Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP address
70.95.108.82,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25cv3725-AGS (MSB)
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX
PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO
SERVE A THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENA
PRIOR TO A RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE
[ECF NO. 4]
On January 8, 2026, Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC (“Strike 3”) filed an “Ex-Parte
Application for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference”
(“Ex Parte Application”). (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff seeks to subpoena Defendant John Doe’s
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) Spectrum (“Spectrum”) for “limited, immediate
discovery . . . so that Plaintiff may learn Defendant’s identity, further investigate
Defendant’s role in the infringement, and effectuate service.” (ECF No. 4-1 at 7.)
Because Defendant has not been identified, no opposition or reply briefs have been
filed. For the following reasons, the Ex Parte Application is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff owns the copyright to certain motion pictures. (ECF No. 4-1 at 7.) On
December 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant John Doe, an
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internet subscriber assigned Internet Protocol (“IP”) address 70.95.108.82, has been
using the BitTorrent protocol to commit “rampant and wholesale copyright
infringement” by downloading and distributing twenty-four movies over an extended
period. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges it used its proprietary forensic software, VXN
Scan, to discover that Defendant’s IP address was illegally distributing Plaintiff’s
copyrighted motion pictures. (ECF No. 4-1 at 7.)
On January 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Ex Parte Application seeking leave to
serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 on Defendant’s ISP,
Spectrum. (ECF No. 4-1 at 8, 18.) Plaintiff maintains that the Rule 45 subpoena “will
only demand the true name and address of Defendant[,]” and “Plaintiff will only use this
information to prosecute the claims made in its Complaint.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff further
claims that “[w]ithout this information, Plaintiff cannot serve Defendant nor pursue this
lawsuit and protect its copyrights.” (Id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, formal discovery is not permitted before the parties have conferred
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Courts,
however, have made exceptions “in rare cases . . . permitting limited discovery to ensue
after filing of the complaint to permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying facts
necessary to permit service on the defendant.” Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185
F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Courts in the Ninth Circuit
apply a “good cause” standard to decide whether to permit early discovery. Semitool,
Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Cal. 2002). “Good cause”
is established “where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the
administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Id. at 276.
“[W]hen the defendants’ identities are unknown at the time the complaint is
filed, courts may grant plaintiffs leave to take early discovery to determine the
defendants’ identities ‘unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities,
or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.’” 808 Holdings, LLC v.
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Collective of Dec. 29, 2011 Sharing Hash E37917C8EEB4585E6421358FF32F29C
D63C23C91, No. 12cv186-MMA (RBB), 2012 WL 12884688, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2012)
(quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). “A district court’s
decision to grant discovery to determine jurisdictional facts is a matter of discretion.”
Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578 (citing Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556
F.2d 406, 430 n. 24 (9th Cir. 1977)).
District courts in the Ninth Circuit typically apply a three-factor test when
considering motions for early discovery to identify Doe defendants. Id. at 578–80. First,
the moving party should be able to “identify the missing party with sufficient specificity
such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could
be sued in federal court.” Id. at 578. Second, the movant “should identify all previous
steps taken to locate the elusive defendant” to ensure “that [the movant has made] a
good faith effort to comply with the requirements of service of process and specifically
identifying defendants.” Id. at 579. Third, the plaintiff “should establish to the Court’s
satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss.”
Id.; see also Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (stating early discovery to identify unknown
defendants should be permitted unless the complaint would be dismissed on other
grounds).
In addition to satisfying all three factors, plaintiff should provide “reasons
justifying the specific discovery requested [and] identification of a limited number of
persons or entities on whom discovery process might be served and for which there is a
reasonable likelihood that the discovery process will lead to identifying information
about defendant that would make service of process possible.” Columbia Ins. Co., 185
F.R.D. at 580; see also Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (explaining that early discovery is
precluded if it is not likely to provide the identity of the defendant). These safeguards
are intended to ensure that early discovery “will only be employed in cases where the
plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant
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pre-service, and will prevent use of this method to harass or intimidate.” Columbia Ins.
Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks leave to serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45 on Defendant’s ISP, Spectrum. (ECF No. 4-1 at 7–8.) The Cable Privacy Act
generally prohibits a cable operator from disclosing “personally identifiable information
concerning any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the
subscriber concerned.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1). A cable operator, however, may disclose
the information if the disclosure is made pursuant to a court order and the cable
operator notifies the subscriber of the order. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B). A cable operator
is “any person or group of persons . . . who provides cable service over a cable system
and directly or through one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such cable
system,” or “otherwise controls or is responsible for, through any arrangement, the
management and operation of such a cable system.” 47 U.S.C. § 522(5).
Spectrum is a cable operator, and the information Plaintiff seeks falls within the
exception to the Cable Privacy Act’s disclosure prohibition. See 47 U.S.C. §551(c)(2)(B).
Accordingly, if Plaintiff satisfies the multi-factor test used by district courts to determine
whether early discovery is warranted, Defendant’s ISP may disclose the requested
information pursuant to this Court’s order.
A. 	Plaintiff Has Identified Defendant with Sufficient Specificity
Plaintiff must identify Defendant with enough specificity to allow the Court to
determine that Defendant is a real person or entity, subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. “[A] plaintiff identifies Doe defendants
with sufficient specificity by providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual
defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by using ‘geolocation
technology’ to trace the IP addresses to a physical point of origin.” 808 Holdings, LLC,
2012 WL 12884688, at *4 (internal citations omitted).
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In support of its Ex Parte Application, Plaintiff submitted the Declaration of Jorge
Arco, a Senior Developer for General Media Systems, LLC, the parent company for Strike
3. (See ECF No. 4-2 at 3–4.) Mr. Arco uses Plaintiff’s infringement detection system,
VXN Scan, to identify the IP addresses used by individuals infringing Plaintiff’s movies
through the BitTorrent protocol. (Id. at 9–10.) Further, although the BitTorrent
protocol contains some default and automatic functions, the functions that Plaintiff
accuses Defendant of using require human operation. See Christopher Civil, Mass
Copyright Infringement Litigation: Of Trolls, Pornography, Settlement and Joinder, 30
Syracuse J. Sci. & Tech. L. 2, 12 (2014) (“BitTorrent transfers do not involve a centralized
server that hosts or transfers the data files in question. Instead, BitTorrent involves
users interacting directly with other users to upload and download the content.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has established that an actual human was involved in the
downloading and sharing of Plaintiff’s allegedly infringed works.
Plaintiff also submitted the Declaration of Patrick Paige, a Managing Member at
Computer Forensics, LLC, where Mr. Paige contends that he utilized Packet Capture
(“PCAP”), “a computer file containing captured or recorded data transmitted between
network devices[,]” and VXN Scan to connect Defendant’s IP address to the alleged
“piece of an infringing copy of Plaintiff’s works.” (ECF No. 4-2 at 24.) According to Mr.
Paige, “[t]he PCAP contains a record data concerning that transaction, including, but not
limited to, the [IP] Addresses used in the network transaction, the date and time of the
network transaction, the port number used to accomplish each network transaction,
and the Info Hash value that the VXN Scan used as the subject of its request for data.”
(Id. at 24.) Mr. Paige contends that the contents of the PCAP confirm that the infringing
activity connected to the IP address 70.95.108.82 was initiated on December 4, 2025, at
08:32:59 UTC. (Id.) Mr. Paige concludes that “the PCAP evidence shows that within that
transaction, IP address 70.95.108.82 uploaded a piece or pieces of a file corresponding
to hash value [representing Plaintiff’s works] to VXN Scan.” (Id.) This date and time
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correspond with the date and time when one of Plaintiff’s works was allegedly illegally
downloaded according to Exhibit A of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.)
In addition, Plaintiff submitted the Declaration of Emilie Kennedy, Plaintiff’s in-
house General Counsel, in which Ms. Kennedy asserts geolocation was done by an
unspecified person to identify the location of Defendant on three separate occasions.
(ECF No. 4-2 at 33.) First, “[a]fter [Plaintiff] received infringement data from VXN Scan
identifying IP address 70.95.108.82 as infringing its works, the IP address was
automatically inputted into Maxmind’s Geolocation Database.” (Id.) Based on this
search, Ms. Kennedy contends that “Maxmind determined that the IP address traced to
a location in San Diego, California, which is within this Court’s jurisdiction.” (Id.)
Plaintiff subsequently inputted Defendant’s IP address into Maxmind’s Database prior to
filing the Complaint and Ms. Kennedy’s Declaration. (Id.) On both occasions, the IP
address linked to Defendant, 70.95.108.82, continued to trace to this District.1
Plaintiff has provided sufficient information about infringing activity tied to
Defendant’s unique IP address, the specific date and time associated with the activity,
and the location of the activity. Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated with sufficient
specificity that Defendant is a real person or entity, likely subject to the jurisdiction of
this Court. See Crim. Prods., Inc. v. Doe-72.192.163.220, No. 16cv2589-WQH (JLB), 2016
WL 6822186, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) (holding that the sufficient specificity
threshold is satisfied when the IP address identified by Maxmind geolocation service
identifies a physical location within the court’s jurisdiction).
B. 	Plaintiff Made a Good Faith Effort to Identify Defendant
Plaintiff must also demonstrate that it has taken previous steps to locate and
serve the Defendant. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579. Although Plaintiff
maintains it diligently attempted to identify Defendant by searching for Defendant’s IP
1 Attached as Exhibit 1 to Ms. Kennedy’s Declaration is a chart reflecting the results of the third and
final MaxMind Database search, showing the IP address alleged to be involved in the illegal downloads
and confirming that the location traces to San Diego, CA. (ECF No. 4-2 at 36.)
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address “on various web search tools, including basic search engines like
www.google.com,” Plaintiff does not submit evidence supporting this claim. (ECF No. 4-
1 at 14.) However, Ms. Kennedy’s Declaration and the MaxMind results attached as
Exhibit 1 indicate that Plaintiff took substantial steps to locate Defendant’s IP address
and identify Defendant’s ISP. (ECF No. 4-2 at 32–36.) Despite these efforts, Plaintiff was
unable to correlate the IP address to Defendant’s identity. Plaintiff maintains that it has
been “unable to identify any other way to go about obtaining the identities of its
infringers and does not know how else it could possibly enforce its copyrights from
illegal piracy over the Internet.” (ECF No. 4-1 at 14.) The Court therefore finds that
Plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify, locate, and serve the Defendant. See
Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1 through 6, No. 12cv1355-LAB (DHB), 2012 WL
4471538, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012) (finding plaintiff’s efforts to identify Doe
defendant were sufficient because “there is no other way for [p]laintiff to obtain
[d]efendants’ identities, except by serving a subpoena on [d]efendants’ ISPs demanding
it[]”); see also Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–5698, No. C 11-04397 LB, 2011 WL 5362068, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (finding plaintiff’s attempts to identify and locate defendant
sufficient, where the plaintiff “investigated and collected data on unauthorized
distribution of copies of the [alleged infringed work] on BitTorrent-based peer-to-peer
networks.”).
C. 	Plaintiff’s Suit Could Withstand a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff must further show that the Complaint in this case could withstand a
motion to dismiss. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579. A suit may be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b) on several bases. Of all the bases that bear dismissal, those
relevant here are lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and
failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (6). As to both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
For subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “[t]his Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and
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28 U.S.C. § 1338 (jurisdiction over copyright actions).” (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 4-1 at
15.) On the issue of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff maintains it used geolocation
technology to determine that Defendant’s IP address correlates to a physical address in
the Southern District of California. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3; ECF No. 4-1 at 15.)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,
732 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a single cause of action against
Defendant for direct copyright infringement. (ECF No. 1 at 8–10.) To allege a claim for
direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright;
and (2) that the defendant violated the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under the
Copyright Act.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations omitted). “In addition, direct infringement requires the plaintiff to show
causation (also referred to as ‘volitional conduct’) by the defendant.” Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff alleges it owns the copyrights to the works that are the subject of this suit
and claims that the works “have been registered with the United States Copyright
Office.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “downloaded, copied, and
distributed Plaintiff’s Works without authorization.” (Id.) Assuming Plaintiff’s
allegations are true, they state a claim on which relief can be granted. See A&M Recs.,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiffs sufficiently
demonstrated ownership and infringement by showing Napster allowed its users to
download copyrighted music, up to seventy percent of which was owned or
administered by the plaintiffs); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Case No. 16cv1916-
GPC (JMA), 2016 WL 6216183, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (holding that plaintiff
alleged a prima facie case of copyright infringement against defendant by alleging that
plaintiff owned twelve copyrighted movies at issue, and that defendant infringed
plaintiff’s copyrights by copying and distributing plaintiff’s movies through the
BitTorrent network without plaintiff’s permission). Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently
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alleged the prima facie elements of copyright infringement, and the Complaint will likely
withstand a motion to dismiss.
D. 	Whether Requested Discovery Will Lead to Identifying Information
Finally, Plaintiff is required to demonstrate that “there is a reasonable likelihood
that the discovery process will lead to identifying information about defendant that
would make service of process possible.” Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 580. As
discussed above, Plaintiff’s forensic investigation uncovered the unique IP address
70.95.108.82. (ECF No. 4-2 at 24.) Further, Exhibit 1 to Ms. Kennedy’s declaration
indicates that her MaxMind search revealed that the ISP Spectrum owned Defendant’s
IP address at the time of the infringement. (Id. at 36.) Based on his experience in
similar cases, Mr. Paige explains that “Spectrum is the only entity that can correlate”
Defendant’s IP address to the IP address owner’s identity. (Id. at 26.) Accordingly, if
Spectrum provides Plaintiff with Defendant’s name and address, this will likely lead to
information making it possible for Plaintiff to effectuate service on Defendant.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Ex Parte Application for Leave
to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference [ECF No. 4] as follows:
1. 	Plaintiff may serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45 on Spectrum, seeking only the name and address of the subscriber assigned to the IP
address 70.95.108.82. Plaintiff may not subpoena additional information about the
subscriber;
2. 	Plaintiff may only use the disclosed information to protect its copyrights in
the instant litigation;
3. 	Within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the subpoena, Spectrum
shall notify the subscriber assigned the IP address 70.95.108.82 that his, her, or its
identity has been subpoenaed by Plaintiff;
4. 	The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed shall have thirty (30)
calendar days from the date of the notice to challenge the disclosure of his, her, or its
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name and address by filing an appropriate pleading with this Court contesting the
subpoena;
5. 	If Spectrum wishes to move to quash the subpoena, it shall do so before
the return date of the subpoena. The return date of the subpoena must allow for at
least forty-five (45) days from service to production. If a motion to quash or other
customer challenge is brought, Spectrum shall preserve the information sought by
Plaintiff in the subpoena pending resolution of the motion or challenge;
6. 	Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Order with any subpoena obtained and
served to Spectrum pursuant to this Order;
7. 	Spectrum must provide a copy of this Order along with the required notice
to the subscriber whose identity is sought pursuant to this Order.
8. 	No other discovery is authorized at this time.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 14, 2026
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