Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-23977-CIV-ALTONAGA/SANCHEZ
YASENIA TERESITA JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_______________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON REVIEW OF COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
The Plaintiff, Yasenia Teresita Jimenez (“Jimenez” or “Plaintiff”), brought this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for disability benefits.2 The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 16, 22; see also ECF No. 24. After
careful consideration of the administrative record, the parties’ filings, and the applicable law, and
the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY
RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 22,
be GRANTED, that Jimenez’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16, be DENIED, and
that the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
1 Frank Bisignano was appointed Commissioner for the Social Security Administration on May 6,
2025, and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) is automatically substituted as the
defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 The Honorable Cecilia M. Altonaga, Chief United States District Judge, referred the Complaint
to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 12.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
This is the second time this case has been before this Court. 	Jimenez initially filed
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on January 12,
2020, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2018. Tr. 497-511.3 A hearing was held on
February 10, 2022, Tr. 95-129, and on February 23, 2022, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Clara H. Aranda issued a decision finding that the Plaintiff was not disabled, Tr. 192-211. Jimenez
requested review of the ALJ’s decision, and on May 12, 2022, the Appeals Council remanded
Jimenez’s case to an ALJ with instructions. Tr. 212-16. ALJ Aranda held an additional hearing
on November 15, 2022, Tr. 61-94, and issued another unfavorable decision on December 15, 2022.
Tr. 23-47. Jimenez appealed the December 2022 decision to the Appeals Council, which denied
her request for review on March 20, 2023. Tr. 1-6.
Jimenez then petitioned this Court for review of the December 2022 decision. See Jimenez
v. Kijakazi, Case No. 23-cv-21614-LOUIS; Tr. 1630-42. On August 15, 2023, the District Court
remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings and the issuance of a new decision
after the Commissioner voluntarily moved for remand. Tr. 1643-49.
ALJ Lornette Reynolds thereafter held a new hearing on June 20, 2024. 	Tr. 1563-94.
Jimenez was represented by counsel and testified at the hearing, as did a vocational expert (“VE”).
Id. On August 16, 2024, the ALJ issued a new decision which again found that Jimenez did not
have a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. 	Tr. 1532-62. 	Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), Jimenez now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s August 16, 2024 decision and
asks this Court to remand the case for a new hearing before a different ALJ and a new decision.
ECF No. 16 at 14.
3 Citations to the transcript of proceedings before the Social Security Administration, filed at ECF
No. 5, are to “Tr. [page #].”
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II. 	THE ALJ’S DECISION
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). In
that sequential process, the ALJ must evaluate whether a claimant:
(1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe physical or
mental impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals a listed
impairment and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform her past relevant
work, in light of her residual functional capacity (RFC); and (5) can make an
adjustment to other work, in light of her RFC, age, education, and work experience,
that is available in the national economy.
See Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021); see also, e.g.,
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4).
In this case, the ALJ made the following findings. At step one, she concluded that Jimenez
had engaged in substantial gainful activity during the second quarter of 2020, but that “there ha[d]
been a continuous 12-month period[] during which [Jimenez] did not engage in substantial gainful
activity.” Tr. 1538.
At step two, the ALJ found that Jimenez had “the following severe impairments: bronchial
asthma; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); degenerative disc disease; depressive
disorder; and generalized anxiety disorder.” Id. The ALJ also found that Jimenez’s “substance
abuse disorder is non-severe.” Tr. 1539.
At step three, the ALJ found that Jimenez did not “have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments” found in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id.
Next, the ALJ found that Jimenez had the residual functional capacity “to perform light
work” except that:
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[Jimenez] can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. [Jimenez] can occasionally stoop. She can frequently balance. She can
occasionally kneel, crouch, and crawl. 	[Jimenez] should avoid concentrated
exposure to fumes, odors, gases, and poor ventilation. 	She should avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme cold, hazards, unprotected heights (does not
include operation of motor vehicle), and concentrated exposure to vibrations.
[Jimenez] can understand, remember, and carryout simple instructions or tasks.
She can frequently use judgments to make simple work-related decisions. She can
maintain concentration, persistence, and pace for 2-hour periods at a time and for
8-hours in a workday on simple tasks and instructions. 	[Jimenez] can deal with
occasional changes in a work setting without special supervision in both simple
instructions and tasks. She can have frequent interaction with supervisors and co-
workers, but only occasional interaction with the public on routine matters.
[Jimenez] must be able to work at a flexible pace, defined as a work environment
that is free from fast paced production work or fixed timed hourly units during the
work shift, but the employer can set end of the workday productivity goals. She
can stay on task 95% of the workday.
Tr. 1541-42.
At step four, the ALJ found that Jimenez had “no past relevant work.” Tr. 1548.
At step five, the ALJ found that, given Jimenez’s “age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [she] can perform.” Tr. 1549. In making that determination, the ALJ relied on the
VE’s testimony, including testimony that Jimenez would be able to perform the requirements of
the following representative occupations: (1) “Mail Clerk” (DOT 209.687-026), (2) “Merchandise
Marker” (DOT 209.587-034), and (3) “Hotel Housekeeper” (DOT 323.687-014), all of which had
a Specific Vocational Preparation rating of 2. Tr. 1549.
As a result of the foregoing findings, the ALJ found that Jimenez is not disabled. Tr. 1549-
50.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
In a social security appeal, review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether substantial
evidence supports the decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied. 	See
Buckwalter, 5 F.4th at 1320; Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir.
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2011). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Buckwalter, 5 F.4th at 1320 (quoting
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). A reviewing court “will
affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the
preponderance of the evidence weighs against it.” Id. Under this limited review, a court may not
“decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations, or re-weigh the evidence.” 	Pupo v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 17 F.4th 1054, 1060 (11th Cir. 2021); see also, e.g., Ingram v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,
1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
A reviewing court will, however, “review de novo the legal principles applied by the
Commissioner in social security appeals.” Pupo, 17 F.4th 1054 at 1060; see also, e.g., Ingram,
496 F.3d at 1260 (“[W]e review de novo the Commissioner’s conclusions of law.”). Indeed, an
ALJ’s “failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning
for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” 	Ingram,
496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)).
At the conclusion of its review, the Court has the authority to enter a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the ALJ, with or without remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Perez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 06-CV-1648, 2008 WL 191036, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2008).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
In her appeal, Jimenez argues the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to adequately
consider the required factors of consistency and supportability when assessing the psychological
medical opinion of Dr. Cristian Del Rio, Psy.D. ECF No. 16 at 5-7.
Under the post-2017 revised regulations, an ALJ does “not defer or give any specific
evidentiary weight to any medical opinion or prior administrative finding” but must instead
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“determine the persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings by
considering five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) the provider’s ‘[r]elationship with
the claimant’; (4) specialization; and (5) ‘other factors.’” LeCroy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-
11883, 2024 WL 1249165, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2024) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-
(5)). Among these five factors, supportability and consistency are the “most important” factors to
consider, and the ALJ must consider them when evaluating medical expert testimony. 	LeCroy,
2024 WL 1249165, at *1.
For supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). For consistency, “the
more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the
medical 	opinion(s) 	or 	prior 	administrative 	medical 	finding(s) 	will 	be.” 	20 	C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). 	In other words, while “supportability” asks the ALJ to
analyze “the extent to which a medical source has articulated support for the medical source’s own
opinion,” “consistency” refers to “the relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other
evidence within the record.” 	Rodriguez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-cv-1674, 2022 WL
807443, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2)).
“[T]he ALJ need not use any ‘magic words’ in considering the two factors.” Alvarez v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-cv-24711-CIV-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes, 2022 WL 2092886, at *2
(S.D. Fla. June 10, 2022); see also Frye v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:21-cv-741-DCI, 2022 WL
1045719, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2022). Indeed, an ALJ is not required “to use particular language
or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505
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(3d Cir. 2004), cited with approval in Raper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261, 1275-76 (11th
Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Raper v. O’Malley, 145 S. Ct. 984 (2024). Instead, “ALJs are
required to articulate their reasoning such that the reviewing court can ‘trace the path of an
adjudicator’s reasoning.’” 	Alvarez, 2022 WL 2092886, at *3 (quoting Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5858 (Jan. 18, 2017)). 	As the
Eleventh Circuit has explained, “it is proper to read the ALJ’s decision as a whole, and . . . it would
be a needless formality to have the ALJ repeat substantially similar factual analyses” in a decision.
Raper, 89 F.4th at 1275-76 (quoting Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Here, Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ failed to properly analyze the supportability and
consistency factors for Dr. Del Rio’s opinion fail to consider the ALJ’s decision as a whole.
A. The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Del Rio’s Opinion
In her decision, the ALJ devoted approximately two single-spaced pages, see Tr. 1539,
1540, 1545, 1546-47, to addressing the approximately two-page report prepared by Dr. Del Rio,
Tr. 722-24. First, in assessing Jimenez’s impairments at step 3 of the disability analysis, the ALJ
made the following findings:
In understanding, remembering, or applying information, [Jimenez] has a moderate
limitation. 	At 	[Dr. 	Del 	Rio’s] 	consultative 	examination, 	a 	mental 	status
examination showed the claimant’s registration and delayed recall were intact (Ex.
4F, page 3). 	Her recent memory was intact and her memory span and working
memory were fair (Id.). Her remote memory was intact.
Tr. 1539.
In interacting with others, [Jimenez] has a moderate limitation. At [Dr. Del Rio’s]
consultative examination, the examiner noted that rapport was easily established
with the claimant, and she was cooperative (Ex. 4F, page 2).
Tr. 1540.
With regard to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, [Jiminez] has a
moderate limitation. At [Dr. Del Rio’s] consultative examination, the claimant’s
sustained attention was weak, but her planning was within normal limits and her
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organization was adequate (Ex. 4F, page 3). Her pace was rushed but her initiation
was intact. Task persistence required prompting and her concentration was weak.
Tr. 1540.
In her assessment of Jimenez’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ first provided a
thorough and detailed summary of Dr. Del Rio’s opinion, citing his report. Tr. 1545. The ALJ
then summarized her assessment of the persuasiveness of Dr. Del Rio’s opinions, finding that:
On October 11, 2020, consultative examiner, Dr. Del Rio, opined that the
claimant’s social skills are somewhat impaired, her ability to sustain relationships
is somewhat impaired, sustained attention is weak (an hour or less), pace is rushed,
task persistence requires prompting, concentration is weak, and other problems
include problems with her executive functions. (Ex. 4F/3). Dr. Del Rio’s opinions
about the claimant’s social skills, attention, and executive function is neither
persuasive, consistent with nor supported by the substantial evidence.
Tr. 1546 (emphasis added). 	The ALJ then went on to explain that Dr. Del Rio’s “opinion is
inconsistent with and unsupported by the substantial evidence of record, including clinical notes,
earnings report, work activities and other acknowledged activities.” Id. The ALJ then proceeded
to discuss some of the medical evidence and work history that were inconsistent with Dr. Del Rio’s
opinion, providing copious record citations to support her analysis. Tr. 1546-47. Among other
findings, the ALJ explained that Jimenez’s “consistent work activity document[ed] more
functionality than acknowledged and demonstrates an ability to sustain concentration to perform
such tasks, which is inconsistent with Dr. Del Rio’s opinion,” and that, “[g]iven that [Jimenez] has
consistently engaged in work activity through at least the date of the hearing, this portion of [Dr.
Del Rio’s] opinion is unpersuasive for the reasons stated herein and throughout this decision.” Tr.
1547. The ALJ further discussed that Jimenez inconsistently sought and inconsistently followed
treatment, that she engaged in substance use, and that she had engaged in various work activities
that required social interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. Id. The ALJ further
noted that Jimenez “was not receiving treatment” at the time of Dr. Del Rio’s examination, that
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Jimenez “did not disclose her substance use” to Dr. Del Rio, and that Dr. Del Rio did not have the
“benefit of [Jimenez’s] work history subsequent to the examination.” Id. Based on her analysis
of all of those factors and evidence, the ALJ found that Dr. Del Rio’s “opinion is neither consistent
with nor supported by the substantial evidence of record and is therefore not persuasive.” Id.
B. Supportability
Notwithstanding the ALJ’s extensive analysis of Dr. Del Rio’s opinion, Jimenez argues
that the ALJ allegedly failed to properly consider the supportability factor of Dr. Del Rio’s opinion
because “the ALJ [] made no citations to Del Rio’s findings in rejecting the persuasiveness of the
opinion,” “omitted any reference to Exhibit 4F [Dr. Del Rio’s report] or the findings of Dr. Del
Rio therein,” and did not “establish[] a logical bridge” between her conclusion on supportability
and Dr. Del Rio’s findings. ECF No. 16 at 6-8; see also ECF No. 24 at 2. Plaintiff further contends
that, contrary to the ALJ’s findings, Dr. Del Rio’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence.
ECF No. 16 at 6; see ECF No. 24 at 2.
Contrary to Jimenez’s arguments, the ALJ conducted a thorough analysis of Dr. Del Rio’s
opinion in which she carefully discussed Dr. Del Rio’s findings and repeatedly cited to his report.
See Tr. 1539, 1540, 1545, 1546-47. 	As set forth above, citing to Dr. Del Rio’s report, the ALJ
specifically recognized that Dr. Del Rio “opined that the claimant’s social skills are somewhat
impaired, her ability to sustain relationships is somewhat impaired, sustained attention is weak (an
hour or less), pace is rushed, task persistence requires prompting, concentration is weak, and other
problems include problems with her executive functions.” Tr. 1546 (citing Ex. 4F/3). The ALJ,
however, expressly found that Dr. Del Rio’s opinion on Jimenez’s “social skills, attention, and
executive function” was “unsupported by the substantial evidence of record.” Tr. 1546 (emphasis
added). Significantly, the ALJ had already discussed some of Dr. Del Rio’s inconsistent findings
concerning 	Jimenez’s 	limitations 	with 	respect 	to 	understanding, 	remembering, 	applying
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information, interacting with others, concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace, which she
found were contrary to Dr. Del Rio’s opinions. See, e.g., Tr. 1539 (summarizing Dr. Del Rio’s
medical findings regarding Jimenez’s memory); Tr. 1540 (noting that Dr. Del Rio found that
“rapport was easily established” with Jimenez and that Jimenez’s planning was normal, her
organization was adequate, and her initiation was intact).
In addition, the ALJ ended her analysis of Dr. Del Rio’s opinion by stating that Jimenez
“did not disclose her substance use to [Dr. Del Rio], neither did the doctor have the benefit of her
work history subsequent to that examination.” 	Tr. 1547. 	Significantly, Dr. Del Rio himself
recognized as noteworthy that he didn’t have access to all of the relevant evidence. See Tr. 722
(“Historical information contained in this report is based on the report of the claimant. It should
be noted that no relevant records were received at the time of the evaluation.”). 	The ALJ’s
discussion that Dr. Del Rio did not and was unable to consider certain relevant evidence further
demonstrates the ALJ’s consideration and explanation of the supportability of Dr. Del Rio’s
opinion. See, e.g., Erminy v. Kijakazi, No. 22-CV-61089, 2023 WL 3645401, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla.
May 25, 2023) (recognizing ALJ’s consideration that the medical consultant “did not have the
opportunity to review updated medical evidence” as part of supportability analysis); Major v.
Kijakazi, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1235 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (concluding that ALJ’s supportability
evaluation was sufficient where the ALJ explained that the medical opinion being evaluated was
based largely on Plaintiff’s statements rather than her medical records).
Here, the ALJ’s discussion and analysis of Dr. Del Rio’s findings provide a logical
explanation for her conclusion that Dr. Del Rio’s opinion was not persuasive, at least in part,
because it was not well supported. 	Indeed, the ALJ found that Dr. Del Rio’s conclusions on
impaired social skills, executive function, and concentration did not align with some of his findings
and were based on incomplete information. See, e.g., McCarver v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:20-
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CV-01053-JHE, 2022 WL 860190, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 22, 2022) (finding the ALJ sufficiently
addressed supportability where ALJ identified inconsistencies between doctor’s opinion and some
of her reported findings). 	Although it appears that Jimenez would have the Court ignore or
discount potions of the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Del Rio’s report—particularly those that are not
contiguous to the sentences in which the ALJ states her finding that Dr. Del Rio’s report is
unpersuasive—a full reading of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the ALJ adequately
considered supportability in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c) and
416.920c(c). 	See, e.g., McCarver, 2022 WL 860190, at *6 (considering portions of the ALJ’s
opinion beyond the discussion of the pertinent doctor’s opinion when reviewing the ALJ’s
evaluation of consistency and supportability); see also Raper, 89 F.4th at 1276 (“Though the ALJ
did not repeat his discussion of those records in the same paragraph, he thoroughly discussed those
records in the immediately preceding paragraphs . . . . 	Short of re-summarizing or adding an
internal citation to those paragraphs, it is hard to imagine how the ALJ could have been clearer.”).
C. Consistency
Jimenez also argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider the consistency factor when
evaluating Dr. Del Rio’s opinion. ECF No. 16 at 9-10. According to Jimenez, the ALJ cherry-
picked evidence by focusing on objective records rather than her subjective symptoms and ignored
multiple psychological hospitalizations. Id. at 9-12. Jimenez also argues that the ALJ incorrectly
assumed that Plaintiff’s prior work history equates with an ability to work full-time. Id. at 12-13.
The ALJ, however, explicitly found that Dr. Del Rio’s opinion is “inconsistent with . . . the
substantial evidence of record, including clinical notes, earnings report, work activities and other
acknowledged activities.” 	Tr. 1546 (emphasis added). 	The ALJ, moreover, supported that
conclusion with numerous citations to both medical and non-medical evidence. See Tr. 1546-47.
In fact, the ALJ discussed numerous inconsistencies between Dr. Del Rio’s opinion and other
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evidence in the record, including both medical and nonmedical evidence. 	See Tr. 1546-47; see
also, e.g., Tr. 1546 (contrasting clinical notes that documented, inter alia, that Jimenez’s “memory
and concentration were intact with fair insight and judgment” with Dr. Del Rio’s finding that
Jimenez’s “concentration is weak”); Tr. 1547 (pointing out that “[Jimenez’s] consistent work
activity”—as a retail customer service clerk, a ticket taker, a fast food worker, and a contribution
solicitor—“document more functionality than acknowledged and demonstrates an ability to sustain
concentration to perform such tasks, which is inconsistent with Dr. Del Rio’s opinion”); Tr. 1547
(noting inconsistency arising from Dr. Del Rio’s examination of Jimenez while she “was not
receiving treatment” and Jimenez’s account that she “d[id] better with medication” but did not
consistently follow her prescribed treatment regime); Tr. 1547 (pointing out inconsistency between
VE testimony that Jimenez’s work activity demonstrated an “an ability to socially engage” with
the public, co-workers, and supervisors and Dr. Del Rio’s opinion that Jimenez had somewhat
impaired social skills). 	The many inconsistencies that the ALJ identified between the record
evidence and Dr. Del Rio’s opinion amply support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Del Rio’s opinion
was unpersuasive. See, e.g., Douglas v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-00822-CLM, 2021 WL 2188198, at
*6 (N.D. Ala. May 28, 2021) (“A reasonable person could conclude, as the ALJ did, that [the
medical] opinions lacked supportability and conflicted with the other record evidence. 	So
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to find [the medical] opinions unpersuasive.”).
The ALJ also did not ignore Jimenez’s subjective complaints. Instead, as described above,
the 	ALJ 	thoroughly 	analyzed 	Jimenez’s 	entire 	medical 	record, 	including 	her 	inpatient
hospitalizations and her subjective symptoms, see Tr. 1539-41, 1542-47, but found that Jimenez’s
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Tr. 1546; see also
id. (finding that the “statements of the claimant regarding persistence, severity, and limiting effects
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of her impairments are inconsistent with the substantial evidence of record”). 	Significantly,
discounting a medical opinion because it is based on a claimant’s unreliable complaints is
permissible. 	See, e.g., Lacina v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 606 F. App’x 520, 528 (11th Cir.
2015) (concluding that an ALJ may appropriately discount a medical opinion when it is based on
a claimant’s subjective reports and the ALJ’s decision identifies good reasons for questioning the
reliability of the claimant’s subjective complaints); McCarver, 2022 WL 860190, at *6.
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ cherry-picked evidence by over-relying on objective
medical records and failing to account for her inpatient hospitalizations is simply not supported by
the record and is, in any event, misplaced, as the argument essentially invites the Court to reweigh
the evidence. This Court, however, may not reweigh the evidence or the facts. See, e.g., Pupo, 17
F.4th at 1060; see also Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
Moreover, Jimenez’s complaint that the ALJ’s decision did not discuss evidence that Jimenez
believes is favorable to her claim does not advance her cause; there is “no rigid requirement that
the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her] decision.” 	Alvarez, 2022 WL
2092886, at *3 (quoting Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782). “If the Commissioner’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it.”
Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782 (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff’s last argument that the ALJ equated Jimenez’s part-time work history with an
ability to work full-time is also meritless because the ALJ never made such a finding. Instead, the
ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s work history as a customer service clerk, ticket taker, and fast-food
worker to further demonstrate the inconsistences between the record and Dr. Del Rio’s opinion.
Tr. 1547 (“[Jimenez’s] consistent work activity document more functionality than acknowledged
and demonstrates an ability to sustain concentration to perform such tasks, which is inconsistent
with Dr. Del Rio’s opinion.”). 	The ALJ further pointed out that the VE’s testimony about
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Jimenez’s work history demonstrated her ability to interact with the public, co-workers, and
superiors, which revealed another inconsistency between the evidence and Dr. Del Rio’s opinion.
See id.
Here, a review of the ALJ’s decision establishes that the ALJ adequately considered the
consistency and supportability of Dr. Del Rio’s opinion and that the ALJ’s findings and
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, even if the ALJ’s articulations concerning consistency and supportability had
fallen short, courts should “decline[] to remand for express findings when doing so would be a
‘wasteful corrective exercise’ in light of the evidence of record and when no further findings could
be made that would alter the ALJ’s decision.” Sanchez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 507 F. App’x 855,
856 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 412-13 (5th Cir. Unit A July 24,
1981)); see also, e.g., Miller v. Barnhart, 182 F. App’x 959, 960 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen an
incorrect application of the regulations results in harmless error because the correct application
would not contradict the ALJ’s ultimate findings, the ALJ’s decision will stand.”). 	Here,
remanding this case for a more detailed articulation of the ALJ’s consistency and supportability
analysis would be a futile exercise that would not alter the ALJ’s findings and conclusions, their
underlying basis, or the fact that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial
evidence. See, e.g., Battie v. Kijakazi, 20-24444-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2022 WL 4000728, at *7 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 9, 2022) (finding ALJ’s “conclusory finding that the state agency consultants were
persuasive” was harmless error that did not warrant remand because substantial evidence in the
record supported the ALJ’s persuasiveness finding), report and recommendation adopted, 2022
WL 3975093 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2022).
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15
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS
that 	Jimenez’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment, 	ECF 	No. 	16, 	be 	DENIED; 	that 	the
Commissioner’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 22, be GRANTED; and that the
Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
Within fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of this Report and Recommendation, the
parties shall serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation with the
Honorable Cecilia M. Altonaga, United States District Judge. Failing to file timely objections will
bar a de novo determination by the District Judge of any issue addressed in the Report and
Recommendation, will constitute a waiver of a party’s “right to challenge on appeal the district
court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions,” and will only allow appellate
review of the district court order “for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir.
R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d
790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Harrigan v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d
1185, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2020).
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED in Chambers in Miami, Florida this 13th day of
December 2025.
___________________________________
EDUARDO I. SANCHEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	Hon. Cecilia M. Altonaga
Counsel of Record
Case 1:24-cv-23977-CMA Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2025 Page 15 of 15