St. Charles v. International Security Guard Services, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-CV-22063-MOORE/Elfenbein
YANICK ST. CHARLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
GUARD SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs Yanick St. Charles, Alecsandre Gabriel,
Bradeley Isidore, Jean Atis, Jocelyne Jennings, Ronald Francis, Pablo Westbrooks, and Nevada
Washington’s (collectively, the “Moving Plaintiffs”) Amended Motion for Default Final Judgment
Against 	Defendant 	International 	Security 	Guard 	Services, 	Inc. 	(the 	“Motion 	for 	Default
Judgment”), see ECF No. [72]. 	In response, Defendant International Security Guard Services,
Inc.’s (“International”) filed its Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Default and Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion for Default Judgment (the “Response” or “Motion to Set Aside”), see
ECF No. [78]. The Honorable K. Michael Moore referred the Motion for Default Judgment to me
“to take all necessary and proper action as required by law and/or to issue a Report and
Recommendation regarding [the] Motion for Default Judgment.” 	See ECF No. [74]. 	For the
reasons explained below, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion for Default Judgment,
ECF No. [72], be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Motion to Set Aside, ECF
No. [78], be DENIED.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
This case arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–216. The
Moving Plaintiffs, along with Bernice M. Louijeun and Everton Gray (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),1
a group of security guards, allege that International, Fenel Luxama, and Wilmene Dorvil
(collectively, “Defendants”) failed to pay them minimum and overtime wages pursuant to
Defendants’ contractual obligation to provide security services to Miami-Dade County Public
Schools. 	The Amended Complaint asserts three counts: (1) violations of the FLSA’s minimum
wage provisions; (2) violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions; and (3) breach of contract.
A. Procedural History
On May 29, 2024, Plaintiff Yanick St. Charles (“St. Charles”) originally filed this action
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. See ECF No. [1] at 1. From June through
July 2024, the remaining Plaintiffs filed Notices of Consent to Join as prospective plaintiffs. See
ECF Nos. [15], [16], [33], [35] and [36]. 	The additional Plaintiffs sought to present the same
claims as St. Charles against the same Defendants for the same job during the same period. See
ECF No. [46] at ¶5.
During this time, on June 28, 2024, St. Charles filed returns of service reflecting substitute
personal service on the co-resident and brother-in-law of all Defendants. See ECF No. [17], [18],
and [19]. That same day, St. Charles moved for entry of clerk’s default as to all Defendants, which
the Clerk entered on July 1, 2024. See ECF Nos. [20] and [25]. The Court ordered St. Charles to
file a motion for default judgment within 20 days pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(b), which Plaintiff timely filed. See ECF Nos. [26] and [29]. On July 11, 2024, St. Charles
1 The Moving Plaintiffs joined in this Motion do not include all Plaintiffs named in the Amended Complaint.
Compare ECF No. [72] with ECF No. [48]. Specifically, Bernice M. Louijeun and Everton Gray are not
joined in the Motion.
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struck her initial motion for default judgment, see ECF Nos. [29] and [37], and attempted to file a
new motion for default judgment with the additional proposed, but not yet added, Plaintiffs. See
ECF No. [38]. On October 11, 2024, the Court denied as moot St. Charles’s motion for default
judgment because the proposed Plaintiffs seeking relief were not named in any pleadings and St.
Charles withdrew her prior bid for collective certification. See ECF No. [45]. Accordingly, the
Court instructed St. Charles to refile a motion for default judgment individually or seek leave to
amend to add the other Plaintiffs. See id.
On October 28, 2024, St. Charles moved for leave to amend to incorporate the proposed
Plaintiffs, which the Court granted the next day. See ECF Nos. [46] and [47]. On November 1,
2024, St. Charles and her co-Plaintiffs filed the operative Amended Complaint. See ECF No. [48].
On November 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a third motion for default judgment. See ECF No. [49].
The Court denied this third default judgment motion without prejudice due to Plaintiffs’ failure to
serve Defendants with the Amended Complaint and ordered Plaintiffs to effect service on the
Defendants by December 6, 2024. See ECF No. [50]. In January 2025, Plaintiffs moved for leave
to effect alternative service through Florida’s Secretary of State, which the Court granted based on
Plaintiffs’ assertion that they attempted service six times without success and that Defendants were
likely evading service. 	See ECF Nos. [55] and [56]. 	Delivery confirmations reflected that
Defendants received the Summonses and Amended Complaint via certified mail on February 10
and 11, 2025, see ECF Nos. [63] and [64], and International acknowledged receipt thereof by letter
dated February 28, 2025 sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel, see ECF No. [66-1].
On March 6, 2025, Plaintiffs moved for entry of clerk’s default as to International, which
the Clerk entered the next day. See ECF Nos. [67] and [68]. On March 11, 2025, the Court directed
Plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment within 20 days. See ECF No. [69]. On March 12,
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2025, counsel for Defendant appeared in the case. 	See ECF No. [71]. 	On April 3, 2025, the
Moving Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Default Judgment at issue here. See ECF No. [72]. On
April 16, 2025, International filed its combined Response and Motion to Set Aside. See ECF No.
[78]. 	Defendant argued that: (1) the Moving Plaintiffs failed to comply with the conferral
requirement under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3); (2) the Amended Complaint did not adequately allege
FLSA coverage or damages; and (3) the Motion was untimely under the Court’s March 11 order.
See ECF No. [78] at 9–16. On April 23, 2025, the Moving Plaintiffs filed their Reply. See ECF
No. [80].
B. Plaintiffs’ Operative Amended Complaint, ECF No. [48]
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, a group of security guards, allege that Defendants
failed to pay them minimum and overtime wages pursuant to International’s contractual obligation
to provide security services to Miami-Dade County Public Schools beginning on April 1, 2024.
See ECF No. [48] at 2-5. 	Plaintiffs assert that they continued performing the same duties for
Defendants, regularly working in excess of 40 hours per week, and that Defendants did not
properly compensate them for their labor. 	See id. 3–8. 	Plaintiffs allege both individual and
enterprise FLSA coverage, claiming that “Defendants’ business activities involve those to which
the [FLSA] applies” because Defendants’ business and Plaintiffs’ work involved receiving and
unloading food transported in interstate commerce, employed at least two employees engaged in
such activity, and had gross revenues exceeding $500,000 annually. See id. at ¶¶22–25, 35–38.
The Amended Complaint asserts that Plaintiffs were denied meal or any other breaks, paid
below the minimum wage set by both federal and Florida law, and received no overtime
compensation despite regularly working over 40 hours per week. 	See id. at ¶¶12-18. Plaintiffs
allege they are “owed unpaid salaries under the agreed rate of $14.00 per hour, in the alternative
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unpaid salaries at the Florida Minimum wage and overtime.” 	See ECF No. [48] at ¶34. 	Each
Plaintiff sets forth the number of regular and overtime hours worked, the agreed-upon rate of pay,
liquidated damages, partial payments, and total amounts owed, with claims ranging from several
hundred dollars to more than $24,000. See id. at ¶¶41–50. The Amended Complaint asserts three
counts: (1) violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions; (2) violations of the FLSA’s
overtime provisions; and (3) breach of contract. 	See id. at 3-8. 	Plaintiffs also assert that
Defendants acted willfully in failing to investigate or comply with wage obligations under the
FLSA. See id. at ¶¶18, 20, 39. In Count III, Plaintiffs assert a breach of contract claim based on
Defendants’ failure to pay the agreed $14.00 hourly wage and applicable overtime. See id. at ¶¶52-
54. They allege they performed work under the agreement and suffered material damages from
Defendants’ non-payment. See id. at ¶53-56. Plaintiffs seek liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees,
interest, and other relief, and request a jury trial. See id. at 8.
The Amended Complaint’s allegations include a few notable inconsistencies. 	As to
overtime, Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n the course of employment with Defendants, Plaintiffs
regularly worked overtime hours (hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, referred to herein
as ‘overtime hours’) and w[ere] not paid overtime compensation . . .” See id. at ¶32. Unlike all
other Moving Plaintiffs, the calculations for Pablo Westbrooks (“Westbrooks”), Bradley Isidore
(“Isidore”), and Jean Atis (“Atis”) do not include any allegation that these Plaintiffs worked any
overtime hours. See id. at 5-7. Additionally, the Amended Complaint reiterates several times that
Plaintiffs’ agreed-upon rate between themselves and Defendants was $14.00 per hour. See ECF
No. [48] at ¶¶14, 34, 52. 	The calculations for St. Charles, Westbrooks, Isidore, Atis, Nevada
Washington (“Washington”), and Jocelyne Jennings (“Jennings”) are consistent with the $14.00
rate allegation. 	See id. at 5-7. 	However, the calculations for Ronald Francis (“Francis”) and
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Alecsandre Gabriel (“Gabriel”) state a rate higher than $14.00. See id. at 5, 6.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Vacating a Clerk’s Default
“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead
or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the
party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (a). A court “may set aside an entry of [clerk’s] default for
good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The good cause standard used in setting aside a clerk’s entry
of default is less stringent than the required showing to set aside a default judgment. See E.E.O.C.
v. Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc., 896 F.2d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1990); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As
the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
Good cause is a mutable standard, varying from situation to situation. It is also a
liberal one—but not so elastic as to be devoid of substance. We recognize that good
cause is not susceptible to a precise formula, but some general guidelines are
commonly applied. Courts have considered whether the default was culpable or
willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether the
defaulting party presents a meritorious defense. We note, however, that these
factors are not talismanic, and that courts have examined other factors including
whether the public interest was implicated, whether there was significant financial
loss to the defaulting party, and whether the defaulting party acted promptly to
correct the default. Whatever factors are employed, the imperative is that they be
regarded simply as a means of identifying circumstances which warrant the finding
of ‘good cause’ to set aside a default. However, if a party willfully defaults by
displaying either an intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings,
the court need make no other findings in denying relief.
Compania Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948,
951–52 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Because “there is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits,” courts in this Circuit
“view defaults with disfavor.” In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
2003); see also Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Because
of our strong policy of determining cases on their merits, however, default judgments are generally
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disfavored.” (quotation marks omitted)); Varnes v. Loc. 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. &
Can., 674 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that “default judgments are disfavored”
and that “the federal rules favor a decision on the merits” and “[c]ourts prefer adjudication on the
merits”). “For that reason, any doubts regarding whether to set aside an entry of default should be
resolved in favor of the party seeking relief.” Insituform Techs., Inc. v. AMerik Supplies, Inc., 588
F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2008); see also Davis v. Parkhill–Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489,
495 (5th Cir. 1962)2 (“[A]ny doubt should, as a general proposition, be resolved in favor of the
movant to the end of securing a trial upon the merits.” (quotation marks omitted)); Chunara v.
SOL Glob. Invs. Corp., No. 22-CV-22167, 2023 WL 3171995, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2023)
(same). 	A defendant need only make “a bare minimum showing to support relief under Rule
55(c).” 	See Jones v. Harrell, 858 F.2d 667, 668-69 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that a district
court did not abuse its discretion by setting aside a clerk’s default when a defendant “had made a
bare minimum showing to support relief under Rule 55(c)”).
B. Default Judgment Standard
After the clerk enters a default, the Court is authorized to enter a final default judgment if
the party seeking it applies for one. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2); Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1244 (“When
a defendant has failed to plead or defend, a district court may enter judgment by default.”). “A
‘defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact’ as set forth in the
operative complaint.” TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Hernandez, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1298 (S.D.
Fla. 2016) (quoting Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307
2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit stated: “We hold that the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit . . . , as that court existed on September 30, 1981,
handed down by that court prior to the close of business on that date, shall be binding as precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit, for this court, the district courts, and the bankruptcy courts in the circuit.” 661 F. 2d 1206,
1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
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(11th Cir. 2009)). 	But the defendant “is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to
admit conclusions of law.” 	Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quotation marks omitted). 	And a
defendant’s default does not automatically permit the Court to enter a default judgment: “Because
the defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well pleaded or to admit conclusions of law,
the court must first determine whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleading for the judgment
to be entered.” Chanel, Inc. v. Replicachanelbag, 362 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2019);
see also Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (“Entry of default judgment is only warranted when there is a
sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” (internal quotations omitted)).
The Eleventh Circuit has “interpreted the standard” for evaluating whether a sufficient
basis for default judgment exists “as being akin to that necessary to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245; see also Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,
123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] default judgment cannot stand on a complaint
that fails to state a claim.”). Of course, to “survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). 	“This plausibility standard is met ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
III. 	DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the Court must first determine whether International has met its
burden to show good cause for setting aside the Clerk’s default. 	The Eleventh Circuit has
explained that the good cause standard is a “mutable” and “liberal” one, but it is not “so elastic as
to be devoid of substance.” See Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951–52. If the good cause
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standard has not been met, the Court must next decide whether there is a “sufficient basis” for a
final default judgment based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint. See Chanel, Inc., 362
F. Supp. 3d at 1259; Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245. A sufficient basis for default judgment exists if
the Amended Complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
A. Motion to Set Aside the Clerk’s Default
At the outset, the Court notes that International failed to address why the Court should set
aside the Clerk’s default — a critical and necessary component of a request seeking to vacate a
default. A movant “forfeits an issue when [he] raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting
arguments and authority.” Harner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 38 F.4th 892, 899 (11th Cir. 2022)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Singh v. United States Atty. Gen., 561 F.3d 1275,
1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellant’s simply stating that an issue exists, without further
argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and precludes our considering the
issue on appeal.”) (citation omitted); Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316,
1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (same). The lack of any explanation whatsoever for setting aside the default
prevents 	the 	Court 	from 	discerning 	the 	factual 	and 	legal 	foundations 	of 	International’s
argument. “It is not the job of the court to search through the record and make arguments for the
parties.” 	Broughton v. Crews, No. 15-CV-22925, 2016 WL 4628051 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28,
2016), R&R adopted, No. 15-CV-22925, 2016 WL 4625616 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2016); see also,
Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (“With a typically heavy
caseload and always limited resources, a district court cannot be expected to do a petitioner’s work
for him.”). Other than the title of the Motion to Set Aside, International fails to make any reference
to setting aside the Clerk’s default, let alone any arguments or case law supporting such a decision
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or how International satisfies the good cause requirement of Rule 55(c).
Nevertheless, based on the record, the Court finds that no good cause exists to set aside the
default. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that a court “may set aside an entry of
default for good cause.” 	Courts considering whether to set aside an entry of default typically
evaluate various non-exclusive factors, such as whether the default was culpable or willful,
whether setting it aside would prejudice the non-defaulting party, and whether the defaulting party
presents a meritorious defense. 	See Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951. Other relevant
considerations include whether the public interest is implicated, whether the defaulting party acted
promptly, and whether there would be significant financial loss. Id. Still, when a party “willfully
defaults by displaying either an intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings, the
court need make no other findings in denying relief.” See id at 951–52.
The record here reflects that International failed to act promptly and failed to identify any
plausible defense to Plaintiffs’ claims. 	Starting with International’s failure to act, Plaintiffs
properly served International via the Florida Secretary of State in accordance with the Court’s
Order, and delivery was confirmed on February 11, 2025. 	See ECF Nos. [56] and [64-1].
International also acknowledged receipt of the “documents regarding the lawsuit” in a February
28, 2025 letter. See ECF No. [66-1]. Despite actual notice,3 International did not respond, appear,
or seek an extension from the Court, so the Clerk entered default on March 7, 2025. See ECF No.
[68]. 	Defense counsel appeared on March 12, 2025, but failed to file a motion to set aside the
default until April 16, 2025 — more than two months after International was served with a copy
3 The Court also notes that St. Charles first served the Defendants with the original Complaint through
substituted service on June 5, 2024 — approximately ten months before Defendants took any action in this
case. See ECF No. [17], [18], and [19]. On June 28, 2024, St. Charles moved for entry of a clerk’s default
as to all Defendants, which the Clerk entered on July 1, 2024. See ECF Nos. [20] and [25]. Thus, the
record suggests that Defendants had notice of the claims in the original Complaint as early as June 2024
but did nothing to defend against those claims.
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of the Amended Complaint and Summons and more than five weeks after entry of default. See
ECF Nos. [71] and [78]. 	In fact, International only sought to set aside the default in a passing
reference when responding to the Motion for Default Judgment. 	It appears that International
simply sat back for weeks waiting to see if Plaintiffs would seek a default judgment before taking
any action itself. International offers no explanation at all for its delay and fails articulate a single
reason why the Court should set aside the default.
In addition, International has failed to identify a single meritorious defense to the claims
alleged in the Amended Complaint. 	Unlike the “meritorious defense” standard applied in the
context of vacating a default judgment, “which requires the movant to ‘make an affirmative
showing of a defense that is likely to be successful,’” on a motion to set aside a clerk’s default, a
defendant need only show “‘a hint of a suggestion’ that the case has merit.’” ACF-AI Origination,
LLC v. Tiendas Soriana S.A. de C.V., No. 24-CV-22606, 2025 WL 1179356, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
22, 2025) (internal citations omitted) (finding that a “mere suggestion” that forged documents
tainted the plaintiff’s claims was enough to establish a meritorious defense); see also Go Relax
Travel, LLC v. Process Am., Inc., No. 12-CV-2086, 2012 WL 13014700, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 13,
2012) (“Likelihood of success is not the measure with respect to the sufficiency of a meritorious
defense when weighing a vacatur of the Clerk’s entry of default. . . Here, [the defendant] provided
that suggestion by asserting that it substantially complied with its obligations under the applicable
agreements.”).
Here, International has failed to meet even this minimal threshold. 	In its Response,
International argues that default judgment should not be entered because the Amended Complaint
is conclusory and fails to adequately plead coverage under the FLSA. See ECF No. [78] at 11–16.
In doing so, International simply attacks whether the Amended Complaint sufficiently states a
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claim for relief, but it does not provide any contrary allegations suggesting that coverage under the
FLSA cannot apply to it (as opposed to suggesting that the allegations in the Amended Complaint
are merely insufficient as pled). 	Further, International does not identify a single defense that it
would raise to defend against the claims of unpaid overtime wages, unpaid minimum wages, and
breach of contract if the default were set aside.
Although courts in this Circuit have “a strong policy of determining cases on their merits”
and “view defaults with disfavor,” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1244–45, and a defendant need only make
“a bare minimum showing to support relief under Rule 55(c),” Jones, 858 F.2d at 668–69,
International has not made that bare showing here. International has failed to provide the Court
with a single reason why it should vacate the default, any explanation for its failure to respond to
the Amended Complaint, or even a suggestion that it has any substantive defenses to Plaintiffs’
claims. As a result, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Default,
ECF No. [78], be DENIED.
B. 	Motion for Default Judgment Against International
To recap, the Amended Complaint contains three counts: (1) FLSA unpaid minimum wage
violation; (2) FLSA unpaid overtime wage violation; and (3) breach of contract for failure to pay
the agreed-upon regular rate. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s default-judgment standard, the Court
must confirm that the well-pleaded facts — taken as true — state plausible claims. Hornady v.
Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 118 F.4th 1367, 1383 (11th Cir. 2024). 	By this standard, “the
defendant cannot contest the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” See id. at 1383-84 (citing Nishimatsu
Constr. Co., v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). “But the same is not
true for legal arguments; those can be challenged as not offering a sufficient basis for the
judgment.” Id. at 1383 (citing Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206). Stated differently, “defendants can
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forfeit the ability to contest the truth of facts asserted, but a default does not give the court powers
beyond those established by law.” See id. Accordingly, the Court will analyze the claims through
this lens.
i. 	Counts I and II – FLSA Minimum Wage and Overtime Violations
To establish a claim for federal FLSA minimum wage or overtime pay, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) defendant employed them; (2) plaintiff’s work and/or defendant’s enterprise
engaged in interstate commerce covered by the FLSA; and (3) plaintiff worked hours for which
defendant did not pay the required minimum wages and/or overtime wages to them. See Eleventh
Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil Cases 4.14 (Sept. 5, 2025); see also Morgan v. Family
Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1277 n.68 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a));
Betancourt v. Buggy Techs. Inc., No. 23-CV-21184, 2024 WL 4635113, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8,
2024), R&R adopted, No. 23-CV-21184, 2024 WL 5038766 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2024) (quoting Ray
v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2022)). “[T]he requirements to
state a claim of a FLSA violation are quite straightforward.” 	Sec’y of Labor v. Labbe, 319 F.
App’x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2008). “The elements that must be shown are simply a failure to pay
overtime compensation and/or minimum wages to covered employees . . .” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C.
§§ 206 and 207). “There is no need to prove intent or causation that might require more extensive
pleading.” 	Id. (citing Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2005)).
Additionally, where a plaintiff’s affidavit provides sufficient evidence to show the amount and
extent of the work performed, and a defendant fails to oppose that information, courts have held
that the affidavit is “sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of the work [the plaintiff]
performed.”. See Michaud v. U.S. Steakhouse Bar & Grill, Inc., No. 04-CV-1371-ORL-UAM,
2007 WL 2572197, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2007).
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As to the first element, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege an employment relationship between
themselves and International. 	Plaintiffs allege they worked as security guards for International
beginning April 1, 2024, after International took over the Miami-Dade County Public Schools
contract. See ECF No. [48] at ¶¶6-8. International hired them as a group, kept them in the same
posts and shifts, issued them uniforms and provided timesheets. See id. at ¶¶8-11. Defendants, by
their default, admit Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations of fact, as set forth in the Amended
Complaint. See Hornady, 118 F.4th at 1383; Betancourt, 2024 WL 4635113, at *5.
Moving onto the second element, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege both individual and
enterprise coverage under the FLSA. 	To be eligible for FLSA claims, “an employee must first
demonstrate that he is ‘covered’ by the FLSA.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.,
662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). 	“There are two possible types of FLSA coverage[:]”
individual and enterprise. Id. (citing e.g., Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054, 1056
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). “An employee is subject to individual coverage if
he is directly and regularly ‘engaged in’ interstate commerce.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting
Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006)). 	“[F]or an employee
to be ‘engaged in commerce’ under the FLSA, he must be directly participating in the actual
movement of persons or things in interstate commerce by . . . regularly using the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce in his work, e.g., regular and recurrent use of interstate telephone,
telegraph, mails, or travel.” Id. at 1315-16 (quoting Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266). “[A]n employee
is subject to enterprise coverage if he is ‘employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce[.]’” See id. at 1298-99 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). An
“enterprise” “is the activities performed by a person or persons who are (1) engaged in ‘related
activities,’ (2) under ‘unified operation or common control,’ and (3) have a ‘common business
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purpose[.]’” Id. (quoting § 203(r)(1)). And commerce means “‘trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place
outside thereof[.]’” Id. (quoting § 203(b)). An enterprise is generally covered if: (i) its employees
engage in interstate commerce or handle goods/materials that moved in interstate commerce, and
(ii) its annual gross sales or business is at least $500,000. 	See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§
203(s)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), 207(a)(1)).
Contrary to Defendant’s argument attacking Plaintiffs’ allegations of individual and
enterprise coverage, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs allege both types of coverage in the
Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs state that their work for Defendants involved receiving trucks that
carried and delivered food originating in other states. See ECF No. [48] at ¶22. Plaintiffs allege
that this work for Defendants “was actually in and/or so closely related to the movement of
commerce . . .” See id. These allegations satisfy the requirement for interstate commerce in both
individual and enterprise coverage. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants employed two
or more employees that handled goods or materials moving in commerce and that annual gross
sales exceeded $500,000 in 2023 and are expected to exceed $500,000 in 2024. See id. at ¶¶23-
25. Taken as true, these paragraphs plausibly allege enterprise coverage. Plaintiffs’ allegations
satisfy both § 203(s)(1)(A) prongs of enterprise coverage through the allegations of handling food
that traveled through interstate commerce and pleading Defendants’ sales revenue for the relevant
time period. 	See Betancourt, 2024 WL 4635113 at *5 (finding enterprise coverage sufficiently
pled where the complaint described the nature of the business and job and provided straightforward
allegations tying the work to interstate commerce and it alleged at least $500,000 in annual
revenue). With these allegations, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint sufficiently
pleads FLSA coverage.
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Turning to the last element, Plaintiffs must sufficiently allege International failed to pay
overtime compensation and minimum wages. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil
Cases 4.14 (Sept. 5, 2025); Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1277. Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an employer
that violates the FLSA is liable for an employee’s unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime,
plus an equal amount in liquidated damages. 	See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). 	Under 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiffs are only entitled to the statutory minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for
regular hours worked; it does not authorize recovery of unpaid regular wages above the statutory
minimum if the employee’s regular rate exceeded the federal minimum wage. 	See Pastrana v.
Level Up Fitness, LLC, No. 21-CV-21985, 2021 WL 5631776, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2021)
(citing Bolick v. Brevard Cnty Sheriff’s Dep’t., 937 F. Supp. 1560, 1568 (M.D. Fla. 1996)); 29
U.S.C. § 216(b). By contrast, the FLSA overtime statute “mandates ‘that an employee . . . must
be paid a wage of time and a half his regular rate for each hour that he works in excess of forty
hours per week.’” Guevara v. Lafise Corp., 127 F.4th 824, 829 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Collar
v. Abalux, Inc., 895 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).
Starting with Count I (FLSA unpaid minimum wage claim), in the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege they are “owed unpaid salaries under the agreed rate of $14.00 per hour, in the
alternative unpaid salaries at the Florida4 Minimum wage and overtime.” 	See ECF No. [48] at
¶34. 	Plaintiffs allege that they regularly worked more than forty hours per week without being
paid either the statutory minimum wage for all hours worked or the required time-and-a-half
premium for hours over forty. See id. at ¶¶15, 20, 32, 39. They further allege specific regular and
overtime hours worked, identify an agreed-upon regular rate (which will be applied at a time-and-
4 Although the Amended Complaint refers to “Florida Minium wage and overtime,” it does not bring a
claim under the Florida minimum wage statute. It only brings an unpaid minimum wage claim under the
FLSA.
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a-half rate to overtime hours),5 and assert that International failed to pay those wages when due,
instead making only partial, lump-sum payments that did not fully compensate their work. See id.
at ¶¶39, 41–50. 	Taken as true, these allegations state a claim that International failed to pay at
least the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for all hours worked, as required by 29 U.S.C.
§§ 206, 216(b). 	See Pastrana, 2021 WL 5631776, at *3 (explaining that the FLSA minimum-
wage remedy is limited to the unpaid statutory minimum).
Having met all three elements of a FLSA claim for unpaid minimum wages (Count I), the
Moving Plaintiffs have stated a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Cotton v. Mass.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “a defaulted defendant is
deemed to admit the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact.”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Surtain,
789 F.3d at 1245; Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1370 n.41. 	As a result, the Moving Plaintiffs are
entitled to final default judgment on Count I.6 See Chanel, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d at 1259; Surtain,
5 All calculations for the Moving Plaintiffs allege a $14.00 rate, except Francis and Gabriel whose
calculations use a higher hourly rate. See ECF No. [48] at 5, 6. Since Francis and Gabriel’s individual
calculations are inconsistent with the Amended Complaint’s other regular rate allegations, the Court should
apply the $14 per hour rate when computing the amount of overtime owed. Indeed, Plaintiffs repeatedly
allege that the “agreed-upon” rate between Plaintiffs and Defendants was $14 per hour, so International is
deemed to have admitted that it agreed to pay Plaintiffs this rate. See ECF No. [48] at ¶14 (“the agreed-
upon rate of $14.00 per hour”); ¶34 (“Plaintiffs are owed unpaid salaries under the agreed rate of $14.00
per hour”); ¶52 (“Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed to a $14.00 per hour compensation, which was the same
compensation paid by the prior contractor.”). Nowhere in the Amended Complaint do Francis or Gabriel
allege that International agreed to pay them at a higher hourly rate; they instead inconsistently include a
different number for their hourly rate in their calculations. Although it is unclear to the Court why Francis
and Gabriel used a rate contrary to the “agreed-upon” one in their calculations, given International’s
admission, through its default, that it agreed to pay them $14 per hour, the Court should use that number.
6 International also argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment should be denied because Plaintiffs’
counsel did not comply with the conferral requirement in Local Rule 7.1(a)(3). Although a motion for
default judgment is not listed among the express exceptions in Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), that omission reflects
the practical reality that, in the default-judgment context, there is typically no opposing counsel with whom
to confer. At the time Plaintiffs had filed their Motion for Default Judgment, Defendants had failed to
defend or respond, and it would have served no purpose to require Plaintiffs to “confer” with an adversary
who has declined to defend the litigation. The absence of a pre-filing conference under these circumstances
is therefore not a basis to deny default judgment.
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789 F.3d at 1245.
As to Count II (FLSA unpaid overtime wages), all Moving Plaintiffs except Westbrooks,
Isidore, and Atis claim they worked overtime hours in their individual calculations. See ECF No.
[48] at ¶¶41-45, 47-49. Indeed, the Amended Complaint alleges that “[d]uring the [e]mployment,
Plaintiffs worked [] overtime as described in the individual claims below,” see ECF No. [48] at
¶34 (emphasis added), 	and a review of the individual claims for Westbrooks, Isidore, and Atis
reveals that they did not work any overtime hours, see ECF No. [48] at 6-7. Since Westbrooks,
Isidore, and Atis are the only Moving Plaintiffs that do not allege they have worked any overtime
hours, the Court should deny default judgment on Count II only as to Westbrooks, Isidore, and
Atis.
By contrast, all other Moving Plaintiffs (St. Charles, Francis, Gabriel, Washington, and
Jennings) claim that they worked unpaid overtime hours and that International failed to pay one-
and-one-half times Plaintiffs’ regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty per week, as required
by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).7 See Guevara, 127 F.4th at 829 (explaining that the FLSA “mandates
that an employee . . . must be paid a wage of time and a half his regular rate for each hour that he
works in excess of forty hours per week” (quotation marks omitted)). They have, therefore,
International further notes, in passing, that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment was filed a few days
late. While the better practice would have been for Plaintiffs to seek an extension of time, it would be
inequitable to deny them recovery of earned wages on that ground alone, particularly where International
was already in default, has identified no prejudice arising from the brief delay, and the Court had not
dismissed the case before the Motion for Default Judgment was filed. The Court should, therefore, accept
the belated filing and address the motion on its merits.
7 In the Motion for Default Judgment, the calculation for St. Charles’s unpaid wages states a higher rate
than alleged in the Amended Complaint. Compare ECF No. [72] at 3 with ECF No. [48] at 5. Because a
“default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings[,]”
the Court should not award a higher rate than what Plaintiffs alleged in the Amended Complaint. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(c). Accordingly, the Court should apply the $14.00 rate to St. Charles’s calculations.
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satisfied all three elements for a FLSA claim for overtime wages (Count II)8. See Cotton, 402 F.3d
at 1278; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245; Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1370 n.41. As
a result, St. Charles, Francis, Gabriel, Washington, and Jennings are entitled to final default
judgment in their favor on Count II. See Chanel, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d at 1259; Surtain, 789 F.3d
at 1245.
Accordingly, I RECOMMEND that final default judgment as to Count I be GRANTED
in favor of the Moving Plaintiffs and against International and that final default judgment as to
Count II be GRANTED in favor of St. Charles, Francis, Gabriel, Washington, and Jennings and
against International but DENIED to Westbrooks, Isidore, and Atis.
1. 	Unpaid Minimum Wage and Overtime Damages Under the
FLSA
After determining that the Moving Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations have established
International’s liability under the FLSA, the Court must next determine “the amount and character
of damages to be awarded.’” See Pastrana, 2021 WL 5631776, at *3 (citing Miller, 75 F. Supp.
2d at 1346). “Damages may be awarded on default without an evidentiary hearing if the record
adequately reflects the basis for the award via ‘a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing
the necessary facts.’” See id. (quoting Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan,
777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985); United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th
8 Although “a defaulted defendant admits well-pleaded allegations of liability, allegations relating to the
amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default. Rather, the Court determines the amount and
character of damages to be awarded.” Pastrana, 2021 WL 5631776, at *3 (citing Miller v. Paradise of Port
Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999)). Plaintiffs’ individual damages calculations do
not themselves determine damages, nor could they as they do not correctly apply the FLSA’s remedial
framework: they calculate unpaid wages at the $14 contract rate rather than at the statutory rate of $7.25
per hour, and they do not allege when Defendants’ partial payments were made or how those payments
apply to particular pay periods and overtime hours. However, those pleading-level discrepancies affect
only the calculation of damages and any corresponding liquidated damages, not the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’
liability allegations that International failed to pay them the minimum wage and overtime as required by
the FLSA.
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Cir. 1979)); see also SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2005). “In other words, a
court may award damages ‘as long as the record contains evidence allowing the court to ascertain
damages from mathematical calculations and detailed affidavits.’” 	Id. (quoting Holtz v. Bagel
Mkt., Inc., No. 12-CV-62040, 2013 WL 12141515, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2013); Adolph Coors,
777 F.2d at 1543–44)) (internal quotations omitted).
At present, the Amended Complaint and the Moving Plaintiffs’ declarations give the Court
enough information to decide liability and to understand, in broad strokes, the nature of the claimed
underpayments, but they do not yet supply the “detailed affidavits” and timing information needed
to reduce the FLSA damages to reliable figures. Plaintiffs’ individual damages tables have two
major problems: (1) they are framed at the $14.00 contractual rate, rather than at the statutory
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for the FLSA minimum wage claim; and (2) they do not allege
when Defendants’ partial payments were made or how those payments correspond to particular
pay periods and overtime hours. 	Those discrepancies affect the computation of unpaid FLSA
wages, any corresponding liquidated damages (further discussed below), and the separation
between contract-rate damages (also further discussed below) and statutory damages, but they do
not undermine the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ FLSA liability allegations. As to the first problem, to
the extent the Moving Plaintiffs seek the agreed-upon rate of $14.00 per hour for their regular
(non-overtime) hours, that relief is not available under the FLSA’s minimum-wage provision and
must instead be analyzed, if at all, under their breach-of-contract claim in Count III.9 Under Count
I for unpaid FLSA minimum wages, Plaintiffs are only entitled to unpaid minimum wages at a rate
9 Plaintiffs may not “double dip” by recovering both breach-of-contract damages and FLSA minimum-wage
damages for the same regular hours. As further discussed below, any recovery for regular wages must be
awarded once, under the appropriate theory, and any FLSA award must be limited to true minimum-wage
shortfalls and overtime premiums not already compensated.
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of $7.25 per hour.
Turning to the second problem, to calculate damages for the unpaid wage claims, the timing
of Defendants’ partial payments is critical because the FLSA requires that minimum wage and
overtime be paid “on time” each pay period, and late payments can still give rise to liability and
liquidated damages even if the total amount eventually paid exceeds the statutory minimum. See
Martin v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 611, 617–18 (2014) (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil,
324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945)). As the Supreme Court explained, Congress recognized that the “failure
to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum
standard of living ‘necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers’ and to the
free flow of commerce, that double payment must be made in the event of delay in order to insure
restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well being.” Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S.
at 707. Consistent with this “on time” mandate, courts have held that a FLSA claim accrues, and
a violation occurs, when the employer fails to pay the employee on the regular payday for the work
in question. 	See, e.g., Martin, 117 Fed. Cl. at 617–18 (collecting cases); Olson v. Superior
Pontiac–GMC, Inc., 765 F.2d 1570, 1579 (11th Cir. 1985), modified, 776 F.2d 265 (11th Cir.
1985) (“The employee must actually receive the minimum wage each pay period.”). Thus, even
where a lump-sum payment ultimately appears to exceed the aggregate statutory minimum and
overtime, the Court must still know when that payment was made and how it relates to the pay
periods at issue to determine: (1) whether there were weeks in which Plaintiffs were not timely
paid the required minimum wage and overtime, and (2) the proper base for liquidated damages
under § 216(b).
This is particularly relevant here because Westbrooks, Isidore, Washington, and Jennings’
alleged unpaid wages appear, on their face, to be exceeded by Defendants’ lump-sum partial
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payment:
Minimum Wages
Earned at
$7.25/hour
Overtime Wages
Earned at
$21.00/hour
Total Wages
Earned
Defendant’s
Partial
Payment
Total
Unpaid
Wages
Westbrooks 	600 hours:
$4,350.00
0 hours
$4,350.00 	-$7,532.00 	$0
Isidore 	112 hours:
$812.00
0 hours
$812.00 	-$1,370.00 	$0
Washington 	520 hours:
$3,770.00
8.6 hours:
$180.60 	$3,950.60 	-$5,600.05 	$0
Jennings 	600 hours:
$4,350.00
25 hours:
$525.00 	$4,875.00 	-$5,363.30 	$0
See ECF No. [48] at ¶¶43-44,48, 50 (for alleged hours worked); ECF No. [72] at ¶¶11-12, 14, 17
(for Defendants’ total payments).
This partial payment, however, does not by itself resolve FLSA liability because an FLSA
claim accrues, and a violation occurs, when the employer fails to pay the employee on the regular
payday for the work in question, and late payment does not prevent liability for liquidated damages
and attorneys’ fees. 	Accordingly, the Court should ORDER the Moving Plaintiffs to file
supplemental affidavits detailing, to the extent they have this information: (1) the pay periods in
which they earned their regular and overtime wages; (2) the dates, amounts, and pay periods to
which Defendants’ partial payments were applied; and (3) any designation by Defendants (e.g., in
paystubs or communications) as to whether those payments were intended to cover regular time,
overtime, or both.
2. 	Liquidated Damages Under the FLSA
All Plaintiffs entitled to default judgment on Count I or Count II are entitled to liquidated
damages in an amount equal to the totals above as International admitted its violation of the FLSA
was willful. 	See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 	Once a violation is established, and willfulness is found,
liquidated damages are generally required. See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1282 (explaining that a jury’s
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finding that the employer acted willfully precludes the court from concluding that the employer
acted in good faith when it decides the liquidated damages question.) 	On this record,
International’s default operates as an admission that any FLSA violations were willful, and the
Moving Plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to liquidated damages on whatever sum is ultimately
determined to be “unpaid” FLSA wages. See Pastrana, 2021 WL 5631776 at *3.
The remaining question is not whether liquidated damages are available, but on what base
amount they should be calculated. Again, liquidated damages, like unpaid FLSA wage damages,
are dependent upon the timing of Defendants’ partial payments for the same reasons stated above.
The allocation of Defendants’ partial payments is also important to prevent FLSA liquidated
damages from being applied to breach-of-contract damages above the statutory floor. 	FLSA
liquidated damages apply only to true FLSA shortfalls (minimum wage and overtime), not to
unpaid straight-time wages above the statutory floor. 	See Pastrana, 2021 WL 5631776, at *3
(explaining that minimum-wage remedy is limited to unpaid statutory minimum). This is because
the FLSA does not authorize recovery of unpaid regular wages above the statutory minimum if the
employee’s regular rate exceeded the federal minimum wage. See id. (citing Bolick, 937 F. Supp.
at 1568); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Additionally, any breach of contract damages are not entitled to liquidated damages. The
“additional equal amount as liquidated damages” is a remedy created by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and
applies only to violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. 	By contrast,
state law governs damages for breach of contract and such damages are generally limited to
expectation damages — i.e., the unpaid contract wages (plus prejudgment interest) — unless the
parties’ agreement itself contains a valid liquidated-damages clause. 	See Glanzrock v. Patriot
Roofing Indus., Inc., No. 07-CV-535, 2009 WL 179634, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2009)
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(“liquidated damages are only available under the FLSA, not under state law for breach of
contract.”) (citing Allen v. Shayona Enters. Am., Inc., No. 06–CV–1441, 2007 WL 1626199, at *4
n.3 (M.D. Fla. 2007)); Moore v. Pooches of Largo, Inc., No. 20-CV-2184, 2021 WL 12301311, at
*5 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2021) (same). 	Florida law defines liquidated damages as “specific and
precise sums of money immediately apparent from the express terms of the contract itself, or
determinable therefrom by mathematical calculation, or fixed by a specific rule of law.” Watson
v. Internet Billing Co., Ltd., 882 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Hill v. Murphy, 872
So. 2d 919, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)) (“Damages are liquidated when they can be determined by
mathematical calculation or the application of definite rules of law.”); Bowman v. Kingsland Dev.
Inc., 432 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (“Damages are liquidated when the proper amount
to be awarded can be determined with exactness from the cause of action as pleaded, i.e., from a
pleaded agreement between the parties, by an arithmetical calculation or by application of definite
rules of law.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Controltec Inc., 561 So. 2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. 5th DCA
1990) (“In a contractual setting, liquidated damages exist when a specific sum of money has been
expressly stipulated or agreed to by the parties for recovery by either party following a breach of
the contract by the other.”). Plaintiffs are therefore not entitled to an “additional equal amount” of
liquidated damages on any portion of an unpaid regular wage claim that is recoverable only as
contractual damages at the $14 rate.
Based on the current record, the Court cannot compute: (1) the net unpaid minimum wage
and overtime amounts after crediting timely and late payments, (2) the corresponding liquidated
damages under § 216(b), or (3) the residual contract-only shortfall at the $14 rate, while avoiding
double recovery. For this additional reason, the Court should require Plaintiffs to supplement the
record with affidavits that provide the information detailed above in Section B.i.1, supra.
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In 	addition, 	the 	Court 	should 	ORDER 	the 	Moving 	Plaintiffs 	to 	submit 	a 	short
memorandum explaining their proposed allocation of International’s partial payments between
FLSA minimum and overtime wages and their contract claims, and clarifying their election of
remedies for regular (non-overtime) hours (further discussed below), so that the Court can (a)
calculate 	unpaid 	FLSA 	wages 	and 	corresponding 	liquidated 	damages 	by 	mathematical
computation and (b) segregate any remaining underpayment at the contract rate into a single, non-
duplicative contract damages award.
3. 	Attorney’s Fees and Costs Under the FLSA
Lastly, the Moving Plaintiffs seek to recover their attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the
FLSA. See ECF No. [72] at ¶8; ECF No. [48] at 3, 4, 7-8. The FLSA requires courts to award
reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Kreager v. Solomon
& Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Section 216(b) of the Act makes fee
awards mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs.”) “The determination of a reasonable fee pursuant to
section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and
will not be set aside absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Vasconcelo v. Miami Auto Max, Inc., 981
F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kreager, 775 F.2d at 1543). Courts calculate fees using
the lodestar method, which means determining a reasonable hourly rate and multiplying it by the
number of hours reasonably expended, based on evidence supporting the hours worked and the
rates claimed. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992); Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994); Harbaugh v.
Greslin, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Bouchouk v. Econ. Food Store, Inc., No.
20-CV-20982, 2020 WL 8262409, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2020), R&R adopted, No. 20-CV-
20982, 2021 WL 243688 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2021). If the documentation of hours is inadequate,
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the district court may reduce the award, and it must explain its reasoning and show its calculation
to permit meaningful review. 	See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Cty. of
Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988).
In applying the lodestar, courts must ensure the fee is reasonable and consistent with
Eleventh Circuit guidance, avoiding both excessive and inadequate awards. See Norman, 836 F.2d
at 1299–1302; ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999). District courts have
substantial discretion to determine whether to award fees and to adjust the lodestar to an
appropriate amount in light of their superior understanding of the litigation. See Cullens v. Ga.
Dep’t of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1994); Columbus Mills, Inc. v. Freeland, 918
F.2d 1575, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990).
The first step is to determine a reasonable hourly rate, defined as “‘the prevailing market
rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skills, experience and reputation.’” 	Bouchouk, 2020 WL 8262409 at *4 (quoting Loranger, 10
F.3d at 781; Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299). 	“The relevant market is ‘the place where the case is
filed.’” Id. (quoting ACLU, 168 F.3d at 427). The fee applicant bears the burden of submitting
satisfactory evidence that the requested rate matches prevailing market rates, including evidence
of rates actually billed and paid in similar cases. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. At the same time,
the court is an expert on fees in its community and may rely on its own knowledge and experience
to form an independent judgment on a reasonable rate. 	See Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781 (quoting
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303). The second step of the lodestar analysis is to determine the reasonable
number of hours expended and to exclude time “‘that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and
therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation, or experience of counsel.’”
Bouchouk, 2020 WL 8262409 at *6 (quoting ACLU, 168 F.3d at 428; Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301).
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The fee applicant must show that the time claimed was reasonably expended with specific, detailed
evidence. See id. As an expert on litigation time, the court may rely on its own judgment, see id.
(citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303), and may award fees based solely on affidavits in the record,
see id. (citing Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Coniglio, 629 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Here, Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $400 for their counsel, Claudio R. Cedrez. 	In his
declaration, Mr. Cedrez attests that his “general billing rate is $400.00 per hour, which is consistent
with or below rates charged by other attorneys with [his] experience as a practicing attorney in
federal court litigation.” See ECF No. [72-1] at ¶¶9, 11. Although the affidavit does not specify
his years of practice, the Florida Bar’s records reflect that he was admitted in 2007, giving him
approximately 18 years of experience, and the Court may consider this public information in
evaluating the reasonableness of his rate. 	Further, the Court is familiar with prevailing rates in
FLSA cases in South Florida. 	This case is a straightforward FLSA matter, resolved without
discovery or trial on default judgment, but it involves multiple Plaintiffs and several rounds of
pleading and motion practice. and wage-and-hour litigation in this District. Given Mr. Cedrez’s
years of experience and the undersigned’s recent approval of rates in the $400–$450 range in other
similar recent FLSA matters, the Court finds that an hourly rate of $400 is reasonable and
consistent with prevailing market rates in this District.
As to the second step, Mr. Cedrez’s declaration provides a task-based breakdown of the
work performed and the hours requested. 	He lists time for initial consultations with the ten
plaintiffs, research to locate Defendants and research on FLSA issues, drafting the original and
Amended Complaint, preparing motions for entry of clerk’s default, default judgment, and final
judgment, and preparing declarations of Plaintiffs and counsel, along with a motion for leave to
amend. See ECF No. ECF No. [72-1] at ¶7. The total requested time is 22.0 hours, for which he
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seeks $8,800.00 in fees at $400 per hour. See id. at ¶¶7, 10. The declaration also notes that counsel
did not bill for “several other activities,” such as frequent phone contact with multiple clients. See
id. at ¶¶6, 7. On this record, the hours claimed are adequately described, are not block-billed, and
are customary for pre-suit investigation, complaint drafting, amending pleadings, drafting
dispositive motions in a default context, and preparation of ten client declarations in a multi-
plaintiff FLSA action. There is no indication of excessive duplication or unnecessary work, and
International’s Response does not challenge the reasonableness of the time. 	Independently
reviewing the affidavit and the docket, the 22.0 hours requested were reasonably expended in
prosecuting this action and require no reduction. See ACLU, 168 F.3d at 428; Norman, 836 F.2d
at 1303.
Multiplying the reasonable hourly rate of $400 by the 22.0 reasonable hours results in a
lodestar of $8,800.00 in attorneys’ fees. In addition, Mr. Cedrez attests that he advanced $350.00
in filing fees and $804.00 for service of process, for a total of $1,154.00 in costs, which are
adequately documented and recoverable under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See ECF No. ECF No. [72-1]
at ¶5. On the record in this matter, there is no basis to adjust the lodestar upward or downward.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of $8,800.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,154.00 in
costs, for a total of $9,954.00 in fees and costs
ii. Count III – Breach of Contract
“For a breach of contract claim, Florida law requires the plaintiff to plead and establish:
(1) the existence of a contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; and (3) damages resulting
from the breach.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009); see also
Isaac Indus., Inc. v. Petroquimica de Venezuela, S.A., 676 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1232 (S.D. Fla. 2023);
Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 985 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 	Plaintiffs allege that
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“Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed to a $14.00 per hour compensation . . . Plaintiffs commenced
work and performed under the agreement. Defendants have failed to pay the wages at the agree-
upon rate and the overtime at time and one-half.”10 	See ECF No. [48] at ¶¶52-54. 	These
allegations sufficiently show the existence of a contract for employment at a rate of $14.00 per
hour, International’s material breach for failing to pay Plaintiffs at that rate, and Plaintiffs’
damages by not receiving compensation.
Having met all three elements of a breach-of-contract claim, the Moving Plaintiffs have
stated a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Surtain, 789 F.3d
at 1245; Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1370 n.41. As a result, the Moving Plaintiffs are entitled to final
default judgment on Count III. See Chanel, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d at 1259; Surtain, 789 F.3d at
1245. Accordingly, I RECOMMEND that final default judgment as to Count III be GRANTED
in favor of the Moving Plaintiffs and against International.
As explained in Section B.i.2, supra, Plaintiffs have pursued two alternative theories for
their regular (non-overtime) hours: (1) FLSA minimum-wage violations under 29 U.S.C. §§ 206,
216(b), and (2) breach of contract for failure to pay the agreed-upon $14.00 hourly rate. Those
theories are legally coexistent but incompatible as to the same regular hours to the extent they
would produce duplicative recovery. 	Under Florida’s doctrine of election of remedies, a party
“electing one course of action should not later be allowed to avail himself of an incompatible
course.” Wynfield Inns v. Edward LeRoux Grp., Inc., 896 F.2d 483, 488 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting
10 Although Plaintiffs refer to the “overtime at time and one-half” in their breach of contract claim, Plaintiffs
fail to specify that this overtime rate was a term of the agreement, but merely allege that Defendants’ failed
to pay the overtime rate as well as the “agreed-upon rate.” See ECF No. [48] at ¶¶52, 54. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to plead the contract included the statutory overtime rate. And “[b]ecause the
defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well pleaded or to admit conclusions of law,” the Court
lacks the required factual allegations to grant final default judgment on the breach of contract claim in
Count III as it relates to unpaid overtime damages.
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Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Fla. 1987)). The doctrine “operates on the theory”
that when a party chooses between inconsistent remedies “with knowledge of all the pertinent
facts, he binds himself to the course he adopts first and cannot later withdraw from this knowing
election.” See id. (quoting Barbe, 505 So. 2d at 1334) (internal quotations omitted). Its purpose
is to prevent duplicative recovery for the same wrong by requiring a party to elect between “legally
coexistent and inconsistent remedies.” See id. (citing Barbe, 505 So. 2d at 1332–33); see also In
re Alchar Hardware Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1985).
Federal procedure permits Plaintiffs to plead alternative and even inconsistent theories at
the outset of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)–(3); Allstate Ins. Co. v. James, 779 F.2d 1536,
1540 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Litigants in federal court may pursue alternative theories of recovery,
regardless of their consistency.”). 	“A party may plead alternative and inconsistent facts and
remedies against several parties without being barred by the election of remedies doctrine. The
pleading will not amount to an election unless a choice is made with the full and clear
understanding of the problem, facts and remedies essential to the exercise of an intelligent choice.”
Id. at 1541. Thus, there is no bar to Plaintiffs having alleged both FLSA minimum wage claims
and a contract claim for the higher $14 rate in a single action.
Election becomes necessary, however, at the remedies stage. 	“Generally, an election
between inconsistent remedies is made after a verdict is entered but prior to the entry of judgment.”
Wynfield, 896 F.2d at 488 (citing Barbe, 505 So. 2d at 1333); see also Allstate, 779 F.2d at 1540–
41; Magee v. Maesbury Homes, Inc., No. 11–cv–209–Orl–19DAB, 2011 WL 1457173, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2011). The same principle applies here. As a result of its default, International
admits the well-pleaded factual allegations of liability on both the FLSA minimum-wage claim
and the breach-of-contract claim for regular wages, but “allegations relating to the amount of
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damages are not admitted by virtue of default,” and the Court must ensure that “there is a
substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the particular relief sought.” Pastrana, 2021 WL
5631776, at *3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) further provides that a default judgment
“must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings,” and the
Court has an independent obligation to prevent double recovery of the same unpaid wages under
overlapping legal theories. See Wynfield, 896 F.2d at 488.
Because the FLSA provides a remedy only for unpaid statutory minimum wages and
unpaid overtime compensation, while the contract claim seeks the higher agreed-upon $14 rate for
the same regular (non-overtime) hours, Plaintiffs cannot recover both FLSA minimum-wage
damages and contract-rate damages for those regular hours. They may obtain one full recovery of
their regular wages — either at the statutory minimum under the FLSA (with an equal amount as
liquidated damages), or at the contractual $14 rate under state law — but not both for the same
work. To implement the election-of-remedies doctrine and to comply with Rule 54(c), the Court
will therefore require the Moving Plaintiffs, all of whom have viable claims for both FLSA
minimum-wage shortfalls and contract-rate shortfalls on the same regular hours, to file a notice
electing whether they seek their regular-hour recovery under the FLSA or under the breach of
contract claim. Once that election is made, the Court will calculate damages accordingly to ensure
a single, non-duplicative recovery consistent with Florida law and the federal default-judgment
framework. 	Accordingly, the Court should ORDER the Moving Plaintiffs to include in their
supplemental affidavits a statement electing recovery under either the breach-of-contract claim
(Count III) or the FLSA minimum-wage claim (Count I).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that:
1. 	The Moving Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment against International,
ECF No. [78], be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
2. 	A Final Default Judgment BE ENTERED as to Count I in favor of all Moving Plaintiffs
and against International;11
3. 	A Final Default Judgment BE ENTERED as to Count II in favor of St. Charles, Francis,
Gabriel, Washington, and Jennings and against International; and DENIED to Westbrooks,
Isidore, and Atis;12
4. 	A Final Default Judgment BE ENTERED as to Count III in favor of all Moving Plaintiffs
and against International;13
5. 	The Court should take UNDER ADVISEMENT the entry of judgment awarding a specific
sum of damages until after the Moving Plaintiffs provide the supplemental information
recommended below:
a) 	Within ten days of the Court’s Order on the Motion for Default Judgment, the Court
should ORDER the Moving Plaintiffs to file a notice of election of remedies
between Count I and Count III in supplemental affidavits;
b) 	Within ten days of the Court’s Order on the Motion for Default Judgment, the Court
should ORDER the Moving Plaintiffs to file supplemental affidavits detailing, to
11 The applicable rate for all Moving Plaintiffs’ unpaid regular hours is $7.25 for Count I.
12 The applicable rate for St. Charles, Francis, Gabriel, Washington, and Jennings’s unpaid overtime hours
is $21.00 for Count II.
13 The applicable rate for all Moving Plaintiffs’ unpaid regular hours is $14.00 for Count III.
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the extent they have the information available: (1) the pay periods in which they
earned their regular and overtime wages; (2) the dates, amounts, and pay periods to
which Defendants’ partial payments were applied; and (3) any designation by
Defendants (e.g., in paystubs or communications) as to whether those payments
were intended to cover regular time, overtime, or both; and
c) 	Within ten days of the Court’s Order on the Motion for Default Judgment, the Court
should ORDER the Moving Plaintiffs to file a short memorandum explaining the
legal basis for their proposed allocation of Defendants’ partial payment as: (1)
either on time with regularly scheduled payment or unreasonably delayed; and (2)
being applied first to the contract claim for regular wages or the FLSA claim for
overtime wages. 	This memorandum should include how that allocation avoids
double recovery while honoring the FLSA’s requirement that “unpaid” wages be
calculated as the difference between what the statute requires and what the
employer actually paid;
d) 	If the Moving Plaintiffs elect to proceed with damages under the FLSA, the Court
should AWARD Plaintiffs $8,800.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,154.00 in costs, for
a total of $9,954.00 in fees and costs.
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties will have fourteen (14) days from the
date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written
objections, if any, with the Honorable K. Michael Moore, United States District Judge. Failure to
timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of
an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to
factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if
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necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149
(1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on December 3, 2025.
____________________________________
MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: All Counsel of Record
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