Anderson v. Cocciardi

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Kelvin Damarilamor Anderson, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Unknown Cocciardi Officer B0544,
Defendant.
No. CV 25-02612 PHX ROS CDB
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:
I. Background
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights
complaint on July 24, 2025. In an order entered July 31, 2025, Plaintiff was given leave to
proceed on Count One of his Complaint, alleging Defendant Cocciardi subjected Plaintiff
to excessive force, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, as Plaintiff was
“[c]oming back from court” on or about March 20, 2025. (ECF No. 5).1 The Court
dismissed Count Two of the Complaint, alleging that, after the incident described in Count
One, Plaintiff was “given an unfair hearing and had to sit thirty days in the whole,” and he
did not receive medical attention and he lost privileges. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 5 at 4).
The Court also dismissed Count Three, alleging that “for months’ after being attacked on
1 Plaintiff alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of excessive force.
At the relevant time Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, and the Court therefore concluded the Eighth
Amendment was not applicable and that Plaintiff had adequately stated a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 5 at 4).
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 1 of 9

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
or about March 20, 2025, Plaintiff was denied medical care for injuries sustained on the
attack described in Count One, and he was also denied mental health treatment and
medication. (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 5 at 4). The Court dismissed Count Two and Count
Three of the Complaint because the only defendant named in the Complaint was Cocciardi,
and failed to allege Cocciardi’s participation in the events involved in Counts Two and
Three. (ECF No. 5 at 4). Defendant Cocciardi was served and has answered the Complaint.
(ECF Nos. 18 & 22).
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to proceed on an amended complaint on
October 31, 2025, and lodged a proposed amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 20 & 21).
II. Governing Law
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the screening of prisoner complaints and
the dismissal of allegations that fail to adequately state a claim for relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff
has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A plaintiff should be given leave to amend their complaint when justice so requires.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See also, e.g., Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., 953 F.3d 567,
574 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit has counseled the district courts to apply this
standard “with extreme liberality.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir.
2009). See also Brown, 953 F.3d at 574; Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d
1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). Granting or denying leave to amend is a matter committed to
the Court’s discretion. E.g., Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707
F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013).
Before granting leave to amend, Rule 15(a) requires the Court to evaluate the
elements of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of
amendment. See, e.g., Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). Futility of
amendment is sufficient to justify denial of leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland,
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 2 of 9

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amendment is futile if, accepting all of
the facts alleged as true, the claim would be immediately “subject to dismissal” for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298
(9th Cir. 1998).
The Court is obliged to liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s
complaint. See, e.g., Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, although
pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, conclusory and vague allegations will not
support a cause of action. E.g., Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Furthermore, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential
elements of the claim, Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014), cited in
Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, (9th Cir. 2022), and the Court should not assume the
plaintiff “can prove facts different from those alleged in the complaint.” McGrath v. Scott,
250 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (D. Ariz. 2003). Additionally, “legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness and conclusory allegations
of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient” to state a claim for relief that will
survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1220 (internal quotations omitted).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does not demand
detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Additionally, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id., quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief [is] … a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqubal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 3 of 9

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
To properly state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish
an act by the named defendant, taken under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a
federal constitutional right, and caused the plaintiff harm. See, e.g., Thornton v. City of St.
Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege they
suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and must also
sufficiently allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant.
E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). A claim may be properly dismissed
when the pleading lacks specific factual allegations showing the named defendant’s
participation in the alleged constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Carey v. Von Blanckensee, 515 F. Supp.
3d 1051, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2021). To survive screening, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not
simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation
of his civil rights.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff seeks to add the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office; Correctional Health
Services; “Officer Evans,” an “intake and release” officer at the Watkins Jail, and “Officer
Fieslman,” a “Detention Officer” at the Watkins Jail, as defendants. (ECF No. 20; ECF
No. 21).
A. Count One of the proposed amended complaint
In Count One of the proposed amended complaint Plaintiff reasserts his claims
against Defendant Cocciardi with regard to the events on or about March 20, 2025. (ECF
No. 21 at 5). Plaintiff provides additional facts with regard to this claim for relief and
mentions “several other officers.” (Id.). Broadly construing Plaintiff’s proposed amended
complaint, he has adequately stated a claim for relief with regard to amending Count One
to allege Detention Officers Fieslman and Evans used excessive force against him in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee.
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 4 of 9

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
B. Count Two of the proposed amended complaint
In Count Two of his Complaint, Plaintiff asserted a claim regarding “Disciplinary
proceedings,” stating as follows:
After the incident was over i was given an unfair hearing and had to sit thirty
days in the hole again i did not receive medical attention from medical I lost
my privileges to speak to my family I filed an appeal and it was rejected i did
not receive any type of justice or fairness.
(ECF No. 1 at 4). With regard to the harm he sustained from being placed in segregation,
Plaintiff alleged he now has “back problems,” a “damaged” ”mental state,” Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, and he cannot “sleep at night.” (Id). The Court concluded Plaintiff did not
allege Defendant Cocciardi’s participation in these events. (ECF No. 5 at 4).
In Count Two of his proposed amended complaint Plaintiff repeats, verbatim, the
claim quoted supra. (ECF No. 21 at 6). Plaintiff alleges his Eighth Amendment right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment was violated and further asserts his “14th
Amendment” due process rights were violated. (Id.).
A pretrial inmate is entitled to due process with regard to being placed in
disciplinary segregation. However, to adequately state a claim for a constitutional violation
in this regard the inmate must allege facts sufficient showing they either did not receive
any type of a hearing prior to being placed in segregation or that the hearing did not
adequately protected their due process rights. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517,
524 (9th Cir. 1996); Cardenas v. Lewis, 66 F. App’x 86, 89-90 (9th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff does not assert any facts supporting a conclusion that his hearing was
“unfair” such that his due process rights were violated. Nor does Plaintiff allege that any
specific named defendant violated his rights with regard to who was involved in the “unfair
hearing.” Accordingly, Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend his Complaint to add
this claim for relief.
C. Count Three of the proposed amended complaint
In Count Three of his Complaint Plaintiff alleges a claim regarding “Medical care,”
as follows:
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 5 of 9

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
After being attacked by officers i requested to see mental health and
they repeatedly ignored me for months medical staff would not address my
injuries or my mental state of mind now i live in constant fear of retaliation
from the officers.
They ignored my mental health request for months They would not
give me medications, they would not give me one on one [counseling], they
violated my hippa rights2 Addressing me at the door in the pod instead of
taking me outside the dorm to talk or the visiting rooms they didn’t help me
with anything.
I have ptsd, i can’t sleep, i have rapid heart beating when im sleeping
my back hurts sometimes. [sic]
(ECF No. 1 at 5).
In Count Three of his proposed amended complaint Plaintiff repeats, verbatim, the
claim stated in his Complaint, asserting a violation of his Eighth and Fifth Amendment
rights to medical care. (ECF No. 21 at 7). Plaintiff presumably alleges this claim against
Correctional Health Services, which he seeks to add as a defendant.
To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public
function, such as an entity providing medical care to inmates, the plaintiff must meet the
test articulated in Monell v. New York Department of Social Services. See 436 U.S. 658,
690-94 (1978); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying
Monell to private entities acting under color of state law).
At the time of the events giving rise to the Complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee. Claims of inadequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118,
1124 (9th Cir. 2018); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Fourteenth Amendment medical care
claims must be evaluated under an objective, rather than a subjective, standard as to what
2 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”) does not provide a
private cause of action for violations of its provisions, nor is the violation of HIPPA constitute a
violation of a federal constitutional right. See Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir.
2010).
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 6 of 9

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
constitutes a potential defendant’s “deliberate indifference” to a detainee’s serious medical
needs. See Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2021).
Pursuant to the standard stated Gordon and affirmed in Sandoval, pretrial detainees
alleging they were constitutionally adequate medical care must show: (1) the defendant
made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was
confined, including a decision with respect to medical treatment; (2) those conditions put
the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take
reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the
consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the
defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. See Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 669; Gordon, 888 F.3d
at 1125. To satisfy the third element of this test, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
actions were “objectively unreasonable,” which requires a showing of “more than
negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Gordon,
888 F.3d at 1125. Thus, in contrast to a prisoner bringing claims under the Eighth
Amendment, a pretrial detainee bringing claims under the Fourteenth Amendment “need
not prove … subjective elements about the [defendant]’s actual awareness of the level of
risk.” Id. at 1125, n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has, arguably, sufficiently alleged that he was denied adequate medical care
in Count Three of his proposed amended complaint, and broadly construing his proposed
amended complaint he indicates he is asserting this claim against Correctional Health
Services, which he seeks to add as a defendant.
III. Conclusion
Broadly construing Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff should be
given leave to add Fieslman and Evans as defendants with regard to Count One asserting a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of excessive force with regard to
the incident occurring on or about March 20, 2025.
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 7 of 9

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff has not stated adequate facts to state a cognizable claim regarding his due
process rights in Count Two, nor does Plaintiff clearly identify a defendant amenable to
suit with regard to Count Two of the proposed amended complaint.
Broadly construing Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff has
adequately stated a claim for inadequate health care against Correctional Health Services,
in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 20) seeking leave to
amend his complaint be granted only as explained herein with regard to Counts One and
Count Three.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s
judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this
recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2). Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days
within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2(e)(3), Local Rules
of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed ten (10) pages in length.
Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the
findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
//
//
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 8 of 9

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Dated this 7th day of November, 2025.
Case 2:25-cv-02612-ROS-CDB Document 24 Filed 11/10/25 Page 9 of 9