Wilson v. Trans Union LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-01470-NYW-NRN
SHAUNDRIA W. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRANS UNION LLC,
Defendant.
RECOMMEDATION DENYING DEFENDANT TRANS UNION LLC’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (ECF No. 13)
N. REID NEUREITER
United States Magistrate Judge
This is a lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Shaundria Wilson (“Ms. Wilson”) against
Defendant Trans Union LLC (“Trans Union’), a credit reporting agency, for alleged
inaccuracies in her credit report and challenging the reasonableness of the investigation
done by Trans Union after Ms. Wilson took steps to dispute entries in her credit report.
The matter is before the Court pursuant to an order by Judge Nina Y. Wang, ECF
No. 14, referring Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion”),
ECF No. 13, filed on June 5, 2025. Ms. Wilson responded to the Motion on June 6,
2025. ECF No. 15. Trans Union filed a reply on June 13, 2025. ECF No. 16. The Court
heard argument on August 18, 2025. ECF No. 35. The Court has taken judicial notice of
the Court’s file and considered the applicable Federal Rules of Procedure and case law.
Now, being fully informed and for the reasons discussed below, the Court makes the
following recommendation.
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I. 	COMPLAINT
Ms. Wilson alleges various violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),
28 U.S.C. § 1681. She claims that she obtained a Trans Union credit report through
AnnualCreditReport.com as part of preparations for a mortgage pre-qualification. Upon
review, she noticed severe inaccuracies and “outdated derogatory remarks,” including
accounts that were past the reporting period, had inaccurate balances, or reflected
unverifiable ownership. ECF No. 1 at 4. Ms. Wilson alleges that as “a result of the
negative and inaccurate information appearing on her TransUnion report, [Ms. Wilson]
was denied pre-approval for a home loan, prompting direct disputes with TransUnion to
correct the record.” Id.
One example of an alleged inaccuracy that Ms. Wilson claims she raised with
Trans Union through its online portal is with respect to a Wells Fargo credit card—
”specifically its balance, status, and first date of delinquency.” Id. Ms. Wilson alleges
that Trans Union responded 12 days later, “verifying the account as accurate and
updating only the ‘Date Updated’ and ‘Rating’ fields, without removing or correcting the
charge-off or delinquency history.” Id.
Ms. Wilson also says that on March 4, 2025, she submitted a second dispute via
the Trans Union portal where she identified multiple lines of credit with “inaccurate,
incomplete, or unverifiable reporting,” specifically:
- 	Navy 	Federal 	Credit 	Union—inaccurate 	last 	payment 	amount 	and
delinquency date;
- 	Wells 	Fargo—resubmitted 	dispute 	regarding 	inaccurate 	aging 	and
balance;
- 	Canvas Credit Union—disputed last payment, charge-off status, and
date of first delinquency;
- 	Apple Card/GS Bank USA—disputed last payment, delinquency date,
and charge-off details; and
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- 	Portfolio 	Recovery 	Associates—disputed 	ownership 	and 	balance
accuracy.
Id. Ms. Wilson alleges that Trans Union issued the results of its investigation on April 1,
2025, confirming Canvas Credit Union, Apple Card, Wells Fargo, and Portfolio
Recovery were all “Verified as Accurate,” despite Ms. Wilson’s evidence to the contrary
and specific dispute requests. Only Navy Federal Credit Union was deleted from the
credit report. Id.
Ms. Wilson alleges violations of three different aspects of the FCRA. In Claim I,
Ms. Wilson alleges that Trans Union violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) by failing to conduct
a reasonable reinvestigation after she had submitted disputes challenging the accuracy
of her credit report. She claims that Trans Union’s reinvestigations were inadequate, in
part because they were done so quickly (one response within 12 days) and because
Trans Union was merely “parroting information from data furnishers without conducting
an independent or meaningful analysis,” as required by the FCRA. Id.
In Claim II, Ms. Wilson alleges that Trans Union violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by
reporting “inaccurate, outdated, and unverifiable information without ensuring the
maximum possible accuracy.” ECF No. 1-1 at 1. This allegedly resulted in a “denial of a
home loan pre-approval and caused emotional distress, reputational harm and credit
damage.” Id.
In what the Complaint refers to as “Count III,” Ms. Wilson alleges that Trans
Union acted willfully in failing to comply with its obligations as a consumer reporting
agency under the FCRA. Id. Ms. Wilson alleges that Trans Union repeatedly failed to
“conduct reasonable investigations, verify account accuracy, take independent action
and respond substantively to [Ms. Wilson]’s specific disputes,” which represents a
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“pattern of willful disregard for its statutory duties under the FCRA.” Id. Ms. Wilson
alleges that Trans Union “had actual knowledge of its responsibilities under 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681i and 1681e(b), as evidenced by previous litigation, CFPB enforcement, and
court decisions. . . .” Id.
As relief, Ms. Wilson asks for actual damages, including $75,000 in emotional
distress caused by credit denials; reputational harm and mental anguish; statutory
damages of $1,000 per violation under 15 U.S.C. §1681n, for a total of no less than
$5,000 based on supposed “repeated reinvestigation failures and inaccuracies”; punitive
damages; a court order compelling Trans Union to provide a full written Method of
Verification for all disputed accounts; and deletion of all accounts found not to have
been properly investigated or verified in accordance with FCRA standards. ECF No. 1 at
5.
II. 	TRANS UNION’S MOTION TO DISMISS
The FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies, in preparing consumer reports,
to follow reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of information
concerning the individual to whom the report relates. To prevail in a private action under
one section of the FCRA, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the consumer reporting
agency failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of its reports; (2)
that the report in question was, in fact, inaccurate; (3) that plaintiff suffered injury; and
(4) that agency’s failure caused plaintiff’s injury. Wright v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 805
F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015).
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In moving to dismiss, Trans Union generally asserts that Ms. Wilson’s Complaint
is devoid of sufficient factual allegations to state a claim that is “‘plausible on its face’”
under the FCRA. ECF No. 13 at 2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
First, Trans Union argues that Ms. Wilson has failed to adequately allege that her
consumer credit report contained an inaccuracy. Id. at 3. As noted, the existence of an
inaccuracy is a necessary element of Ms. Wilson’s FCRA claim. See Wright, 805 F.3d
at 1239. Trans Union argues that while Ms. Wilson alleges her Wells Fargo account
contains “outdated derogatory information beyond 7 years,” there is no specificity as to
what purported “derogatory” information is being reported. Trans Union insists that the
same analysis applies to the Canvas Credit Union and Apple Card/GS Bank USA
accounts, where Ms. Wilson claims that Trans Union is reporting “inaccurate balances”
and “payment histories” without including details about what specifically is inaccurate
about the balances or histories. Id. at 4.
Trans Union’s second argument for dismissal is that Ms. Wilson’s complaint
about the Portfolio Recovery account is not actionable because it involves a legal
dispute as to who owns that debt. Per Trans Union, a consumer reporting agency is not
required to investigate legal disputes. Id. at 5 (citing Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs.,
LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that reinvestigation claims are not
the proper vehicle for collaterally attacking the legal validity of consumer debts.”) and
DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding a reasonable
reinvestigation does not entail resolving “legal issue[s] that a credit agency . . . is neither
qualified nor obligated to resolve under the FCRA”)). Trans Union characterizes Ms.
Wilson’s complaint about the Portfolio Recovery account as disputing whether the debt
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was validly assigned to Portfolio Recovery, which Trans Union states is a question that
requires a legal determination, placing it outside the competency of a consumer
reporting agency. Id. According to Trans Union, this means Ms. Wilson’s claim fails as a
matter of law.
Third, Trans Union insists that Ms. Wilson has failed to adequately plead that
Trans Union failed to investigate her alleged disputes. Trans Union argues that
conclusory statements alleging merely that a defendant failed to conduct a lawful
reinvestigation are not sufficient. Id. at 6 (citing Green v. Innovis Data Sols., Inc., No.
3:20-CV-01614-L, 2021 WL 4244779 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2021)). Trans Union
insists that Ms. Wilson’s allegations that Trans Union failed to obtain proper verification
from furnishers by “‘an independent investigation’ ‘given the compressed timelines and
lack of corrections across three disputes’” are inadequate. Id.
Fourth, Trans Union asserts that Ms. Wilson’s claimed damages and causation
are inadequately pled. Id. (citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), a
case about whether claimed damages were sufficient to establish constitutional
standing). Trans Union states that “[Ms. Wilson] does not plead any alleged damages or
causation,” and that failure should result in the dismissal of her claims. Id. at 7.
Finally, Trans Union argues that Ms. Wilson’s claim that Trans Union acted
“willfully” in violating the FCRA should be dismissed. Id. Trans Union asserts that Ms.
Wilson has not alleged that Trans Union had a practice or policy that was objectively
unreasonable in light of the FCRA’s statutory language. Trans Union therefore suggests
that Ms. Wilson’s allegations of willfulness are insufficient and conclusory and should
therefore be dismissed.
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III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
a. 	Pro Se Plaintiff
Because Ms. Wilson proceeds pro se, the Court “review[s] [her] pleadings and
other papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys.” Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). Pleadings drafted by pro se litigants are held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
However, a court may not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that have not been
alleged, or that a defendant has violated laws in ways that a plaintiff has not alleged.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 526 (1983); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir.
1997) (the court may not “supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint”); Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (the
court may not “construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any
discussion of those issues”). A plaintiff’s pro se status does not entitle her to an
application of different rules. See Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002).
b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “The court’s
function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties
might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally
sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,
336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “A court
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reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are
true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pleaded
facts which allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Iqbal evaluation requires two prongs of analysis.
First, the court identifies “the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the
assumption of truth,” that is, those allegations which are legal conclusions, bare
assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 679–81. Second, the court considers the factual
allegations “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 681. If
the allegations state a plausible claim for relief, such claim survives the motion to
dismiss. Id. at 679.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
The FCRA was the product of congressional concern over abuses in the credit
reporting industry. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 884 F.2d 881. 883 (5th Cir.
1989). The legislative history of the FCRA reveals that it was crafted to protect
consumers from the transmission of inaccurate information about them and to establish
credit reporting practices that utilize accurate, relevant, and current information in a
confidential and responsible manner. See Kates v. Croker Nat’l Bank, 776 F.2d 1396,
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1397 (9th Cir. 1985); see also St. Paul, 884 F.2d at 883. These consumer-oriented
objectives support a liberal construction of the FCRA. Kates, 776 F.2d at 1397.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) states:
Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.
A successful claim brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) must be based on
inaccurate information disclosed in a consumer credit report:
To prevail in a private civil action under [§ 1681e(b)], a plaintiff must
establish that (1) the consumer reporting agency failed to follow reasonable
procedures to assure the accuracy of its reports; (2) the report in question
was, in fact, inaccurate; (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury; and (4) the
consumer reporting agency’s failure caused the plaintiff’s injury.
Cassara v. DAC Servs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002).
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) requires the following from the credit reporting
agency’s reinvestigation of consumer disputes:
[I]f the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a
consumer’s file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and
the consumer notifies the agency directly, or indirectly through a reseller, of such
dispute, the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to
determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current
status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file. . . before the end
of the 30–day period beginning on the date on which the agency receives the
notice of the dispute from the consumer or reseller.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). To prevail on a § 1681i(a) claim, a plaintiff must prove
essentially the same elements as those for a § 1681e(b) claim—unreasonable
procedures in reinvestigating a report, inaccuracy of the report, injury, and causation—
in addition to proving they informed the credit reporting agency about the inaccuracy.
Wright, 805 F.3d at 1242.
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The FCRA provides for compensation in the form of actual damages and
attorney fees if a consumer reporting agency negligently fails to comply with any
provision of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. In addition, a consumer can recover punitive
damages for willful non-compliance. Id. § 1681n.
On the question of whether Ms. Wilson has adequately and plausibly alleged
inaccuracies on her credit report so as to make out an FCRA claim, the Court concludes
that she has. As noted above, in her Complaint, Ms. Wilson identifies the various
accounts she says contained inaccuracies and lists the specific areas where the
accounts were supposedly incorrect: For Navy Federal Credit Union, there was an
inaccurate last payment amount and delinquency date. For Canvas Credit Union, there
was a disputed last payment, disputed charge-off status, and date of first delinquency.
For Apple Card/GS Bank USA, there was again a disputed last payment and
delinquency date, and incorrect charge-off details. And for Portfolio Recovery, while Ms.
Wilson disputed ownership of the debt, she also disputed the accuracy of the balance.
ECF No. 1 at 4. She also referenced the specific disputes that she had submitted to
Trans Union via its online portal, by both date and report number, which would provide
additional information about the claimed inaccuracies in her Trans Union credit report.
Id. The Court finds this is more than sufficient to put Trans Union on notice of the
claimed inaccuracies at this stage of the case. These are much more than, as Trans
Union suggests, “mere labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements
of the cause of action.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).
If Trans Union needs more specific information about the asserted inaccuracies, it can
obtain that information from Ms. Wilson through discovery.
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On the issue of whether Portfolio Recovery has properly acquired the debt, and
whether an FCRA claim is the appropriate vehicle to attack the disputed ownership of
the debt, there certainly is case law that supports Trans Union’s position. See, e.g.,
Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 892 (“We agree that reinvestigation claims are not the proper
vehicle for collaterally attacking the legal validity of consumer debts.”). However, at the
very least, Ms. Wilson alleges that the Portfolio Recovery account was incorrect as to
the balance amount, and therefore the FCRA claim with respect to Portfolio Recovery
should not be dismissed at this time. If Ms. Wilson persists in questioning the propriety
of the Portfolio Recovery debt ownership, beyond the dispute as to the amount of the
debt, then this issue may be ripe for decision on summary judgment.
The Court also rejects Trans Union’s superficial argument that Ms. Wilson did not
plausibly plead that Trans Union failed to reasonably investigate her dispute. Ms. Wilson
alleged, among other things, that Trans Union responded to her initial dispute after only
12 days, without removing or correcting the charge-off or delinquency history and
updating only two fields. ECF No. 1 at 4. Ms. Wilson alleges that Trans Union’s
investigation procedures “parrot[ed] information from data furnishers without conducting
an independent or meaningful analysis, as required under the FCRA.” Id. The ultimate
question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid claim when
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Reading this Complaint in the light
most favorable to Ms. Wilson, the Court concludes that Ms. Wilson has met her burden
of stating a plausible claim on the question of Trans Union’s inadequate investigation.
The short time between Ms. Wilson submitting her dispute and TransUnion’s response,
and TransUnion’s alleged “parroting” of the information, without providing any
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description to Ms. Wilson of any independent investigation or meaningful analysis, is
sufficient to adequately allege this element of an FCRA violation at the motion to
dismiss stage.
To the extent that Trans Union claims Ms. Wilson has not alleged sufficiently that
she has suffered damages, the Court disagrees. Ms. Wilson alleges that she suffered
“emotional distress caused by credit denials, reputational harm, and mental anguish.”
ECF No. 1 at 5. At the motion to dismiss stage, this is a sufficient allegation of both
causation and damages for purposes of stating a claim under the FCRA. Emotional
distress is a recognized aspect of damages under the FCRA. See Llewellyn v. Allstate
Home Loans, Inc., 711 F.3d 1173, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2013) (affidavit containing
allegations that plaintiff experienced “great stress and anxiety” in response to various
written communications from defendants was recognized as part of legitimate basis for
damages claim under FCRA); Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 239
(4th Cir. 2009) (holding that actual damages under the FCRA may include “economic
damages, as well as damages for humiliation and mental distress.”); Johnson v. Dep’t of
Treasury, I.R.S., 700 F.2d 971, 985 (5th Cir. 1983) (mental anguish included as an
element of recovery in FCRA claims); Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d
1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The term ‘actual damages’ has been interpreted to include
recovery for emotional distress and humiliation.”).
To establish that Trans Union willfully failed to comply with § 1681e(b), Ms,
Wilson must establish that Trans Union either knowingly or recklessly violated that
section. Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat’l Bank, 554 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2009);
see also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56–57 (2007). A credit reporting
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agency can be deemed to have willfully violated a statutory requirement under the
FCRA when it acts in “reckless disregard” of the law. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 57.
Conversely, a credit reporting agency that adopts an objectively reasonable reading of
the FRCA does not knowingly violate the Act. Id. at 70 n.20.
Trans Union is correct that a claim of a willful violation of the FCRA may be
dismissed on a motion to dismiss if the allegations, when read in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, show that the credit reporting agency did not act based on an
objectively unreasonable interpretation of the statute. See Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., 868
F.3d 1275, 1281–1282 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of claim that reporting
agency willfully violated the FCRA where company had not taken objectively
unreasonable position); King v. MovieTickets.com, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1342–43
(S.D. Fla. 2008) (dismissing claim of willful violation of §1681c(g) because alleged
unlawful interpretation was not clear from the statute).
But the above-cited cases all addressed whether the interpretation of the FCRA
by a consumer reporting agency was objectively reasonable. See Pedro, 868 F.3d at
1282. The instant case does not involve the reasonableness of Trans Union’s
interpretation of the statute. Instead, it involves the scope of the agency’s investigation
after getting notice from the debtor that the credit report was disputed. Ms. Wilson’s
allegations—that Trans Union “parott[ed]” information from creditors and failed to
incorporate reviews by Trans Union employees capable of analyzing disputed accounts
and initiate requests for account-level documentation when appropriate—support an
inference that the system Trans Union used to very information is automated.
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At this early stage, this is sufficient to get past a motion to dismiss. See Hinkle v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 827 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (denying motion for
summary judgment on willful violation of FCRA in part because “the record supports an
inference that the system [the reporting agency] uses to verify information is automated
and does not incorporate review by [agency] employees capable of analyzing disputed
accounts and initiating requests for account-level documentation,” and “[a] reasonable
jury could find that [the agency] adopted such a system with reckless disregard for the
fact that it would result in perfunctory review in contravention of the FCRA”). Of course,
at the summary judgment stage, Ms. Wilson will be required to bring forward not just
allegations but actual evidence of Trans Union’s procedures and willfulness in adopting
those procedures while knowing of their potential inadequacy.
V. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Trans
Union’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 13, be DENIED.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),
the parties have fourteen (14) days after service of this recommendation to serve
and file specific written objections to the above recommendation with the District
Judge assigned to the case. A party may respond to another party’s objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. The District Judge need
not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party’s failure to file
and serve such written, specific objections waives de novo review of the
recommendation by the District Judge, Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148–53
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(1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.
Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse,
91 F.3d 1411, 1412–13 (10th Cir. 1996).
Dated at Denver, Colorado this 17th Day of November 2025
_______________________
N. Reid Neureiter
United States Magistrate Judge
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