Masse v. MSC Cruises, S.A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-CV-61121-DAMIAN/STRAUSS
JUSTIN MASSE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MSC CRUISES, S.A.,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Defendant’s (Re-Filed) Motion for Costs and
Attached Bill of Costs [DE 42] (the “Motion”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72, and the Magistrate Judge Rules of the Local Rules of the Southern District of
Florida, the Motion has been referred to me to take all necessary and proper action as required by
law [DE 44]. I have reviewed the Motion, the attachments thereto, and all other pertinent portions
of the record. Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Motion, and the deadline to do so has passed.
Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed herein, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion be
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, with the Court awarding Defendant taxable costs
in the amount of $1,180.75.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Unless a federal statute, [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], or a court order provides
otherwise, costs . . . should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). “[T]here
is a strong presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs” under Rule 54. 	Yellow
Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d 1159, 1166 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mathews v.
Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007)). While a trial court has some discretion in deciding
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whether to award costs, such discretion is not unlimited. Id. A decision to deny full costs must be
supported by a sound reason. Id. (citing Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F. 3d 1012, 1039 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
Nevertheless, the presumption favoring an award of costs generally applies to only those
costs that are taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Id. (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987)). In other words, a court’s discretion to award costs under Rule 54
is limited by the categories of taxable costs specified in § 1920. Id. (citing Arcadian Fertilizer,
L.P. v. MPW Indus. Servs. Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001)). Section 1920 specifically
permits the taxation of the following costs:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where
the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section
1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
ANALYSIS
On October 10, 2025, the Court entered the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [DE 33], concluding that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. 	Consequently, the Court entered a Final Judgment [DE 34] in favor of Defendant, which
states that Plaintiff shall take nothing by this action. 	Thus, Defendant is clearly the prevailing
party. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to an award of taxable costs.
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Pursuant to the Motion, Defendant seeks an award of the following costs:
Description 	Amount
Court Reporter & Transcript 	$1,028.50
Plaintiff’s Medical Records/Copies 	$188.98
Expert Witnesses 	$38,041.43
Total 	$39,258.91
Although Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion, which “may be deemed sufficient cause for
granting the motion by default,” S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)(1), “the Court has an independent duty to
only award costs which are lawful and justified under federal law.” 	Richardson v. Florida
Drawbridges Inc., No. 21-CV-80803, 2022 WL 3370789, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2022).
First, I find that Defendant should be awarded the $1,028.50 it has requested for deposition
and transcript expenses. The taxing of costs is permitted for “[f]ees for printed or electronically
recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). 	Thus,
deposition transcript costs are taxable if the transcripts were “necessarily obtained for use in the
case.” 	U.S. E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 621 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Pronman v.
Styles, No. 12-80674-CIV, 2015 WL 6913391 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2015). To satisfy the necessarily
obtained requirement, a deposition must only appear to have been reasonably necessary when it
was taken. See W&O, 213 F.3d at 620-22; Savino v. Federated Law Grp., PLLC, No. 18-60956-
CIV, 2019 WL 2008901, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2019); Katz v. Chevaldina, 127 F. Supp. 3d
1285, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2015); Pronman, 2015 WL 6913391. The party challenging the cost has the
burden of demonstrating that the specific deposition “was not necessary for use in the case or that
the deposition was not related to an issue present in the case at the time of the deposition.”
Pronman, 2015 WL 6913391 (quoting George v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07–80019–CIV, 2008
WL 2571348, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2008)). Here, the transcript and court reporter expenses
are for Plaintiff’s deposition, see [DE 42-2] at 2, which, undoubtedly, was necessarily obtained for
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use in the case. 	Moreover, the court reporter’s invoice, [DE 42-2] at 2, shows that the amount
sought is reasonable. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to recover the $1,028.50 it seeks.
Second, Defendant seeks $188.98 it asserts it incurred for Plaintiff’s medical records and
copies. 	As indicated above, “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case” are taxable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(4). 	In the Motion, Defendant indicates that Exhibit 3 to the Motion contains invoices
reflecting the $188.98 Defendant seeks. 	However, Exhibit 3 only reflects charges of $150 and
$2.25 pertaining to this case. [DE 42-2] at 3-5. It does not substantiate the additional amounts
sought for medical records and copies. Therefore, Defendant should not be awarded more than
$152.25. However, Defendant should be awarded the substantiated amount ($152.25), given that
the expenses appear to be taxable under § 1920(4) and given that Plaintiff has failed to respond to
the Motion to show otherwise.
Lastly, Defendant states it “incurred $38,041.43 in taxable costs for Expert Witnesses,
Keith Caballer-Diaz, Zdenek Hejzlar, Okorie Okorocha, and Preston Rideout to provide expert
witness reports.” [DE 42] at 3-4. Defendant contends that these expenses are taxable under 28
U.S.C. § 1920(3), which provides for the taxing of “[f]ees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses.” 	Importantly, Defendant provides no authority for the proposition that § 1920(3)
includes expert witness fees. 	Nor does Defendant cite any other provision allowing for taxing
expert witness fees as costs.
Defendant’s contention that the requested expert witness fees – for expert witness reports
– are taxable is plainly incorrect. Section 1920 does “not authorize an award for expenses such as
expert witness fees[.]” Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 341 (2019); see also
Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 439-45. 	“[E]xpert witness fees . . . are clearly nonrecoverable.”
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Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1399 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Therefore, the
Court should deny Defendant’s request to tax $38,041.43 in expert witness fees.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion [DE 42]
be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and that the District Court award Defendant
taxable costs in the amount of $1,180.75 ($152.25 incurred to obtain Plaintiff’s medical records
and $1,028.50 in court reporter and transcript expenses), plus interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961.1
The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable
Melissa Damian, United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties
from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar
the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this
Report except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th
Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 13th day of February 2026.
1 See BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994)
(“When a district court taxes costs against a losing party, the award of costs bears interest from the
date of the original judgment.” (quoting Ga. Ass’n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d
794, 799 (11th Cir. 1988))).
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