ALEXANDER v. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
CLIFTON ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-5-MW-MJF
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is an alumnus of Florida State University (“FSU”). Doc. 13.
Plaintiff alleges that FSU violated the Lanham Act—specifically 15
U.S.C. § 1125—when it terminated its “Alumni Email for Life” program.
Doc. 13. Because Plaintiff’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity, and
because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the District Court should grant FSU’s motion to dismiss this
civil action.
B ACKGROUND
On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this civil
action against FSU. Doc. 1. Plaintiff claimed that FSU’s decision to end
its “Alumni Email for Life” program by May 2025 constituted a “violation
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of Federal Trade Commission regulations pursuant to deceptive practices
and 	false 	advertising.” 	Id. 	Because 	the 	complaint 	was 	a 	so-called
“shotgun pleading,” the undersigned struck the complaint and provided
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. Doc. 6.
On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Doc.
13. Plaintiff asserts that in the late 2000’s FSU “began advertising an
‘Alumni Email for Life’ program.” Id. at 4. In 2012, Plaintiff enrolled at
FSU and received a free email account. FSU decided to end its “Alumni
Email for Life” program and confirmed that Plaintiff would lose access to
his free alumni email account in May 2025. Id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that
FSU’s actions violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Although a Plaintiff may assert
several distinct claims under § 1125, Plaintiff does not specify in his
complaint the type of claim he is attempting to assert against FSU.
Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction against Defendant to prevent
Defendant 	from 	deleting 	his 	“Alumni 	Email 	for 	Life” 	account 	and
damages of $50,000. Doc. 13 at 6.
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s Claim is Barred by Sovereign Immunity
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The 	District 	Court 	should 	dismiss 	this 	civil 	action 	because
Plaintiff’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity.
Generally, the Eleventh Amendment recognizes that states may
assert sovereign immunity to civil actions against the State and its
agencies unless Congress has abrogated the State’s immunity. See Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304,
1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Additionally, a plaintiff may overcome
the sovereign immunity bar under the narrow exception set forth in Ex
parte Young if he sues a state official for prospective injunctive relief to
remedy ongoing violations of federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
State universities—such as FSU—“are ‘arms of the state’ and thus
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Page v. Hicks, 773 F.
App’x 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373,
1378 (11th Cir. 1990). In other words, FSU “receives the same Eleventh
Amendment protection from suit in a federal court as the state itself.”
Wang v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 2017 WL 1155889, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 27, 2017).
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Congress has not abrogated Florida’s immunity from suits arising
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and Florida has not waived its immunity to such
suits. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999). Furthermore, because FSU is not a state official
but rather an “arm of the state,” the Ex parte Young exception does not
apply to Plaintiff’s claim against FSU. Page, 773 F. App’x at 518; Eubank
v. Leslie, 210 F. App’x 837, 844 (11th Cir. 2006); Camm v. Scott, 834 F.
Supp. 2d 1342, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
Because FSU is entitled to sovereign immunity as recognized by the
Eleventh Amendment, the District Court should dismiss this civil action
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125
There is a second, independent reason for the District Court to
dismiss this civil action: Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
1. 	Plaintiff Failed to Identify the Precise Claim Asserted
“The Lanham Act was intended to make ‘actionable the deceptive
and misleading use of marks,’ and ‘to protect persons engaged in . . .
commerce 	against 	unfair 	competition.’” 	Dastar 	Corp. 	v. 	Twentieth
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Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
1127). 	Section 	1125 	of 	Title 	15 of 	the 	United 	States 	“goes 	beyond
trademark protection.” Id. Section 1125 creates a cause of action for—
among other things—trademark infringement, trademark dilution, false
designation of origin, false advertising, false description of goods and
services, false representation of goods and services, and cybersquatting.
Because § 1125 is a broad provision that creates multiple causes of
action, a plaintiff who asserts a claim pursuant to § 1125 must specify
the type of claim he seeks to assert. Synergy Real Est. of SW Fla., Inc. v.
Premier Prop. Mgmt. of SW Fla., LLC, 578 F. App’x 959, 961 (11th Cir.
2014). Absent such specificity, to ascertain a plaintiff’s intent, courts
would be forced to resort to guesses, and courts “should not have to guess
at the nature of the claim asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires clarity in pleading. Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir.
2004). Rule 8 requires that a plaintiff apprise the court and the defendant
the type of claim asserted and the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
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Because 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	specify—or 	otherwise 	allege 	facts
indicating—the type of claim he attempts to assert under § 1125, the
District Court should dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. See Black Diamond Land Mgmt. LLC v. Twin
Pines Coal Inc., 707 F. App’x 576, 579 (11th Cir. 2017).
2. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a False Advertising Claim
Even 	if 	the 	undersigned 	ventured 	a 	guess 	that 	Plaintiff 	is
attempting to assert a false advertising claim, Plaintiff fails to state such
a 	claim. 	To 	state 	a 	claim 	of 	false 	advertising 	under 	15 	U.S.C.
§1125(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff must allege six essential elements:
1. the defendant made a statement;
2. the defendant’s statement was false or misleading;
3. the 	statement 	deceived, 	or 	had 	the 	capacity 	to 	deceive,
consumers;
4. the deception had a material effect on the consumers’ purchasing
decision;
5. the misrepresented service affects interstate commerce; and
6. 	the plaintiff has been, or likely will be, injured as a result of the
defendant’s false or misleading statement.
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Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. HBS Int’l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1196
(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order v. Fla.
Priory of Knights Hospitallers, 702 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012));
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d
1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002).
As to the sixth element, a plaintiff must allege “an injury to a
commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused
by the defendant’s misrepresentations.” 	Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 140, (2014); Black Diamond
Land Mgmt. LLC, 707 F. App’x at 580. But Plaintiff does not allege that
he suffered an injury to a commercial interest in sales. Nor does he allege
that he suffered an injury to his business reputation.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that his
injury is limited to FSU’s termination of Plaintiff’s email account and
Plaintiff’s disappointment in obtaining a degree from FSU. The Lanham
Act is not a balm to assuage disappointment. “A consumer who is
hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product . . . cannot invoke
the protection of the Lanham Act.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc, 572 U.S. at 132.
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Because Plaintiff fails to allege an injury to a commercial interest
in 	sale 	or 	business 	reputation 	caused 	by 	the 	allegedly 	false
advertisement, Plaintiff fails to state a false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act. For this reason too, the District Court, should dismiss this
civil action.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss; and
2. 	DIRECT the Clerk of the Court to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida this 27th day of October 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b); 	Fed 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Objections 	to 	these
proposed findings and recommendations must be filed
within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only and does not control. An objecting
party must serve a copy of its objections upon all other
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parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate
judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report 	and 	recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to
challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th
Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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