Porsche Leasing Limited et al v. Dorfman Weis

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
RACHEL BETH DORFMAN WEIS, 	Case No. 25-19069-SMG
Debtor. 	Chapter 7
____________________________________/
PORSCHE LEASING LIMITED and
PORSCHE LEASING, LTD.,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	Adv. No. 25-01372-SMG
RACHEL BETH DORFMAN WEIS,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant and debtor Rachel Beth Dorfman Weis guaranteed the lease of a
2019 Lamborghini Urus by an entity called RD3 LLC. Plaintiff Porsche Leasing,
Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court	_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on March 5, 2026.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 1 of 11

2
LTD.1 alleges that after RD3 defaulted, Ms. Dorfman Weis failed to honor her
guaranty. But beyond merely breaking her promise to satisfy the lease obligations if
RD3 defaulted (i.e., breaching a contract), Porsche Leasing alleges that Ms. Dorfman
Weis should therefore be denied a chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge because she
“transferred, concealed, or permitted the concealment and/or disposal of the vehicle.
. . with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” Porsche Leasing; “previously engaged
in similar conduct resulting in bankruptcy, [2] including allowing vehicles purchased
in her name to be sold, concealed, or otherwise disposed of”; and “knowingly failed to
disclose full involvement or control in entities used in the current scheme.”3 Porsche
Leasing further alleges that Ms. Dorfman Weis’s debt for the guaranty should be
excepted from any discharge she might otherwise receive because she “willfully and
knowingly obtained the relevant debt through false pretenses, false representations
and/or fraud,” and that the debt “is one for money or property obtained by fraud or
defalcation 	while 	acting 	in 	a 	fiduciary 	capacity, 	embezzlement 	or 	larceny.”4
Ms. Dorfman Weis has moved to dismiss Porsche Leasing’s complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, arguing that it fails to allege
sufficient facts to plausibly support denial of discharge or nondischargeability.5 The
Court agrees.
1 The docket lists two plaintiffs – Porsche Leasing Limited and Porsche Leasing, LTD. The complaint,
however, only asserts claims on behalf of Porsche Leasing, LTD.
2 In re Rachel B. Dorfman, Case No. 14-15294-RBR.
3 Dkt. No. 1.
4 Id.
5 Dkt. No. 6.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 2 of 11

3
I. 	FACTS.
On August 13, 2024, RD3 leased a 2019 Lamborghini Urus from West Broward
Imports, LLC.6 At that time, Ms. Dorfman Weis was RD3’s manager. She personally
guaranteed RD3’s obligations under the lease.7 West Broward Imports then assigned
the lease to Porsche Leasing, which became the titled owner of the vehicle.8 The lease
required monthly payments of $3,943.37 for a thirty-six-month term. RD3 defaulted
under the lease around October 2024, and Ms. Dorfman Weis likewise failed to
perform under her guaranty. The Lamborghini was not returned to Porsche Leasing
and instead was sold to a third-party dealership. Ms. Dorfman Weis filed a voluntary
petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 5, 2025.9 As of
the 	petition 	date, 	Porsche 	Leasing 	was 	owed 	approximately 	$213,852.45.
Ms. Dorfman Weis listed Porsche Leasing as a creditor on her bankruptcy schedules,
and Porsche Leasing filed a proof of claim.
Ms. Dorfman Weis had previously filed for bankruptcy in 2014 based in part
on her romantic involvement with Bryan Goldstein. Together with Mr. Goldstein,
Ms. Dorfman Weis allegedly engaged in a scheme whereby Mr. Goldstein used
Ms. Dorfman Weis’s name and information to purchase three motorcycles and two
cars, with Ms. Dorfman Weis guarantying obligations in connection with those
vehicles. Mr. Goldstein then allegedly sold those vehicles with Ms. Dorfman Weis’s
6 Dkt. No. 1, at Ex. A.
7 Dkt. No. 1, at Ex. A and C.
8 See Dkt. No. 1, at Ex. B.
9 25-19069-SMG, at Dkt. No. 1.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 3 of 11

4
knowledge but leaving Ms. Dorfman Weis on the hook for her guaranties. This led to
her first bankruptcy filing in 2014.
Porsche Leasing essentially alleges that given her history with Mr. Goldstein
involving similar conduct – by permitting Mr. Goldstein to once again use her name
and information in a fraudulent scheme to obtain luxury vehicles without paying for
them – this time Ms. Dorfman Weis cannot portray herself as a victim. Rather,
according to Porsche Leasing, she must be held accountable for this fraudulent
scheme, the result of which is – according to Porsche Leasing – that Ms. Dorfman
Weis should be denied a discharge or alternatively that the guaranty should be
excepted from any discharge she might receive. Specifically, Porsche Leasing asserts
claims for: (i) denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) based on the transfer,
concealment, or disposal of property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors;
(ii) denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) and (C) based on false oaths
and 	material 	omissions; 	(iii) 	nondischargeability 	of 	a 	debt 	under 	11 	U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A) 	for 	false 	pretenses, 	false 	representations, 	or 	actual 	fraud; 	and
(iv) nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) for fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”10 As
explained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly11 and Ashcroft v.
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), made applicable here by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008.
11 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 4 of 11

5
Iqbal,12 this means that “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”13 A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference” of the defendant’s liability.14 A claim is not facially plausible,
however, if the allegations contain only “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation 	of 	the 	elements 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action,’”15 or 	“conclusory 	allegations,
unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts.”16 A
complaint that “do[es] not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility”
of liability fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief17 and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).18
When a complaint alleges fraud, the pleading standard is even higher. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that the complaint “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud.”19 This requires the plaintiff to allege: “(1) the
precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and
person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these
statements misled the [p]laintiffs; and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged
12 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
13 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
14 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
15 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
16 Warren Tech., Inc. v. UL LLC, 962 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jackson v. BellSouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)).
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
18 Id. at 678–79.
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), made applicable here by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7009.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 5 of 11

6
fraud.”20 Stated another way, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff “must assert
the who, what, when, and where of the purported fraud.”21
III. 	SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS.
Ms. Dorfman Weis argues that the complaint should be dismissed because it is
poorly pleaded, internally inconsistent, and fails to state any plausible claim for
relief. At the outset, she contends that the complaint is a classic shotgun pleading
because each count incorporates all prior allegations and relies on broad, conclusory
assertions rather than facts tied to the elements of the specific statutory claims.
According to Ms. Dorfman Weis, this structure alone makes it impossible to discern
what conduct supports which cause of action.
Ms. Dorfman Weis also points to internal contradictions in the complaint. Most
notably, Porsche Leasing alleges that it owns the Lamborghini yet claims that
Ms. Dorfman Weis had a property interest in the Lamborghini that she transferred
or concealed. Ms. Dorfman Weis argues that both cannot be true, and that this
inconsistency is fatal to the § 727(a)(2)(A) claim, which requires a transfer of property
belonging to the debtor or the estate.
As to the false oath claim under § 727(a)(4)(A), Ms. Dorfman Weis maintains
that the complaint does not identify any specific false statement, omission, or act of
fraud. 	Instead, 	it 	relies 	on 	generalized 	accusations 	untethered 	to 	particular
disclosures, testimony, or schedules. She also argues that the complaint pleads no
20 Rosen v. Case (In re Case), 636 B.R. 834, 840–41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2022) (quoting Sampson v.
Washington Mut. Bank, 453 F. App’x 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up)).
21 Id. (quoting In re Taylor, Bean, & Whitaker Mortg. Corp., 2011 WL 5245420, at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011)).
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 6 of 11

7
facts at all that would fall under § 727(a)(4)(C), which concerns bribery or the
exchange of value for action or inaction in a bankruptcy case.
With 	respect 	to 	the 	fraud-based 	nondischargeability 	claim 	under
§ 523(a)(2)(A), Ms. Dorfman Weis argues that the allegations fall short of Rule 9(b)’s
heightened pleading standard. Because Porsche Leasing is merely an assignee of the
lease, Ms. Dorfman Weis contends that the complaint does not plausibly allege what
representations were made to the original lessor, who made them, when they were
made, or how Porsche Leasing or its predecessor justifiably relied on them.
Finally, as to the § 523(a)(4) claim, Ms. Dorfman Weis argues that the
complaint does not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship arising from a
formal or technical trust, which is required for a claim of fraud or defalcation. Nor
does it allege facts supporting embezzlement or larceny. For all these reasons,
Ms. Dorfman Weis seeks dismissal of the complaint with prejudice and an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs.
In response,22 Porsche Leasing asserts that the complaint plausibly alleges
that Ms. Dorfman Weis engaged in a repeated scheme involving the acquisition and
disposition of luxury vehicles, supported by specific factual allegations and citations
to Ms. Dorfman Weis’s sworn Bankruptcy Rule 2004 testimony, and therefore
satisfies the pleading standards of Rules 8 and 9(b). Porsche Leasing argues that
Count I adequately pleads a claim under § 727(a)(2)(A) because, under Florida law,
Ms. Dorfman Weis may have held a sufficient equitable or beneficial interest in the
22 Dkt. No. 12.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 7 of 11

8
vehicle to constitute “property of the debtor,” and that Counts II and III similarly
state plausible claims for denial of discharge and nondischargeability based on
alleged false oaths and actual fraud. As for Count IV, however, Porsche Leasing
concedes that its claim under § 523(a)(4) should be dismissed without prejudice.
IV. 	ANALYSIS.
A. 	Count I – 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A).
Count I fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Section
727(a)(2)(A) applies where a debtor has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated,
or concealed “property of the debtor” within one year before the petition date, with
the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. The complaint, however, expressly
alleges that Porsche Leasing – not Ms. Dorfman Weis – “is the owner and otherwise
has a legal and equitable interest”23 in the Lamborghini. As for Ms. Dorfman Weis,
all the complaint alleges is that she was the manager of the entity (RD3) that leased
the Lamborghini, and that she personally guaranteed the lease. There are no
allegations that she held any legal or equitable interest in the Lamborghini at any
relevant time. Accordingly, Count I fails to plead an essential element of a claim
under § 727(a)(2)(A) and must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. 	Count II – 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) and (C).
Count II also fails to state a claim. To plead a claim under § 727(a)(4)(A), a
plaintiff must allege that the debtor knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath or
account and must identify the specific false statement or omission at issue. Here, the
23 See Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 8 and 37.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 8 of 11

9
complaint alleges that Ms. Dorfman Weis made false oaths and withheld information,
but it does not identify any particular statement, schedule, or testimony that was
false. The allegations consist only of conclusory assertions untethered to specific
facts.24 As pleaded, the Court cannot discern what specific false oath Ms. Dorfman
Weis is alleged to have made.
Count II fares no better under § 727(a)(4)(C). That subsection addresses
bribery or the exchange of money, property, or advantage for action or inaction in
connection with a bankruptcy case. Count II contains no allegations that would
plausibly fall within the scope of § 727(a)(4)(C). Accordingly, Count II fails to state a
claim and must be dismissed.
C. 	Count III – 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
Count III asserts a claim to determine that a debt is excepted from discharge
based on false pretenses, false representations, or actual fraud. To survive dismissal,
this type of claim must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement that fraud be pleaded with
particularity by providing the “who, what, when, and where”25 of the purported
fraudulent statements. Count III fails to meet this standard. While it recites the
statutory elements of § 523(a)(2)(A), it does not allege with sufficient factual detail
what representations were made, when they were made, by whom they were made,
or how those representations were false at the time they were allegedly made. The
allegations amount to little more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of fraud,
coupled with a hindsight inference that default and loss necessarily imply fraudulent
24 See Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 44 and 45.
25 Case, 636 B.R. at 840–41 (quoting Taylor, Bean, 2011 WL 5245420, at *5).
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 9 of 11

10
intent at inception. Porsche Leasing’s allegations regarding Ms. Dorfman Weis’s
earlier bankruptcy filing do not remedy this deficiency, because they again lack
specificity tying that filing to an intent to deceive at the time she incurred the
guaranty obligation. Count III therefore also fails to state a claim and must be
dismissed.
D. 	Count IV – 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
In its response, Porsche Leasing withdrew its claim asserted in Count IV
without prejudice. Count IV will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
E. 	Leave to Amend.
Because the Court is dismissing the complaint based on pleading deficiencies,
the Court will give Porsche Leasing an opportunity to remedy these deficiencies.26
Dismissal will therefore be without prejudice to Porsche Leasing filing an amended
complaint within 21 days.
F. 	Request for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.
Finally, because the Court is not dismissing this adversary proceeding with
prejudice at this time, Ms. Dorfman Weis’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs will
be denied without prejudice.
V. 	CONCLUSION.
For the reasons discussed above, it is ORDERED that:
1. 	Ms. Dorfman Weis’s motion to dismiss27 is GRANTED IN PART, as set
forth herein.
26 See Garcia v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 48 F.4th 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Bryant v.
Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001)).
27 Dkt. No. 6.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 10 of 11

11
2. 	The complaint28 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. 	The remainder of the relief requested in the motion to dismiss is
DENIED without prejudice.
4. 	Porsche Leasing may file an amended complaint within 21 days of entry
of this order. If Porsche Leasing does not timely file an amended complaint, then
dismissal will be with prejudice, after which Ms. Dorfman Weis may renew her
request for attorneys’ fees and costs.
# # #
Copies to all parties of record by CM/ECF.
28 Dkt. No. 1.
Case 25-01372-SMG Doc 14 Filed 03/06/26 Page 11 of 11