Rodriguez Latorre v. Baltazar

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-04281-NYW
CESAR FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ LATORRE,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity,
Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). 	[Doc. 1]. 	Respondent has responded to the
Petition. 	[Doc. 8]. 	Petitioner proceeds pro se and is currently detained by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora,
Colorado. [Doc. 1 at 1–2]. The Court must construe Petitioner’s filings liberally because
he is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be
an advocate for a pro se litigant. 	See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. 	The Court has reviewed
the Petition, the related briefing, and the applicable case law. For the reasons set forth
in this Order, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Cesar Fernando Rodriguez Latorre (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Latorre”), a
citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in June 2022 and has lived in the country
ever since. [Doc. 1-1 at 1]. On or about June 13, 2026, Mr. Latorre was detained by ICE,
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and he remains in custody at the ICE Aurora Contract Detention Facility. 	[Id.; Doc. 1 at
1–2].1
In the Petition, Mr. Lattore asserts one claim that challenges his detention without
a bond hearing as a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 2]. He seeks “immediate release” or “a bond
hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence that [his] continued detention is necessary.” [Id. at 4].
In the Response, Respondent confirms that Petitioner “is in removal proceedings
and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement” and state that “[f]or
purposes of this specific case, Respondent is not submitting a brief in opposition to the
Petition[.]” [Doc. 8 at 1]. “Respondent recognizes that the Court may then decide to grant
the Petition and award appropriate relief” and “submit that if the Court does grant the
Petition, the appropriate relief would be an Order directing that Respondent, within seven
days of this Court’s Order, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), or else release Petitioner.” [Id. at 1–2 (quoting Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180
F.4th 1226, 1251 n.13 (10th Cir. 2026) (remanding and directing that “the district court
shall order the Government to, within seven days of such order, either provide [the
1 Petitioner refers to an order of removal issued on August 13, 2026, but also indicates
that the order of removal has been appealed. [Doc. 1-1 at 1]. Respondents do not contest
this assertion or argue that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. 	[Doc. 8].
Accordingly, because an appeal of the removal order remains pending, Petitioner's order
of removal is not administratively final. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a) (“An order of removal
made by the immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the
Act shall become final . . . [u]pon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration
Appeals.”); Hidalgo Anazco v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-01133-PAB, 2026 WL 1004485, at *1
(D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2026).
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petitioner] with a bond hearing or else release him.”))].
This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. 	No Party has requested an
evidentiary hearing or oral argument, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
16, 2025) (declining to hold a hearing where the petitioner’s habeas challenge was
“fundamentally legal in nature”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s claim turns on whether his detention is governed by § 1226(a). 	The
Court summarizes the statutory framework before turning to Petitioner’s argument.
I. 	Statutory Framework
Two statutory provisions govern detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). 	The first, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226, “sets forth ‘the default rule’ for detaining noncitizens ‘already present in the United
States.’” Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at
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*5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303). This section permits,
but does not require, the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending removal
proceedings, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at
303; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2) (the Attorney General “may continue to detain” or “may
release” 	the 	noncitizen 	(emphasis 	added)). 	Section 	1226(a) 	thus 	establishes 	a
discretionary framework for the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings.
Another provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), “supplement[s] § 1226’s detention scheme.”
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting
Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022)). Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States,” i.e., “applicants for
admission.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. 	This section provides, in relevant part, that “in
the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted, the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings. 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Under § 1225(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” is
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival
and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters).
The Tenth Circuit has explained that “[t]he only time a noncitizen can be said to be
seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the border.”
Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F. 4th 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 2026). “Since § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies 	only 	to 	those 	seeking 	admission,” 	the 	Tenth 	Circuit 	has 	concluded 	that
“§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s application is limited to the border.” Id. at 1240. Absent an exception
for urgent humanitarian reasons not implicated in this case, “detention under § 1225(b)(2)
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is considered mandatory,” and “[i]ndividuals detained under § 1225 are not entitled to a
bond hearing.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
II. 	Section 1226(a) Applies to Petitioner
Petitioner claims that his detention is governed by § 1226(a). 	[Doc. 1 at 2].
Respondent 	does not contest 	this 	assertion 	in 	the 	response brief, 	see [Doc. 8],
presumably because the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Santillan Quiroz makes clear that
§ 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens, like Petitioner, who were taken into
custody years after they entered the United States. In Santillan Quiroz, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the denial of a habeas petition filed by a noncitizen who had resided in the United
States for years before he was detained by ICE during a traffic stop. 180 F. 4th 1232–33.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Santillan Quiroz petitioner and those similarly situated
to him, i.e. “those who entered the United States without admission and who have lived
here since,” “are categorically unable to seek admission while they remain in the country.”
Id. at 1239. After all, “[a] person cannot make a present request for permission to enter
the United States, lawfully or otherwise, once he or she has already entered.” Id. Thus,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that “[t]he only time a noncitizen can be said to be seeking
admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the border.” Id.; see also
id. (“Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those seeking admission, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is
likewise limited to the border.”). 	Because the petitioner in Santillan Quiroz had been
residing in the United States for years before he was detained, he was not seeking
admission and could not be detained under § 1225. Id. Instead, the petitioner was subject
to detention under § 1226(a). 	Id. at 1251 n.13; see also id. at 1237 (holding that
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“noncitizens who entered the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of
the 	country 	are 	usually 	subject 	to 	§ 	1226(a) 	(and 	thus 	eligible 	for 	bond), 	not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)”).
The analysis and holding in Santillan Quiroz control this case. 	Mr. Latorre had
been residing in the United States since 2022 when he was detained on June 13, 2026.
His detention is therefore governed by § 1226(a). And because Petitioner has not been
provided with the bond hearing required by statute, his continued detention without a bond
hearing violates § 1226(a). See, e.g., Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW,
2025 WL 2977650, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025).
Having determined that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention, the Court also
concludes that his detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights.
Because Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a), at a minimum “the process due to him is
that which is afforded under Section 1226(a).” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp.
3d 771, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2025), aff’d, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026). As explained above,
that process is an individualized bond determination. 	See, e.g., Velasquez Salazar v.
Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1241 (D.N.M. 2025) (describing the process owed under
§ 1226 as “an individualized bond hearing before an [immigration judge]”); Hyppolite v.
Noem, 808 F. Supp. 3d 474, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[Section] 1226(a) requires an
individualized bond determination.”). 	The Court thus concurs with the numerous other
district courts that have held that denying a bond hearing to a noncitizen detained under
§ 1226(a) violates the noncitizen’s due process rights. 	See, e.g., Garcia Cortes, 2025
WL 2652880, at *4; Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784–85.
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition is GRANTED with respect to
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Petitioner’s claim.
III. 	Appropriate Remedy
Petitioner 	asks 	the 	Court 	to 	order 	his 	immediate 	release. 	[Doc. 	1 	at 	4].
“Respondents submit that if the Court does grant the Petition, the appropriate relief would
be an Order directing that Respondents, within seven days of this Court’s Order, provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or else release Petitioner.” [Doc.
8 at 1–2].
The Court finds it appropriate to order a bond hearing, rather than immediate
release. 	Section 1226(a) “does not require release—it provides DHS the discretion to
grant an alien release on bond.” 	Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS,
2025 WL 2996643, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025); see also Santillan Quiroz, 2026 WL
1876709, at 	*17 n.13 	(instructing 	the district 	court on remand 	only 	to order 	the
Government to provide the petitioner with a bond hearing or else release him). This Court
has previously held that a bond hearing before an immigration judge is sufficient to
vindicate the procedural protections afforded by § 1226(a). 	See, e.g., Loa Caballero,
2025 WL 2977650, at *9; Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03439-NYW, 2026 WL
35227, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2026).
Following the weight of authority in this District, the Court has previously required
the Government to bear the burden of proof at a § 1226(a) bond hearing where, as here,
the petitioner is initially erroneously detained under § 1225. 	See Diaz Lopez v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-04089-NYW, 2026 WL 206220, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2026); Martinez
Escobar v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00296-NYW, 2026 WL 503313, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 24,
2026); see also, e.g., Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1159 (D. Colo.
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2026) (“[T]he weight of authority in this District is clear: it is the Government’s burden to
justify a noncitizen’s continued detention at a bond hearing.” (cleaned up) (collecting
cases)). But see De La Cruz v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB, 2026 WL 439217, at *4
(D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026) (declining to place burden on the Government in a similar case).
The Court also concurs with the decisions concluding that “the clear and convincing
standard that generally applies to civil detention where liberty is at stake is appropriate
here as well.” Arredondo v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03040-RBJ, 2025 WL 4083607, at *4 (D.
Colo. Oct. 31, 2025) (quotation omitted); see also Martinez Escobar, 2026 WL 503313,
at *5 (collecting cases).
Accordingly, Respondent is ORDERED to provide a constitutionally adequate bond
hearing no later than October 15, 2026. At the bond hearing, the Government shall bear
the burden of justifying Petitioner’s detention by clear and convincing evidence. 	If
Respondent does not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 	1226(a) as 	required 	herein, 	Petitioner 	must 	be 	immediately 	released 	from
detention. 	In addition, on or before October 22, 2026, Respondent shall file a status
report concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no hearing
was held, the date Petitioner was released from custody; and (2) whether any additional
proceedings in this matter are required.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Order, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[Doc. 1] is GRANTED;
(2) 	Respondent shall provide a constitutionally adequate bond hearing no later
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than October 15, 2026. 	At the bond hearing, the Government shall bear
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner’s
continued detention is justified. If Respondent does not provide Petitioner
with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner
must be immediately released from detention;
(3) 	On or before October 22, 2026, Respondent shall file a status report
concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no
hearing was held, the date Petitioner was released from custody; and
(2) whether any additional proceedings in this matter are required; and
(4) 	A copy of this Order shall be sent to Petitioner at his address of record.
DATED: October 8, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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