Soto-Fong v. Shinn

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Martin Raul Soto-Fong,
Petitioner,
v.
David Shinn,
Respondent.
No. CV-21-00337-TUC-SHR
Order Adopting R&R
Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 34)
issued by United States Magistrate Judge Jacqueline M. Rateau recommending the Court
deny Respondent’s “Motion to Lift Stay” (Doc. 32). Respondent has filed an Objection
(Doc. 35). For the following reasons, the Court will adopt the R&R.
I. Background
The Court accepts the following unobjected-to facts as set forth in the R&R (Doc.
34). Following a trial in Pima County Superior Court, Petitioner was found guilty of three
counts of first-degree murder and other offenses committed when he was 17 years old and
was initially sentenced to death. Petitioner’s sentence was later vacated pursuant to Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and he was subsequently re-sentenced to various
consecutive terms totaling at least 109 years of imprisonment.
In 2013, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing his sentence violates
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392 (Ariz. 2016),
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which require the superior court to determine whether his crimes reflect “irreparable
corruption” prior to sentencing him—a juvenile—to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. In October 2020, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled Petitioner was not entitled
to relief. State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, ¶ 50 (Ariz. 2020).
In March 2021, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
asserting the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to United States Supreme
Court precedent and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. On September
22, 2021, Respondent filed a limited answer arguing the Petition was untimely and should
be dismissed. The same day, Petitioner filed a motion asking the Court to stay the case
pending review of Petitioner’s underlying state criminal conviction by the Pima County
Attorney’s Office (“PCAO”), the original prosecuting agency. In the Motion to Stay,
Petitioner asserted PCAO’s review of his “conviction and sentence” would “promote
efficiency and judicial economy by avoiding potentially unnecessary litigation.” Petitioner
further asserted a stay pending review by PCAO would be “consistent with the principles
of comity and federalism underlying habeas review.” Respondent did not object to the
Motion to Stay. On October 7, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed motion and
stayed the case pending PCAO’s review. (Doc. 24.)
On June 25, 2025, Respondent filed a Motion to Lift Stay, requesting the Court lift
the stay prior to completion of PCAO’s review and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 32.) On September 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Rateau issued an
R&R recommending the Court deny Respondent’s Motion (Doc. 34), and Respondent
timely objected (Doc. 35).
II. Standard of Review
When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If an objection is made to the R&R, the Court “shall make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. Objections to R&Rs “are not to be
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construed as a second opportunity to present the arguments already considered by the
Magistrate Judge.” Betancourt v. Ace Ins. Co. of P.R., 313 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 (D.P.R.
2004); see also Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp.
380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act is to relieve courts
of unnecessary work,” and “[t]here is no increase in efficiency, and much extra work, when
a party attempts to relitigate every argument which it presented to the Magistrate Judge.”
(citation omitted)).
III. Relevant Law
“The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its
power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis
v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). In determining whether to grant a motion to
stay, the Court weighs “the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or
refusal to grant a stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005)
(quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). Those interests include
“the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity
which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice
measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law
which could be expected to result from a stay.” Id. Additionally, “[a] trial court may, with
propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter
a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear
upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979).
“The standard for determining whether an existing stay should remain in place is
the same as the standard for determining whether a Court should impose a stay in the first
place.” MasterObjects, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 16-CV-06824-JSW, 2018 WL 11353751, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018); see United States v. Fallbrook Public Util. Dist., No. 51-CV-
1247-GPC(RBB), 2017 WL 1281915, at *2 (“The corollary to th[e] power [to grant a stay]
is the ability to lift a stay previously imposed.” (quoting Boyle v. County of Kern, No. 1:03-
CV-05162-OWW-GSA, 2008 WL 220413, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008)). “[T]he court
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may abandon its imposed stay of litigation if the circumstances that persuaded the court to
impose the stay in the first place have changed significantly.” Canady v. Erbe
Elektromedizin GMBH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The same court that
imposes a stay of litigation has the inherent power and discretion to lift the stay.”).
IV. Discussion
In its Objection, Respondent argues the stay should be lifted because Petitioner’s
habeas claim is “plainly meritless” and “continuing the stay . . . frustrates both the right of
the victims to be free from unreasonable delay . . . as well as the State’s right to be spared
from unnecessary delays.” (Doc. 35.) However, Respondent did not initially object to the
stay and has not shown any changed circumstances warranting a lift of the stay. As
discussed, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed Motion to Stay to allow PCAO to
review Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 24.) Respondent does not assert
PCAO’s review has concluded, and Petitioner asserts the review “remains ongoing.” (Doc.
31 at 2.) Therefore, the circumstances underlying the Court’s decision to stay these
proceedings have not significantly changed. See Canady, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 75; see also
Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 3:17-CV-2186 JLS-RBB, 2021
WL 22553, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021) (refusing to lift stay “when Plaintiffs had the
opportunity to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion for a stay . . . and chose not to do
so” and “[t]he circumstances under which the Court granted the stay ha[d] not changed
significantly.”)
Respondent additionally argues Magistrate Judge Rateau erred by “fail[ing] to
consider the potential merit of Petitioner’s Miller claim.” (Doc. 35.) However, as Judge
Rateau stated, determining Petitioner’s habeas claim is meritless upon consideration of a
procedural issue, without full briefing from the parties, would be inequitable to Petitioner.
(Doc. 34 at 4.) Further, the resolution of PCAO’s review could render Petitioner’s habeas
petition moot should PCAO vacate his convictions or reduce his sentence. As stated in the
R&R, “[r]equiring the parties to fully brief a habeas claim—in not only this Court but
invariably in the Ninth Circuit as well—that may ultimately prove moot would
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unnecessarily invite a waste of the time and resources of this Court and the parties.” (Id.
(quoting Doc. 33 at 4).)
Having conducted a de novo review, see § 636(b)(1), the Court finds Petitioner’s
interests in staying the proceedings outweigh Respondent’s interests in lifting the stay, see
Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the R&R’s reasoning and
conclusion and deny Respondent’s Motion to Lift Stay (Doc. 32).
V. Conclusion
IT IS ORDERED Magistrate Judge Rateau's R&R (Doc. 34) is ADOPTED in its
entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondent's Motion to Lift Stay (Doc. 32) is
DENIED.
Dated this 5th day of February, 2026.
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