thoroughly
explains (Doc. 17 at 6-9), the case law demands a much more fact-intensive pleading.
Tempe’s motion to dismiss the Monell claim is granted. Based on the very limited
factual allegations in the current complaint, it is difficult to determine what factual basis,
if any, supports Rodriguez’s attempt to pursue a Monell claim. Because it is possible she
would be able to allege additional facts, leave to amend is granted. But Rodriguez is
cautioned that if she hopes to pursue a Monell claim, she must provide significantly more
facts to meet the Iqbal/Twombly standard.
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IV. Conclusion
The first amended complaint does not allege a Monell claim against Tempe but
Rodriguez is granted leave to amend. Because her claims of excessive force and negligence
will proceed, the parties must confer and prepare a Joint Case Management Plan.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED the motion to dismiss Count II of the First Amended Complaint
(Doc. 17) is GRANTED with leave to amend. No later than January 26, 2026, plaintiff
may file an amended complaint. If no amended complaint is filed by that date, the two
remaining claims in the current complaint will proceed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as follows:
The parties are directed to meet, confer, and develop a Rule 26(f) Joint Case
Management Report, which must be filed within 4 weeks of the date of this order. It is the
responsibility of plaintiff(s) to initiate the Rule 26(f) meeting and prepare the Joint Case
Management Report. Defendant(s) shall promptly and cooperatively participate in the Rule
26(f) meeting and assist in preparation of the Joint Case Management Report.
The Joint Case Management Report shall contain the following information in
separately-numbered paragraphs.
1. The parties who attended the Rule 26(f) meeting and assisted in developing
the Joint Case Management Report;
2. A list of all parties in the case, including any parent corporations or entities
(for recusal purposes);
3. Any parties that have not been served and an explanation of why they have
not been served, and any parties that have been served but have not answered or otherwise
appeared;
4. A statement of whether any party expects to add additional parties to the case
or otherwise amend pleadings;
5. The names of any parties not subject to the court’s personal (or in rem)
jurisdiction;
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6. A description of the basis for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, citing
specific jurisdictional statutes. If jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the report
shall include a statement of the citizenship of every party and a description of the amount
in dispute. See 28 U.S.C. §1332;
7. A short statement of the nature of the case (no more than three pages),
including a description of each claim, defense, and affirmative defense;
8. A listing of contemplated motions and a statement of the issues to be decided
by those motions;
9. Whether the case is suitable for reassignment to a United States Magistrate
Judge for all purposes or suitable for referral to a United States Magistrate Judge for a
settlement conference;
10. The status of any related cases pending before this or other courts;
11. A discussion of any issues relating to preservation, disclosure, or discovery
of electronically stored information (“ESI”), including the parties’ preservation of ESI and
the form or forms in which it will be produced;
12. A discussion of any issues relating to claims of privilege or work product;
13. A discussion of necessary discovery, which should take into account the
December 1, 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) and should include:
a. The extent, nature, and location of discovery anticipated by the parties
and why it is proportional to the needs of the case;
b. Suggested changes, if any, to the discovery limitations imposed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
c. The number of hours permitted for each deposition. The parties also
should consider whether a total number of deposition hours should be
set in the case, such as twenty total hours for plaintiff and twenty
total hours for defendants. Such overall time limits have the advantage
of providing an incentive for each side to be as efficient as possible in
each deposition, while also allowing parties to allocate time among
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witnesses depending on the importance and complexity of subjects to
be covered with the witnesses;
14. Proposed deadlines for each of the following events. In proposing deadlines,
the parties should keep in mind the Case Management Order will contain deadlines to
govern this case and once the dates have been set the court will vary them only upon a
showing of good cause. A request by counsel for extension of discovery deadlines in any
case that has been pending more than two years must be accompanied by a certification
stating the client is aware of and approves of the requested extension. The court does not
consider settlement talks or the scheduling of mediations to constitute good cause for an
extension. The parties must propose the following:
a. A deadline for the completion of fact discovery, which will also be
the deadline for pretrial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3). This
deadline is the date by which all fact discovery must be completed.
Discovery requests must be served and depositions noticed
sufficiently in advance of this date to ensure reasonable completion
by the deadline, including time to resolve discovery disputes. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the court will not entertain discovery
disputes after this deadline;
b. Dates for full and complete expert disclosures and rebuttal expert
disclosures, if any;
c. A deadline for completion of all expert depositions;
d. A date by which any Rule 35 physical or mental examination will be
noticed if such an examination is required by any issues in the case;
e. A deadline for filing dispositive motions;
f. Case-specific deadlines and dates, such as the deadline to file a motion
for class certification or a date on which the parties are available for a
Markman (patent claim construction) hearing;
g. A date by which the parties shall have engaged in face-to-face good
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faith settlement talks;
h. Whether a jury trial has been requested and whether the request for a
jury trial is contested, setting forth the reasons if the request is
contested;
i. Any other matters that will aid the court and parties in resolving this
case in a just, speedy, and inexpensive manner as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1;
15. A statement indicating whether the parties would prefer that the court hold a
case management conference before issuing a scheduling order—and, if so, an explanation
of why the conference would be helpful.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the parties shall file a proposed Case Management
Order containing all the proposed dates at the same time they file the Rule 26(f) Case
Management Report. The proposed Case Management Order must also be emailed in Word
format to Lanham_Chambers@azd.uscourts.gov.
Dated this 12th day of January, 2026.
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