Bet Midrash Ohr Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, Florida

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
BET MIDRASH OHR HACHAYIM
HAKADOSH, INC., a Florida non-profit
corporation, 	Case No. 26-10599-SMG
Debtor. 	Chapter 11
_________________________________________/
BET MIDRASH OHR HACHAYIM
HAKADOSH, INC., a Florida non-profit
corporation,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Adv. No. 26-1132-SMG
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, Florida,
Defendant.
_________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
Bankruptcy 	Courts 	do 	not 	often 	address 	civil 	rights 	lawsuits 	raising
Constitutional 	challenges 	to 	a 	municipality’s 	zoning 	ordinances. 	The 	unusual
Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court	_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on August 28, 2026.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 1 of 15

2
procedural path this dispute took to get here will be explained further below. The
factual 	background, 	however, 	is 	straightforward. 	Plaintiff 	Bet 	Midrash 	Ohr
Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc., is a Jewish religious nonprofit that operates a synagogue.
It purchased commercial property at 1720 Harrison Street in Hollywood, Florida with
the intention of opening a K–12 Jewish day school. To do so, it needed a special
exception under the City of Hollywood’s Zoning and Land Development Regulations.
The City denied Bet Midrash’s special exception application. Bet Midrash contends
the denial was unconstitutional – that the City applied a zoning scheme that has
already been found unconstitutional in another case by a District Court Judge in this
District, and that the denial violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Defendant City of Hollywood moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the special exception criteria are
facially neutral and generally applicable, that they are subject only to rational basis
review, and that Bet Midrash has not stated a plausible constitutional claim. Bet
Midrash disagrees, pointing to the earlier federal court ruling that found the City’s
special exception procedure to be an unconstitutional prior restraint and arguing that
the current criteria are, if anything, worse than those previously condemned. While
a determination of the merits of this action is a question for another day, for the
reasons discussed below, at the pleading stage, the Court will deny the City’s motion
to dismiss and will allow Bet Midrash’s claims to proceed.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 2 of 15

3
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
A. 	The District Court Action.
Bet Midrash filed its complaint on March 26, 2025 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 0:25-cv-60592,1 asserting three
counts against the City of Hollywood:
• 	Count I: A facial equal protection challenge to Article V of the City’s Zoning
and Land Development Regulations, specifically Sections 5.3 and 5.7, alleging
that the special exception criteria are unconstitutionally vague and void on
their face.
• 	Count II: A claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Bet
Midrash’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights – specifically, the right to
free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly – arising from the City’s
denial of the special exception.
• 	Count III: A claim for temporary and permanent injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the same constitutional violations.
On July 22, 2025, the City filed a motion to dismiss2 the complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Bet Midrash filed a response on August 22, 2025,3 and the City filed a reply4
on September 2, 2025. Thus, the motion to dismiss was fully briefed when this action
was referred to this Court.5
1 As discussed below, this case was later referred to this Court where it was assigned Adv. No. 26-
1132. Upon that referral, all filings in the District Court to the date of referral were re-docketed in
this adversary proceeding. Unless otherwise noted, all references in this order to docket entries are to
docket entries in Adv. No. 26-1132.
2 Dkt. No. 12.
3 Dkt. No. 18.
4 Dkt. No. 22.
5 When the complaint was originally filed, this case was assigned to the Honorable Robin L. Rosenberg.
On August 4, 2025, the case was then reassigned to the Honorable Jose E. Martinez. On December 17,
2025, the case was again reassigned, this time to the Honorable Ed Artau. Then on March 17, 2026,
Judge Artau referred the case to this Court.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 3 of 15

4
B. 	The Bankruptcy Filing and Referral.
On January 19, 2026, Bet Midrash filed a voluntary petition for relief under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, commencing Case No. 26-10599-SMG in this
Court. With the bankruptcy case pending, Bet Midrash then moved in the District
Court to refer this action to this Court.6 On March 17, 2026 – over the City of
Hollywood’s objection – the District Court granted that motion7 and referred this
action to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157. The District Court also directed this Court,
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3), to determine whether this proceeding is a core proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under
the Bankruptcy Code.
C. 	The Core/Non-Core Determination.
On April 29, 2026, this Court entered an order determining that the civil rights
claims asserted by Bet Midrash against the City of Hollywood – a facial constitutional
challenge and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for damages and injunctive relief – are non-
core claims but are related to Bet Midrash’s bankruptcy case.8 The claims are non-
core because they neither invoke substantive rights created by federal bankruptcy
law nor exist exclusively in the bankruptcy context.9 But the claims are related to Bet
Midrash’s bankruptcy case because their disposition could alter the debtor’s rights,
liabilities, options, or freedom of action and could conceivably have an effect upon the
handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate.10 After determining that these
6 Dkt. No. 25.
7 Dkt. No. 28.
8 Dkt. No. 30.
9 Id.
10 Id.; see Wortley v. Bakst, 844 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2017).
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 4 of 15

5
claims are non-core claims, this Court set an oral argument on the motion to dismiss
for June 2, 2026.11 The Court then took the matter under advisement.
II. 	JURISDICTION AND ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY.
Given the unusual procedural path this proceeding took to get before this
Court, the Court begins by explaining how and why it has subject matter jurisdiction
and adjudicatory authority to hear and deny the motion to dismiss.
A. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
When originally commenced in District Court, Bet Midrash asserted subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343(a)(3) and
(a)(4) (civil rights and elective franchise). Bankruptcy Courts, however, cannot
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1343.12 After Bet Midrash filed its
chapter 11 petition, however, an additional basis for jurisdiction over this action –
bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 – arose. As this Court explained in
its order determining the claims are non-core, Bet Midrash’s civil rights claims are
related to its chapter 11 bankruptcy case because their resolution – particularly the
damages claim in Count II and the injunctive relief claim in Count III – could alter
the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action and could have a
conceivable effect on the administration of the bankruptcy estate.13 Thus, jurisdiction
over this proceeding now also lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
11 Dkt. No. 32.
12 Bankruptcy courts may only hear and determine cases under title 11 of the United States Code and
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a);
see In re Tomasevic, 279 B.R. 358, 361 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002); In re Fiorillo, 494 B.R. 119, 142–43
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2013).
13 See Dkt. No. 30, at 4-5; see also In re Jimenez, 627 B.R. 536, 540–41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021)
(explaining federal bankruptcy jurisdiction).
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 5 of 15

6
B. 	This Court’s Authority to Deny the Motion to Dismiss.
Based on 28 U.S.C. § 157, the District Court’s referral order,14 and this Court’s
order determining that claims asserted by Bet Midrash against the City of Hollywood
are non-core claims but are related to Bet Midrash’s bankruptcy case, this Court can
hear the motion to dismiss.15 And, because an order denying a motion to dismiss is
not a final order, this Court may – without submitting proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the District Court – enter this order denying the motion to
dismiss.16
III. 	ARGUMENTS.
A. 	The City’s Arguments.
The City argues that Bet Midrash’s complaint should be dismissed for four
principal reasons. First, the City argues that the special exception criteria are facially
neutral and generally applicable – they apply to any school seeking to operate in the
particular zoning district, not just religious schools or entities engaged in expressive
activity. Because the criteria do not target protected activity, the City contends that
the 	elevated 	scrutiny 	applied 	in 	cases 	like 	Lady 	J. 	Lingerie, 	Inc. 	v. 	City 	of
14 Dkt. No. 28.
15 Dkt. No. 30.
16 In re Veros Energy, LLC, 587 B.R. 134, 147 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2018) (“An order denying a motion to
dismiss is not a final order.”) (citing Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229, 236, (1945); Wallace v. Norman
Indus., 467 F.2d 824, 826 (5th Cir. 1972); O’Toole v. McTaggart (In re Trinsum Grp., Inc.), 467 B.R.
734, 741–42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)); In re Nu Ride Inc., 2024 WL 4376130, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. 2024),
aff’d, 2025 WL 2639177 (D. Del. 2025) (bankruptcy court has “authority to enter orders on preliminary
matters to the extent they do not constitute a final adjudication of a matter over which the Court does
not have constitutional authority to enter a final order. That includes specifically the authority of the
Court to determine . . . whether a complaint states a plausible claim on which relief can be granted.”)
(citing Trinsum Grp., 467 B.R. at 738); see Wortley, 844 F.3d at 1318 (“If a matter is a non-core
proceeding (i.e., a related case, like a tort or contract dispute, that could potentially affect the
bankruptcy estate), then the bankruptcy court can entertain the dispute but generally cannot enter
final judgment.”).
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 6 of 15

7
Jacksonville,17 and Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood,18
does not apply. Second, the City argues that the applicable standard of review is
rational basis, not heightened scrutiny, relying on Thai Meditation Association of
Alabama, Inc. v. City of Mobile,19 and Employment Division v. Smith.20 Because the
complaint does not allege that the special exception provision fails rational basis
review, the City contends Count I must be dismissed. Third, the City argues that the
as-applied challenge in Counts II and III is deficient because Bet Midrash does not
allege that the City applied the special exception criteria in a manner that was hostile
to its expressive activity, or that the City selectively enforced the special exception
provision against it. And fourth, the City argues that Count III – the claim for
injunctive 	relief 	– 	fails 	because 	the 	complaint 	contains 	no 	factual 	allegations
establishing the elements of injunctive relief and because the practical challenges of
operating a K–12 school in a congested downtown area make injunctive relief
inappropriate.
B. 	Bet Midrash’s Arguments.
Bet Midrash counters each point as follows: First, Bet Midrash argues that the
case is governed by Hollywood Community Synagogue and Lady J. Lingerie because
the City’s special exception procedure has already been found by a federal court
applying those very precedents to be an unconstitutional prior restraint. The City of
Hollywood conceded in Hollywood Community Synagogue that if the special exception
17 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999).
18 436 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
19 83 F.4th 922 (11th Cir. 2023).
20 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 7 of 15

8
procedure 	constituted 	a 	prior 	restraint, 	Lady 	J. 	Lingerie 	would 	control. 	That
concession, and the resulting ruling, cannot be undone by the City’s current litigation
posture. Second, Bet Midrash argues that it is engaged in First Amendment protected
activity – operating a synagogue and seeking to expand into religious education – and
that 	the 	Free 	Exercise 	Clause 	protects 	that 	activity. 	Prior 	restraints 	are
presumptively unconstitutional and face strict scrutiny; content-neutral time, place,
and manner restrictions are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Either way, rational
basis is not the applicable standard. Third, Bet Midrash argues that the current
special exception criteria are worse than those condemned in Hollywood Community
Synagogue because the City added criteria taken directly from Lady J. Lingerie –
criteria that the Eleventh Circuit found to be impermissibly vague and subjective. In
support of this contention, the complaint contains detailed factual allegations,
including comparative tables. Fourth, Bet Midrash argues that the injunctive relief
claim is adequately supported by the factual allegations incorporated by reference
into Count III and that the City’s arguments about traffic and parking are factual
disputes that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.
IV. 	STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 12(b)(6).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”21 As
explained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly22 and Ashcroft v.
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
22 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 8 of 15

9
Iqbal,23 this means that “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”24 A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference” of the defendant’s liability.25 A claim is not facially plausible,
however, if the allegations contain only “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation 	of 	the 	elements 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action,’”26 or 	“conclusory 	allegations,
unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts.”27 A
complaint that “do[es] not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility”
of liability fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement to show that the pleader is
entitled to relief28 and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).29
Notwithstanding these well-articulated standards, substantial portions of both
parties’ arguments conflate the merits of their positions with the elementary analysis
of whether the complaint states a claim. At this stage, the Court is only determining
whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. The Court will not – in
ruling on the motion to dismiss – determine the applicable standard of Constitutional
review 	(e.g., 	rational 	basis, 	intermediate 	scrutiny, 	or 	strict 	scrutiny). 	That
23 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
24 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
25 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
26 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
27 Warren Tech., Inc. v. UL LLC, 962 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jackson v. BellSouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)).
28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
29 Id. at 678–79.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 9 of 15

10
determination goes to the substantive merits of this action, but not to whether Bet
Midrash has stated a plausible claim.
V. 	ANALYSIS.
A. 	Bet Midrash Plausibly Alleged That It Is Engaged in First Amendment
Protected Activity.
The City of Hollywood’s main argument for dismissal is that Bet Midrash is
not engaged in First Amendment protected activity – that it is merely a school seeking
a zoning exception, not a religious institution seeking to exercise its constitutional
rights. This argument fails at the pleading stage. The complaint alleges that Bet
Midrash’s “purpose is to teach including religious education, provide social and
religious discourse, community assistance and to worship consistent with the tenets
of the Jewish religion.”30 It alleges that Bet Midrash purchased the property “to
expand its operations to open a K-12 Jewish educational school, which it could not do
in its current space in which it operates its synagogue.”31 Counts II and III expressly
seek relief for violations of Bet Midrash’s “right to free exercise of religion and right
to 	freely assemble as 	secured by 	the 	First 	Amendment 	to 	the 	United States
Constitution.”32
The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion. Religious education
– particularly the operation of a Jewish day school by a religious nonprofit that also
operates a synagogue – is a form of religiously motivated conduct protected by the
30 Dkt. No. 3, ¶ 4.
31 Id., ¶ 24.
32 Id., ¶ 54.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 10 of 15

11
Free Exercise Clause.33 At the pleading stage, the Court accepts these allegations as
true. Whether Bet Midrash can ultimately prove that its proposed school constitutes
protected religious exercise is a question for another day. For now, the allegations are
sufficient.
The City’s reliance on the distinction between the school and the synagogue is
a factual argument that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The City points
to the special exception application, which describes the proposed use as a “K-8th
grade school” with up to 700 students.34 But the complaint also alleges that the school
is a Jewish educational school operated by a religious nonprofit whose purpose
includes religious education and worship. These allegations, taken together and in
the light most favorable to Bet Midrash, plausibly allege that the proposed school is
an exercise of religious activity protected by the First Amendment.
B. 	Bet Midrash Plausibly Alleged a Facial Challenge.
Count I asserts a facial challenge to the City’s special exception criteria. “A
facial challenge asserts that a law ‘always operates unconstitutionally,’ . . . ; therefore,
a facial challenge will succeed only if the statute ‘could never be applied in a
33 See Alpine Christian Fellowship v. Cty. Comm’rs of Pitkin Cty., 870 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Colo. 1994)
(finding religious education constituted protected religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause);
Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“the
religious education of children is in fact central to modern Orthodox Judaism: the religious education
of children is a key religious obligation mandated by the Torah, and for most modern Orthodox Jews,
the enrollment of their children in a dual curriculum Jewish school, such as WDS, is virtually
mandatory.”); Religious Rights Found. of PA v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 2023 WL 8359957, at *4
(M.D. Pa. 2023) (“enrolling a child in a parochial school to receive a religious education is a form of
religiously motivated conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause”).
34 Dkt. No. 22, at 2.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 11 of 15

12
constitutional manner.’”35 The complaint plausibly alleges that the special exception
criteria cannot be applied in a constitutional manner to entities engaged in First
Amendment protected activity, because the criteria lack “narrow, objective, and
definite standards” and vest City officials with unbridled discretion.36 This is the
same theory that succeeded in Hollywood Community Synagogue, where Judge
Lenard found the City’s special exception criteria to be unconstitutional as applied to
a place of worship.
The City argues that the current criteria are different from those condemned
in Hollywood Community Synagogue and that the facial challenge must fail because
the criteria can be applied constitutionally to entities not engaged in protected
activity. But the complaint alleges – with specificity and comparative tables – that
the current criteria are the same as, or worse than, those condemned in Hollywood
Community Synagogue.37 The complaint further alleges that the City added criteria
taken directly from Lady J. Lingerie – criteria that the Eleventh Circuit found to be
impermissibly vague and subjective.38
In Lady J. Lingerie, the Eleventh Circuit examined a special exception scheme
and found that none of the nine criteria was “precise and objective,” and that all of
them 	“individually 	and 	collectively 	empower 	the 	zoning 	board 	to 	covertly
35 Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting B LACK’ S LAW
D ICTIONARY 223 (7th ed. 1999); DA Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir.
2007)).
36 See Fla. Beach Adv., LLC v. Cty. of Treasure Island, 511 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2021)
(“[A] law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license,
without 	narrow, 	objective, 	and 	definite 	standards 	to 	guide 	the 	licensing 	authority, 	is
unconstitutional.”) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
37 Dkt. No. 3, ¶¶ 22, 35–38.
38 Id.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 12 of 15

13
discriminate against adult entertainment establishments under the guise of general
‘compatibility’ or ‘environmental’ considerations.”39 The Eleventh Circuit further held
that the scheme was unconstitutional because it failed to place limits on the time
within which the decisionmaker must issue a decision.40 The allegations here – that
the current criteria mirror those condemned in Lady J. Lingerie and Hollywood
Community Synagogue and that the City can deny a special exception even if all
criteria are met – are sufficient to state a plausible facial challenge.41 The motion to
dismiss Count I will therefore be denied.
C. 	Bet Midrash Plausibly Alleged an As-Applied Challenge.
Counts II and III assert as-applied challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section
1983 provides a cause of action for violations of the Constitution and laws of the
United States caused by persons acting under color of state law.”42 An as-applied
challenge addresses whether a law is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case
or as applied to a particular party.43 The complaint alleges that the City applied the
unconstitutional special exception criteria to Bet Midrash’s application and denied
the special exception on that basis. The City argues that an as-applied challenge
39 176 F.3d at 1362 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA. LAND U SE C ODE § 656.131(c)(1)(ii) & (iii)).
40 Id. at 1363.
41 Because the Court has determined that the complaint states a plausible facial challenge, it need not
at this stage determine the applicable standard of constitutional review (e.g., rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny). The City argues that given the facts set forth in the
complaint, rational basis scrutiny must be applied. Dkt. No. 12, at 2, 6. Bet Midrash, on the other
hand, argues that the special exception criteria are subject to a higher level of scrutiny than rational
basis. Dkt. No. 18, at 6-7. To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny, however, the Court must
determine whether Bet Midrash’s application seeks a special exception for a First Amendment
protected activity, as Bet Midrash argues, or simply to operate a school generally, as the City argues.
This goes to the merits of this dispute and is not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.
42 Scott v. Estes, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1268 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
43 Harris, 564 F.3d at 1308.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 13 of 15

14
requires a showing that the City applied the criteria in a manner hostile to Bet
Midrash’s expressive activity, or that the City selectively enforced the criteria.44 This
argument overstates the pleading requirement. At the pleading stage, Bet Midrash
need only allege facts that plausibly suggest the City applied unconstitutional criteria
to its application and denied the special exception as a result. The complaint does
exactly that, so the motion to dismiss Counts II and III on the as-applied challenge
ground will be denied as well.
D. 	Bet Midrash Sufficiently Pleaded a Claim for Injunctive Relief.
As a remedy, Count III seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief. The
City argues that Count III contains no factual allegations establishing the elements
of 	injunctive 	relief. 	Count 	III, 	however, 	incorporates 	by 	reference 	the 	factual
allegations in paragraphs 1 through 40 of the complaint. Those allegations describe
in detail the history of the Hollywood Community Synagogue litigation, the City’s
failure to comply with Judge Lenard’s directive to enact constitutional special
exception criteria, Bet Midrash’s application and the City’s denial, and the harm Bet
Midrash suffered as a result. These factual allegations provide the foundation for the
injunctive relief claim.
The loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time,
constitutes irreparable injury.45 The complaint alleges that Bet Midrash has been
unable to open its school as a result of the City’s denial. At the pleading stage, these
allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim for injunctive relief. The City’s
44 Dkt. No. 12, at 8, 10.
45 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 14 of 15

15
arguments about traffic congestion, parking, and student safety are factual disputes
that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. They may be relevant at a later stage
of the proceedings, but they do not provide a basis to dismiss the complaint. The
motion to dismiss Count III will be denied on this basis as well.
VI. 	CONCLUSION.
Bet Midrash’s complaint contains detailed, specific factual allegations that,
taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, state plausible
claims for relief under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The City’s arguments – that its zoning criteria are neutral and generally applicable,
that rational basis review applies, and that Bet Midrash is not engaged in protected
activity – may ultimately prevail on a fuller record. But they do not justify dismissal
at the pleading stage, where the Court must accept the complaint’s well-pleaded
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.46
It is therefore ORDERED that the City of Hollywood’s motion to dismiss47 is
DENIED.
# # #
Copies furnished to all counsel of record via CM/ECF.
46 See Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010)).
47 Dkt. No. 12.
Case 26-01132-SMG Doc 34 Filed 08/28/26 Page 15 of 15