Hood-Anderson v. Sweeney-Jones

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
TRYNITY HOOD-ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
V.
NEW CASTLE COUNTY,
DELAWARE; SEAN SWEENEY-
JONES, individually and in his
official capacity as an officer for the
NEW CASTLE COUNTY POLICE
DEPARTMENT; and VAUGHN
M.BOND,JR., in his official
capacity as Director ofPublic
Safety for New Castle County,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 24-1012-CFC
Michael P. Minuti, MCCANN DILLON JAFFE & LAMB,LLC, Wilmington,
Delaware
Counselfor Plaintiff
Helene E. Episcopo, NEW CASTLE COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER,New
Castle, Delaware; Karen V. Sullivan, NEW CASTLE COUNTY LAW
DEPARTMENT, New Castle, Delaware; Michael F. McTaggart, NEW CASTLE
COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW,New Castle, Delaware
Counselfor Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
January 13, 2026
Wilmington, Delaware
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COLM F/^NNOLLY
CHIEF JUDGE
This case arises out of the treatment of Plaintiff Trynity Hood-Anderson
while she was in the custody of the New Castle County Police Department.
Defendants are New Castle County, Delaware (the County); Sean Sweeney-Jones,
individually and in his official capacity as an officer ofthe New Castle County
Police Department; and Vaughn M.Bond, Jr.* in his official capacity as Director of
Public Safety for New Castle County.^ In the First Amended Complaint, Hood-
Anderson alleges several federal civil rights and state tort law claims against
Defendants. See D.I. 8. Pending before me is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). D.I. 10.
'Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Elmer Setting, the current
Director ofPublic Safety for New Castle County, will replace Vaughn M.Bond, Jr.
as a defendant. See D.I. 20 at 1 n.l (stating that Bond has been replaced by Elmer
Setting as Director ofPublic Safety); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)("[A public] officer's
successor is automatically substituted as a party. Later proceedings should be in
the substituted party's name ...").
^ At several places in the Amended Complaint, Hood-Anderson refers to
"Defendant Officers," both "known and unknown." See, e.g., D.I. 8 53, 62.
The Amended Complaint does not name any other officers as defendants. I will
therefore consider Hood-Anderson's claims against the named defendants only.
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i; BACKGROUND
A. Alleged Facts in Amended Complaint
The following facts are taken from the allegations in the Amended
Complaint. I must accept these facts as true for purposes of deciding the merits of
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542
F.3d 59,64(3d Cir. 2008).
On November 21, 2022, Hood-Anderson was charged with assault in the
third degree and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. D.I. 8^16.
After being charged, the New Castle County Police Department took Hood-
Anderson into custody. D.I. 8^15. While in police custody. Hood-Anderson was
kept in a holding cell. See D.I. 8 17, 18. About twenty minutes after midnight
on November 21, 2022, Officer Sweeney-Jones "forcefully grabbed, pushed,
punched, tackled, and/or otherwise struck [Hood-Anderson] prior to and while she
was in" the holding cell. D.I. 8^17. Officer Sweeney-Jones and other officers
also threatened to tase Hood-Anderson. D.I. 8 ^ 26.
Officer Sweeney-Jones's actions injured Hood-Anderson, causing her to
require medical treatment. D.I. 8 ^ 22. Despite suffering these injuries, Hood-
Anderson was forced to stay in the holding cell without proper medical care.
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D.I. 8 ^ 24. On November 21, 2024,^ Hood-Anderson went to Christiana Care
medical center seeking treatment for "facial contusions, cervical strain, blunt head
injury, and contusion of her hip." D.I. 8 Tf 27. On December 14, 2022, Hood-
Anderson sought treatment for headaches at Newark 24/7 Urgent Care. D.I. 8
128.
B. Procedural Posture
On September 5, 2024, Hood-Anderson filed suit against Defendants.
D.I. I. Defendants moved to partially dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). D.I, 6. Instead of opposing Defendants'
motion to dismiss, Hood-Anderson amended the Complaint on November 5, 2024.
D.I. 8. On December 6, 2024, Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss
^ The Amended Complaint alleges that Hood-Anderson went to Christiana Care
medical center on November 21, 2024, rather than November 21, 2022. D.I. 8
^ 27. The date "November 21, 2024" appears to be a typo. The injuries described
in paragraph twenty-seven of the Amended Complaint are consistent with the
incident that allegedly occurred on November 21, 2022. See D.I. 8 Tf 27
(describing Hood-Anderson's alleged "facial contusions, cervical strain, blunt head
injury, and contusion of her hip"). The Amended Complaint also alleges that
Hood-Anderson sought medical treatment "for headaches" on December 14, 2022,
less than a month after the alleged incident. D.I. 8 ^ 28. November 21, 2024 is
also more than two months after Hood-Anderson filed her initial complaint in this
case. See D.I. 1.
Both parties, however, state in their briefing that Hood-Anderson went to a
Christiana Care medical center on November 21, 2024. D.I. II at 5; D.I. 16 at 6.
For the purposes of deciding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 10), I will accept
the fact as true.
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several counts ofthe First Amended Complaint(the Amended Complaint)pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). D.I. 10.
The Amended Complaint originally had ten counts. D.I. 8. In her
opposition to Defendants' motion, Hood-Anderson agreed to dismiss the § 1986
claims in Counts I, II, and III as well as the entirety of Counts IV, VI, and IX.
D.I. 16 at 3. I will therefore dismiss those counts.
Hood-Anderson also agreed to dismiss her official capacity claims against
Bond and Sweeney-Jones that I "deem[] to be redundant." D.I. 16 at 3. Hood-
Anderson argues, however, that "any such claims should remain proper if either
Defendant is deemed necessary to any specific Count." D.I. 16 at 3. In her
briefing. Hood-Anderson repeatedly states, "[s]hould the Court find [that] official
capacity claims against Defendant Sweeney-Jones or Bond are necessary for this
count to remain, then [tjhe Plaintiff retracts [her] prior dismissal of Sweeney-
Jones['s] and/or Bond['s] official capacity claims as to this Count." D.I. 16 at 5.
I am puzzled by what Hood-Anderson seeks to do here. Hood-Anderson has
volunteered to dismiss her official capacity claims against Bond and Sweeney-
Jones. D.I. 16 at 3. But she has also tried to reserve the right to revoke her
voluntary dismissal, depending on whether I consider those claims to be
"necessary." D.I. 16 at 3. I am not dealing here with a pro se individual. Hood-
Anderson is thus responsible for "advancing the facts and arguments entitling [her]
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to relief." Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386(2003)(Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Hood-Anderson has failed to argue that
the official capacity claims against Sweeney-Jones and Bond are necessary.
Accordingly, I will dismiss Hood-Anderson's claims against Bond and Sweeney-
Jones in their official capacities. Because Hood-Anderson has sued Bond solely in
his official capacity, no counts remain against Bond. Thus, the only remaining
defendants are the County and Officer Sweeney-Jones in his personal capacity.
All the remaining counts are brought pursuant to federal civil rights
statutes—42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985—or Delaware tort law. Counts I through III
assert both § 1983 and § 1985 claims. In Count I of the Amended Complaint,
Hood-Anderson alleges that, while working as a police officer for the County,
Officer Sweeney-Jones's use of excessive force violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. D.I. 8 31-50. In Count II, Hood-Anderson alleges that
Defendants' "denial of medical care" deprived Hood-Anderson of her Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. D.I. 8 51-56. In
Count III, Hood-Anderson alleges that Officer Sweeney-Jones's actions violated
the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. D.I. 8 57-63. In Count
V, Hood-Anderson asserts a "municipal liability for failure to train" claim, alleging
that Defendants failed to adequately train police officers on how to place custodial
detainees in holding cells. D.I. 8 TfTf 74-84. And in Count X,Hood-Anderson
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alleges that the actions of Officer Sweeney-Jones, and by extension the County,
were grossly negligent. D.I. 8 106-122. Hood-Anderson seeks damages and
costs. D.l. 8 ^ 123.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
A district court"may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) if, accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Ballentine v. United States, 486
F.3d 806, 810(3d Cir. 2007)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.
R. Civ. R 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the complaint
must include more than mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action." BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
The complaint must set forth enough facts, accepted as true, to "state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim is facially plausible
"when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
6
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alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice." Id. Deciding whether a claim is plausible is a "context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'
Id. at 679.
B. Rule 12(b)(1)
A federal court "generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first
determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-
matter jurisdiction)." Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
422, 430-31 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is characterized as either a
facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v.
Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346(3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack contests the
sufficiency ofthe pleadings, whereas a factual attack contests the sufficiency of
jurisdictional facts. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC,800 F.3d 99,
105(3d Cir. 2015). In a factual attack, the court may consider any evidence
submitted by the parties that is relevant to the issue ofjurisdiction. Davis, 824
F.3d at 346("[A] factual challenge allows 'a court [to] weigh and consider
evidence outside the pleadings.'")(quoting Const. Party ofPa. v. Aichele, 757
7
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F.3d 347, 358(3d Cir. 2014)). In such cases,"no presumptive truthfulness
attaches to plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will
not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits ofjurisdictional
claims. Moreover, the plaintiff will have the burden of proofthat jurisdiction does
in fact exist." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891
(3d Cir. I97iy, see also Davis, 824 F.3d at 346(quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at
891).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Counts I, II, and III(§§ 1983 and 1985 Claims)
Counts I, II, and III each assert claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
In the Amended Complaint, Counts I, II, and III are directed against all three
Defendants. D.I. 8 32, 52, 58. Because, however. Hood-Anderson agreed to
dismiss all official capacity claims against Bond and Officer Sweeney-Jones,
D.I. 16 at 3, Counts I, II, and III are now directed only to the County and Officer
Sweeney-Jones in his personal capacity.
I. Section 1983 Claims
Hood-Anderson alleges in Count I that Officer Sweeney-Jones's use of
excessive force violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights "to be free
from excessive, unreasonable force" and "unreasonable search and seizure." D.I. 8
Tf 40. In Count II, Hood-Anderson alleges that Defendants' denial of medical care
"deprived Plaintiff of her right to be secure in her person against cruel and unusual
8
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punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. D.I. 8 ^ 53. Hood-Anderson alleges
in Count III that Defendants' actions violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. D.I. 8 59-60.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[Mjunicipalities and other local government units
[are] . .. persons to whom § 1983 applies." Monell v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658,690(1978).
a. The County
Defendants seek to dismiss the § 1983 claims against the County in Counts
I, II, and III because "Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a [§] 1983
claim for municipal liability" under Monell. D.I. 11 at 10.
The § 1983 claims against the County fail for two reasons. Hood-Anderson
first relies upon an impermissible respondeat superior theory as the basis for the
County's liability. See D.I. 8 49, 52,60. Such a theory is improper as a matter
oflaw under Monell. 436 U.S. at 691. "[A] municipality cannot be held liable
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solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot
be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at
691 (emphasis in the original). The Supreme Court has noted that a "stringent
standard of fault" is required "lest municipal liability under § 1983 collapse into
respondeat superior." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70(2011)(quoting 5(7.
ofCnty. Comm 'rs ofBryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410(1997)). Instead,
"[t]o plead a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must allege that 'a [local]
government's policy or custom ... inflict[ed] the injury' in question." Estate of
Roman v. City ofNewark,914 F.3d 789, 798(3d Cir. 2019)(quoting Monell, 436
U.S. at 694).
Counts I, II, and III each allege that the County is liable based on respondeat
superior. See D.I. 8 49, 52, 60. The only actions alleged in Count I are those of
Officer Sweeney-Jones. D.I. 8 33-50. The County is implicated only to the
extent that Officer Sweeney-Jones "was employed by [the County]." D.I. 8 T| 35.
Hood-Anderson seeks to hold Officer Sweeney-Jones,"and by extension [the
County]" liable. D.I. 8 49(emphasis added). Count II also focuses solely on
Officer Sweeney-Jones's actions, but liability is "directed to" the County too.
D.I. 8 52-56. In Count III, Hood-Anderson alleges that her substantive due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated "[a]s a result of
affirmative acts of[Officer Sweeney-Jones] and therefore[the County]." D.I. 8
10
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^ 60(emphasis added). Hood-Anderson even argues in her briefing that she "has
met the necessary requirements" for the § 1983 claims in Counts II and III "against
[the County] per Respondeat Superior." D.I. 16 at 4. Hood-Anderson's use of
respondeat superior to impose § 1983 liability on the County is improper as a
matter of law.
The § 1983 claims against the County also fail because the Amended
Complaint contains no factual allegations from which I can infer that a municipal
policy or custom caused Hood-Anderson's alleged injuries. "A municipality is
liable under § 1983 when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the municipality itself,
through the implementation of a municipal policy or custom, causes a
constitutional violation." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1027
(3d Cir. 1991). Thus, a municipality may be sued directly if it is alleged to have
violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights through "a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that [municipality's]
officers." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. A municipality also may be sued under § 1983
"for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official
decisionmaking channels." Id. at 690-91. A custom exists only if"a given course
of conduct [is] so well-settled and permanent as to virtually constitute law."
Forrest v. Parry,930 F.3d 93, 105-06(3d Cir. 2019).
11
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Counts I, II, and III are devoid of factual allegations that plausibly imply that
the County had a policy or custom that violated Hood-Anderson's constitutional
rights. The allegations in Counts I, II, and III instead focus entirely on the
individual actions of Officer Sweeney-Jones. See D.I. 8 31-50, 53-56, 59-63.
Count I refers repeatedly to "[t]he actions," D.I. 8 ^ 40, and "[t]he acts," D.I. 8 ^
45, of Officer Sweeney-Jones. But there is no mention of a municipal policy that
required Officer Sweeney-Jones to act in this way. Nor is there any allegation that
this conduct occurred so frequently among New Castle County police officers such
that it constitutes a custom. See Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (stating that, to be a
custom,"a given course of conduct [must be] so well-settled and permanent as to
virtually constitute law").
Counts II and III also lack any factual allegations that may establish a policy
or custom. See D.I. 8 51-63. The only possible reference to a policy or custom
in these counts is a conclusory statement in the Amended Complaint that Officer
Sweeney-Jones's "actions were consistent with the customs or practices of
Defendants [Bond] and [the County]." D.I. 8^12. Hood-Anderson does not
allege any facts to support this assertion. In the absence of any factual allegations
to support the existence of a policy or custom, Hood-Anderson's "mere conclusory
statements" are not sufficient to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
12
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I will therefore dismiss without prejudice the § 1983 claims against the County in
Counts I, II, and III.
b. Sweeney-Jones
Defendants also seek to dismiss the § 1983 claims in Counts II and III
against Officer Sweeney-Jones. D.I. 11 at 3, 16-18.
(1) Count II(Eighth Amendment)
Defendants argue that the § 1983 claim in Count II should be dismissed with
prejudice because "the Eighth Amendment does not provide a cause of action to
bring the pre-trial detention medical care claims alleged in Count II." D.I. 11 at
16.
Because the Eighth Amendment"was designed to protect those convicted of
crimes," the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause "applies only after the State
has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with
criminal prosecutions." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318(1986)(internal
quotation and citation omitted). That is, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment "does not apply until 'after sentence and
conviction.'" Hubhard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164(3d Cir. 2005)(quoting
Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989)). Pretrial detainees are therefore
not entitled to the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Boring v. Kozakiewicz,
833 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1987). The parties do not dispute that Hood-Anderson
13
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was a pretrial detainee. See D.I. 8 15-17 (alleging that Hood-Anderson was
detained in a holding cell after being charged); D.l. 11 at 16; D.l. 16 at 19-20.
Hood-Anderson thus cannot base the § 1983 claim in Count 11 on the Eighth
Amendment.
Hood-Anderson argues, however, that even if the Eighth Amendment does
not provide a basis for the § 1983 claim in Count 11, "Plaintiff clearly identified
[her][§] 1983 [djue process claim in Count 111 of her Amended Complaint" and
"thus intends to pursue her [§] 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause in Count
111." D.l. 16 at 19-20.
Count 111 does not appear to challenge the same conduct as alleged in Count
II. Count 11 alleges that Defendants "fail[ed] to provide timely medical treatment
to Plaintiff," D.l. 8 % 55, resulting in a "denial of medical care," D.l. 8 ^ 53. Count
III, by contrast, alleges more broadly that Defendants violated Hood-Anderson's
"rights to be free from unwarranted state interference involving operational and
tactical ineptitude along with excessive and brutal use of physical force that was
applied in such a manner as to shock the conscience." D.l. 8 ]f 62. It is unclear to
me whether "operational and tactical ineptitude" encompasses an alleged denial of
medical care. Aside fi-om this vague reference to "operational and tactical
ineptitude," Count 111 is silent with respect to medical care. Hood-Anderson
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cannot advance a denial of medical care claim in Count III absent factual
allegations that Defendants denied Plaintiff medical treatment.
Even ifI were to consider Hood-Anderson's denial of medical care claim
under the substantive due process theory articulated in Count III, Hood-Anderson
nevertheless fails to state a claim. The Amended Complaint states in a conclusory
fashion that "Plaintiff was caused to remain in the holding cell without proper
medical care." D.I. 8 Tf 24. Yet Hood-Anderson does not plead facts sufficient to
establish an inference that Defendants did, in fact, deny Hood-Anderson medical
care while in their custody. The Amended Complaint merely provides "a
formulaic recitation ofthe elements" of a denial of medical care claim. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, I will dismiss the § 1983 claim in Count II against
Officer Sweeney-Jones."^
(ii) Count III (Substantive Due Process)
Defendants also seek to dismiss the § 1983 claim in Count III against Officer
Sweeney-Jones. D.I. 11 at 17-18. Defendants argue that "[a]side from Plaintiffs
conclusory allegations that Defendant Sweeney-Jones was acting under color of
Count II is also directed to the County. D.I. 8 ^ 52. For the reasons stated above,
I have already dismissed the § 1983 claim in Count II against the County. But
because the Eighth Amendment cannot serve as a basis for liability in cases
involving pretrial detainees, the § 1983 claim in Count II also fails against the
County for this reason.
15
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state law, Plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating that [Officer Sweeney-
Jones's] acts were more than personal pursuits ...[or] were related to the state
authority conferred on him." D.I. 11 at 18 (footnote omitted).
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law."
West V. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To act "under color of state law," a
defendant must be "clothed with the authority of state law." Id. at 49(internal
quotation omitted)."[A]n otherwise private tort is not committed under color of
law simply because the tortfeasor is an employee of the state." Mark v. Borough of
Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1150(3d Cir. 1995). Rather, the defendant's act "must
entail '[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
Here, the Amended Complaint adequately alleges that Officer Sweeney-
Jones was acting under color of state law. Defendants point to three paragraphs of
the Amended Complaint as the only support that Officer Sweeney-Jones was
acting under color of state law. D.I. 11 at 18 n.3 (citing D.I. 8 61,62, 63). But
several factual allegations suggest otherwise. At the time of the alleged incident.
Hood-Anderson was detained in a New Castle County holding cell. D.I. 8 17.
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Officer Sweeney-Jones was acting as an employee of the New Castle County
Police Department. D.I. 8 4. Officer Sweeney-Jones's interactions with Hood-
Anderson appear consistent with the duties of a police officer at a detention
center—^namely, putting a detainee in a holding cell. See D.I. 8 17-21. Hood-
Anderson has therefore alleged sufficient facts to support an inference that Officer
Sweeney-Jones was acting under color of state law.
Defendants also argue—for the first time—in their reply brief that 1 should
dismiss the § 1983 claim in Count 111 against Officer Sweeney-Jones because
"[cjourts should apply the specific amendment that is concerned with the alleged
violation, instead of allowing a substantive due process claim to proceed." D.I. 20
at 8. Because "Plaintiffs substantive due process claim duplicates her [Fourth
Amendment excessive force] claim in Count 1," Defendants assert that the § 1983
claim in Count 111 should be dismissed. D.I. 20 at 8. By failing to make this
argument in their opening brief, Defendants have waived it. See In re Fosamax
(Alendronate Sodium)Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 157(3d Cir.
2014)( We have consistently held that [a]n issue is waived unless a party raises it
in its opening brief ")(alteration in original)(internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Because Defendants have made no other arguments with respect
to this claim, 1 will not dismiss the § 1983 claim in Count 111 against Officer
Sweeney-Jones.
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2. Section 1985 Claims
Defendants argue that the § 1985 claims in Counts I, II, and III should be
dismissed against the County and Officer Sweeney-Jones because the Amended
Complaint "does not allege any facts related to a conspiracy ... let alone any of
the other elements required of any § 1985 claim." D.I. II at 8.
Section 1985 prohibits conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. Section 1985 recognizes three categories of conspiracies that may
interfere with an individual's civil rights:(I)preventing an officer from
performing duties;(2)obstructing justice or intimidating a party, witness, or juror;
and (3)depriving a person of rights or privileges. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
The § 1985 claims in Counts I, II, and III fail, as Hood-Anderson has not
alleged an indispensable component of a § 1985 claim—conspiracy. Every
subsection of § 1985 requires, at a minimum, that "two or more persons in any
State or Territory conspire." See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Thus, regardless ofthe
subsection of § 1985 under which a plaintiff proceeds, a plaintiff must allege a
conspiracy. "[A]negations of a conspiracy must provide some factual basis to
support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted
action." Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. ofN.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009)(quoting
Crabtree ex rel. Crabtree v. Muchmore,904 F.2d 1475, 1480-81 (lOth Cir. 1990)).
To plead an unconstitutional conspiracy,"a plaintiff must assert facts from which a
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conspiratorial agreement can be inferred." Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP,615 F.3d 159, 178(3d Cir. 2010). This agreement, or "meeting of
the minds," can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Jutrowski
V. Township ofRiverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 295 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Startzell v.
City ofPhiladelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)("To constitute a
conspiracy, there must be a 'meeting ofthe minds.'")(quoting Adickes v. S.FI.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970)).
The Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts that support an inference
that Defendants conspired to interfere with Hood-Anderson's civil rights. At most,
Hood-Anderson alleges that Officer Sweeney-Jones and "another unknown
officer," D.I. 8 ^ 20, or "other officers," D.I. 8 ^ 26, engaged in unconstitutional
conduct. In Count II, Hood-Anderson alleges a denial of medical care by
"Defendant Officers," D.I. 8 ^ 53, referring to Officer Sweeney-Jones and
"currently unknown co-employee officers," D.I. 8 Tf 56. Count III also mentions
"Officer Defendants, both known and unknown." D.I. 8 ^ 62. But mere references
to Officer Sweeney-Jones working alongside another officer do not establish a
conspiracy. Aside from these vague allegations, the Amended Complaint is devoid
of any facts that plausibly imply that Officer Sweeney-Jones agreed with another
individual to deprive Plaintiff of her rights.
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Trying to salvage the § 1985 claims, Hood-Anderson includes in her
opposition brief screenshots from security video footage taken inside the New
Castle County detention center. See D.I. 16 at 11-15. Hood-Anderson did not
incorporate these screenshots into the Amended Complaint, attach them to the
Amended Complaint, or provide the video to the Court. These screenshots, Hood-
Anderson argues, show how "facts related to the conspiracy are alleged in the
Amended Complaint." D.I. 16 at 11. Plaintiff asserts that the screenshots offer
"plausible" evidence and "definitively confirm[]" that Defendants "acted in a
coordinated, broadly conspiratory manner to deprive the Plaintiff of her rights and
privileges." D.I. 16 at 16. Hood-Anderson cites no legal authority establishing
that I may consider the screenshots at the motion to dismiss stage.
"As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not
consider matters extraneous to the pleadings." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426(3d Cir. 1997). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, courts therefore consider "the complaint in its entirety, as well as other
sources .. .[such as] documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and
matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322(2007). Courts may also consider "exhibits attached
to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic
documents if the complainant's claims are based upon [those] documents." Mayer
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V. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,230(3d Cir. 2010). Notably,"a document integral to
or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting
the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment." In re Burlington Coat, 114
F.3d at 1426(emphasis in the original)(internal quotation and alteration omitted).
"[W]hat is critical is whether the claims in the complaint are 'based' on an
extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly
cited." Id.
The Amended Complaint refers to the video only once, alleging that "[t]he
events leading up to the violent actions by Officer [Sweeney-Jones], while in the
course and scope of his employment with [the County] were captured on intemal
security footage." D.I. 8 ^ 25. At no other point in the Amended Complaint does
Plaintiff cite to the video or describe its contents. If the video were truly "integral
to" the Amended Complaint, Hood-Anderson presumably would have discussed its
contents in greater depth. See In re Burlington Coat, 114 F.3d at 1426. Similarly,
if the Amended Complaint "explicitly relied upon" the video, the Amended
Complaint would have said so. See id. The claims in the Amended Complaint also
are not "based" on the video. Rather, the claims are based on the events that
allegedly occurred on November 21, 2022. And those events just happened to be
captured on video. More generally, Hood-Anderson cannot save a sloppily drafted
complaint from dismissal by padding her opposition brief with extrinsic evidence.
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Accordingly,I will not consider the screenshots for the purposes of Defendants'
motion to dismiss.
Even ifI were to consider the screenshots, Hood-Anderson has still failed to
allege facts from which an unconstitutional conspiracy can be inferred. At most,
the screenshots show one element of conspiracy, concerted action, without the
other element, agreement. See Capograsso, 588 F.3d at 185 (stating the "elements
of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action"). For example, one screenshot
depicts two officers appearing to restrain Hood-Anderson in a holding cell. See
D.I. 16 at 14. But the video does not demonstrate any agreement among the
officers. The screenshots therefore do not provide sufficient facts from which 1
can infer that Officer Sweeney-Jones and other officers conspired to violate Hood-
Anderson's constitutional rights.
Hood-Anderson has also failed to plead sufficient facts to satisfy the specific
requirements of a plausible § 1985(2) or § 1985(3) claim. The Amended
Complaint does not identify the subsection of§ 1985 under which Hood-Anderson
proceeds. See generally D.l. 8 31-63. Hood-Anderson instead argues that "[a]
plain reading of the Amended Complaint displays primarily the third element of
[§ 1985 of] 'depriving a plaintiff of rights or privileges' and to a lesser extent the
second element of'obstructing justice or intimidating a party.'" D.l. 16 at 10. To
support this argument. Hood-Anderson points to paragraphs 1, 35, 37, 40, 43, 44,
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49, and 50 ofthe Amended Complaint. D.I. 16 at 10. Each of those paragraphs
allege that Hood-Anderson's civil rights were violated. See, e.g., D.I. 8 ^ 37
("Plaintiff posed no probable threat to Defendant [Sweeney-Jones] when he
violated Plaintiffs civil rights, while acting in his official capacities.").
But conclusory allegations that Hood-Anderson's civil rights were violated
are insufficient to plead a claim under § 1985(2)or § 1985(3). Both sections
require an intent to deprive another of equal protection of the laws or equal
privileges and immunities under the law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(requiring
"intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)(requiring a conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving ... any person or
class of persons of the equal protection ofthe laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws"). Sections 1985(2)and 1985(3)therefore apply only if
there is "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971); see also Davis V. Township ofHillside, 190 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 1999)
(discussing § 1985(2)); Farber v. CityofPaterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir.
2006)(discussing § 1985(3)).
Here, Hood-Anderson has not alleged any such racial or class-based animus.
The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint also cannot be reasonably interpreted
to state a § 1985(2) claim because "[t]he gist of the wrong at which § 1985(2) is
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directed is ... intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court
proceedings." Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998). At no point does the
Amended Complaint allege that Hood-Anderson was a witness, much less that
Defendants violated her rights as a means of intimidation or retaliation for
testifying. I will therefore dismiss without prejudice the § 1985 claims in Counts I,
II, and III against the County and Officer Sweeney-Jones.
B. Count V (Failure to Train Claim)
Hood-Anderson alleges in Count V ofthe Amended Complaint that the
County failed to adequately train New Castle County police officers, including
Officer Sweeney-Jones,"with respect to proper procedures to follow when placing
a custodial detainee in a holding cell." D.I. 8 ^ 77; see also D.I. 8 77-84.
Defendants seek to dismiss this failure to train claim against the County and
Officer Sweeney-Jones. D.I. 11 at 15-16.
"[I]n the absence of an unconstitutional policy [or custom], a municipality's
failure to properly train its employees and officers can create an actionable
violation of a party's constitutional rights under § 1983." Reitz v. County ofBucks,
125 F.3d 139, 145(3d Cir. 1997). A failure to train serves as a basis for § 1983
liability only when the failure to train "amounts to 'deliberate indifference' to the
rights of persons with whom those employees will come into contact." Carter v.
City ofPhiladelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357(3d Cir. 1999)(quoting City ofCanton v.
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Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Deliberate indifference is "a stringent standard
of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action." Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 410. To sufficiently plead
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that "(1) municipal policymakers
know that employees will confront a particular situation;(2)the situation involves
a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3)the wrong choice
by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights." Carter,
181 F.3dat357.
Put differently, a municipal policymaker must have notice that the training
program will violate individuals' constitutional rights. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62
("Without notice that a course oftraining is deficient in a particular respect,
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program
that will cause violations of constitutional rights."). "A pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is 'ordinary necessary' to
demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train." Id. (quoting
Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). Alternatively, deliberate indifference may be based
on a single incident but only if the plaintiff shows that her injury was an "obvious
consequence" of the deficient training program. See id. at 63-64. A plaintiff must
also establish that "the identified deficiency in a [municipality's] training program
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[was] closely related to the ultimate injury" such that "the deficiency in training
actually caused" the constitutional violation. Harris, 489 U.S. at 391.
1. The County
Defendants argue that Hood-Anderson's failure to train to claim should be
dismissed against the County because "Plaintiff has not alleged particular facts
sufficient for the Court to infer that the County has failed to train its employees, or
a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees." D.I. 11 at
15. To support her claim, Hood-Anderson points to paragraphs 29, 30, and 74
through 84 of the Amended Complaint. D.I. 16 at 17-19(some capitalization
removed).
Paragraphs 74 through 84 contain only conclusory assertions that the County
failed to train its police officers. See, e.g., D.I. 8 ^ 77("The training policies ofthe
Defendant New Castle County police department were not adequate to train its
police officers, including but not limited to the Officer Defendants, with respect to
proper procedures to follow when placing a custodial detainee in a holding cell.");
D.I. 8 ^ 82("Defendant New Castle County, through its managers and other staff,
including [Bond], was aware that failure to implement some sort of training with
respect to their officers' conduct would result in continuing to have numerous
unreasonable officer-involved excessive force instances with regularity."). These
paragraphs merely provide "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
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action." 556 U.S. at 678. Such a recitation "will not do." Twombly,5S0
U.S. at 555. Paragraphs 74 through 84 are therefore insufficient to state a claim.
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009)("After Iqbal, it
is clear that conclusory or 'bare-bones' allegations will no longer survive a motion
to dismiss.").
Paragraphs 29 and 30 also do not allege a pattern of constitutional violations
from which I may infer that the County was deliberately indifferent. Paragraph 29
asserts that Officer Sweeney-Jones "has, on two previous occasions, been involved
in officer-involved use of force investigations, to include(1) a January 22, 2023
shooting of Alistair DiPasquale and Evan Chandler, and (2)a[n] April 19, 2017
shooting of Keith Price." D.I. 8 ^ 29. Paragraph 30 states,"The outcome and
determinations made concerning [Officer Sweeney-Jones's] prior conduct will
require both subpoena and discovery power so Plaintiff can retain further
information regarding those instances of professional conduct and/or misconduct."
D.I. 8^30. Two alleged use offorce incidents by a single officer do not establish
a "pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees." Connick,
563 U.S. at 62. Such a pattern is ordinarily required "to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train." Id. Hood-Anderson also has failed to
allege that her injury was an "obvious consequence" of the deficient training
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program. See id. at 63-64. The Amended Complaint therefore does not state a
plausible claim that the County was deliberately indifferent.
Hood-Anderson also points to the security video footage to support the
failure to train claim in Count V. See D.I. 16 at 18-19(arguing that the
"voluminous visual video depictions of the methods, procedures, processes,
actions, offenses, etc.(and failures of such)taken by Defendants" are "sufficient to
properly support Plaintiffs claims"). As discussed above, however, I will not
consider the video for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss.
In a final attempt to salvage the failure to train claim against the County,
Hood-Anderson relies again on respondeat superior. See D.I. 16 at 19. Hood-
Anderson argues that, even if Count V is dismissed against Bond and Officer
Sweeney-Jones,"the Respondeat Superior relationship should cause this claim to
stand as against [the County]." D.I. 16 at 19. This argument fails. As discussed
above,"a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, I will dismiss Count V
against the County without prejudice.
2. Officer Sweeney-Jones
Defendants argue that 1 should dismiss Hood-Anderson's failure to train
claim against Officer Sweeney-Jones because "a 'municipal liability' [claim] for
failure to train is not appropriate to allege against him as an individual officer."
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D.I. 11 at 16. Hood-Anderson does not respond to this directly, pointing instead to
paragraphs 17, 18, 19, and 21 of the Amended Complaint. See D.l. 16 at 16-17.
Paragraphs 17, 18, 19, and 21 describe Officer Sweeney-Jones's alleged
actions in the holding cell. See, e.g., D.l. 8^17(alleging that Officer Sweeney-
Jones "forcefully grabbed, pushed, punched, tackled, and/or otherwise struck
[Hood-Anderson] prior to and while she was in a New Castle County holding
cell"). But nowhere in the Amended Complaint does Hood-Anderson allege that
Officer Sweeney-Jones is responsible for training other police officers. Hood-
Anderson refers to Officer Sweeney-Jones merely as "an agent and/or employee of
the New Castle County Police Department." D.l. 8 T| 4. And in her briefing,
Hood-Anderson even concedes that "[i]t is currently unknown whether Officer
Sweeney-Jones was superior to the other unknown officer in the video footage."
D.l. 16 at 17. Accordingly, 1 will dismiss Count V against Officer Sweeney-Jones.
C. Count X(Gross Negligence Claim)
Defendants seek to dismiss Count X against the County under Rule 12(b)(1).
See D.l. 11 at 21. Defendants argue that 1 lack subject matter jurisdiction over this
count because, by statute, the County is immune from tort claims. See D.l. 11 at
19.
The County and Municipal Tort Claims Act(the Act), codified at Del. Code
Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4010^013(2025), grants broad immunity from tort claims to local
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governmental entities and their employees. See McCaffrey v. City of Wilmington,
133 A.3d 536, 545 (Del. 2016)("In general, municipalities in Delaware are
immune from suit for state law claims under the Tort Claims Act."); see also
Sadler v. New Castle County, 565 A.2d 917, 921 (Del. 1989)(explaining how "the
grant ofimmunity [in the Act] is broadly cast and open-ended"). The Act provides
that "all governmental entities and their employees shall be immune from suit on
any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages." Del. Code Ann. tit. 10,
§ 4011(a). "Like qualified immunity under federal law, immunity under the Tort
Claims Act is not merely a 'defense to liability,' but rather an 'immunity from suit'
for damages." McCaffrey, 133 A.3d at 546(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 227(1991)). Courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over those who are •
immune to suit. See, e.g., Gary v. Pa. Hum. Pels. Comm 'n, 497 F. App'x 223,227
(3d Cir. 2012)(affinning dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over state law claims asserted against defendants who were statutorily "immune
from suit").
The Act exposes municipal governmental entities and employees to liability
for tort claims in certain limited circumstances. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10,
§§ 4011(c), 4012. The statutory exceptions to immunity depend on the type of
defendant involved. Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 10,§ 4011(c) with Del. Code
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Ann. tit. 10, § 4012. Section 4011(c) of the Act provides an exception to immunity
for municipal government employees, stating that:
[a]n employee may be personally liable for acts or
omissions causing property damage, bodily injury or death
in instances in which the governmental entity is immune
under this section, but only for those acts which were not
within the scope ofemployment or which were performed
with wanton negligence or wilful and malicious intent.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4011(c).
Section 4012 ofthe Act, by contrast, applies to governmental entities and
lists the only three instances in which "[a] governmental entity shall be exposed to
liability for its negligent acts or omissions causing property damage, bodily injury
or death." Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4012; see also Fiat Motors ofN. Am., Inc. v.
Mayor & Council ofCity of Wilmington, 498 A.2d 1062, 1066 (Del. 1985)
(explaining how,"in the absence of an explicit statute indicating otherwise, the
activities listed in § 4012 are the only activities" for which "a municipal
government is not to have immunity"). The Delaware Supreme Court has noted
that "the word 'negligent' in § 4012, referring to the [municipality's] liability,. ..
mean[s] ordinary negligence as opposed to 'wanton'(or gross) negligence or
'willful and malicious intent'(intentional acts)." City of Wilmington v. Sikander,
2006 WL 686589, at *2 n.4 (Del. Mar. 17, 2006). Other Delaware courts have
similarly found that § 4012 strips local governmental entities of immunity for
claims of ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. See Schueler v. Martin, 674
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A.2d 882, 888 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996)("[Section] 4012 acts as a waiver of local
governmental entity immunity where carefully prescribed acts are done
negligently")(emphasis in the original); Garvin v. City of Wilmington, 2018 WL
2220935, at *2(Del. Super. Ct. May 8, 2018)("Sections 4010-4012 ofthe County
and Municipal Tort Claims Act[] is unlike the State Torts Claim Act and does not
blatantly bar immunity for gross negligence."); see also Farris v. Moeckel,664
F. Supp. 881, 897(D. Del. 1987)("Section 4012 exempts municipal entities from
immunity only for negligent acts or omissions. As applied to governmental
entities, the Tort Claims Act does not create an exemption from its blanket
immunity provision for conduct that is ... grossly negligent.")(emphasis in the
original)(citations omitted). Under the Act, a municipal government thus cannot
be liable for a gross negligence claim.
Section 4012 ofthe Act bars Hood-Anderson's gross negligence claim
against the County. As stated above, § 4012 exposes a local governmental entity
to liability for "its negligent acts or omissions," Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4012, not
its "grossly negligent actions," D.I. 8^114. See Sikander, 2006 WL 686589, at *2
n.4. The parties do not dispute that the County constitutes a "governmental entity"
under the Act. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4010(2)(defining "[gjovernmental
entity" to mean, in part,"any municipality, town, county, administrative entity or
instrumentality created pursuant to Chapter 8 of Title 22 or Title 9"); D.l. 8 T|3
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(describing the County as "a municipal corporation duly organized, existing and
operating under and pursuant to the applicable laws of the State of Delaware"). By
directing Count X to the County, D.I. 8 T| 107, Hood-Anderson asserts a gross
negligence claim against a local governmental entity. The plain language of
§ 4012 bars such a claim as a matter of law.^
In her briefing, Hood-Anderson utterly fails to rebut Defendants' argument
that Hood-Anderson's gross negligence claim is statutorily barred with respect to
the County. iSee D.I. 16 at 22-23. Hood-Anderson instead argues that
"[ijmmunity of government officials is not absolute," and "[w]hen conduct reaches
a certain level of outrageousness, that immunity can become unavailable." D.I. 16
at 23. At no point, however, does Hood-Anderson acknowledge that the County
and Municipal Tort Claims Act establishes when municipal government officials
^ In the Amended Complaint, Hood-Anderson asserts that her "allegations of gross
or wanton negligence against the Officer Defendants are not barred by the
Delaware State Tort Claims Act(10 Del. C. § 4001)as sovereignty is not a valid
defense to allegations of gross or wanton negligence." D.I. 8^116. I will
disregard this assertion for two reasons. First, this statement is a legal conclusion,
and I am "not required to credit bald assertions or legal conclusions improperly
alleged in the complaint." In re Rockefeller Ctr Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d
198, 216(3d Cir. 2002). Second, based on the facts as pleaded in the Amended
Complaint, the Delaware State Tort Claims Act does not apply here. The State Tort
Claims Act, codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4001-4006, limits civil liability
for "the State or any public officer or employee." Del. Code Arm. tit. 10, § 4001.
Here, however. Hood-Anderson asserts a gross negligence claim against New
Castle County and other county employees. See D.I. 8 106-22. The County
and Municipal Tort Claims Act, rather than the State Tort Claims Act, thus applies.
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and entities are subject to liability for tort claims. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10,
§§4010^013.^
Hood-Anderson further asserts that she "has plainly plead[ed] gross
negligence against all Defendants." D.I. 16 at 22. The problem here, however, is
not a matter of pleading. Rather, the problem is that the Act bars gross negligence
claims against the County as a matter of law. See McCaffrey, 133 A.3d at 546
("[IJmmunity under the [County and Municipal] Tort Claims Act is ... an
immunity from suit for damages.")(internal quotations omitted). Because I lack
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, I will dismiss Count X against the
County with prejudice.
D. Leave to Amend the Complaint
Finally, the parties dispute whether Hood-Anderson should be granted leave
to amend the Amended Complaint. Hood-Anderson has already amended her
Complaint once, D.I. 8, in response to Defendants' initial motion to dismiss, D.I. 6.
Defendants subsequently filed the present motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint. D.I. 10. Rather than requesting leave to amend. Hood-Anderson chose
^ At one point in her briefing, Hood-Anderson cites to "10 Del. C. § 4011(c)."
D.I. 16 at 23. As discussed above, § 4011(c) states that a local government
employee may be liable for acts "performed with wanton negligence or wilful and
malicious intent." Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4011(c). Because Defendants seek to
dismiss Hood-Anderson's gross negligence claim against the County only,
§ 4011(c) does not apply.
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to oppose Defendants' motion to dismiss on the merits. D.I. 16. In her opposition
brief, Hood-Anderson now requests leave to amend the Amended Complaint
"[s]hould any claims be found deficient." D.I. 16 at 24. Defendants oppose any
further amendment of the Amended Complaint, asserting that the claims "are
legally deficient and any further amendment would be futile." D.I. 20 at 10.
"[I]n civil rights cases[,] district courts must offer amendment—irrespective
of whether it is requested—^when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim
unless doing so would be inequitable or futile." Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pate
Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). Amendment is futile
when "the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted." Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). Leave to
amend therefore must be granted "unless the amendment would not cure the
deficiency." Id.
Only two of Hood-Anderson's claims fail as a matter oflaw—^the § 1983
claim based on the Eighth Amendment in Count II and the gross negligence claim
in Count X as applied to the County. See Boring, 833 F.2d at 471 (stating that
"[pjretrial detainees are not within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment"); Garvin,
2018 WL 2220935, at ^2("Sections 4010^012 of the County and Municipal Tort
Claims Act[] ... do[] not blatantly bar immunity for gross negligence."). Because
I will dismiss the remaining claims for lack of factual support, amendment would
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not be futile. Hood-Anderson shall therefore have the opportunity to file a Second
Amended Complaint to cure any factual deficiencies.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I will grant in part and deny in part
Defendants' motion to dismiss. I will grant the motion with respect to the official
capacity claims against Bond and Officer Sweeney-Jones; the § 1983 claims
against the County in Counts I, II, and III; the § 1983 claim against Officer
Sweeney-Jones in Count II; the § 1986 claims in Counts I, II, and III; Count IV;
Count V; Count VI; Count IX; and Count X against the County. I will deny the
motion with respect to the § 1983 claim against Officer Sweeney-Jones in Count
III.
The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
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