Jensen v. Bondi

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jason Adam Jensen,
Plaintiff,
v.
Pamela Bondi,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00246-TUC-JGZ
ORDER
On May 23, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Jason Adam Jensen, who is proceeding in forma
pauperis, filed a Complaint against Pam Bondi in her official capacity “for policies and
practices that perpetuate procedural inequities under the [in forma pauperis (IFP)] statute.”
(Doc. 1 at 2.) In a December 8, 2025 Order, the Court dismissed the Complaint because
Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. (Doc. 10.) The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an
amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order.
On January 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11). On
February 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement Complaint and Join
Defendant. (Doc. 12.) The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Supplement
Complaint and Join Defendant and dismiss the First Amended Complaint.
I. 	Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in a case in which a plaintiff has been granted
in forma pauperis status, the Court shall dismiss the case “if the court determines that . . .
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(B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.”
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does
not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual
allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there
are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts
must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th
Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam)).
If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other
facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal
of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The
Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim, and deny leave to
amend.
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II. 	First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff is a resident of Tucson, Arizona and has been diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder. He sues Defendant Bondi in her official capacity as U.S. Attorney
General “for policies and practices that perpetuate procedural inequities under the [in forma
pauperis (IFP)] statute.” (Doc. 1 at 2.)
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes a “Factual Allegations” section.
Many of the statements in Plaintiff’s “Factual Allegations” section are not factual
allegations but are instead citations to statutory authority and legal conclusions, which the
Court is not required to accept as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
However, exclusive of legal conclusions and citations to statutory authority, Plaintiff
alleges as follows.
Plaintiff is indigent, unrepresented, and diagnosed with autism, and he identifies
himself as part of the “Institutionally Indigent.” (Doc. 11 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he has
been subjected to the in forma pauperis (“IFP”) screening framework under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e), which permits courts to dismiss claims sua sponte prior to service. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12.)
Plaintiff contends that the current IFP screening regime allows courts to dismiss
claims for failure to state a claim before an adversarial proceeding occurs, thereby
depriving indigent litigants of meaningful access to the courts. (Id. ¶¶ 7–15.) Plaintiff
further alleges that the Department of Justice, through the Attorney General, maintains a
“litigation posture” that defends and perpetuates this screening regime. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)
Plaintiff asserts that this framework disproportionately impacts indigent litigants
and individuals with disabilities by subjecting them to pre-service merits review, which he
contends violates due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment right to petition.
(Id. ¶¶ 16–19.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring changes to the
administration and defense of § 1915(e). (Id. at 10–11.)
A. 	Claims for Relief
Plaintiff 	asserts 	two 	claims 	against 	Defendant, 	seeking 	relief 	under 	the
Administrative 	Procedure 	Act. 	In 	Count 	One, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendant’s
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maintenance of a litigation posture supporting § 1915(e) is “contrary to constitutional
right” in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 62–65.)
In 	Count 	Two, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendant’s 	conduct 	is 	“arbitrary 	and
capricious” 	in 	violation 	of 	5 	U.S.C. 	§ 	706(2)(A), 	asserting 	that 	the 	government
inconsistently justifies IFP screening while denying indigent litigants meaningful access to
judicial review. (Id. ¶¶ 66–69.)
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
A claim against an individual in his or her official capacity is “only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). “In an official-capacity suit[,] the entity’s
‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S.
29, 39 (2010) (the “‘policy or custom’ requirement [in Monell] applies in § 1983 cases
irrespective of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective.”). A plaintiff must
allege, as a matter of law, that a specific policy or custom caused him to suffer
constitutional injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006).
Although Plaintiff alludes broadly to policies that “that perpetuate procedural
inequities under the IFP statute,” he has failed to identify specific policies and customs that
allegedly caused him injury and has failed to explain how he was personally harmed by
such policies or customs. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a DOJ “litigation posture” are
generalized and conclusory. He does not identify a discrete agency action, final agency
action, or particular policy attributable to Defendant Bondi that caused him a concrete
injury.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations primarily challenge the way courts apply 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e), rather than conduct by Defendant Bondi. Yet Defendant Bondi has no role in
IFP screening. Under the statute, a court is required to screen and dismiss a complaint filed
by a person with IFP status if the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (providing “the court shall dismiss the case at any time” if the court
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determines that . . . the action of appeal is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted) (emphasis added). The Attorney General does not and cannot control
judicial decision-making, including how courts screen complaints filed by litigants
proceeding in forma pauperis. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendant
Bondi caused, or could cause, the constitutional deprivation he asserts.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and the First Amended Complaint
will be dismissed on that basis.
III. 	Motion for Leave to Supplement and Join Defendant
Plaintiff seeks to supplement his First Amended Complaint based on events that
allegedly occurred after its filing, asserting the events arise from the same series of events.
(Doc. 12.) In support, Plaintiff alleges that because this Court denied him in forma pauperis
status in a different case, he was forced to seek redress for his common carrier dispute via
protest at The UPS #6850 Store, which resulted in his arrest for disorderly conduct. 	He
seeks to join The UPS Store as a defendant. (Id.)
Rule 20(a)(2) allows a defendant to be joined in an action if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff’s protest and arrest at The UPS Store #6850 do not arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the Plaintiff’s claims against the U.S. Attorney General
for her litigation posture regarding IFP screening. Nor do Plaintiff’s claims present
common questions of law or fact sufficient to satisfy Rule 20(a)(2). Instead, the proposed
claims involve distinct factual circumstances and would introduce new issues unrelated to
the operative complaint. Accordingly, even if the First Amendment complaint were not
subject to dismissal, joinder of The UPS Store #6850 under Rule 20 would be improper,
and the Motion will be denied.
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IV. 	Leave to Amend
“Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to
dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has
previously been permitted to amend his complaint. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. U.S.,
90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996).
Here, the Court will deny leave to amend because amendment would be futile.
Plaintiff’s claims challenge the way the Court screens in forma pauperis complaints under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a function committed to the judiciary—not the Attorney General.
Because Defendant has no authority over judicial screening decisions, Plaintiff cannot
plausibly allege that Defendant caused or could remedy the alleged constitutional injury.
This defect cannot be cured by amendment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Join The UPS Store #6850 as a Defendant (Doc. 12) is
denied.
(2) 	The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) is dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim.
(3) 	This Clerk of Court must close this action.
Dated this 24th day of April, 2026.
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