Cothran v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 20-cv-00995-PAB
SHERRY SUE COTHRAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, 1 Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of
Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) [Docket No. 25] filed by
Sherry Cothran on July 8, 2022. Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees after the Court reversed
and remanded the Commissioner’s administrative decision for further proceeding on
May 5, 2022. Docket No. at 25 at 1. Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi opposes an award of
fees under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), on the basis that her position was
“substantially justified.” Docket No. 26 at 1.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 4, 2017, plaintiff applied for social security benefits. R. at 217.
Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of September 1, 2016. Id. After her claims were
1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will
substitute Kilolo Kijakazi as defendant for Andrew Saul, former Commissioner of Social
Security.
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initially denied on March 30, 2018, plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. R. at
162, 165. A hearing was held on March 5, 2019. See R. at 71.
On May 7, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff’s claim. R. at 50.
Ultimately, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled between her alleged onset date
and last insured date. R. at 63. On February 13, 2020, the Appeals Council denied
plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. R. at 1. Thus, the ALJ’s decision
was the final decision of the Commissioner.
On May 5, 2022, the Court reviewed the ALJ’s decision and found reversable
error. Docket No. 22 at 8–10. The Court ordered the decision remanded for further
proceedings and potential fact finding. Id. at 11. Plaintiff filed the instant motion for
attorney’s fees on July 8, 2022. Docket No. 25.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the EAJA, “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United
States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . ., brought
by or against the United States . . ., unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified.” Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.
2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis omitted)). “Substantially
justified” means “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person” or, stated
otherwise, that the government had a “reasonable basis both in law and fact” for its
position. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). “Under the EAJA, the
government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified.”
Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). However, the test for
substantial justification is simply “one of reasonableness” and “it does not necessarily
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follow from [a court’s] decision vacating an administrative decision that the
government's efforts to defend that decision lacked substantial justification.” Madron v.
Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “[I]n the vast
majority of cases, a position defending a final administrative decision despite its
imperfections will be justified.” DeLong v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 748 F.3d 723,
728 (6th Cir. 2014).
Courts consider the reasonableness of both the government’s position in the
underlying agency action and its position during any subsequent litigation. Hadden, 851
F.2d at 1267; see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (“‘position of the United States’ means, in
addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure
to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based”). The EAJA also gives courts
discretion to deny awards when equitable considerations or other “special
circumstances that make an award of fees unjust.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166,
1172 (10th Cir. 2007).
III. ANALYSIS
In the Court’s prior order, the Court found the ALJ’s analysis failed to track the
applicable legal standard or explain the basis for her findings. Docket No. 22 at 8. The
ALJ did not state whether she found a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce plaintiff’s pain or other
symptoms, as is required by SSR 16-3p. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).
Additionally, without an explanation or sufficient citation to the record, the ALJ stated
that she found plaintiff’s allegations that she was incapable of all work activity through
the date of the last insured inconsistent with the evidence. Docket No. 22 at 9. The
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ALJ therefore made general findings without detailing how specific evidence supported
each conclusion. Accordingly, the Court found that the ALJ’s determination as to
plaintiff’s subjective allegations were not supported by substantial evidence. Id. The
Court declined to further scrutinize the decision because other arguments raised on
appeal may have been affected by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on remand. Id. at
10 n.4.
Plaintiff argues that, for the same reasons that the Court concluded that the
ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence, the decision was not
substantially justified. Docket No. 27 at 3 (“[a]n administrative position that is sparing,
inadequate, and does not track the applicable legal standard or explain its basis cannot
be considered substantially justified.”). Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision was
reasonable because, although it was insufficiently clear, it indirectly addressed the
factors identified in the Commissioner’s regulations and SSR 16-3p. Docket No. 26 at
4.
The Court finds that the commissioner’s position was substantially justified when
considering the government’s position in the underlying agency action. Hadden, 851
F.2d at 1267; see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). In reversing the ALJ’s decision, the Court
did not find the ALJ’s ultimate conclusions unreasonable; rather, the Court found that
the ALJ’s explanation of her findings failed to track the applicable legal standard with
sufficient evidence from the record. Docket No. 22 at 8. The ALJ’s conclusions were
based on a consideration of “numerous factors” that implicated the ALJ’s entire
discussion of the medical record, without specifying which evidence and opinions she
found persuasive or relevant. R. at 58. Remand was necessary for the ALJ to identify
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the evidence supporting her conclusions more clearly and expand her analysis under
the factors required by SSR 16-3p. A review of the ALJ’s discussion of the record
shows that had she addressed each factor required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, her
ultimate conclusions would have had a reasonable basis in fact. R. at 57–62.
Furthermore, plaintiff does not argue, and the Court did not find, that the ALJ’s ultimate
conclusions were based on a misapplication of the law. As such, the ALJ’s decision
was based on a reasonable basis in law. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.
The Court finds that the commissioner’s position was substantially justified when
considering the government’s position in the litigation. Hadden, 851 F.2d at 1267. A
fully justified position taken by an ALJ may still be poorly explained. Hays v. Berryhill,
694 F. App'x 634, 638 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). The fact that the Commissioner
now admits that the ALJ’s decision was unclear does not make its defense of the
decision unreasonable. Neither does the fact that the Commissioner failed to address
the narrow issue the Court ruled on in its response to plaintiff’s forty-three-page brief.
Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees under EAJA will be denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney Fees [Docket No. 25] is
DENIED.
DATED October 31, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
___________________________
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