Singh v. Bondi et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 26-cv-00601-PAB
SHAMSHER SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, 1 Acting U.S. Attorney General, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Shamsher Singh’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1]. Respondents filed a response. Docket No. 9.
Pursuant to the Court’s Minute Order dated March 3, 2026, see Docket No. 11,
petitioner filed supplemental briefing and respondents filed a response. Docket Nos.
12, 13.
I. BACKGROUND 2
Petitioner is a citizen and native of India who entered the United States on or
about September 28, 2024 without inspection or admission near the southern border of
the United States. Docket No. 1 at 7. Shortly after entry, petitioner was apprehended
by immigration authorities. Id.
1 Todd Blanche is substituted as a party for Pamela Bondi, George Valdez is
substituted as a party for Robert Guadian, and Markwayne Mullin is substituted as a
party for Kristi Noem pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
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On June 3, 2025, an immigration judge issued a written decision that denied
petitioner’s application for asylum, ordered petitioner’s removal to India, and granted
petitioner a withholding of removal to India pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Docket
No. 12 at 2; Docket No. 13 at 2; Docket No. 12-1 at 7. On June 17, 2025, petitioner
filed an appeal of the June 3, 2025 Order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
regarding the denial of his application for asylum and order of removal. Docket No. 13
at 2. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appealed the withholding of
removal. Docket No. 12 at 2; Docket No. 13 at 2. On January 29, 2026, the BIA
affirmed the denial of petitioner’s application for asylum, vacated the withholding of
removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings to reassess petitioner’s
eligibility for withholding of removal. Docket No. 12 at 2; Docket No. 13 at 2; Docket No.
15 at 7.
On February 14, 2026, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Docket No. 1. Petitioner asserts that, “[g]iven the
Petitioner’s continued detention since September 2024 – now approximately 17 months
– without a meaningful opportunity for release, and considering the absence of any
criminal history, the Petitioner now has a strong due process argument under prolonged
detention principles.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff further claims that he is a member of the class
certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861,
at*11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025), and that he is being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226,
which entitles him to a bond hearing. Id. at 2-7. Petitioner argues that respondents
have violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and that he is entitled to relief
pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See Docket No. 12 at 6-8.
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Plaintiff requests that the Court order respondents to release petitioner or, in the
alternative, that petitioner be afforded a bond hearing. Docket No. 1 at 11.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Zadvydas Claim
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen ordered removed and
detained under § 1231(a)(6) cannot be indefinitely detained past the 90-day removal
period 3 without violating the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. After the expiration of 90-day removal period, Zadvydas
held that a six-month period detention is presumptively reasonable, but “[a]fter this 6-
month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. This standard does not
require petitioner to “show the absence of any prospect of removal—no matter how
unlikely or unforeseeable.” Id. at 702. Rather, he simply must show that removal is not
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 701.
Petitioner argues that he can seek relief under Zadvydas because he is subject
to a final order of removal “notwithstanding the ongoing remand proceedings” after the
BIA issued its decision. See Docket No. 12 at 6. Petitioner contends that, “[a]lthough
the BIA sustained the Department of Homeland Security’s appeal in part by vacating the
grant of withholding and remanding for further proceedings, that remand was limited to
3 After a final order of removal is entered, the “Attorney General shall remove the
alien from the United States within a period of 90 days,” which is referred to as the
“removal period.” 8 U.S.C.§ 1231(a)(1)(A).
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the availability of protection from removal and did not disturb the validity of the removal
order itself.” Id.
Respondents argue that Zadvydas does not afford petitioner relief because
petitioner’s detention is “lawful and within the presumptively reasonable period of
detention to effectuate removal.” Docket No. 13 at 6. Respondents contend that
petitioner’s order of removal did not become final until the BIA issued its January 29,
2026 Order and that the ensuing period following the BIA’s decision is lawful under
Zadvydas. See id. at 7-8.
The removal period under § 1231 “begins when an alien is ‘ordered removed,’
and the removal order becomes ‘administratively final.’” See Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534 (2021). “A removal order becomes ‘administratively final’
when the order has been affirmed by the BIA or the time for seeking review has
expired.” Ndou v. Noem, 2026 WL 686564, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 11, 2026) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B); Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 267 (2025)). Because petitioner
appealed his removal order and the denial of his application for asylum, petitioner’s
order of removal did not become administratively final until the BIA issued its decision
on January 29, 2026. See Singh v. Choate, No. 19-cv-00909-KLM, 2019 WL 3943960,
at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2019) (“a removal order does not become administratively final
until the BIA affirms the immigration judge’s order”).
The Court next addresses whether petitioner’s ongoing withholding proceedings
affect the finality of the removal order. In the BIA’s January 29, 2026 Order, the BIA
remanded petitioner’s case to the immigration judge for further proceedings on whether
to grant petitioner withholding of removal, which remains pending. See Docket No. 15
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at 6-7. A withholding-only proceeding is a proceeding where “the only issue is whether
the alien may be removed to his home country.” See Riley, 606 U.S. at 265. Pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), a noncitizen may be granted a withholding of removal to a
country if the noncitizen’s “life or freedom would be threatened in that country because
of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” The “validity of removal orders is not affected by the grant of
withholding-only relief” and a noncitizen’s “initiation of withholding-only proceedings
does not render non-final an otherwise ‘administratively final’ reinstated order of
removal.” See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 540. Because “[a]n order of removal is
administratively final regardless of whether a noncitizen has pending ‘withholding only’
proceedings,” the Court finds that petitioner’s order of removal was final for purposes of
§ 1231 and Zadvydas on January 29, 2026. See Perez v. Berg, 2025 WL 566884, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2025) (citing Johnson, 594 U.S. at 534-46). Thus, petitioner is subject
to detention under § 1231. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“Section 1231 . . . authorizes
detention ‘when an alien is ordered removed’ and enters the ‘removal period,’ which
begins on ‘[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.’”) (citing
§§ 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)).
Given that petitioner’s removal order became final on January 29, 2026, the 90-
day removal period under § 1231 does not expire until April 29, 2026. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). Thus, petitioner cannot show a violation of his due process
rights under Zadvydas. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682; see S.H. v. Warden, Stewart
Det. Ctr., 2022 WL 1280989, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2022) (“Because Petitioner filed
his habeas application challenging his detention under § 1231(a) less than ninety days
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after he became detained pursuant to that provision, his claims are premature under
both the ninety-day removal period and the Zadvydas presumptively reasonable six-
month period.”). Accordingly, the Court will deny petitioner’s request for relief pursuant
to Zadvydas.4
B. Relief Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 or 1226
Petitioner contends that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, despite
being detained upon his initial entry into the United States and being first encountered
by respondents near or at the border. See Docket No. 12 at 5. Petitioner argues that
the “critical inquiry is not the moment of initial apprehension, but the individual’s current
posture—namely, physical presence in the United States and ongoing participation in
removal proceedings.” Id. Even if petitioner were detained under § 1225, petitioner
4 Petitioner argues that, “[i]n the alternative, should this Court find that Zadvydas
does not directly govern Petitioner’s detention, independent of Zadvydas, Petitioner’s
detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Docket No. 12 at
7-8. Petitioner does not cite any legal standard for evaluating his due process claim
outside the context of Zadvydas. Moreover, petitioner’s detention does not violate the
Fifth Amendment because he is not faced with “indefinite and potentially permanent
detention.” See Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 757 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal
quotation omitted). Petitioner has a final order of removal and is now in withholding-
only proceedings, which are “finite.” See id. “[O]ngoing withholding-only proceedings
do not, standing alone, cast doubt on the foreseeability of an alien’s removal in the
future.” Id. at 758. To the extent that petitioner is arguing that he is entitled to relief
under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the Court finds that petitioner is
not entitled to such relief where he is still in the 90-day removal period and is “well
within the presumptively reasonable six-month timeframe under Zadvydas.” See
Ordoian v. Lyons, 2026 WL 594183, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 3, 2026) (“Petitioner’s current
detention under § 1231(a)(2) falls within a carefully limited exception to one’s private
interest in being free from imprisonment.”). Furthermore, “the risk of erroneous
deprivation of his liberty interest is low since Petitioner is detained following an
individualized proceeding before an IJ where he was able to present evidence and
argue his case on its merits – and the IJ’s decision was then reviewed and affirmed by
the BIA.” See id. Finally, respondents have a substantial interest in “ensuring that
noncitizens, subject to a final order of removal, will be present when it is time for them to
be removed.” See id.
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argues that the fact he has been detained for approximately seventeen months without
a bond hearing entitles him to relief. See id.
Because petitioner has a final order of removal, petitioner is detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a), rather than 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 or 1226. See Munoz Teran v. Bondi,
2026 WL 161527, at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 21, 2026) (“Once an order of removal has become
final, the authority governing a noncitizen’s detention shifts [from §§ 1225 or 1226] to
another statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).”); Ordoian, 2026 WL 594183, at *2
(“because an order of final removal has been entered in Petitioner’s case, the Court no
longer has jurisdiction to consider the issue of Petitioner’s re-detention and continued
detention without a bond hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to the
community”).
Accordingly, the Court will deny petitioner’s request for relief pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1225 or 1226.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that petitioner Shamsher Singh’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Docket No. 1] is DENIED without prejudice.
DATED April 7, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
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