In Re: Estate of Remo Ceniccola Deceased et al v. Rinaldi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-62572
LINDA KULMANN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATALIE RINALDI, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER was assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant
to Administrative Order 2025-11. However, because I find that dismissal of this case is warranted
now (at the screening stage),1 and because I do not presently have authority to issue a dispositive
order, I am issuing a Report and Recommendation. I have separately entered an order directing
the Clerk to randomly reassign this case to a District Judge of this Court. For the following reasons,
I respectfully RECOMMEND that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1336
(11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th
1 Plaintiff has sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 	[DE 3]. 	Therefore, the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply here. Under that statute, “the court shall dismiss the case
at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). “Subject matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to hear a
given type of case; it represents the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or
the status of things.” 	Wilson v. Hearos, LLC, 128 F.4th 1254, 1260 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)). “A district court can hear a case
only if it has at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a
specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3)
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” 	Id. (quoting Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg.
Materials Corp. of Am., 849 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2017)).
Significantly, “[t]he burden for establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction rests with
the party bringing the claim.” Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1314
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sweet Pea Marine Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2005)); see also Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir.
2011) (“It is the burden of the party seeking federal jurisdiction to demonstrate that diversity exists
by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citing McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th
Cir. 2002))). “If the plaintiff fails to shoulder that burden, the case must be dismissed.” Williams,
839 F.3d at 1314 (citing In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir.
2008)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (““If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); McIntosh v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., 5 F.4th 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021) (“If subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, dismissal
must be without prejudice.” (citation omitted)).
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Here, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden to show that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction2 – even after the entry of an Order to Show Cause [DE 8] requiring Plaintiff to file a
written response to show cause why this action should not be dismissed without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. In that Order to Show Cause, I observed the following:
Here, as an initial matter, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s case-initiating
document [DE 1] is a Complaint or a Notice of Removal. On the one hand, DE 1
appears to be labeled as a Complaint. 	On the other hand, however, immediately
above “Complaint,” DE 1 states, “Removal of State Case to Federal District Court.”
DE 1 also references Plaintiff’s prior attempt to remove a state court probate case
(apparently to federal court in Connecticut). 	Nevertheless, it is unclear from the
substance of DE 1 whether Plaintiff – through this action – is attempting to remove
a state court action to federal court or whether Plaintiff is attempting to file a new
lawsuit.
At any rate, regardless of whether Plaintiff is attempting to remove a state
court action or file a new action, DE 1 seems to be seeking to have this Court
interfere in the administration of a decedent’s estate, which this Court cannot do.
For instance, DE 1 concludes by stating that Plaintiff’s “father’s estate must be
lawfully administered in FL under diversity jurisdiction.” [DE 1] at 4. However,
“a federal court may not exercise diversity jurisdiction over state probate matters.”
Fisher v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2 F.4th 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 2021). 	The probate
exception to federal diversity jurisdiction “reserves to state probate courts [1] the
probate or annulment of a will and [2] the administration of a decedent’s estate . . .
[and] also bars federal courts from [3] disposing of property that is in the custody
of a state probate court.” 	Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)
(alteration adopted).
[DE 8] (footnote omitted).
2 Plaintiff is pro se, and pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to “less stringent
standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th
Cir. 2020). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to
serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain
an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). Moreover,
pro se litigants (like all litigants) are required to comply with procedural rules. 	See McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in
ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel.”); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]lthough [courts]
are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, ‘[courts] nevertheless have
required them to conform to procedural rules.’” (citing Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2002))).
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Plaintiff did respond to the Order to Show Cause. 	[DE 12, 20]. 	But if anything, her
response creates more confusion, and, regardless, fails to establish that this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over this action. 	See id. 	For starters, Plaintiff states, “[i]n response as to
whether this is a removal or a complaint, it’s both.” [DE 20] at 4.
At any rate, whether Plaintiff removed a state court action or filed a new action, she has
failed to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. If Plaintiff removed an action to
this Court, it appears based on her filings in this case that she was possibly attempting to remove
a state court probate proceeding from state court in Broward County (Case No. PRC240000711;
hereinafter, the “Probate Case”). 	That appears to be the only Broward County, Florida case
referenced in Plaintiff’s filings in this case. 	But wholesale removal of the Probate Case is
improper. After all, “a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate.”
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946).
As to Plaintiff’s contention that she has filed a separate lawsuit, Plaintiff indicates that she
is seeking to pursue a claim for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance against the
executors of her father’s estate. See [DE 20] at 4. And Plaintiff correctly recognizes (see id. at 4-
5) that the probate exception does not prevent her from bringing such a claim (a state law tort) in
federal court so long as diversity jurisdiction exists. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-
12 (2006) (emphasis added) (“[T]he probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate
or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal courts
from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does
not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within
federal jurisdiction.”). However, Plaintiff has failed to show that diversity jurisdiction exists. She
has not alleged the citizenship of the parties to this action, notwithstanding the entry of the Order
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to Show Cause requiring her to show why this matter should not be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Regardless, both Plaintiff and the individuals against whom she seeks to assert
a tortious interference claim appear to be citizens of Connecticut.3 Therefore, diversity jurisdiction
would not exist. 	At bottom, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction even though it was her burden to do so. Therefore, this action should be dismissed
without prejudice.4
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that this action be
DISMISSED without prejudice and that all pending motions be denied as moot.
The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with this Court.5
3 To be sure, Plaintiff has only indicated that both she and the executors reside in Connecticut.
See, e.g., [DE 9]. 	While residency is not equivalent to citizenship, Plaintiff’s allegation gives
reason to believe that both she and the executors are citizens of Connecticut. 	And, at any rate,
there is no indication in the record that complete diversity exists.
4 Were this a removal case, remand (rather than dismissal) would be appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 	However, given that Plaintiff’s largely incoherent
filings have made it impossible to determine whether this action is in fact one she removed from
state court (as opposed to a new lawsuit), dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.
5 As set forth in Rule 4(b) of the of the Magistrate Judge Rules of this Court’s Local Rules:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, recommendations
or report under subsections 1(d), (e), and (f) of these rules, supra, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof, or within such other time as may
be allowed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. Such party shall file with the
Clerk of the Court, and serve on all parties, written objections which shall
specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or
report to which objection is made, the specific basis for such objections, and
supporting legal authority. . . . A District Judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.
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Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by a District
Judge of this Court of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on
appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds
of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 28th day of January 2026.
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