Boodrookas et al v. Mollendor et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-01509-PAB-KAS
ALEX BOODROOKAS,
KYLE MONTANIO,
SARAH NAPIER,
ALEXANDRIA NICKENS,
ELOWYN FAHNESTOCK,
SPENCER PAJK,
JOIE HA,
HARRIET FALCONETTI, and
ANDREA MAESTREJUAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JASON MOLLENDOR, Police Chief, in his individual capacity,
JOSHUA BODE, Corporal, in his individual capacity,
CORRIE CURRY, Officer, in his individual capacity,
JOHN GASCHLER, Officer, in his individual capacity,
LANCE MUNIZ, Detective, in his individual capacity,
JOSEPH FLAGEOLLE, Officer, in his individual capacity,
ERIC MARTINEZ, Sergeant, in his individual capacity, and
PATRICK FLAGEOLLE, Officer, in his individual capacity,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery [#32]
(the “Motion”). The Motion [#32] has been referred to the undersigned. See Order
Referring Motion [#33]. Plaintiffs filed a Response [#41] and Defendants filed a Reply
[#42]. The Court has reviewed the Motion [#32], Response [#41], Reply [#42], the entire
case file, and the applicable case law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the
Motion [#32].
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I. 	Background
This lawsuit arises from events that occurred at an on-campus protest in April
2024. See Am. Compl. [#20]. As a result of these events, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants,
all members of the Auraria Campus Police Department, violated their First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Am. Compl. [#20] at 2, 5-6, 40-49. Plaintiffs also assert
similar claims under the Colorado constitution. Id. at 33-40. Defendants filed a Motion to
Dismiss [#31] on August 14, 2025. See Motion to Dismiss [#31]. At the same time, they
filed the instant Motion [#32]. Through the Motion [#32], Defendants argue a stay of all
discovery in this case is warranted given their pending Motion to Dismiss [#31]. Motion
[#32] at 1-2. Specifically, Defendants state their Motion to Dismiss [#31] raises the
defense of qualified immunity with respect to all federal claims, and that issue should be
adjudicated prior to proceeding to discovery. Motion [#32] at 3-4. In addition, they argue
the String Cheese Incident factors1 support a stay. Id. at 4-7. Plaintiffs respond that
discovery should still proceed on Plaintiffs’ state law claims because the defense of
qualified immunity is only applicable to the federal law claims. Response [#41] at 3-6.
II. 	Analysis
A. 	Whether to Grant a Partial or Full Stay of Discovery, if a Stay is Granted
Courts generally prefer to resolve questions of jurisdiction and immunity at the
earliest 	stages 	of 	litigation 	to 	conserve 	the 	court’s 	and 	the 	parties’ 	time 	and
resources. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (noting that discovery can
be 	particularly 	disruptive 	when 	a 	dispositive 	motion 	regarding 	immunity 	is
pending); Moore v. Busby, 92 F. App’x 699, 702 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming stay of
1 String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-01934-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL
894955 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006).
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discovery pending resolution of absolute immunity). “Qualified immunity, no less than
absolute immunity, invokes the protection to be free from discovery: ‘Until this threshold
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Lucero v. City of Aurora,
No. 1:23-cv-00851-GPG-SBP, 2023 WL 5957126, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2023)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Courts in this District have recognized that “discovery should not proceed until
threshold immunity questions are resolved even if not every claim or defendant raises an
immunity defense.” Id. at *5 (emphasis omitted); see, e.g., Handy v. City of Aurora, No.
24-cv-03082-DDD-CYC, 2025 WL 1939556, at *2 (D. Colo. July 15, 2025); Cook v.
Whyde, No. 20-cv-02912-PAB-STV, 2021 WL 981308, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2021);
Lincoln v. Maketa, No. 15-cv-00423-CMA-KMT, 2015 WL 3413271, at *1, 3 (D. Colo. May
28, 2015). However, this approach is not uniform throughout the District. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Armor Corr. Health Servs., Inc., No. 20-cv-01406-WJM-NYW, 2020 WL 13850254, at
*4 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2020) (reasoning that governmental defendants could not
“piggyback on the [i]ndividual [d]efendants’ assertion of immunity to postpone their own
discovery obligations given the distinction between the different theories of liability raised
by [the] [p]laintiff”).
The Court agrees, as a practical matter, that Defendants are not automatically
entitled to a blanket stay of discovery merely because the defense of qualified immunity
may apply only to Plaintiffs’ federal claims. However, in this case, the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) supports a stay of discovery on all
claims, even where an immunity defense has not been raised. See Est. of Deweese v.
Hancock, No. 24-cv-00960-DDD-NRN, 2024 WL 4333366, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2024)
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(“[T]he fact that certain claims may not be subject to a qualified immunity defense is not
a good reason for allowing discovery to proceed in the face of a legitimate, plausible
qualified immunity defense[.]”). Thus, the Court turns to analyzing the String Cheese
Incident factors.
B. 	String Cheese Incident Factors
Although the stay of proceedings in a case is generally disfavored, the Court “has
broad discretion in managing its docket, which includes decisions regarding issuing stays
for all or part of a proceeding.” White Knuckle, IP, LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 1:15-cv-
00036-DN-BCW, 2015 WL 5022579, at *1 (D. Utah Aug. 24, 2015). In exercising its
discretion, 	the 	Court 	considers 	the 	following 	factors: 	(1) 	the 	plaintiff’s 	interest 	in
proceeding expeditiously with discovery and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a
delay; 	(2) 	the 	burden 	on 	the 	defendants 	by 	proceeding 	with 	discovery; 	(3) 	the
convenience to the court; (4) nonparties’ interests in either staying or proceeding with
discovery; and (5) the public interest in either staying or proceeding with discovery. String
Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-01934-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL
894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006) (citing FDIC v. Renda, No. 85-2216-O, 1987 WL
348635, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987)).
Regarding the first String Cheese Incident factor, the Court acknowledges that
Plaintiffs have a general interest in expeditious litigation and proceeding with discovery.
See, e.g., Rivera v. Maldonado, No. 21-cv-01119-CMA-NYW, 2021 WL 5050425, at *2
(D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2021). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice
because Plaintiffs seek damages for past conduct rather than injunctive relief, and there
is no risk of witnesses or evidence becoming unavailable. Motion [#31] at 5; Hancock,
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2024 WL 4333366, at *4 (finding a threat of loss “less serious” where facts of the case
were documented by body cameras, law enforcement officers, and third-party videos and
the alleged events occurred over a “relatively short period of time”). Plaintiffs argue the
opposite. Response [#41] at 7-8. The Court finds Plaintiffs’ interest in proceeding with
discovery weighs against a stay.
Regarding the second String Cheese Incident factor, a stay may be appropriate if
resolution of a preliminary motion may dispose of the entire action, and this is even more
true when, as here, the preliminary motion raises the issue of immunity. See Casias v.
City of Pueblo, No. 20-cv-02545-WJM-KMT, 2021 WL 11449170, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 10,
2021) (qualified immunity). Importantly, qualified immunity is not merely a defense to
liability, it is a limited “entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,”
including discovery. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985)). Should the District Judge grant the Motion to Dismiss [#31], he may likely refuse
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismiss the
case in its entirety. Defendants would undoubtedly be prejudiced if they were forced to
engage in discovery if their Motion to Dismiss [#31] is ultimately granted. String Cheese
Incident, 2006 WL 894955, at *2. Therefore, the Court finds that the second factor weighs
in favor of a stay.
The third String Cheese Incident factor, convenience to the Court, also weighs in
favor of a stay. The Court recognizes that it is “inconvenienced by an ill-advised stay
because the delay in prosecuting the case . . . makes the Court’s docket less predictable
and, hence, less manageable.” McGinn v. El Paso Cnty., Colo., 640 F. Supp. 3d. 1070,
1076 (D. Colo. Nov. 14, 2022) (quoting Lester v. Gene Express, Inc., No. 09-cv-02648-
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REB-KLM, 2010 WL 743555, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2010)) (emphasis added). However,
“every motion to stay comes with different considerations[.]” Id. Where “the pending
motion to dismiss may result in the resolution of this case in its entirety, . . . a stay may
prevent a waste of judicial time and resources in handling discovery disputes regarding
claims and parties that are subject to dismissal.” Ashaheed v. Currington, No. 17-cv-
03002-WJM-SKC, 2019 WL 11690136, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 2019). Here, the state law
claims largely mirror the federal claims. As such, if only a partial stay were granted, “it
would be particularly difficult to distinguish between discovery related to claims that may
be subject to [ ] immunity, and those that are not.” See Thompson v. Williams, No. 21-cv-
00602-RM-KMT, 2021 WL 4748663, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 12, 2021). Ultimately, because
resolution of the Motion to Dismiss [#31] may result in the entirety of this case being
dismissed, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of a stay.
Regarding the fourth String Cheese Incident factor, the interests of nonparties,
Plaintiffs assert “the interests of specific non-parties are neutral” and Defendants argue
there are “[n]o identified non-parties with significant particularized interests in this case[.]”
Response [#41] at 9; Motion [#32] at 6. Accordingly, the fourth String Cheese Incident
factor weighs neither in favor of nor against staying discovery.
Finally, with respect to the fifth and final String Cheese Incident factor, “there is a
general public interest in the speedy resolution of legal disputes” but “there is also a strong
public policy in ‘avoiding unnecessary expenditures of public and private resources on
litigation.’” Ashaheed, 2019 WL 11690136, at *3 (quoting Chapman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 15-cv-00279-WYD-KLM, 2015 WL 4574863, at *4 (D. Colo. July 30, 2015)
and citing Waisanen v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., No. 09-cv-01104-MSK-KMT, 2009 WL
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5184699, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2009)). Defendants argue a stay will promote the
public’s interest to avoid wasting judicial time and resources because Defendants are
represented by the Colorado Department of Law, which relies on public funding. Motion
[#32] 	at 	6-7. 	Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	the 	state-wide 	and 	national 	media 	attention
surrounding this case represents a significant public interest. Response [#41] at 9-10.
While litigation is “necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, [it] exacts heavy
costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 685. In general, “[t]he public has a strong interest . . . [in] [a]voiding wasteful efforts
by the court and litigants[.]” Colo. Access v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-02913-NYW,
2022 WL 3716518, at *4 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2022) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Because a ruling on the qualified immunity issue may entirely resolve this case,
this factor weighs in favor of a stay.
Having balanced all five factors, the Court finds that a stay of discovery pending
resolution of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#31] is warranted. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#32] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery in this matter is STAYED pending
resolution of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#31].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 14 days of any order on the Motion to
Dismiss [#31] that does not fully dispose of the case, the parties shall file a joint status
report with proposals for any necessary modifications to the current case deadlines.
Dated: November 12, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
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Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
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