V. v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
M. V.,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
Case No. 26-cv-00609-YGR (AGT)
DISCOVERY ORDER
Re: Dkt. No. 18
The parties have submitted a discovery letter setting out their disagreements as to (i)
the duration of Plaintiff’s Rule 35 psychiatric examination, and (ii) the scope of that exami-
nation. Dkt. 18. The undersigned addresses each issue below.
Duration. Defendant proposes a six-hour examination, broken into two separate ses-
sions if needed. Id. at 3. Plaintiff doesn’t set forth her desired duration, any support of any
position, or propose a compromise resolution. Id. at 4-6; see also AGT Civil Standing Order
§ VII.B (required elements of a discovery letter). Nevertheless, based on Defendant’s state-
ment and the letter’s attached exhibits, the undersigned understands that Plaintiff seeks to
limit the duration of the examination to four hours. Dkt. 18 at 1. The undersigned agrees
with Defendant that Plaintiff’s examination should be limited to six hours, not four, broken
up into two separate sessions if needed. The forensic psychiatrist who will conduct Plaintiff’s
examination declares that four hours wouldn’t provide sufficient time to adequately evaluate
her. Dkt. 18-1 at ¶ 4. Further, as the psychiatrist’s declaration and the notices in other bell-
wether cases show, six to eight hours is a typical length for this kind of examination. Id.; see
also dkt. 18-6 at 6 (bellwether plaintiff J.U.’s examination notice, stating that “an examina-
tion typically lasts 7 to 8 hours.”). Finally, while Plaintiff’s discovery letter statement doesn’t
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specifically explain why Plaintiff seeks a length of four hours, the undersigned understands
that Plaintiff’s request is due to her care responsibilities. Dkt. 18-10 at 22. Defendant’s will-
ingness to split the examination into two sessions, as well as its agreement to hold the ex-
amination in a location close to Plaintiff’s home, adequately addresses these concerns. Dkt.
18 at 1; Dkt. 18-10 at 23.
Scope. The parties also disagree as to the scope of the Rule 35 examination. Dkt. 18
at 2, 4. Defendant seeks an examination “encompassing all of the events and diagnoses re-
flected in Plaintiff’s treatment records.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff argues that the permissible scope
of the examination should be more narrowly limited to the specific circumstances alleged in
her complaint, and particularly to the period stretching from her incarceration to the filing
of her complaint. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff also states that the parties disagree about the “scope of the bellwether pro-
ceeding” established by the Court, id. at 4, and claims that determining “the boundaries of
the proceeding itself” is a “threshold determination” that belongs to Judge Gonzalez Rogers,
not the undersigned. Id. at 6. Plaintiff doesn’t cite any authority for this assertion. The un-
dersigned finds that the parties’ dispute is suitable for resolution as a discovery matter.
As Plaintiff notes, the parties have already agreed that the scope of discovery at this
phase is “expressly limited to issues relevant to resolution of statute-of-limitations and eq-
uitable tolling questions.” Case No. 4:24-cv-06580-YGR, Dkt. 152 at 1-2. They’ve further
agreed that the equitable tolling factors raised in these cases include:
Retaliation — threats, intimidation, punishment, adverse actions,
or other conduct that may have deterred reporting or timely claim
presentment; Barriers to Reporting — institutional practices,
grievance procedures, PREA reporting mechanisms, confidentiality
limitations, access to counsel or advocates, and other structural or
operational impediments to disclosure or timely filing; and
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Psychological Harm — trauma-related conditions, mental health
impacts, delayed recognition of injury, and other psychological ef-
fects relevant to diligence or delayed filing.
Id. at 2. And, as the undersigned has explained previously, the equitable tolling in-
quiry examines the breadth of a plaintiff’s functional capacities and limitations as it relates
to her ability to timely present a claim, not just a plaintiff’s discrete conditions. Case No.
4:24-cv-06580-YGR, Dkt. 195, at 2 (citing Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th
Cir. 2010) (denying request to limit relevant healthcare records to those involving previously
diagnosed mental health conditions)). Plaintiff’s pleadings echo this when she states that
“equitable tolling is a fact-intensive inquiry, and courts must consider the full context of the
plaintiff’s experience, including mental health challenges.” Dkt. 2 at ¶ 85. Plaintiff’s discov-
ery statement also concedes that “other events [can] be addressed as to their occurrence,
timing, and effect.” Dkt. 18 at 4.
Against this backdrop, Plaintiff doesn’t cite any authority supporting the examination
limitations she seeks or more generally addressing the proper scope of a Rule 35 examination
in the equitable tolling context. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s desired scope is too
narrow and there is no basis to restrict the scope of the examination. See dkt. 18-10 at 9. Like
the examinations in other bellwether cases, the examiner should be able to ask in some detail
about Plaintiff’s background and mental history, to fully evaluate her functional capacity to
timely present her claims. Dkt. 18-6 at 7. That may include events and diagnoses that took
place before Plaintiff’s incarceration. It should not be strictly limited to “the period between
[Plaintiff’s] release from FCI Dublin and the filing of [her] administrative claim.” Dkt. 18-
10 at 9.
Consistent with this phase’s scope, the examination is meant to assess Plaintiff’s
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ability to bring her claims in a timely manner. Id. Therefore, the examination should address
Plaintiff’s background and treatment records to the extent it’s necessary to understand this
capacity. The language Defendant has included in its Notice of Psychiatric Examination re-
flects this understanding. Dkt. 18-2 at 3. The undersigned therefore orders that Plaintiff’s
Rule 35 examination proceed according to the scope currently outlined in Defendant’s No-
tice of Psychiatric Examination. Id.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
______________________________
Alex G. Tse
United States Magistrate Judge
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