BARR v. MEEKINS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
TIMOTHY JACOB BARR,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 1:25cv323-MW/ZCB
CROSS CITY, FLORIDA, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________/
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This Court has considered, without hearing, the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation, ECF No. 17, and has also reviewed de novo Plaintiff’s objections,
ECF No. 22. The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of Counts IV through IX
in the third amended complaint for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. Having
reviewed the allegations of the third amended complaint, de novo, the report and
recommendation and Plaintiff’s objections, this Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that Counts IV through IX fail to state plausible claims for relief.
Starting with Count IV, which Plaintiff identifies as a claim under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for “Deficient Investigation,” ECF No.
14 at 19–20, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Roberts, the jail administrator, violated
Plaintiff’s right to due process by producing a deficient report regarding the
excessive force incident involving Plaintiff, which included contradictory and
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fabricated evidence, and Defendant Valentine then approved the report without
independent review. The Magistrate Judge recommends the dismissal of this claim
as there is no constitutional right to an investigation. Plaintiff objects because (1)
Judge Bolitho cites a prior case of his as additional support for the legal principle
that there is no constitutional right to an investigation and (2) this claim is actually
a fabrication-of-evidence claim under the standard articulated in Devereaux v.
Abbey, 263 F. 3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001). ECF No. 21 at 6–7. First, there is no error in
a judge citing his or her prior decision as additional support for a stated legal
principle. Moreover, Plaintiff ignores the Eleventh Circuit decision Judge Bolitho
also cited which appears to be on all fours with the principle that there is no
constitutional right to an investigation of an excessive force complaint. See ECF No.
17 at 10 (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F. 3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002)).
In addition, Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint by filing objections and
reformulating the legal theories upon which he bases his claims. But even if this
Court could liberally construe Plaintiff’s claim for “deficient investigation” as,
instead, a claim for “fabrication of evidence,” the allegations he cites in support of
Count IV do not give rise to a claim that Defendants Roberts and Valentine violated
Plaintiff’s due process rights by fabricating incriminating evidence against him. See
Riley v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 104 F. 3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting
that it was well established that fabricating incriminating evidence could give rise to
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liability under section 1983 as a violation of due process right to fair trial). Count IV
is due to be dismissed.
As for Count V, Plaintiff attempts to state a claim for supervisory liability
against the Chief of Police, Defendant King, and the Sheriff of Dixie County,
Defendant Butler. In his objections, Plaintiff insists this claim is only about these
Defendants’ 	deliberate 	indifference 	to 	Defendants 	Meekins’s 	and 	Chapman’s
actions when they allegedly beat Plaintiff unconscious in the Dixie County Jail. ECF
No. 21 at 7. But inasmuch as Defendant King is the Chief of Police and does not
employ or supervise Defendants Meekins and Chapman, the claim against him fails.
Moreover, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that any
claim against King based on his failure to investigate the threats that a private citizen
made against Plaintiff is also due to be dismissed.1
As for Plaintiff’s claim for supervisory liability against Defendant Butler,
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Butler’s inaction in the face of months of
complaints from Plaintiff regarding the alleged excessive force in January 2023
amounts to deliberate indifference. To start, Plaintiff “has no substantive right of any
kind to an investigation of [his] excessive force complaint by the Sheriff’s Office,
much less one created by the Constitution.” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1356. Moreover,
1 Plaintiff has now disavowed such a claim in his objections. See ECF No. 21 at 7 (“The
supervisory liability claim against Butler and King is not about protecting Plaintiff from Brunet.”).
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insofar as Plaintiff now attempts to morph his Fourteenth Amendment claim for
supervisory liability into a deliberate indifference claim on some failure-to-protect
theory, Plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to give rise to a plausible inference the
Defendant Butler’s inaction with respect to records requests following complaints
about the alleged excessive force in fact caused the excessive force to happen. Count
V is due to be dismissed in toto.
Next, Counts VI and VII attempt to allege municipal liability against Dixie
County and Cross City, respectively. The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal
of both claims as Plaintiff has failed to allege an underlying constitutional violation,
because both claims depend on allegations that the lack of procedures or policies for
maintaining public records and responding to record requests somehow violates
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
In response, Plaintiff asserts his claims also encompass the alleged excessive
force that constitutes an underlying constitutional violation to support municipal
liability. ECF No. 21 at 10. But, again, Plaintiff’s objections are not a mechanism by
which to amend his complaint. Count VI, as alleged in the third amended complaint,
only asserts that the County is liable for having “(A) no transparent public records
custodian; (B) no written video retention policy; (C) no independent internal affairs
structure.” ECF No. 14 at 20. And Count VII, as alleged in the third amended
complaint, only asserts that the City is liable for having “(A) no public records
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custodian; (B) no written public records policies or procedures; (C) no written policy
or procedures on internal affairs.” Id. at 21. Both of these counts incorporate factual
allegations that pertain solely to Plaintiff’s attempts to file complaints or requests
for information following the alleged excessive force that occurred in January 2023.
Neither claim includes any factual allegation that would give rise to municipal
liability for excessive force. See Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F. 2d 1436,
1443 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The complaint states that the City of Cooper City has a
custom of allowing the use of excessive force. If established, this allegation provides
the requisite fault on the part of the city, as a persistent failure to take disciplinary
action against officers can give rise to the inference that a municipality has ratified
conduct, thereby establishing a ‘custom’ within the meaning of Monell.”). Contrary
to Plaintiff’s suggestion, Fundiller does not stand for the proposition that the “failure
to investigate citizen complaints can be the basis for Monell liability.” ECF No. 21
at 12. Instead, as noted above, the plaintiff in Fundiller based his claim for municipal
liability on the alleged excessive force, which he alleged the city had a custom of
allowing the use of excessive force. Plaintiff did not make similar allegations in the
case before this Court. Accordingly, both claims are due to be dismissed.
With respect to Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges a claim titled “First Amendment:
failure to produce records,” ECF No. 14 at 21, which he bases entirely on the premise
that the several named Defendants “failed to produce” records pursuant to specific
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records requests. The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal because Plaintiff
cannot proceed on a constitutional claim the alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with
the sought records inasmuch as there is no First Amendment right to public
information. ECF 17 at 10. In response, Plaintiff concedes there is no First
Amendment right to public records but asserts the Magistrate Judge failed to address
his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim at issue in Count VIII. ECF No. 21 at
14. But, again, Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint by filing objections. The third
amended 	complaint 	plainly 	states 	that 	Count 	VIII 	is 	premised 	on 	the 	First
Amendment and the alleged failure to produce records. Plaintiff makes no mention
of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor could one liberally construe Count VIII to
include a due process claim based on the fabrication of evidence. Accordingly, this
claim is also due to be dismissed.
As for Count IX, Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-
intervene claim against Defendant Brenda Timmons based on the allegations that
Defendant Timmons was aware of what had happened to Plaintiff during the events
giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force but she had later refused to come
forward because she allegedly said she did not want to get involved. The Magistrate
Judge recommends dismissal inasmuch as there are no allegations suggesting
Defendant Timmons was ever in a position to intervene during Plaintiff’s arrest and
subsequent alleged beating. This Court agrees. Plaintiff essentially concedes that the
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facts, as alleged, do not fit within the “traditional failure-to-intervene-during-force
claim” framework. ECF No. 21 at 16. Moreover, Plaintiff identifies no authority that
supports his theory that the failure to come forward as a witness after-the-fact gives
rise to a failure-to-intervene claim. Liability for the failure to intervene to stop police
brutality only arises when the defendant “is in a position to intervene and fails to do
so.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 924–25 (11th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, Count IX is also due to be dismissed.
Finally, this Court rejects the balance of Plaintiff’s objections, which suggest
that the Magistrate Judge has not adequately reviewed his filings or somehow
manufactured a pleading trap by holding Plaintiff to the page limit for pro se
complaints. Plaintiff’s argument that his failure to include any claims against
Defendants Lea and Dorman is based on the Magistrate Judge’s failure to permit
him to exceed the page limit is belied by the record—for example, Plaintiff used up
pages of his third amended complaint pursuing a First Amendment claim that was
due to be dismissed and which the Magistrate Judge had previously notified Plaintiff
was not feasible as an independent constitutional claim.
In short, this Court has independently reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations in the
third amended complaint and concludes that Counts IV through IX are due to be
dismissed for failure to state plausible claims for relief.
Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED:
The report and recommendation, ECF No. 17, is accepted and adopted, over
the Plaintiff’s objections, as this Court’s opinion. Counts IV through IX are
DISMISSED for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. Count I against
Defendants Meekins and Chapman, Count II against Defendant Dehart, and Count
III against Defendant Meekins are permitted to proceed. This case is referred back
to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED on March 27, 2026.
s/Mark E. Walker 	____
United States District Judge
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