ROYCE v. MCNEIL

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
SAMUEL DAVID ROYCE,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-358-TKW-MJF
WALT MCNEIL,
Respondent.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Samuel Royce is a Florida pretrial detainee confined at
the Leon County Detention Facility. In his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, Royce seeks release from pre-trial detention and complains about
his conditions of confinement. Doc. 1 at 1, 7. Because the abstention
doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) precludes
the District Court from interfering in Florida’s ongoing prosecution of
Royce, and because Royce’s claims concerning conditions of confinement
can only be asserted in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the District Court should dismiss Royce’s petition.
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B ACKGROUND
The State of Florida has charged Royce with attempted first-degree
murder in Leon County Case No. 2025CF001319. In his petition, Royce
asserts four grounds:
(1) the probable cause affidavit for his arrest warrant was not
signed,
(2) the trial court denied bond during his first appearance,
(3) the State of Florida failed to arraign him timely, and
(4) he has had little or no communication with his attorney.
Royce also asserts that while confined, the staff have interfered with
Royce’s mail and religious materials. Royce also alleges that the jail is
unsanitary and the staff refuses to provide him recreation and medical
treatment. 	Royce 	seeks 	release 	from 	pre-trial 	detention, 	and 	an
injunction against his accuser, and damages of $4,000.
D ISCUSSION
A. 	The Younger Abstention Doctrine
“When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief prior to a pending
state criminal trial the petitioner must satisfy the ‘Younger abstention
hurdles’ before the federal courts can grant such relief.” Hughes v. Att’y
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Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kolski v.
Watkins, 544 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1977)).
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should not
enjoin 	a 	pending 	state 	criminal 	proceeding 	unless 	an 	injunction 	is
necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury. 401 U.S. at
53–54. As the Supreme Court stated: “the normal thing to do when
federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is
not to issue such injunctions.” Id. at 45. The Supreme Court’s Younger
decision 	was based on a strong federal policy against federal-court
interference with pending state judicial proceedings. Id. at 44; Green v.
Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2009).
Under Younger, a district court should abstain from interfering
with ongoing state proceedings when “(1) state proceedings, judicial in
nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state
interests; and (3) the state proceeding afford adequate opportunity to
raise constitutional issues.” Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1099
(11th Cir. 2022); see Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). “There are three narrow exceptions to
the 	abstention 	doctrine: 	(1) 	there 	is 	evidence 	of 	state 	proceedings
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motivated by bad faith; (2) irreparable injury would occur; or (3) there is
no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can
be raised.” Johnson, 32 F. 4th at 1099.
Generally, the Younger analysis is conducted in three steps. First,
federal courts consider whether a qualifying state-court proceeding is
pending. Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC v. Gwinnett Cnty., 940 F.3d 1254, 1267–
68 (11th Cir. 2019). If so, federal courts then consider whether it is
appropriate to abstain under the factors set forth in Middlesex. Id. at
1268. If abstention appears to be appropriate, federal courts then must
determine whether any exception to Younger applies. Middlesex, 457 U.S.
at 435; Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123–25 (1975).
1. 	There is an Ongoing, Qualifying State Proceeding
Florida is currently prosecuting Royce for attempted first degree
murder in Leon County Case No. 2025CF001319. Accordingly, the first
Younger criterion is satisfied.
2. 	The Middlesex Factors Weigh in Favor of Abstention
At the second step of the Younger analysis, the District Court must
consider whether: (1) the federal action would interfere with ongoing
qualifying state judicial proceedings; (2) the state proceedings implicate
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important state interests; and (3) the underlying state proceedings afford
litigants 	an 	adequate 	opportunity 	to 	raise 	federal 	claims. 	Tokyo
Gwinnett, LLC, 940 F.3d at 1267–68.
(a). 	Interference with State Judicial Proceedings
“In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere
with the state proceeding,” the court looks “to the relief requested and
the effect it would have on the state proceedings. The relief sought need
not directly interfere with an ongoing proceeding or terminate an ongoing
proceeding in order for Younger abstention to be required.” 31 Foster
Children 	v. 	Bush, 	329 	F.3d 	1255, 	1276 	(11th 	Cir. 	2003) 	(citations
omitted).
Royce requests that this court void the state court’s detention order,
release Royce from custody, and impose an injunction on Royce’s accuser.
This relief necessarily would conflict with, and would obviate, Florida’s
pending court proceedings.
(b). 	Important State Interests
The State of Florida’s criminal prosecution of Royce implicates
important state interests. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41–44. The adjudication
of criminal cases—which is a facet of crime prevention—is an important
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state interest, particularly when there are victims involved. Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 750 (1987). “[P]reventing and dealing with crime is much more the
business of the States than it is of the Federal Government . . . .”
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977). The “State has a strong
sovereign interest in ensuring public safety and criminal justice within
its territory, and in protecting all crime victims. . . . The State also has a
strong interest in ensuring that criminal offenders . . . are appropriately
punished and do not harm others in the State.” Oklahoma v. Castro-
Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 651 (2022). Thus, there is a “strong judicial policy
against 	interference 	with 	state 	criminal 	proceedings.” 	Arizona 	v.
Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 243 (1981). Accordingly, the second Middlesex
factor also weighs in favor of abstention.
(c). 	Adequate Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims
Finally, Royce will have an adequate opportunity to raise his
federal claims in state courts. In order for Royce to show he lacks an
adequate opportunity to raise his claims, he must assert that he is
procedurally prevented from raising the claims pretrial, during trial, or
at a subsequent stage of the criminal proceedings. See Johnson, 32 F.4th
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at 1101 (“what matters is whether the plaintiff is procedurally prevented
from raising his constitutional claims in the state courts.”) (citing Pompey
v. Broward Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996)). Royce has not
alleged 	any 	facts 	showing 	that 	he 	is 	procedurally 	prevented 	from
challenging the trial court’s decision to detain him without bond, to
challenge the sufficiency of the warrants, and to challenge his counsel’s
conduct. 	Indeed, 	the 	underlying 	state 	criminal 	case 	affords 	Royce
adequate opportunities to raise the claims he seeks to assert in his
petition. See Flores v. State 66 So. 3d 1094, 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
(granting state habeas relief where trial court failed to make the requisite
finding to support a denial of bond); Johnson, 32 F.4th at 1100 (noting
that Florida law permits a defendant to file a writ of prohibition and a
direct appeal to challenge an alleged violation of the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial). Furthermore, if Royce believes that
his 	attorney 	is 	deficient 	in 	some 	respect, 	Royce 	may 	request
representation by another attorney. Accordingly, the third Middlesex
factor also weighs in favor of abstention.
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3. 	There Are No Applicable Exceptions to Younger
Royce 	has 	not 	alleged 	bad 	faith, 	harassment, 	or 	any 	other
extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate.
“[T]he cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a
single prosecution alone do not constitute ‘irreparable injury’” that would
warrant federal interference in a state criminal proceeding. Kugler, 421
U.S. at 124. Accordingly, for this reason, the District Court should
dismiss Royce’s petition.
B. 	Royce’s Constitutional Challenges to the Conditions of His
Confinement
Constitutional 	challenges 	to 	the 	conditions 	of 	Royce’s
confinement—e.g., Royce’s claim for damages based on the (1) denial of
medical care, (2) denial of recreation time, (3) denial of mail privileges;
and (4) the unsanitary condition of the dorms in the jail—are properly
brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McKinnis v. Mosely,
693 F.2d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1982). Because these claims must be
brought in a civil action, the District Court should dismiss these claims
without prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DISMISS without prejudice Petitioner Samuel David Royce’s
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
2. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 8th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b). Objections to this report and recommendation
(“R&R”) must be filed within fourteen days of the date
of 	the 	R&R. 	A 	party 	who 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the
magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or 	recommendations
contained in this R&R waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1;
28 U.S.C. § 636. If Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of any
facts taken from judicially-noticed documents, or if
they otherwise wish to be heard on the propriety of the
District Court taking judicial notice of those facts, they
must raise this issue in an objection to this R&R.
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