Flores Lara v. Larose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JUANA BEBSABE FLORES LARA,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden,
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25-cv-3565-RSH-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On December 12, 2025, petitioner Juana Bebsabe Flores Lara filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1.
Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras. Id. ¶ 9. In 2014, she applied for admission to the
United States, and was thereafter paroled into the United States and released on an order
of supervision. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23-24; ECF No. 4 at 2. In 2019, Petitioner was ordered
removed from the United States. ECF No. 1 ¶ 25; ECF No. 4 at 2. Petitioner appealed to
the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed her appeal; she thereafter filed a
petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which denied her
petition. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25-26; ECF No. 4 at 2.
On March 3, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customers Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested
Petitioner. ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. On March 20, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen her
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immigration case, which motion remains pending. Id. Petitioner is detained by ICE at the
Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego, California.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of her detention. The merits of the Petition have
been fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 1, 4, 5. As set forth below, the Court grants the petition.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A prisoner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). See also Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d
83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he burden of proof under § 2241 is on the prisoner ….”).
II. 	JURISDICTION
Respondents first contend that Petitioner’s claim is jurisdictionally barred under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(g). ECF No. 4 at 3-4. Section 1252(g) provides that, except as otherwise
provided in that section, and notwithstanding any other provision of law including 28
U.S.C. § 2241, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims “necessarily
arise” from the decision by Respondents to execute removal orders, and that those claims
are therefore barred. ECF No. 4 at 3.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the “arising from” jurisdiction-limiting provision
in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) narrowly, restricting it “only to three discrete actions that the
Attorney General may take”: the “‘decision or action’ to ‘commence 	proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am. –Arab Anti–Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). See
also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret [8 U.S.C. §
1252(g)] to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed
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actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three
specific actions themselves.”). Here, as the Court construes the Petition, Petitioner
challenges the legality of her detention rather than challenging a removal order or
Respondents’ decision to execute a removal order. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s
claims are not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The detention and release of noncitizens who are subject to a final order of removal
is addressed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Under that statute, “when an alien is ordered removed,
the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90
days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the
removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s previous order of supervision was lawfully
revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) and/or § 241.13(i)(2). Respondents state:
An order of supervision may be issued under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, and the
order 	may 	be 	revoked 	under 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	241.4(l)(2)(iii) 	where
“appropriate to enforce a removal order.” See also 8 C.F.R. § 241.5
(conditions of release after removal period). ICE may also revoke the
order of supervision where, “on account of changed circumstances,
[ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may
be 	removed 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future.” 	8 	C.F.R. 	§
241.13(i)(2). The regulations further provide:
Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for
revocation of his or her release or parole. The alien will be
afforded an initial informal interview promptly after his or her
return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to
respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1).
ECF No. 4 at 10.
The first of the regulations cited by Respondents, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2), provides
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that “[r]elease may be revoked in the exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the
revoking official … it is appropriate to enforce a removal order”; and vests such revocation
authority in the “Executive Associate Commissioner,” while providing that “[a] district
director may also revoke release of an alien when, in the district director’s opinion,
revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of
the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2).
The second of the regulations cited by Respondents, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2),
provides that “[t]he Service may revoke an alien’s release under this section and return the
alien to custody if, on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there
is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” The regulation further provides, in language similar to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1), that
“[u]pon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her
release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her
return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for
revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
The Petition asserts that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful, among other reasons,
because Respondents failed to comply with the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 or §
241.13. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17-20, 32-34. In their return, Respondents do not provide evidence
reflecting that prior to the revocation of Petitioner’s supervision: (1) the Executive
Associate Commissioner, or a district director, exercised his or her discretion to revoke
Petitioner’s supervision upon determining that such revocation was appropriate to enforce
a removal order; or that (2) on account of changed circumstances, DHS determined that
there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Nor do Respondents provide evidence reflecting that, upon revocation,
Petitioner was notified of the reasons for the revocation, or was provided a prompt initial
informal interview to allow her a chance to respond. Respondents do not assert that any of
these requirements were met, but argue instead that “[e]ven if the agency failed to follow
these regulations,” the Court should deny the Petition because “Petitioner cannot establish
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that she was prejudiced by these acts or omissions.” ECF No. 4 at 10.
The Court disagrees. Government agencies are required to follow their own
regulations. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts have
determined that where DHS fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the
detention is unlawful and the petitioner’s release must be ordered. See, e.g., Orellana v.
Baker, No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025); M.S.L. v.
Bostock, No. 6:25-cv-1204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *10 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); Ceesay
v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 165-66 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F.
Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017). This Court reaches the same conclusion. Petitioner
was indeed prejudiced by the unlawful deprivation of her liberty, even if DHS could have
revoked her supervision in a lawful manner and may yet do so in the future.
In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the remaining grounds
in the Petition for seeking release.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are ordered to
immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to the conditions of her preexisting
order of supervision.
The hearing currently scheduled for January 8, 2026 is hereby VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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