(HC) Mo v. Albarran et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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YANYUN MO,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, Warden,
California City Correctional
Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 1:25-cv-01789 WBS CSK
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
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Before the court is petitioner Yanyun Mo’s motion for a
temporary restraining order, in which she asks to be released
from custody or provided an individualized hearing. (Docket No.
2 at 2.)
It is undisputed that petitioner entered the United
States illegally. The record indicates that she entered without
inspection on October 15, 2024, was given a credible fear
interview, was charged as inadmissible, and placed in removal
Case 1:25-cv-01789-CSK Document 5 Filed 12/10/25 Page 1 of 4

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proceedings. (Docket No. 2-1 at 5.) She was then detained on
October 31, 2025, during an appointment with Immigration Customs
and Enforcement. (Id.)
“The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is
the same as for a preliminary injunction.” Rovio Entm't Ltd. v.
Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (citing Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,
240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The last two factors “merge when the
Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
435 (2009).
Likelihood of success on the merits is “the most
important factor in determining whether a preliminary injunction
is warranted.” Garcia v. County of Alameda, 150 F. 4th 1224,
1230 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). “[P]laintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction face a
difficult task in proving that they are entitled to this
extraordinary remedy.” Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d
462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). A mere
possibility of success is insufficient to satisfy this factor;
instead, a petitioner must demonstrate “a strong likelihood of
success on the merits.” Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408
F. 3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Petitioner argues her detention violates due process
because she was not given notice and a pre-detention hearing.
(Docket No. 2-1 at 6-7.) Petitioner makes no claim that she was
denied substantive due process; the sole issue is whether
petitioner was denied procedural due process.
This court has now dealt with several petitions like
this one, in which it held that noncitizens present in the United
States who were never legally admitted were presumably
“applicants for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and thus
subject to mandatory detention. See, e.g., Alonzo v. Noem, No.
1:25-cv-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2025) (“The suggestion that petitioner may evade the designation
of ‘applicant for admission’ merely because he has already
entered the United States elides the fact that he was never
lawfully admitted.”); Valencia v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01550 WBS
JDP, 2025 WL 3205133, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (same);
Xavier Oliveria v. Albarran, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01760 WBS AC,
2025 WL 3525923 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (same).
Petitioner presents neither facts nor arguments that
distinguish her case from these prior decisions. Accordingly,
the court again concludes that “the procedure authorized by
Congress” in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) constitutes procedural “due
process” as far as petitioner is concerned. Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); see also
Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2015) (for noncitizen
who “never technically ‘entered’ the United States,” “procedural
due process is simply whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress happens to be.” (citation modified)); Grigoryan v. Barr,
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959 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). And because 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) does not “say[] anything whatsoever about bond
hearings,” petitioner is not entitled to one. Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Petitioner has been afforded the applicable process and
has therefore failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits of her claim that additional process is due. That
being the case, the court “need not consider the other
[preliminary injunction] factors.” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d
558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018).1
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for a
temporary restraining order (Docket No. 2) be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if petitioner wishes to have
a hearing on her motion for preliminary injunction, she shall
file all the papers necessary to support that motion no later
than December 23, 2025. The government shall file its opposition
no later than December 30, 2025. The court will then either set
the motion down for oral arguments or take the motion under
submission.
Dated: December 10, 2025
1 The court also notes that petitioner filed her motion
over a month after her detention. Such a delay in the context of
a temporary restraining order request further supports denial, as
it suggests a lack of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Armstrong v.
County of Placer, No. 21-cv-00779-KJM-KJN, 2021 WL 2258716, at *4
(E.D. Cal. May 3, 2021) (collecting cases).
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