King v. Julia Owner LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Troy King,
Plaintiff,
v.
Julia Owner LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-03686-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Troy King filed his original complaint on October 6, 2025. The court
dismissed that complaint with leave to amend. (Doc. 6.) The dismissal order provided
specific instructions on the changes King would need to make in an amended complaint if
he wished to pursue his claims. (Doc. 6.) King filed an amended complaint, but on
November 5, 2025, the court again determined King had failed to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. (Doc. 8.) The court noted that despite its earlier order explaining
what King would need to allege, the “amended complaint made no headway” in meeting
the requirements. (Doc. 8 at 5.) Based on that, further leave to amend was deemed futile
and the amended complaint was dismissed without leave to amend. Judgment was entered
the same day. (Doc. 9.)
King waited until December 15, 2025, to file a “Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 10.) On December 17, 2025, the court denied that motion
stating judgment had been entered so “the only way for litigation to resume would be for
King to have that judgment set aside.” (Doc. 12 at 1-2.) For unexplained reasons, King then
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waited three months to file a Rule 60 motion. (Doc. 13.)
King identifies his motion as brought under Rule 60(b)(1). (Doc. 13 at 1.) According
to King, the judgment “resulted from excusable neglect and/or mistake in understanding
the rigorous pleading standards” that led to the entry of judgment. (Doc. 13 at 1.) King
argues his failure to include sufficient factual allegations “was not a willful disregard of
court orders or rules, but rather an unintentional oversight born from a layman’s
interpretation of complex legal requirements.” (Doc. 13 at 3.)
Accepting King’s motion as brought under Rule 60(b)(1), that rule “allows a party
to seek relief from final judgment and reopen a case based on mistake or excusable
neglect.” BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 210 (2025). Assuming failure to
understand and follow pleading requirements might qualify as “excusable neglect,” the
court must consider four factors: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party, (2)
the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the
delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4)
whether the moving party’s conduct was in good faith.” Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853,
855 (9th Cir. 2004). No one factor is dispositive and “[the determination of whether a
party’s neglect is excusable is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant
circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116
F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1997) (simplified). Here, two factors weigh in favor of King’s
motion while two factors weigh against.
The first factor requires assessing what prejudice the non-moving party would suffer
if relief were granted. Defendant has not appeared and would suffer no obvious prejudice
if the judgment was set aside. Similarly, the fourth factor requires determining whether
King has acted in good faith. There is no evidence King’s failures were the result of bad
faith, so that factor also supports granting relief. But the other two factors doom King’s
request.
The length of delay weighs against granting relief. Judgment was entered on
November 5, 2025, and King provides no explanation for waiting four months to seek
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relief. He did attempt to amend his complaint in December 2025, but that motion was
denied shortly after filing. After that denial, King then waited three more months to file his
Rule 60 motion. With no explanation for his delay, this factor supports denying the motion.
The “reason for delay” also weighs against granting relief. Pro se litigants such as
King “are not excused from following court rules.” Briones, 116 F.3d at 382. And although
the court must construe pro se complaints liberally, that “does not mean that the court will
supply essential elements of a claim that are absent from the complaint.” Boquist v.
Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2022). The court construed King’s original complaint
liberally, but it did not state any claim for relief. The court gave King clear instructions on
what he needed to include in an amended complaint. King’s amended complaint, construed
liberally, still did not state any plausible claim for relief. And after King’s second attempt
was dismissed, he waited months to seek additional relief without explaining why. The
“reason for delay” factor supports denying the motion.
Considering “all relevant circumstances,” King is not entitled to relief under Rule
60(b)(1). Briones, 116 F.3d at 382 (simplified). But King’s motion could also be construed
as a request for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). That rule “allows a court to grant relief for ‘any
other reason that justifies relief.’” Ratha v. Rubicon Res., LLC, 168 F.4th 541, 561 (9th Cir.
2026) (quoting Rule 60(b)(6)). Relief under this rule is appropriate “only where
extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or
correct an erroneous judgment.” In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc., 503 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir.
2007) (simplified). To meet this demanding standard, a party “must demonstrate both
injury and circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from proceeding with . . .
the action in a proper fashion.” Id. (simplified).
King has not established extraordinary circumstances. He has not identified the
“circumstances beyond his control” that prevented him from amending his complaint as
the court explained in the order dismissing the original complaint. In addition, King has
not explained the delay in seeking relief after judgment was entered. King is not entitled to
relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED the Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. 13) is DENIED.
Dated this 30th day of March, 2026.
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