BLISS v. DIXON et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
KEVIN W. BLISS,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 4:24-cv-520-RH/MJF
RICKY DIXON, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned screened Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff asserts five
claims under the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment against
the 	Florida 	Department 	of 	Corrections 	(“FDC”) 	and 	seven 	of 	its
employees. The District Court should dismiss various claims discussed
below because: (1) the FDC is entitled to sovereign immunity; (2) Plaintiff
fails to state a claim against three supervisory officials whos merely
denied 	grievances Plaintiff had filed; and (3) Plaintiff fails to state an
Equal-Protection claim against any Defendant.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this civil action
against the FDC and seven of its employees, including: (1) FDC central
office 	representative 	A. 	Johns; 	(2) 	Wakulla 	Correctional 	Institution
Warden 	Gary 	Hewett; 	(3) 	Grievance 	Coordinator 	L. 	Robinson; 	(4)
Administrator J. Cornielz; (5) Sergeant Bamford; (6) Sergeant Paden;
and (7) Corrections Officer Waters. Doc. 21 at 2. Plaintiff asserts the
following claims:
• 	a First-Amendment freedom-of-association claim against Hewett
Johns, Robinson, Cornielz, Bamford, Waters, and Paden;
• 	a First-Amendment free-exercise claim against Hewett, Johns,
Robinson, Cornielz, Bamford, Waters, and Paden;
• 	a 	Fourteenth-Amendment 	class-of-one 	equal-protection 	claim
against Hewett, Johns, Robinson, Cornielz, Bamford, Waters, and
Paden;
• 	a First-Amendment claim against the FDC under Monell; and
• 	a Fourteenth-Amendment claim against the FDC under Monell.
Id. at 12. Plaintiff seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages.
Id.
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Plaintiff alleges that the FDC has a custom of allowing wardens to
use their discretion to create institutional specific policies. Id. 	at 8.
Pursuant 	to 	this FDC 	custom, 	Hewett 	created a policy 	prohibiting
inmates in any confinement wing from possessing electronic tablets. Id.
In August 2023, while Plaintiff was in administrative confinement,
Paden, 	Waters, 	and 	Bamford 	enforced 	Hewett’s 	policy 	and 	denied
Plaintiff 	access 	to 	his 	tablet. 	Id. 	at 	9–10. 	Plaintiff 	was 	unable 	to
communicate with his family and friends because he is indigent and
unable to afford stamps. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that this resulted
in a burden on a sincerely held religious belief. Specifically, as an
Orthodox Jew, a central tenet of Plaintiff’s faith is the study of the Torah.
Plaintiff asserts the only Torah that Plaintiff owned was an electronic
copy on his tablet, and the chaplain service did not have Torahs available
for inmates. Thus, he was unable to do his weekly Torah readings and
studies. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff lodged an informal grievance, a formal grievance, and a
grievance appeal regarding the denial of his tablet. Cornielz denied the
informal grievance “without investigating the claim.” Id. at 10. Robinson
denied the formal grievance, and Johns denied the grievance appeal. Id.
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STANDARD
The 	District 	Court 	is required to 	review Plaintiff’s 	complaint,
identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma
pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim
upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The
District Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of
the complaint and must consider all reasonable inferences derived from
those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v.
Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). To survive dismissal,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
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D ISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s 	First- 	and 	Fourteenth-Amendment 	Claims
against the FDC are barred by Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff asserts First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against
the FDC and seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. Doc.
21 	at 	3, 	12. 	These 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	the 	sovereign 	immunity
recognized in the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment generally recognizes that States may
assert sovereign immunity that would bar suits by an individual against
a State, its agencies, and its employees, unless Congress has abrogated
the State’s sovereign immunity or the State has consented to the lawsuit.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d
1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
The FDC, a Florida agency, is “clearly the equivalent of the State of
Florida for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” See Walden v. Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 975 F. Supp. 1330, 1331 (N.D. Fla. 1996). Thus, the FDC is immune
from suit for damages unless the State of Florida waived immunity or it
was abrogated by Congress. See Schloper v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373, 1379
(11th Cir. 1990).
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The 	State 	of 	Florida 	has 	not 	waived 	its 	immunity. 	Zatler 	v.
Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986). Additionally, Congress
has not expressly abrogated state immunity in section 1983 cases of this
type. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67–68 (1989). Thus,
to the extent Plaintiff is seeking damages from the Florida Department
of Corrections, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.1
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Cornielz,
Robinson, and Johns
Plaintiff asserts that Cornielz, Robinson, and Johns violated the
First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment when they denied
Plaintiff’s grievances. Doc. 21 at 10. Plaintiff does not allege that these
Defendants confiscated Plaintiff’s tablet or were otherwise involved in
the promulgation of the policy that required the confiscation of his tablet.
A plaintiff may not assert a § 1983 claim “against supervisory
officials on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.” Keating
1 Plaintiff has not requested injunctive relief. Therefore, the narrow Ex
parte 	Young 	exception 	is 	not 	applicable. 	See 	generally 	Edelman 	v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974). Even if Plaintiff had requested
injunctive relief, his allegations do not entail complaints of ongoing
constitutional violations. Thus, Plaintiff cannot invoke the narrow Ex
parte Young exception. Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla.
Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2000).
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v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Belcher v. City
of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also Hardin v. Hayes,
957 F.2d 845, 849 (11th Cir. 1992). A supervisor is liable under section
1983 only when he personally participates in the alleged constitutional
violation or when “there is a causal connection between the actions of the
supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.’” Keating,
598 F.3d at 762 (quoting Gonzales v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir.
2003)). “A causal connection can be established by, inter alia, ‘facts which
support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed
to stop them from doing so.’” Id. (quoting Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235).
“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Doe v.
School Bd. of Broward Cnty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added).
Prison officials who were not involved in the alleged constitutional
violation, and whose only roles involved the denial of administrative
grievances, are not liable under § 1983 on the theory that failure to act
constituted an acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct. Hoever v.
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Belleis, 703 F. App’x 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2017); accord Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009); Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d
567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008); Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 683 (8th Cir.
2002).
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite causal connection
and simply relies on the denial of administrative grievances as the sole
basis for liability, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Cornielz,
Robinson, and Johns.
C. 	Plaintiff 	Fails 	to 	State 	a 	Fourteenth-Amendment 	Equal-
Protection Claim
Plaintiff asserts a “class on one” equal protection claim and asserts
that 	“he 	was 	intentionally 	discriminated 	against” 	because 	of 	his
administrative confinement status. Doc. 21 at 11.
To state a “class of one” equal-protection claim, a plaintiff must
allege that defendants intentionally treated plaintiff differently from
others who are similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564 (2000); Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d
1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009); Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202
(11th Cir. 2007)
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Plaintiff 	does 	not 	include 	any 	non-conclusory 	allegations 	that
Defendants treated any similarly situated inmate better than Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also fails to allege that Defendants lacked a rational basis for
any disparate treatment Plaintiff suffered. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
failed to state a “class of one” equal-protection claim.
D. 	Dismissal of the Claims Discussed Above is Appropriate
Ordinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity to amend
his complaint before the district court dismisses the action. Corsello v.
Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005). The undersigned
previously advised Plaintiff of the defects in his claims discussed above.
Doc. 10 at 3; Doc. 18 at 3–4. Despite being afforded multiple opportunities
to 	amend 	his 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	never 	corrected 	these 	defects.
Accordingly, dismissal of these claims is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS 	that the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii):
1. 	DISMISS 	all 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	the 	Florida
Department of Corrections;
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2. 	DISMISS all of Plaintiff’s claims against Cornielz, Robinson,
and Johns;
3. 	DISMISS 	Plaintiff’s 	Equal-Protection 	claim 	against 	all
Defendants; and
4. 	RETURN 	the 	case 	file 	to 	the 	undersigned 	for 	further
proceedings 	regarding 	Plaintiff’s 	First-Amendment 	claims 	against
Hewett, Bamford, Paden, and Waters.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 17th day of June 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b); 	Fed 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Objections 	to 	these
proposed findings and recommendations must be filed
within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only and does not control. An objecting
party must serve a copy of its objections upon all other
parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate
judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report 	and 	recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to
challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th
Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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