(HC) Mo v. Albarran et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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YANYUN MO,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, Warden,
California City Correctional
Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 1:25-cv-01789 WBS CSK
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
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Before the court is petitioner Yanyun Mo’s motion for
preliminary injunction, in which she again asks to be released
from custody or provided with an individualized hearing. (Docket
No. 10-1 at 2.)1
The court summarized petitioner’s circumstances in its
prior order denying her motion for temporary restraining order.
(See Docket No. 5.) Petitioner has not included any new facts
1 The motion is decided on the papers without oral
argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g).
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in the instant motion. (See Docket No. 10-1 at 2-3.)
Nor has petitioner briefed new legal arguments.
Indeed, the legal arguments petitioner presents in the instant
motion are identical to those she advanced in her motion for
temporary restraining order. (Compare Docket No. 2-1, with
Docket No. 10-1.) Specifically, petitioner argues once more that
her detention, which was secured without notice and a pre-
detention hearing, violates procedural due process. (Compare
Docket No. 10-1 at 4-7, with Docket No. 2-1 at 6-7.)
I. Preliminary Injunction
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that [s]he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in h[er]
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The last
two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.”
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
Likelihood of success on the merits is “the most
important factor in determining whether a preliminary injunction
is warranted.” Garcia v. County of Alameda, 150 F. 4th 1224,
1230 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). “[P]laintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction face a
difficult task in proving that they are entitled to this
extraordinary remedy.” Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d
462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). A mere
possibility of success is insufficient to satisfy this factor;
instead, a petitioner must demonstrate “a strong likelihood of
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success on the merits.” Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408
F. 3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005).
Petitioner argues that even if she raises only “serious
questions as to the merits” of her claims, the court can grant
relief if she makes a “stronger showing on the balance of
hardships.” (Docket No. 10-1 at 3 (citing Alliance for the Wild
Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F. 3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).) This
is inconsistent with Winter.
In Winter, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part test
for determining when the grant of a preliminary injunction is
warranted. See 555 U.S. at 20. Three years later, despite the
Supreme Court’s admonition, the Ninth Circuit held that the
“serious questions” test survived Winter. See Cottrell, 632 F.
3d at 1131-32. However, just last year, the Supreme Court went
back and held that, “absent a clear command from Congress, courts
must adhere to the traditional four-factor test” for granting a
preliminary injunction articulated in Winter. Starbucks Corp. v.
McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024). Thus, although the Ninth
Circuit has not addressed the continued viability of the “serious
questions” test post-Starbucks, the Supreme Court’s mandate is
clear: because there is no “clear command from Congress” to the
contrary, the “serious questions” test may not be used. See id.
Moreover, even assuming that the so-called “serious
questions” test remains viable after Winter and Starbucks, it is
nevertheless inapplicable here, where petitioner is seeking a
mandatory injunction. “A mandatory injunction orders a
responsible party to take action.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc.
v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F. 3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009)
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(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is subject
to a “doubly demanding” standard and requires the moving party to
“establish that the law and facts clearly favor her position, not
simply that she is likely to succeed.” Garcia v. Google, Inc.,
796 F. 3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). “In
plain terms, mandatory injunctions should not issue in doubtful
cases.” Id. (citation omitted).
Other judges in this circuit have found that the
serious questions test is inapplicable when a petitioner seeks a
mandatory injunction. See, e.g., Cruz Uitz v. Noem, No. cv-25-
06420 MWF (AJRX), 2025 WL 2995008 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025)
(declining to adopt the serious questions test in immigration
detention context because a mandatory injunction was
requested); Jamgotchian v. Ferraro, No. 822-cv-01893 FWS KES,
2023 WL 2396352, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2023) (“The Court
observes that some district courts decline to apply the ‘serious
questions’ test in cases seeking a mandatory injunction on the
basis that it is inconsistent with the heightened standard
applicable to such relief.”) (collecting cases), rev’d on other
grounds, 93 F. 4th 1150.
Here, petitioner asks the court to order her release
from custody or that the government afford her a pre-deprivation
bond hearing. (Docket No. 10-1 at 2.) Ordering the government to
either release petitioner or to provide her with a bond hearing
that the government would not have otherwise provided constitutes
a mandatory injunction. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F. 3d
976, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2017); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp 3d 1083,
1090 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (acknowledging uncertainty regarding
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whether custody release and bond hearing requests in the
immigration detention context may constitute a mandatory
injunction); Salazar v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01017 JLT SAB, 2025
WL 2456232, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) (same).
Petitioner does not merely seek to “freeze[] the
positions of the parties,” Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1333
(1983); rather, petitioner asks the court to compel the
government to affirmatively alter the status quo by providing her
with additional procedural protections. Accordingly, the court
declines to apply the “serious questions” test and therefore
analyzes petitioner's motion pursuant to the test articulated in
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
II. Procedural Due Process
This court has now dealt with several petitions like
this one, in which it held that noncitizens present in the United
States who were never legally admitted were presumably
“applicants for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and thus
subject to mandatory detention. See, e.g., Alonzo v. Noem, No.
1:25-cv-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2025) (“The suggestion that petitioner may evade the designation
of ‘applicant for admission’ merely because he has already
entered the United States elides the fact that he was never
lawfully admitted.”); Mo v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01789 WBS CSK,
2025 WL 3539063, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) (same); Valencia
v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01550 WBS JDP, 2025 WL 3205133, at *3
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (same); Xavier Oliveria v. Albarran,
et al., No. 1:25-cv-01760 WBS AC, 2025 WL 3525923 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
9, 2025) (same).
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Petitioner presents neither facts nor arguments that
distinguish her case from these prior decisions, including the
decision this court made less than one month ago regarding her
own circumstances, see Mo, 2025 WL 3539063, at *2. Accordingly,
the court again concludes that “the procedure authorized by
Congress” in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) constitutes procedural “due
process” as far as petitioner is concerned. Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); see also
Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2015) (for noncitizen
who “never technically ‘entered’ the United States,” “procedural
due process is simply whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress happens to be.” (citation modified)); Grigoryan v. Barr,
959 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). And because 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) does not “say[] anything whatsoever about bond
hearings,” petitioner is not entitled to one. Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Petitioner has not made any other arguments that might
fall within the realm of a procedural due process claim. Thus,
she has been afforded the applicable process and has therefore
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of
her claim that additional process is due.2 That being the case,
the court “need not consider the other [preliminary injunction]
factors.” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, and for
2 The court notes that petitioner has not brought a
substantive due process claim, see E.R.J.B. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-
cv-01843 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3683118, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2025) (analyzing substantive due process claim), or any other
claim.
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the reasons set forth in this court’s prior order denying
petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (see Docket
No. 5), petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction (Docket
No. 10) is hereby DENIED.
Dated: January 6, 2026
Case 1:25-cv-01789-CSK Document 12 Filed 01/06/26 Page 7 of 7