(HC) Rangel Munoz v. Warden, Mesa Verde Detention Facility

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTw
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RICARDO RANGEL MUNOZ
(A-222-597-533),
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, MESA VERDE
DETETNTION FACILITY,
Respondent.
No. 1:26-CV-6836 DAD CSK
ORDER AND FINDINGS &
RECOMMENDATIONS
Petitioner Ricardo Rangel Munoz (A-222-597-533), a citizen and native of Mexico,
entered the United States on an unknown date, and filed a pro se a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 During his time in the United States, petitioner has been
arrested by local authorities on multiple different occasions for different charges, including retail
theft, hit and run, driving under the influence, property damage/destruction, domestic violence in
the presence of a child, and public intoxication. After petitioner was arrested on July 16, 2026 by
local authorities for the domestic violence-related incident, petitioner was taken into custody by
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on August 3, 2026. This habeas action
concerns petitioner’s detention. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends dismissing
1 	This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,
and Local Rule 302(c)(17).
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the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a national and citizen of Mexico. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) In about 2024, petitioner
entered the United States without inspection. (ECF No. 7 at 26.) Petitioner has been arrested by
local authorities on multiple different occasions for different charges. (ECF No. 7 at 1-2.)
Respondent asserts the following criminal history for petitioner:2 (1) conviction on January 28,
2013 for retail theft (shoplifting), in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-6-02, resulting in a 180 day
jail sentence; (2) plea in abeyance on December 2, 2024 for hit and run, in violation of Utah Code
Utah § 41-6A-401, resulting in a sentence requiring 48 hours of community service;
(3) conviction on December 2, 2024 for driving under the influence, in violation of Utah Code
Utah § 41-6A-501(1)+(2A), resulting in a 180 day jail sentence; and (4) conviction on July 30,
2026 for disorderly conduct, in violation of Utah Code Utah § 76-9-102(2)+(3), resulting in a 15
day jail sentence.
On August 3, 2026, petitioner was taken into ICE custody after his July 16, 2026 arrest for
the domestic violence-related incident that resulted in a disorderly conduct conviction. Petitioner
alleges that after his detention by ICE, he has been transferred one time and has been subjected to
inhumane treatment and conditions. (See ECF No. 1 at 5-6.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 26, 2026, petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion to
appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.) On September 4, 2026, respondent timely filed a motion to
dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) Petitioner did not file a reply. Briefing is now complete.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
2 	In the motion to dismiss, respondent also describes criminal charges against petitioner that
were subsequently dismissed or dropped. Respondent does not assert detention authority on the
basis of dismissed or dropped charges, and the Court therefore does not address these charges.
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custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas
corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s
habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner challenges his continued detention on the grounds that his prolonged detention
violates the Fifth Amendment due process clause. (ECF No. 1 at 16-17.) 	Respondent argues that
petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) as his retail
theft conviction renders him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) for having
committed a crime involving moral turpitude. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) Respondent further argues that
this Court should find that because petitioner failed to seek a Joseph hearing in immigration court,
petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and petitioner’s claim challenging his
mandatory detention should be dismissed. (Id. at 3-4 (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I & N Dec. 799
(BIA 1999).) Finally, respondent argues that petitioner’s detention is not prolonged because at
the time of the petitioner’s filing, petitioner had been detained for a little more than one month.
(Id. at 4-6.)
A. 	Due Process Claim (Claim One)
In analyzing petitioner’s challenge to his detention, the court “must first identify the
statutory provision that purports to confer” authority for his detention. Prieto-Romero v. Clark,
534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). Respondent argues that petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) as his retail theft conviction renders him
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) for having committed a crime involving moral
turpitude. (ECF No. 7 at 3.)
For purposes of these findings and recommendations, this Court assumes that petitioner is
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detained pursuant to § 1226(c)(1)(A) based on his January 28, 2013 conviction for retail theft.
Pursuant to § 1226(c), “detention is mandatory, and a noncitizen of the United States . . .
therefore is not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing.” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 529 (9th
Cir. 2023); see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
In the response, respondent also argues that if petitioner claims he is not subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), petitioner can challenge his mandatory detention
under Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), in a “Joseph Hearing.” (ECF No. 7 at
3-4.) Respondent argues that at a Joseph hearing, petitioner can demonstrate that he is not
convicted of a predicate crime, or that the government is otherwise substantially unlikely to
establish that he is not in fact subject to mandatory detention.3 (Id.) Respondent argues that this
Court should find that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to seek a
Joseph Hearing in immigration court. (Id.) Petitioner does not address exhaustion. (See ECF
No. 1.)
28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals
before filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004).
However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available
judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678
F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not
jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int’l, Inc.,
811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the
district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach
the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in
court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency
3 The Supreme Court has explained that: “This ‘Joseph hearing’ is immediately provided to a
detainee who claims that he is not covered by § 1226(c). At the hearing, the detainee may avoid
mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not convicted of the predicate
crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish that he is in fact subject to
mandatory detention.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003).
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consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of
the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude
the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court may waive the exhaustion requirement
when administrative remedies are inadequate, irreparable injury may occur without immediate
judicial relief, or exhaustion otherwise would be futile. Laing, 370 F.3d at 1000-01 (“[D]istrict
court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ordinarily reserved for instances in which
no other judicial remedy is available.”).
Under the circumstances of this case, this Court finds that petitioner should not be excused
from exhausting administrative remedies. See Buckley v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 1030931, at *2-4
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026) (court declined to waive the prudential exhaustion requirements
because petitioner’s appeal of his Matter of Jospeh hearing was pending). At a Joseph hearing,
petitioner “may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not
convicted of the predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish
that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention.” See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3
(2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(h)(2)(ii) (2002)). The Joseph hearing process enables petitioner to
challenge his mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and the immigration court has the expertise
necessary to develop the record and reach a proper decision. Relaxing the exhaustion
requirement under these circumstances would encourage others to bypass the administrative
exhaustion process. Finally, in this case administrative review is likely to allow the agency to
correct its own mistakes and thus avoid the need for judicial review.
“If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, then ‘a
district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the
proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies,’” unless exhaustion is excused.
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d
1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)). Petitioner has provided no argument as to why exhaustion should be
excused under the circumstances of his case. (See ECF No. 1.) Therefore, this Court finds that
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petitioner’s due process claim challenging his detention should be dismissed without prejudice
based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
B. 	Prolonged Detention
For purposes of analyzing petitioner’s prolonged detention claim, this Court assumes that
petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c). While the Supreme Court has rejected a facial
challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), an as
applied challenge is not foreclosed and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Demore
specifically noted that “since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a
lawful permanent resident alien such as [Kim] could be entitled to an individualized
determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became
unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532. In addition, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has yet to take a
position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c).” Loba L.M. v. Andrews, et al., No. 1:25-cv-0611 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2939178, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3187577 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 14, 2025); see Avilez, 69 F.4th at 538 (declining to determine whether due process requires
a bond hearing for noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c)). “Although the Ninth Circuit has
yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that ‘the Due Process
Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of detention . . .
under [section 1226(c)].’” Loba L.M., 2025 WL 2939178, at *5 (quoting Reid v. Donelan, 17
F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2024)
(“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen's constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably
prolonged detention under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden
Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and
Jennings, petitioners detained pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their
detention and that due process affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes
unreasonable)). “[E]ssentially all district courts that have considered the issue agree that
prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, ‘will—at
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some point—violate the right to due process.’” Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-cv-01669-RAJ, 2019
WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (citation omitted); see also Loba L.M., 2025 WL 2939178,
at *5. This Court joins other courts that have found that unreasonably prolonged detention
pursuant to § 1226(c) without a bond hearing can violate due process. See Keo v. Chestnut, et al.,
No. 1:26-cv-1192 DJC CSK, 2026 WL 747117, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2026); Loba L.M.,
2025 WL 2939178, at *5.
The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process
clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their
presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, Tinoco v. Noem, 818 F.Supp.3d 1141,
1151 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
The court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim “in two steps: the first asks whether
there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines
the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with
the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing
Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). Because petitioner has
been detained for less than six months, this Court finds that petitioner does not yet have a
protected liberty interest in freedom from detention. Courts finding protected liberty interests in
freedom from detention under § 1226(c) have based their findings on detention longer than six
months. See Pacheco v. Warden, 2026 WL 1067486, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026), findings
and recommendations adopted, 2026 WL 1169236 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2026) (finding petitioner
detained for over one year pursuant to §1226(c) had protected liberty interest); Lopez v. Warden,
2026 WL 834573, at * 3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026) (finding petitioner detained for over ten
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months pursuant to § 1226(c) had protected liberty interest); Palencia v. Warden, 2026 WL
818580, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2026), findings and recommendations adopted, 2026 WL
939469 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2026) (finding petitioner detained for over eight months pursuant to
§ 1226(c) had protected liberty interest); Keo, 2026 WL 747117, at *2 (concluding clear liberty
interest in freedom from detention where petitioner was detained pursuant to § 1226(c) for over
37 months). Petitioner’s detention does not exceed the time period the Supreme Court noted in
Demore: “the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast
majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which
the alien chooses to appeal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 530. Because petitioner has not demonstrated
a liberty interest based on his detention of less than six months, the petition for writ of habeas
corpus should be denied. See Rakeshkumar H.P. v. Warden, 2026 WL 1146201, at *1-2 (E.D.
Cal. Apr. 28, 2026) (finding no liberty interest where petitioner detained for a little over two
months pursuant to § 1226(c)).
V. 	MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 3.) There currently exists
no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105
F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any
stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254
Cases. The Court concludes that the interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel,
and petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied without prejudice.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be
dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for appointment of
counsel (ECF No. 3) is denied without prejudice.
Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be dismissed without prejudice.
2. 	The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case.
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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days
of the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the
court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be
filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that
failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District
Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
Dated: October 14, 2026
/rang6836.157.2241.imm/10
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