Bellinsky v. Weiser et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 25-cv-02062-PAB-STV
JACOB BELLINSKY,
Plaintiff,
v.
PHILIP JACOB WEISER, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of
Colorado, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before me on plaintiff’s Consolidated Objections Under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(a) [Docket No. 23], wherein plaintiff objects to my orders denying plaintiff’s
motion for recusal, Docket No. 16, denying plaintiff’s motion for a ruling on his motion
for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), Docket No. 17, and denying plaintiff’s motion
to transfer venue, Docket No. 18, (collectively, the “July 21 orders”). See Docket No. 23
at 1. Plaintiff also objects to the magistrate judge’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for
recusal, Docket No. 19. See id. 1
I. 	ANALYSIS
On July 16, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a ruling on his TRO motion, a
motion seeking my recusal and that of the assigned the magistrate judge, and a motion
1 Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his filing liberally
without serving as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991).
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to reassign this case within the District of Colorado, or in the alternative, outside the
Tenth Circuit. Docket Nos. 13-15. On July 21, 2025, I denied plaintiff’s motions.
Docket Nos. 16-18. However, I referred the portion of plaintiff’s recusal motion that
sought the recusal of the magistrate judge to Chief Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak.
Docket No. 16 at 6. Chief Magistrate Judge Varholak denied plaintiff’s motion for
recusal. Docket No. 19.
A. The Court’s July 21 Orders
Plaintiff purports to file “objections” to the July 21 orders pursuant to Rule 72(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Docket No. 23
at 1. However, Rule 72(a) and § 636 permit plaintiff to file objections to the magistrate
judge’s orders, not to orders of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a). Accordingly, there is no legal basis for plaintiff to object to my July 21
orders pursuant to Rule 72(a) or § 636(b)(1).
To the extent that plaintiff asks me to reconsider my July 21 orders, I will deny
that motion. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for
motions for reconsideration. See Hatfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Converse Cnty.,
52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995). Instead, motions for reconsideration fall within a
court’s plenary power to revisit and amend interlocutory orders as justice requires. See
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621 F.2d 1088, 1090 (10th Cir.
1980) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)); see also Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 313 F.2d
91, 92 (10th Cir. 1962). In order to avoid the inefficiency that would attend the repeated
re-adjudication of interlocutory orders, judges in this district have imposed limits on their
broad discretion to revisit interlocutory orders. See, e.g., Montano v. Chao, No. 07-cv-
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00735-EWN-KMT, 2008 WL 4427087, at *5-*6 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2008) (applying Rule
60(b) analysis to the reconsideration of interlocutory order); United Fire & Cas. Co. v.
McCrerey & Roberts Constr. Co., No. 06-cv-00037-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 1306484, at
*1-*2 (D. Colo. May 3, 2007) (applying Rule 59(e) standard to the reconsideration of the
duty-to-defend order). Regardless of the analysis applied, the basic assessment tends
to be the same: courts consider whether new evidence or legal authority has emerged
or whether the prior ruling was clearly in error. See Echon v. Sackett, No. 14-cv-03420-
PAB-NYW, 2019 WL 8275344, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2019); cf. Alpenglow Botanicals,
LLC v. United States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1203 (10th Cir. 2018) (“a motion for
reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s
position, or the controlling law”). Motions to reconsider are generally an inappropriate
vehicle to advance “new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time
of the original motion.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th
Cir. 2000).
First, plaintiff asks me to reconsider my order denying plaintiff’s motion
requesting an “immediate ruling on his Request for Emergency Temporary Restraining
Order.” See Docket No. 23 at 2-6; Docket No. 17 at 1. I denied plaintiff’s motion
because he had not yet filed a TRO motion. See Docket No. 17 at 2. I noted that
plaintiff’s request for a TRO in the complaint did not comply with D.C.COLO.LCivR
7.1(d), which requires that a motion be filed as a separate document. See id. Plaintiff
does not contest that he failed to move for a TRO in compliance with the Local Rules,
but rather argues that his complaint had “Multiple Clear Indicators of TRO Motion.”
Docket No. 23 at 2. However, there being “clear indicators” in the complaint of plaintiff’s
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intention to seek a TRO does not convert his complaint to a TRO motion. Plaintiff also
contends that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A) conflicts with Local Rule 7.1(d) because Rule
65(b)(1)(A) requires that, in order to obtain a TRO, a plaintiff must provide “specific facts
in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show[ing] that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard
in opposition.” See Docket No. 23 at 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Rule 65(b)(1)(A)
and Local Rule 7.1(d) do not conflict with one another. Rule 65(b)(1)(A) requires
immediate and irreparable injury to be established through a verified complaint, while
Local Rule 7.1(d) requires that a party move for a TRO in a separate motion. See
D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Plaintiff also argues that I failed to
afford his complaint a liberal construction. See Docket No. 23 at 4. However, “pro se
status does not exempt [plaintiffs] from their obligations to comply with the procedural
rules that govern all civil actions filed in this District, namely, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice for the District of Colorado.” Burch v. Amica
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-03046-RM-NYW, 2022 WL 2287537, at *1 (D. Colo. May 26,
2022). Moreover, plaintiff fails to show any prejudice from my order. Plaintiff has since
filed an amended complaint and TRO motion, see Docket Nos. 24, 48, and therefore
there is no basis for plaintiff’s argument that my order “effectively bars access to
emergency constitutional relief.” See Docket No. 23 at 5. Therefore, plaintiff fails to
provide new evidence or legal authority or otherwise show that my order denying
plaintiff’s motion for a ruling on his TRO motion was in error. 2
2 Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Gurley’s order finding that this case does
not appear to be appropriate for summary dismissal, Docket No. 7, “confirms the
institutional recognition that Plaintiff’s filing was procedurally sufficient.” See Docket No.
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Second, plaintiff asks me to reconsider my order denying plaintiff’s motion for
recusal. See id. at 6-10. Plaintiff reraises his argument that there are “extraordinary
circumstances mandating disqualification.” See id. at 6. Specifically, plaintiff again
claims that the fact he has filed complaints with the House Judiciary Whistleblower
Committee and that I have failed to act upon “criminal complaints” filed by plaintiff are
bases for recusal. See id. at 6-7. In plaintiff’s view, I have engaged in “underlying
constitutional violations” and the assignment of this case “demonstrates ongoing
retaliation against protected whistleblowing activity.” See id. at 7. Plaintiff also takes
issue with my overruling of plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s use of the
phrase “in the state court” in Case No. 23-cv-03163. See id. at 9. A motion for
reconsideration, however, is not a means for a party to “reiterate[] the very same merits
arguments he had previously raised” in his original motion. Loya v. Garland, 2022 WL
3210353, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 2022) (citing Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249
(7th Cir. 2004) (“A motion [for reconsideration] that merely republishes the reasons that
had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to
change its mind.”)). Therefore, there is no basis to reconsider my recusal order.
Moreover, as I explained in the recusal order, there is “no authority suggesting
that a federal judge can investigate or refer criminal cases.” Docket No. 16 at 3 (internal
quotation omitted). I also explained that a “party cannot force recusal merely by filing a
complaint or a law suit against a judge.” Id. at 5 (quoting Sump v. Fingerhut, Inc., 2002
23 at 5. However, Judge Gurley made no finding regarding plaintiff’s TRO motion or
whether plaintiff properly moved for a TRO. Rather, pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR
8.1(a), Judge Gurley merely found that plaintiff, as “a party who is allowed to proceed
without prepayment of filing fees,” had filed a case that should not be “dismissed
summarily.”
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WL 1602423, at *2 (D. Kan. July 19, 2002)); see also In re Winslow, 107 B.R. 752, 753
(D. Colo. 1989) (“The filing of a complaint with the Judicial Council is not grounds for
disqualification.”). I found that the magistrate judge’s reference to plaintiff’s state cases
did not reveal a high degree of favoritism or antagonism that supported recusal, but was
rather a liberal construction of unclear statements in plaintiff’s complaint. See Docket
No. 16 at 4. Plaintiff speculates that this finding constitutes a “desperate rationalization
that contradicts the crystal-clear language of Plaintiff’s underlying complaints,” but fails
to show that the reference to his state cases evinces bias. See Docket No. 23 at 9.
However, plaintiff fails to identify new evidence or legal authority that shows my denial
of his recusal motion was in error.
Third, plaintiff asks me to reconsider my order denying plaintiff’s motion to
transfer this case to another court. See id. at 10-12. In plaintiff’s motion to transfer, he
requested reassignment “within the District of Colorado to an impartial judge rather than
traditional § 1404(a) transfer.” See id. at 11. As I explained in my order, § 1404(a)
does not provide a basis for reassignment within the district, and plaintiff fails to identify
another legal basis to do so. See Docket No. 18 at 2-3. As explained above, an
alleged “Congressional Investigation” of plaintiff’s unsupported allegations of “underlying
constitutional violations” and “institutional retaliation” are not bases for recusal and
reassignment of this case. See Docket No. 23 at 10. Plaintiff fails to provide new
evidence or legal authority showing that § 1404(a) permits me to transfer this case
within the district. Instead, he merely reiterates the arguments in his original motion.
Plaintiff also argues that I should reconsider my order because it “failed to
address Plaintiff’s alternative request for referral to the Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit
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for administrative review under 28 U.S.C. § 351.” Id. at 11. In his motion to transfer,
plaintiff requested “[c]ertification to the Tenth Circuit or the Judicial Conference for
administrative reassignment or transfer outside the circuit, as contemplated in rare,
extraordinary cases.” See Docket No. 14 at 6. I found that plaintiff failed to “cite legal
authority that supports this proposition” and that the cases plaintiff cited did “not support
the proposition that an ‘extraordinary showing’ would permit this action to be transferred
to a district where it otherwise could not have been brought, absent the consent of the
parties.” Docket No. 18 at 3 & n.3. Furthermore, in his original motion, plaintiff did not
argue that § 351 permits reassignment outside the circuit. Motions for reconsideration
are generally inappropriate vehicles to advance new arguments which were available at
the time of the original motion. See Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012. In any
event, § 351 does not provide a legal basis for me to reassign this case. Rather, § 351
permits a party to file complaints alleging that a judge “engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts . . . with the
clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). Accordingly, plaintiff
fails to identify a basis for me to reconsider my order denying plaintiff’s motion to
transfer this case to another court.
B. The Magistrate Judge’s Recusal Order
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s recusal order on the basis that the order
“falsely characterizes recusal demands as based on ‘previous adverse rulings’ while
ignoring extraordinary circumstances mandating recusal.” See Docket No. 23 at 12-13.
The district court reviews a magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive motion under
a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 72(a). Under this standard of review, a magistrate judge’s finding should not be
rejected merely because the Court would have decided the matter differently. See
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). The clearly erroneous
standard requires a district court to affirm a magistrate judge’s decision unless, “on the
entire evidence[, the district court] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464
(10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948));
see also Allen v. Sybase, Inc., 468 F.3d 642, 658 (10th Cir. 2006). “Under the ‘contrary
to law’ standard, the reviewing court sets aside the magistrate order only if it applied an
incorrect standard or applied the appropriate legal standard incorrectly.” Swan Glob.
Invs., LLC v. Young, No. 18-cv-03124-CMA-NRN, 2019 WL 2171457, at *3 (D. Colo.
May 17, 2019) (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). A recusal order
is a non-dispositive matter. See Nelson v. Mayorkas, No. 23-cv-00100-NYW-SBP,
2023 WL 6390480, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 2, 2023). Therefore, I will review the magistrate
judge’s order, Docket No. 19, under the clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
Plaintiff fails to show that the magistrate judge’s order was clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. Plaintiff moved for the recusal of the magistrate judge on the same
bases upon which he sought my recusal. See Docket No. 13. As discussed in my July
21 recusal order and regarding plaintiff’s “objections” to my recusal order, he fails to
identify a basis for recusal. Because I am not “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed,” see Ocelot Oil Corp., 847 F.2d at 1464, I will
overrule plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s recusal order.
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II. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that the portion of plaintiff’s motion [Docket No. 23] requesting
reconsideration of my orders Docket Nos. 16-18 is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the portion of plaintiff’s motion [Docket No. 23] objecting to the
magistrate judge’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for recusal is OVERRULED.
DATED November 7, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
__________________	__________
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